•     II  ^  {       C-CM  T  \  TJY 


:  CITY  LmOINEER  : 


THE  LIBRARY 
OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 
OF  CALIFORNIA 
LOS  ANGELES 


THE 

PANAMA  CANAL 


COMPRISING  ITS  HISTORY  AND  CONSTRUC- 
TION, AND  ITS  RELATION  TO  THE  NAVY, 
INTERNATIONAL   LAW   AND  COMMERCE 


BY 

REUBEN  E.  BAKENHDS,  S.  B. 

Corps  op  Civil  Engineers,  United  States  Navy 
Public  Works  Officer,  Navy  Yard,  Boston,  Mass. 
Formerly  Assistant  in  Civil  Engineering,  Massachusetts  Institute  op  Technology 

HARRY  S.  KNAPP 

Captain  United  States  Navy;  Formerly  Member 
Naval  War  College  Staff 

EMORY  R.  JOHNSON,  Ph.  D.,  Sc.  D. 

Professor  of  Transportation  and  Commerce,  University  of  Pennsylvania 
Member  of  Public  Service  Commission  of  Pennsylvania 
Special  Commissioner  on  Panama  Canal  Traffic  and  Tolls,  1911-1913 


With  Maps  and  Illustrations 


FIRST  EDITION 

FIRST  THOUSAND 


NEW  YORK 
JOHN  WILEY  &  SONS,  Inc. 

London:  CHAPMAN  &  HALL,  Limited 
1915 


^  LIBRARY 

<   OF  THE  

:  CITY  ENGINEE 

PASADENA,  -  CALIF. 


Copyright,  1914 

BY 

REUBEN  E.  BAKENHUS,  HARRY  S.  KNAPP 

AND 

EMORY  R.  JOHNSON 


Stanbope  ipreas 

F.  H.GILSON  COMPANY 
BOSTON,  U.S.A. 


SUP 

PREFACE 


Although  much  has  been  published  on  the  Panama 
Canal,  it  is  this  very  wealth  of  literature  which  makes 
another  book  desirable.  The  reader  who  would  thor- 
oughly understand  the  canal,  its  history,  where  and 
how  it  was  built,  what  it  means  to  commerce  and  to 
the  navy  and  where  it  stands  in  the  council  of  nations 
would"  perhaps,  wade  through  many  pages  of  pictur- 
esque and  interesting  descriptions  more  or  less  accurate, 
find  a  part  well  described  here  and  a  part  there  and 
yet,  in  the  end,  might  not  have  a  complete  understand- 
ing of  the  mammoth  enterprise.  The  authors  of  this 
volume  have  endeavored  to  take  the  comprehensive 
view,  excluding  non-essential  details  which,  though  in- 
teresting, apply  to  many  other  enterprises  as  well  as  to 
the  canal.  They  have  included,  however,  the  impor- 
tant principles,  laws  and  facts  to  which  the  canal  owes 
its  existence.  That  such  a  treatise  may  hold  the  inter- 
est of  the  reader  the  authors  are  led  to  believe  because 
of  the  many  kind  and  genuine  commendations  from 
those  who  read  the  subject-matter  when  it  first  ap- 
peared in  print. 

It  may  be  of  added  interest  to  know  that  the  articles 
which  have  been  gathered  under  one  cover  to  form 
this  book  were  originally  published  in  the  Proceedings 
of  the  United  States  Naval  Institute,  a  voluntary  pro- 

iii 


iv 


Preface 


fessional  organization  of  naval  officers.  No  body  of 
men  in  the  country  is  more  vitally  interested  in  all 
phases  of  the  Panama  Canal  than  the  officers  of  the 
United  States  Navy.  With  this  in  mind  the  Board  of 
Control  of  the  Naval  Institute  requested  the  prepara- 
tion of  a  series  of  articles  on  the  canal  that  would 
comprehend  not  only  the  history  and  the  engineering 
features  of  the  great  work,  but  also  the  position  of  the 
canal  in  international  law,  in  commerce  and  in  its 
relation  to  the  national  defense.  Their  reception  has 
been  so  favorable  outside  the  naval  service,  as  well  as 
inside,  that  the  material  is  now  presented  in  book 
form  for  the  general  reader. 

The  articles  have  been  thoroughly  reviewed  and, 
with  additional  information  included  therein,  are  pre- 
pared for  the  press  at  a  time  when  the  canal  is  all  but 
complete  and  the  first  vessels  have  already  passed 
through.  Many  years  of  study  and  experience  in  lines 
directly  allied  to  the  subjects  discussed  and  much  hard 
work  were  preparatory  for  this  publication  and  if  the 
authors  have  in  any  way  met  a  want  or  filled  a  gap  in 
the  extensive  literature  on  the  canal  they  will  feel 
well  repaid. 


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 


Acknowledgment  is  due  the  Board  of  Control  of  the 
Naval  Institute,  Annapolis,  Md.,  for  permission  to  pub- 
lish in  book  form  the  material  which  originally  appeared 
as  articles  in  the  Proceedings  of  the  Naval  Institute, 
and  to  the  Secretary,  Lieutenant  Commander  Ralph 
Earle,  U.  S.  Navy,  for  his  unfailing  interest  in  the  work. 

The  annual  and  special  reports  of  the  Isthmian  Canal 
Commission  are  replete  with  information  and  have  been 
a  most  valuable  aid  in  preparation  of  parts  of  this 
volume. 

To  Col.  George  W.  Goethals,  U.  S.  Army,  formerly 
Chairman  of  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission  and  now 
Governor  of  the  Panama  Canal,  and  to  Civil  Engineer 
H.  H.  Rousseau,  U.  S.  Navy,  formerly  member  of  the 
Isthmian  Canal  Commission  and  now  engineer  of  ter- 
minals, as  well  as  to  many  others  connected  with  the 
work,  thankful  acknowledgment  is  made  of  many  cour- 
tesies extended  in  connection  with  inspection  of  the 
canal  operations  and  access  to  the  official  records. 

The  maps  and  the  photographs,  where  not  otherwise 
noted,  are  reproduced  from  official  sources. 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 

in  2014 


https://archive.org/details/panamacanalcomprbyre 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


PART  I 

HISTORICAL 

Page 

Introductory   3 

Early  History   4 

Modern  Canal  Projects   11 

French  Contribution  to  the  Enterprise   15 

Transfer  of  Control  to  the  United  States   21 

PART  II 

THE  ROUTE  — THE  DESIGN  AND  CONSTRUCTION 

Physical  Characteristics  of  the  Canal  Route...  29 

The  Choice  of  Type   35 

Comparative  Data  —  Sea-level  and  Lock  Canal 

(Table)   37 

General  Description  of  the  Canal   41 

Gatun  Lake   46 

The  Gatun  Dam   54 

Gatun  Spillway   59 

Excavation  of  Culebra  Cut   63 

Analysis  of  Cost  of  Excavating  Culebra  Cut 

(Table)   64 

Geology  and  the  Slides   71 

MlRAFLORES  LAKE   78 

The  Canal  Locks   80 

Lock  Operating  Machinery   85 

Constructing  the  Locks   88 

Locks  as  the  Limiting  Feature   91 

The  Sea-level  Sections  and  the  Terminals   94 

Control  of  Water  During  Construction   100 

Aids  to  Navigation   104 

vii 


Table  of  Contents 


PART  III 

SANITATION  — COSTS   OF  WORK  —  ELEMENTS    OF   SUCCESS  — 
CONCLUSION 

Page 

Sanitation   109 

Costs  of  Work   112 

Total  Expenditures  to  June  30,  1913  (Table)   116 

The  Elements  of  Success   117 

In  Conclusion   120 

PART  IV 

THE  NAVY  AND  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

The  Navy  and  the  Panama  Canal   125 

PART  V 

THE  PANAMA  CANAL  IN  INTERNATIONAL  LAW 

The  Panama  Canal  in  International  Law   157 

The  Suez  Canal  Treaty   182 

The  Hay-Pauncefote  Treaty   187 

The  Hay-Bunau  Varilla  (Panama)  Treaty   190 

PART  VI 

COMMERCIAL  IMPORTANCE  OF  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

Commercial  Importance  of  the  Panama  Canal   205 

Distances  and  Time  Saved  by  the  Panama  Canal  206 

Panama  Traffic,  American  and  Foreign   216 

Effect  of  Panama  Canal  upon  Transcontinental 

Rates  by  Railroads  and  Carriers  by  Water.  222 

Effect  of  Fuel  Costs  upon  Usefulness  of  the 

Panama  Canal   228 

Panama  Canal  Tolls  and  Revenue   232 

Exemption  of  the  Owners  of  Coastwise  Ships  . . .  236 

APPENDIX 
NEUTRALITY  PROCLAMATION 

Proclamation  of  Neutrality  of  Canal  Zone  by 

President  Wilson   241 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 


Fia.  Facing  Pa.gb 

1.  The  Canal  at  Empire  under  French  Control  in  1885 ..  .  14 

2.  Culebra  Cut  at  Culebra  in  January  1912   20 

3.  Culebra  Cut  at  Culebra  in  February  1912,  Showing 

"  Break"   20 

4.  Culebra  Cut  at  Empire  in  January  1913   26 

5.  A  Slide  in  Culebra  Cut,  February  1913,  Showing  Shovel 

at  Work   32 

6.  A  Slide  in  Culebra  Cut,  February  1913,  Near  View   32 

7.  Culebra  Cut  at  Culebra  Showing  Dredges  Making  Final 

Excavation  at  Cucaracha  Slide   36 

8.  Gatun  Lower  Lock  under  Construction  and  Sea-level 

Canal   40 

9.  Gatun  Upper  Lock  under  Construction  and  Gatun  Lake  46 

10.  Gatun  Spillway  Dam   58 

11.  Pedro  Miguel  Lock  and  Miraflores  Lake   66 

12.  Miraflores  Upper  Locks  Showing  Steam  Shovels  and 

Construction  Cranes   74 

13.  Concrete  Handling  Cranes  at  Miraflores   74 

14.  A  Gatun  Lock  in  Use  as  a  Dry  Dock   80 

15.  Towing  Locomotives  Handling  Coal  Barge  at  Gatun 

Locks   84 

16.  Operation  of  Gatun  Locks  Showing  Panama  R.R. 

Steamer  A  llianca   90 

17.  Emergency  Dam  at  Pedro  Miguel  Locks   96 

18.  Pedro  Miguel  Locks  Control  House   100 

19.  Toro  Point  Breakwater  under  Construction   116 

20.  American  and  French  Canals  at  Intersection  at  Mindi 

Excavation   116 

ix 


LIST  OF  MAPS  AND  PLANS 


For  greater  convenience  in  reference  all  maps  and  plans  are  bound 

at  end  of  book. 


Plate  No. 

I.  The  Isthmus  with  Completed  Canal. 

II.  Atlantic  End  of  Canal  with  Gatun  Locks  and  Dam  and 
Toro  Point  Breakwater. 

III.  Panama  End  of  Canal  with  Miraflores  Lake,  Locks  and 

Naos  Island  Breakwater. 

IV.  Cross  Sections  of  Canal. 

V.  Profile  of  Canal  from  Atlantic  Ocean  to  Pacific  Ocean. 
VI.  General  Plans,  Profiles  and  Sections  of  Gatun  Locks. 


xi 


THE  PANAMA  CANAL 


Part  I 
HISTORICAL 

BY 

REUBEN  E.  BAKENHUS,  S.  B. 

CIVIL  ENGINEER  U.  S.  NAVY 


THE  PANAMA  CANAL 


HISTORICAL 

INTRODUCTORY 

There  could  be  no  better  introduction  to  a  book 
on  the  Panama  Canal  than  the  enthusiastic  words  of 
Ambassador  Bryce  in  a  recent  chapter  on  the  Isthmus 
of  Panama,  where  he  says,  in  referring  to  the  canal : 

There  is  something  in  the  magnitude  and  the  methods  of  this 
enterprise  which  a  poet  might  take  as  his  theme.  Never  before 
on  our  planet  have  so  much  labour,  so  much  scientific  knowledge, 
and  so  much  executive  skill  been  concentrated  on  a  work  de- 
signed to  bring  the  nations  nearer  to  one  another  and  serve  the 
interests  of  all  mankind. 

In  no  previous  age  could  an  enterprise  so  vast  as  this  have 
been  carried  through;  that  is  to  say,  it  would  have  required  a 
time  so  long  and  an  expenditure  so  prodigious  that  no  rational 
government  would  have  attempted  it. 

It  is  true  we  have  elsewhere  done  work  of  comparable 
magnitude  —  the  tunnels  under  the  Hudson  and  East 
Rivers,  the  great  railroads  and  terminals,  the  Erie 
Canal,  the  city  subways  and  water-supply  systems, 
the  reclamation  projects  and  great  bridges  —  but  these 
are  all  intimately  interwoven  with  our  daily  life  and 
progress.  The  canal  is  a  project  crystallized  from  the 
vast  multitude  of  enterprises  and  is  indisputably  the 
greatest  of  them  all. 

With  a  subject  so  vast,  one  that  has  attained  his- 
toric interest,  and  ranks  as  an  engineering  work  of 

3 


4 


THe  Panama  Canal 


such  magnitude,  it  seems  necessary  to  give  a  resume 
of  the  early  history,  and  to  consider  it  in  relation  to 
events  that  may  be  well  known  in  other  connections. 

EARLY  HISTORY 

One  of  the  most  interesting  subjects  connected  with 
the  Panama  Canal  is  the  history  of  the  canal  idea. 
.  To  study  its  conception  carries  us  back  to  the  Middle 
Ages  —  to  the  conditions  so  well  described  by  Fiske 
in  his  "  Discovery  of  America,"  when  Genoa  and 
Venice  were  the  great  commercial  rivals  and  Spain 
was  a  rising  power.  Following  Marco  Polo's  marvel- 
ous travels  from  1269  to  1295,  throughout  kf4%  and 
that  of  his  adventurous  successors,  a  great  trade  de- 
veloped with  the  Orient,  which  proceeded  unchecked 
via  the  Mediterranean  and  the  ancient  overland  routes 
until  the  hostile  Mohammedan  Turk,  recovering  from 
two  centuries  of  repression  from  the  Crusades,  over- 
flowed his  own  dominions  and  entered  the  Balkan 
peninsula.  In  1453  Constantinople  was  taken  by  the 
Turks,  and  the  alliance  between  that  city  and  Genoa 
was  broken.  This  great  commercial  metropolis,  through 
the  persistent  attacks  of  the  Turks,  was  gradually  de- 
prived of  her  route  to  the  Orient  and  thus  of  her  com- 
merce. The  commerce  of  Genoa's  great  and  only  rival, 
Venice,  had  a  similar  fate. 

Tremendous  pressure  developed  for  the  finding  of 
some  new  route  to  Cathay,  as  the  other  conditions  for 
trade  were  most  favorable.  The  world's  ideas  of  geog- 
raphy at  that  time  were  of  the  crudest  fashion.  America 
was  unknown.   Africa  had  not  been  circumnavigated; 


Historical 


5 


its  southern  limits  were  enveloped  in  a  haze  of  con- 
jecture and  ignorance.  It  was  known  that  Asia  did 
not  extend  indefinitely  to  the  East  and  was  not  bounded 
by  limitless  swamps,  as  had  been  supposed.  With  the 
increasing  hazards  of  the  route  to  Cathay  and  the 
lands  of  spices,  and  the  rising  expectations  of  wealth 
and  riches  fed  by  the  avaricious  and  adventurous  spirit 
of  the  Middle  Ages,  the  minds  of  men  were  forced  to 
think  of  the  possibility  of  other  routes. 

In  the  discovery  by  Dias,  in  1486,  and  the  confirma- 
\  tion  by  Vasco  de  Gama,  in  1496,  of  the  route  to  India 
by  circumnavigating  Africa,  we  are  not  now  interested 
except  to  know  that  the  presence  on  the  first  of  these 
voyages  of  the  brother  of  Christopher  Columbus  acted 
as  a  stimulus  to  the  mind  of  the  great  explorer.  He, 
as  we  know,  put  the  unique  idea  of  reaching  Cathay 
by  sailing  westward  to  the  test  of  four  actual  sea  voy- 
ages. The  results  are  familiar,  but  we  must  bear  in 
mind  that  the  discovery  of  the  American  continent 
was  a  mere  incident  and  that  what  Columbus  was 
really  seeking  was  a  passage  to  the  Orient,  and  for  this 
he  continued  his  search  on  his  three  subsequent  voy- 
ages. His  ships  ran  their  prows  into  the  bays  and  inlets 
in  the  hope  that  they  might  find  a  strait  and  forge  on 
to  the  desired  lands.  The  full  truth  was  never  known 
to  Columbus;  he  little  realized,  when  his  ships  were  at 
Porto  Bello,  that  only  forty  miles  overland  were  the 
waters  —  could  he  only  reach  them  —  which  would 
carry  him  to  his  much-sought-for  goal,  and  thence  to 
Spain.  Succeeding  explorers  continued  these  efforts, 
and  every  indentation  of  the  eastern  coast  line  of  the 


6 


TKe  Panama  Canal 


Americas  was  explored  by  Spanish,  Portuguese,  Eng- 
lish and  Dutch  ships,  only  to  dim  the  hopes  that  the 
passage  could  ever  be  found. 

It  remained  for  Balboa,  led  on  by  tales  of  friendly 
Indians,  to  gain  the  knowledge  of  what  lay  beyond, 
after  an  overland  journey  not  far  distant  from  the  site 
of  the  present  canal.  The  discovery  of  the  Pacific  in 
1513  only  intensified  the  mariners'  desires  to  penetrate 
with  their  ships. 

The  discovery  in  1520,  by  Magellan,  of  the  straits 
named  after  him,  his  entry  into  the  Pacific,  and  the 
completion  of  the  circumnavigation  of  the  globe  in 
1522  by  a  part  of  his  expedition  did  not  solve  the 
problem  and  only  emphasized  the  desirability  of  a 
conveniently  located  passage. 

The  actual  results  of  the  epoch-making  discoveries 
overshadowed  the  original  aims  of  the  explorers.  From 
being  a  primary  aim,  the  search  for  the  interoceanic 
passage,  with  the  gradual  ushering  into  the  known 
world  of  the  two  continents,  became  secondary.  The 
exploration  and  development  of  the  newly  found  lands 
afforded  a  boundless  outlet  for  the  restless  spirit  of  the 
times.  The  canal  idea,  having  had  its  genesis  in  such 
great  world  events,  was  now  to  enter  the  next  stage 
of  its  development. 

It  is  remarkable  that  the  desire  for  the  passage  has 
persisted  throughout  all  these  centuries.  The  increase 
in  geographic  knowledge,  the  correct  understanding  of 
the  relation  of  the  Americas  to  Europe  and  Asia,  polit- 
ical history,  the  invention  and  building  of  railroads, 
and  finally  the  phenomenal  development  of  the  Amer- 


Historical 


7 


ican  continent  itself,  have  all  brought  out  new  phases 
of  the  problem  and  altered  the  point  of  view;  but  in 
all  its  phases  it  has  remained  one  of  the  great  ambitions 
of  the  human  race. 

The  Americans  did  not  have  the  honor  of  sending 
the  first  ship  ^crjoss^he,Is^thmus.  Balboa  and  his  suc- 
cessor, J3il  Gonzales  de  Avila,  both  carried  ships 
across  —  Balboa  after  building  them  near  the  source  of 
lumber  supply  on  the  Atlantic  side  and  then  dismant- 
ling and  re-erecting  them  on  the  Pacific  side,  and  de 
Avila  after  dismantling  the  ships  that  had  carried  him 
across  the  ocean.  Their  enterprise  and-  energy  are 
greatly  to  be  admired.  Untold  difficulties  beset  the 
journeys  through  the  jungle,  and  in  Balboa's  first 
crossing,  one  authority  states  the  number  of  deaths 
amongst  the  Indian  cargadores  to  have  been  five  hun- 
dred, and  another  places  the  number  at  two  thousand. 
The  object  in  crossing  the  Isthmus  was  exploration  on 
the  Pacific  side,  especially  investigations  of  the  reputed 
gold  in  Peru.  Subsequently  there  was  much  traffic 
with  the  Pacific  coast,  which  was  carried  across  the 
Isthmus  and  reshipped. 

Charles  V  of  Spain,  who  succeeded  to  the  throne  in 
1516,  encouraged  the  explorations  of  the  South  Sea,  as 
the  Pacific  was  then  known,  and  urged  his  American 
governors,  if  possible,  to  discover  a  strait  by  systematic 
exploration.  The  expedition  of  Gil  Gonzales  de  Avila 
along  the  Pacific  shores  had  this  object.  He  discovered 
Lake  Nicaragua,  which  has  played  such  an  important 
part  in  the  interoceanic  canal  question.  No  strait 
being  found  after  years  of  search,  Charles  in  1534,  by 


8 


THe  Pa  nama  Canal 


a  royal  decree  directed  examination  to  be  made  of  the 
land  between  the  Atlantic  town  of  Chagres  and  the 
Pacific  with  a  view  to  the  establishment  of  water  con- 
nection. It  is  reported  that  even  as  early  as  1520  sur- 
veys were  ordered  by  the  Emperor.  The  result  of  the 
royal  decree  was  that  the  local  governor  declared  the 
work  to  be  impracticable  and  beyond  the  resources  of 
any  sovereign. 

H*In  the  meantime  a  considerable  commerce  developed 
across  the  Isthmus.  The  city  of  Panama  was  founded 
on  the  Pacific  side  in  1517,  and  Nombre  de  Dios, 
founded  in  1519,  was  the  most  important  post  on  the 
Atlantic  side.  Between  the  two  a  road  was  built  and 
a  series  of  posts  established.  Later  Porto  Bello,  due  to 
a  better  harbor  and  superior  location,  was  made  the 


tlantic  terminus  and  a  new  road  to  Panama  was  built 


ox  such  a  character  that  portions  of  it  may  be  used  to 
this  day.  Subsequent  to  1534  a  partial  water  route 
was  established  for  boats  and  light-draft  vessels  up 
the  Chagres  as  far  as  Cruces  by  removal  of  obstruc- 
tions from  the  river.  This  is  the  identical  stream  and 
valley  which  nearly  four  hundred  years  later  is  being 
utilized  as  the  Atlantic  end  of  the  Isthmian  Canal. 
The  establishment  of  the  partial  water  route  did  not 
lead  to  the  discontinuance  of  the  paved  way.  With 
the  conquest  of  Peru  by  Pizarro  in  1533-1535,  the 
trans-isthmian  trade  grew  in  amount  and  value  and 
the  Spanish  colonies  continued  to  prosper.  Panama 
became  a  great  collecting  and  distributing  center  for 
Spanish  commerce. 

So  lucrative  and  so  extensive  did  the  trade  become 


Historical 


9 


that  under  Philip  II,  who  succeeded  to  the  throne  o 
the  abdication  of  Charles  V  in  1555,  the  search  for  a 
strait  was  given  up  and  all  idea  of  a  canal  abandoned. 
With  untold  treasures  coming  to  Spain  by  the  existing 
means  of  transport,  the  Emperor  did  not  desire  to  seek 
new  means  of  intercourse  which  might  benefit  a  rival 
nation  as  much  as,  or  more  than  Spain,  and  furthermore 
all  the  energies  of  the  people  were  fully  occupied  in 
developing  the  existing  sources  of  treasure  and  none 
seemed  available  for  new  enterprises.  The  same 
policy  continued  for  about  two  centuries. 

In  the  meantime  trade  developed  and  the  terminal 
towns  grew.  Panama  in  its  day  was  the  great  metropolis 
of  the  New  World,  having  pretentious  stone  churches, 
monasteries  and  numerous  dwellings  of  wood.  Its  mar- 
kets and  those  of  Porto  Bello  were  the  meeting-places 
for  the  merchants  of  Peru,  the  Isthmus  and  of  Spain. 
Great  quantities  of  silver  and  gold  passed  eastward 
and  supplies  from  Spain  came  in  the  opposite  direction. 
The  transportation  across  the  Isthmus  was  by  mule 
train.  All  others  than  Spanish  were  excluded  from  the 
traffic.^  The  richness  of  the  trade  and  the  overbearing 
stand  of  the  Spaniards  encouraged  piratical  attacks  by 
the  seamen  of  the  northern  nations  on  the  shipping  of 
the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  coasts,  and  even  on  the  over- 
land mule  trains.  Between  the  years  1570  and  1596 
Sir  Francis  Drake  made  numerous  privateering  attacks, 
which  were  very  much  of  the  nature  of  piracy.  The 
Spaniards  were  sending  their  merchant  ships  in  fleets 
twice  a  year,  convoyed  by  six  and  eight  armed  vessels. 
Drake  was  followed  in  his  enterprise  by  the  buccaneers 


10 


THe  Panama  Canal 


who  reached  the  limit  of  their  power  under  Henry 
Morgan.  Morgan  with  great  energy  and  daring  cap- 
tured Nombre  de  Dios  and  immediately  after  con- 
ducted operations  against  Porto  Bello.  He  turned 
what  was  nearly  a  failure  into  a  cruel  success,  and  a 
year  later,  in  1671,  according  to  his  threatened  promise 
to  the  governor  of  Panama,  he  returned  to  ransack  the 
city  of  Panama.  After  a  wretched  trip  across  the 
Isthmus,  almost  without  food,  the  city  was  attacked 
and  fell  into  the  hands  of  Morgan.  As  a  result  of  his 
raid  the  city  was  destroyed,  and  to  this  day  the  ruins 
of  old  Panama,  the  massive  stone  walls,  the  towers  of 
churches,  monasteries  and  forts  still  remain  as  mute 
and  impressive  evidences  of  the  constructive  energy  of 
the  Spaniards  and  of  the  wicked,  destructive  energy  of 
the  English  buccaneers.  After  a  systematic  plunder 
of  all  the  valuables  of  the  city,  Morgan  left.  The 
town  was  never  rebuilt  on  the  old  location. 

The  trade  of  Panama  suffered  a  period  of  decline 
after  the  Indian  empires  had  been  stripped  of  their 
valuables.  A  royal  cedula  in  1593  forbade  trade  with 
China  and  the  East  Indies;  the  development  of  local 
industries  was  forbidden  through  rival  influences  at 
home;  corrupt  governors  did  the  colonies  no  good, 
and  there  were  various  governmental  restrictions  on 
trade  and  growth.  Even  the  roadway  across  the 
Isthmus  entered  a  period  of  disuse,  and  the  traffic 
between  Spain  and  the  western  ports  went  via  the 
Cape  of  Good  Hope  or  Cape  Horn,  except  a  certain 
amount  crossing  at  Tehuantepec. 
x:^In  the  latter  part  of  the  eighteenth  century  certain 


Historical 


11 


desultory  efforts  were  made  toward  a  canal,  including 
an  examination  of  the  Nicaragua  route  from  1779  to 
1781,  followed  by  a  discouraging  report.  Notwith- 
standing this,  a  company  was  formed  to  undertake  the 
project  and  a  route  utilizing  Lake  Nicaragua  was  se- 
lected. By  1823,  when  all  the  continental  colonies  had 
secured  their  independence  by  revolt,  all  Spanish  effort 
and  influence  ceased. 

MODERN  CANAL  PROJECTS 

With  the  demise  of  Spanish  authority  on  the  conti- 
nent there  was  an  early  active  revival  of  canal  project^ 
In  fact,  as  early  as  1825  the  minister  of  the  then  Cen- 
tral American  Republic  to  the  United  States  addressed 
the  Secretary  of  State,  inviting  attention  to  the  willing- 
ness of  the  Republic  to  receive  the  cooperation  of  the 
United  States  in  the  building  of  a  canal  by  a  group  of 
American  merchants.  The  United  States  gave  a  favor- 
able reply,  but  nothing  resulted  at  that  time.  In  1826, 
however,  the  Republic  of  Central  America  actually  ac- 
cepted the  proposals  of  an  association  for  the  building  of 
the  canal  under  liberal  terms.  The  attempt  to  organize  a 
company  with  a  capital  of  $5,000,000  proved  unsuccess- 
ful. In  1830  the  Central  American  Republic  negotiated 
with  a  Netherlands  company,  and  the  United  States, 
hearing  of  this,  informed  the  Republic  that  it  would 
expect  the  same  rights  and  privileges  of  passage  through 
the  canal  as  other  nations.  In  1835,  at  the  initiative 
of  the  United  States,  some  investigations  were  begun, 
but  were  dropped  in  1837  upon  the  advice  that  the 
time  was  not  propitious.    Another  project  started  in 


12 


TTHe  Panama  Canal 


1838,  and  a  still  further  investigation  and  an  estimate 
of  $25,000,000  were  made  in  President  Van  Buren's 
administration,  but  the  Isthmian  country  was  too  un- 
settled and  revolutionary  for  any  definite  progress  to 
be  made.  There  are  records  of  still  other  efforts  in 
1826,  1827  and  1838.  (in  the  latter  year  a  concession 
was  granted  to  a  French  company  to  build  roads  or 
canals.  |  Asa  result  a  canal  was  recommended  by  Na- 
poleon Garella  with  a  starting-point  in  Limon  Bay, 
thence  to  a  connection  with  the  Chagres  River  below 
Gatun.j  The  divide  was  to  be  crossed  by  means  6f  a 
series  of  eighteen  locks  on  the  Atlantic  side  and  sixteen 
on  the  Pacific  side,  with  a  summit  level  158  feet  above 
the  sea,  and  the  highest  part  of  the  divide  penetrated 
by  a  tunnel  over  three  miles  long.  The  report  of  actual 
conditions  by  Garella  discouraged  the  promoters.  ^ 

During  all  this  period  the  United  States  was  peopled 
only  on  the  Atlantic  seaboard  and  was  interested  in 
commerce  which  started  or  terminated  in  Atlantic 
ports  only.  (  In  the  middle  of  the  century  events  oc- 
curred which  were  destined  to  greatly  increase  the  im- 
portance of  the  Isthmus,  and  to  have  a  strong  influence 
in  pushing  the  canal  idea  to  the  point  where  its  actual 
execution  was  bound  to  follow.]  It  was  the  acquisition 
of  California,  the  discovery  of  gold  therein,  the  ex- 
ploration and  settlement  of  the  Northwest  Territory 
and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  the  purchase  of  Alaska,  which 
led  the  United  States  on  to  its  destiny  as  a  Pacific  as 
well  as  an  Atlantic  power  and  thus  established  the 
conditions  that  ultimately  made  the  canal  a  certainty. 
The  trans-isthmian  route  for  freight  and  passengers 


Historical 


13 


regained  its  old-time  importance,  and  curiously  enough 
it  was  again  the  search  for  gold  that  gave  the  impetus. 
A  railroad  across  the  Isthmus  was  established,  promoted 
by  Americans.  The  success  of  this  road  was  continuous 
on  account  of  the  increasing  amount  of  traffic.  Even 
the  establishment  of  the  transcontinental  railroads  did 
not  vitiate  the  importance  of  the  trans-isthmian  road, 
nor  did  any  of  the  railroads  have  a  real  deterrent 
influence  on  the  canal  scheme. 

Almost  innumerable  projects,  examinations  and  re- 
ports were  made  during  the  latter  half  of  the  nine- 
teenth century,  in  which  the  United  States,  France  and 
Great  Britain  led.  Prior  to  1850  no  extensive  and 
accurate  surveys  had  been  made.  After  that  date 
work  was  done  in  earnest;  no  longer  were  the  results 
of  reconnoissances  afoot  or  on  horseback  sufficient;  the 
methods  of  modern  engineering  were  taking  their  first 
grip  upon  large  enterprises,  and  no  company  or  gov- 
ernment could  entertain  a  proposition  not  based  on 
surveys  by  engineers  and  on  detailed  estimates  of  cost. 
Several  companies  were  incorporated,  including  the 
American,  Atlantic  and  Pacific  Ship  Canal  Company 
in  1850.  All  failed  from  one  reason  or  another  to  do 
much  more  than  organize  or  conduct  surveys.  Always 
some  insuperable  obstacle  was  met.  It  is  no  doubt 
true  that  very  few  fully  realized  the  enormous  difficul- 
ties that  subsequent  experience  disclosed,  and  fortu- 
nately so,  since  the  enthusiasm  for  the  idea  might  have 
received  a  setback  from  which  it  could  not  easily  have 
recovered.  A  predicted  cost  of  $400,000,000  would 
have  made  the  enterprise  seem  impossible. 


14 


THe  Panama  Canal 


In  1869,  official  recognition  was  given  to  the  subject, 
and  President  Grant's  first  message  to  Congress  called 
attention  to  the  advisability  of  an  American  canal  on 
American  soil.  The  appointment  of  a  commission,  known 
as  the  Inter-Oceanic  Canal  Commission,  was  authorized 
by  Congress;  this  commission  not  only  examined  all 
available  data  previously  gathered  by  others,  but  had 
new  data  collected  and  had  access  to  new  surveys  made 
principally  under  the  direction  of  officers  of  the  army 
and  navy,  covering  the  Panama,  Nicaragua  and  Darien 
routes.  In  1876,  after  six  years  work,  the  commission 
reported  that  "  After  a  long,  careful,  and  minute  study 
of  the  several  surveys  of  the  various  routes,  the  one 
known  as  the  Nicaragua  route  .  .  .  possesses,  both 
for  the  construction  and  maintenance  of  a  canal, 
greater  advantages  and  offers  fewer  difficulties  from 
engineering,  commercial,  and  economic  points  of  view 
than  any  of  the  other  routes." 

A  further  survey  of  the  Nicaragua  route  was  made 
in  1885  by  order  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy.  This 
was  followed  in  two  years  by  the  organization  of  the 
Maritime  Canal  Company  of  Nicaragua,  incorporated 
by  Congress  and  having  a  concession  from  the  Nica- 
raguan  government.  The  company  actually  dug  a  por- 
tion of  the  canal  on  the  Atlantic  side,  but  failing  to 
secure  government  aid  the  concession  lapsed  and  the 
property  reverted  to  the  State. 

I  In  1895,  the  Nicaragua  Canal  Board  was  appointed  by 
the  President  by  authority  of  Congress.^  The  board 
visited  Nicaragua,  conducting  investigations,  but  in 
the  six  months  allowed  them  did  not  have  sufficient 


Photo  by  Underwood  and  Underwood,  New  York. 


Fig.  1.  —  The  canal,  Culebra  Cut,  looking  north  from  Empire  in  1885,  under 
French  control. 


Historical 


15 


time  for  further  necessary  explorations,  for  collecting 
the  vast  amount  of  information  and  reaching  a  definite 
conclusion  on  so  momentous  a  matter,  and  accordingly 
recommended  a  further  board.  lAs  a  result  the  Nica- 
ragua Canal  Commission  of  1897  was  appointed,  and  in 
its  report  of  May,  1899,  proposed  a  route  which  fol- 
lowed closely  the  one  suggested  in  1852.X  The  United 
States  was  apparently  committed  to  the  Nicaragua 
route.  (The  Panama  route  had  been  pre-empted  by 
the  French,  but  their  hold  was  loosening.\  Congress 
in  its  next  step  authorized  a  further  commission  with 
greatly  extended  authority,  to  consider  the  Panama  as 
well  as  the  Nicaragua  route  and  to  evaluate  work  done 
by  any  private  company,  having  in  mind  the  French. 
The  first  Isthmian  Canal  Commission  was  accordingly 
appointed  in  1899  —  a  distinct  broadening  in  scope  and 
title  from  those  of  the  previous  boards  and  commissions. 

FRENCH  CONTRIBUTION  TO  THE  ENTERPRISE 

At  this  point  it  is  well  to  pause  in  the  account  of 
American  doings,  to  consider  briefly  what  the  French 
had  contributed  since  the  middle  of  the  century  to  the 
canal  idea  and  to  construction.  In  1844  a  French 
engineer,  after  surveys  having  both  a  railway  and  a 
canal  in  view,  made  an  accurate  report  concerning 
Panama,  all  in  the  interests  of  a  French  company 
holding  concessions.  Like  so  many  others  the  project 
failed  and  the  concessions  lapsed. 

At  the  Congress  of  Geographical  Science  in  1875,  in 
Paris,  M.  Ferdinand  de  Lesseps  came  upon  the  scene 
with  the  sweeping  announcement  that  in  his  opinion 


16 


XKe  Panama  Canal 


the  authors  of  all  plans  up  to  that  time  had  committed 
the  serious  error  of  examining  only  canal  routes  with 
locks,  and  that  the  interoceanic  canal  in  order  to  meet 
the  requirements  of  navigation,  must  be  constructed  at 
sea  level  like  the  Suez.  Thus  early  did  he  show  that 
the  elements  of  his  character  —  force,  unbridled  en- 
thusiasm, convictions  without  investigation,  and  a 
sublime  faith  in  himself  —  which  had  carried  him  on 
to  a  magnificent  success  in  the  straightforward  problem 
at  Suez,  were,  in  the  infinitely  more  difficult  problems 
at  Panama,  to  make  of  him  a  consummate  blunderer 
and  a  deceiver,  brushing  aside  and  ignoring  the  advice 
and  estimates  of  competent  and  trained  engineers 
when  they  did  not  follow  his  own  preconceived  ideas, 
and  leading  many  unfortunate  investors,  including 
himself,  to  financial  ruin.  Under  such  a  leader  the 
French  project  was  foredoomed  to  failure.  De  Lesseps, 
so  far  as  the  French  were  concerned,  made  the  project 
his  own;  he  dominated  the  committees,  moulded  a 
popular  sentiment,  all  being  eager  to  follow  his  lead; 
if  doubts  arose,  his  was  the  reassuring  word,  and  at  his 
solicitation  the  subscriptions  to  the  stock  of  the  com- 
pany poured  in.  His  success  at  Suez  was  his  most 
valuable  asset  and  had  indeed  placed  him  on  a  pinnacle. 
He  was  a  man  of  undoubted  ability,  but  lacked  an 
element  of  discrimination  which  should  have  caused 
him  to  appreciate  the  true  magnitude  of  the  problems 
before  him.  De  Lesseps  having  attempted  great  proj- 
ects must  be  measured  by  great  standards.  He  did 
not  lack  strong  opposition  nor  able  expert  advice,  but 
he  beat  them  down  with  the  same  indiscriminating 


Historical 


17 


ability  as  he  did  natural  obstacles  and  the  financial 
troubles  that  interfered  with  his  idealized  delusion  of 
a  sea-level  canal. 

In  1876,  a  French  committee  with  de  Lesseps  at  the 
head  was  formed;  also,  in  1876,  a  civil  association 
undertook  actual  surveys,  which  were  under  the  direc- 
tion of  Lieut.  L.  N.  B.  Wyse.  In  May,  1878,  after 
completing  the  surveys,  Lieutenant  Wyse  secured  for 
his  association  a  concession  from  the  government  of 
Colombia  for  a  ship  canal.  This  was  the  real  beginning 
of  the  canal  which,  after  many  vicissitudes,  is  now  the 
American  canal.  An  international  congress  of  surveys 
was  held  in  Paris  in  1879,  and  after  elaborate  discus- 
sion decided  on  the  route  from  the  Bay  of  Limon  to 
the  Bay  of  Panama,  and  that  it  should  be  at  sea  level. 
The  decision  for  the  sea-level  canal  was  by  no  means 
unanimous.  "When  one  reads  the  reports  of  the  ses- 
sions of  that  commission,  one  constantly  recognizes  the 
inspiration  of  M.  de  Lesseps,  one  perceives  the  action 
of  his  will,  so  persistent  in  forming  a  general  opinion  in 
favor  of  a  plan  for  a  canal  on  a  level."  There  were 
those  who  foresaw  the  difficulties  and  who  advocated 
a  lock  canal.  In  fact,  de  Lesseps  had  against  him  the 
majority  of  the  engineers  and  contractors.  The  pre- 
dicted cost  was  1,200,000,000  francs,  and  the  time 
twelve  years.  About  three  months  later  the  Universal 
Interoceanic  Canal  Company  was  formed,  but  less  than 
one-tenth  the  stock  was  subscribed  on  the  first  attempt. 
De  Lesseps  did  not  have  a  bed  of  roses;  he  consented 
to  new  surveys  and  new  estimates,  and  he  personally 
went  to  the  Isthmus  in  December,  1879,  accompanied 


18 


THe  Panama  Canal 


by  the  International  Survey  Commission.  The  surveys 
were  accomplished  and  the  conclusions  reached  in  a 
time  so  incredibly  short  as  to  cast  doubt  upon  their 
reliability.  The  estimate  of  cost  was  834,000,000  francs, 
and  of  time  eight  years,  both  remarkably  lower  than 
those  of  the  year  before  by  the  technical  commission. 
The  estimate  of  cost  was  still  further  reduced  to  685,- 
000,000  francs  by  de  Lesseps  himself,  leaving  it  less 
than  sixty  per  cent  of  the  original  estimate,  which  was 
considered  low  by  competent  persons.  Later  a  firm  of 
contractors,  Couvreux  &  Hersent,  favorable  to  the 
views  of  de  Lesseps,  estimated  the  cost  of  the  canal  to 
be  500,000,000  francs  not  including  general  adminis- 
tration and  financing,  and  they  undertook  a  contract 
on  a  cost-plus-profit  basis.  The  annual  revenue  of  the 
completed  canal  was  estimated  at  90,000,000  francs. 
The  stock  issue  of  300,000,000  francs  was  doubly  sub- 
scribed. The  contractors  performed  the  two  years  of 
preparatory  work  at  cost  plus  six  per  cent.  By  the 
end  of  that  time,  December,  1882,  it  was  clear  that  the 
predicted  unit  costs  and  rates  of  progress  could  not  be 
reached,  and  the  contract  was  annulled  on  the  con- 
tractors' proposal. 

The  Superior  Advisory  Commission,  composed  of 
men  eminent  as  engineers  and  technicians,  was  formed 
in  1881.  This  commission  was  dominated  by  de  Les- 
seps through  his  personal  force,  and  their  acts  did  not 
result  in  clearing  the  situation. 

To  carry  on  the  work  abandoned  by  the  closing  of 
the  contract,  the  canal  company  in  1883  secured  the 
services  of  M.  Dingier,  an  able  engineer,  to  supervise 


Historical 


19 


and  direct  the  operations  on  the  Isthmus.  The  devel- 
opments of  the  next  few  years  were :  a  voluminous  report 
by  the  chief  engineer  on  the  sea-level  canal  project; 
discovery  that  the  quantity  to  be  excavated  was  120,- 
000,000  cubic  meters,  rather  than  the  75,000,000  esti- 
mated by  the  International  Commission,  or  the  45,000- 
000  estimated  by  the  International  Congress;  the 
award  of  a  series  of  small  contracts  and  establishment 
of  work  yards;  the  realization  in  July,  1885,  that  less 
than  one-tenth  of  the  excavation  had  been  completed 
although  four  of  the  eight  years  allowed  for  construc- 
tion had  elapsed;  the  return  to  the  former  estimate  of 
1,200,000,000  francs;  a  reorganization  involving  the 
award  of  large  contracts  for  completing  the  canal  in 
five  sections  by  1889;  the  announcement  by  de  Les- 
seps,  m|1886,  after  a  visit  to  Panama,  of  his  utmost 
confidence  in  the  speedy  completion  of  the  canal;  fur- 
ther successful  bond  issues;  renewed  attacks  on  the 
feasibility  of  the  sea-level  canal,  based  on  reports  by 
expert  engineers  of  incontrovertible  facts,  but  inef- 
fective on  de  Lesseps;  the  weakening  of  public  and 
financial  support,  and  the  final  capitulation  of  de  Les- 
seps to  the  lock-canal  idea,  but  only  as  a  temporary 
expedient  to  hasten  completion  and  to  be  followed  by 
a  deepening  to  sea  level.  These  events  were  followed 
by  the  ineffectual  attempt  to  issue  a  series  of  lottery 
bonds  on  authority  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  which 
foreshadowed  the  financial  debacle  of  the  enterprise. 
Receivers  were  soon  appointed  and  the  affairs  of  the 
company  were  wound  up.  De  Lesseps  and  his  son  were 
tried,  convicted  and  sentenced  by  the  courts  of  France 


20 


TKe  Panama  Canal 


to  pay  a  fine  and  serve  a  term  of  five  years  imprison- 
ment. The  sentence  against  the  son  was  reversed,  and 
that  against  the  father  was  never  executed.  He  be- 
came a  complete  wreck,  both  physical  and  mental,  and 
died  in  1893.  The  company  had  actually  expended 
about  1,300,000,000  francs  and  had  accomplished  about 
55,000,000  cubic  yards  of  excavation  on  the  permanent 
work,  or  less  than  one-half  the  total  on  the  French 
plan. 

After  careful  investigation  and  a  great  deal  of  diffi- 
cult work,  the  receiver,  in  1894,  launched  a  new  com- 
pany to  complete  the  lock  canal.  An  extension  of  time 
had  been  secured  from  the  Colombian  government 
through  the  agency  of  Lieutenant  Wyse.  The  first 
step  of  the  new  company  was  to  reinvestigate  the  whole 
subject  of  the  canal,  which  was  done  through  the  ap- 
pointment of  the  "  Comite  Technique "  of  engineers 
of  international  eminence,  including  two  Americans. 
Their  work  was  most  thorough,  comprehensive  and 
to  the  point.  Later,  in  accordance  with  the  charter  of 
the  company,  a  commission  of  five  members  was 
appointed  to  make  final  recommendations,  who  re- 
ported: 

.  .  .  that  the  adopted  project  is  practicable  under  the  condi- 
tions of  time  and  expense  indicated,  and  that  the  New  Company 
has  demonstrated  that  by  works  which  will  not  exceed  an  outlay 
of  about  one  hundred  million  dollars,  and  a  duration  of  about  ten 
years,  it  is  possible  to  open  the  Panama  Canal  to  extensive  com- 
merce, to  remove  the  obstacle  which  the  Isthmus  opposes  to  inter- 
national communication,  and  thus  to  complete  an  immense  work 
that  interests  all  the  nations  of  the  world  and  is  the  greatest 
which  human  genius  has  ever  planned. 


Fig.  2. —  Culebra  Cut,  Culebra,  showing  steam  shovels  working  at  elevation 

+73.    Looking  east,  January  27,  1912. 


Fig.  3.  —  Culebra  Cut,  Culebra,  showing  break  in  east  bank  of  canal.  Amount 
of  material  involved,  320,000  cu.  yds.    February  11,  1912. 


Historical 


21 


There  was  to  be  a  summit  level  and  an  artificial  lake 
at  Bohio  with  the  necessary  locks,  738  feet  long  and 
82  feet  wide,  and  sea-level  connections.  There  is  every 
reason  to  believe  that  the  enterprise  was  feasible  and 
would  have  been  carried  through.  The  company,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  did  only  enough  work  to  care  for  the 
extensive  plant  and  excavated  about  5,000,000  cubic 
yards  in  five  years,  but  the  valuable  and  necessary 
progress  made  was  in  the  way  of  gathering  scientific 
and  engineering  information  that  was  absolutely  essen- 
tial and  which  the  old  company  did  not  have,  and  which 
later  proved  of  the  greatest  benefit  to  the  United  States. 
The  financing  of  the  enterprise  became  impracticable, 
due  to  the  United  States  coming  into  the  field  as  a 
probable  canal  builder.  The  French  were  truly  leading 
a  forlorn  hope  and  finally  their  only  chance  lay  in  selling 
out  to  the  United  States. 

TRANSFER  OF  CONTROL  TO  THE  UNITED  STATES 

The  Isthmian  Canal  Commission  of  the  United 
States,  in  the  two  and  one-half  years  from  June,  1899, 
to  November,  1901,  made  most  elaborate  investiga- 
tions of  the  whole  canal  problem,  covering  the  first 
Darien  route  from  the  Gulf  of  San  Bias  to  the  Gulf  of 
Panama;  the  second  Darien  route  from  Caledonia  Bay 
to  San  Miguel  Bay,  an  arm  of  the  Gulf  of  Panama; 
the  Panama  route  from  Limon  Bay  to  Panama  Bay; 
and  the  Nicaragua  route  from  Greytown  via  the  San 
Juan  River  and  Lake  Nicaragua  to  Brito  on  the 
Pacific,  and  other  less  important  routes.  An  immense 
amount  of  literature,  reports  and  surveys  turned  out 


22 


THe  Panama  Canal 


by  previous  boards  was  accessible,  including  the  most 
excellent  and  complete  data  in  the  hands  of  the  New 
French  Company.  Besides  all  this,  much  additional 
surveying  and  investigation  was  a  necessity. 

The  commission  evaluated  the  French  property  as 
follows: 


Useful  Canal  Excavation   $21,020,386 

Chagres  Diversion   178,186 

Gatun  Diversion   1,396,456 

Railroad  Diversion   300,000 

Contingencies   4,579,005 

Panama  Railroad  Stock   6,850,000 

Maps,  Drawings  and  Records   2,000,000 


Total   $36,324,033 

Add  about  10  per  cent  to  cover  omissions   3,675,967 


Grand  total   $40,000,000 


The  French  company  submitted  an  estimated  valua- 
tion for  purpose  of  discussion  with  a  view  to  sale  to 
the  United  States,  of  $109,141,500.  The  commission 
estimated  the  cost  of  completing  the  Panama  Canal 
to  be  $144,233,358,  to  which  must  be  added  the 
commission's  evaluation  of  the  French  property,  or  a 
total  of  $184,233,358,  or  adding  the  company's  offer 
to  the  cost  of  completion,  a  total  of  $253,374,858. 
The  commission  estimated  the  cost  of  building  the 
Nicaragua  Canal  to  be  $189,864,062. 

A  lock  type  was  found  to  be  obligatory  on  the 
Nicaragua  route,  and  either  a  sea-level  or  lock  canal 
was  found  possible  on  the  Panama  route,  but  the  com- 
mission strongly  recommended  the  lock  canal  and 


Historical 


23 


reported  on  the  relative  advantages  of  the  two  schemes 
as  follows: 

The  estimated  annual  cost  of  maintaining  and  operating  the 
Nicaragua  Canal  is  $1,300,000  greater  than  the  corresponding 
charges  for  the  Panama  Canal. 

The  Panama  route  would  be  134.57  miles  shorter  from  sea  to 
sea  than  the  Nicaragua  route.  It  would  have  less  summit  eleva- 
tion, fewer  locks,  1568  degrees  and  26.44  miles  less  curvature. 
The  estimated  time  for  a  deep-draft  vessel  to  pass  through  is 
about  12  hours  for  Panama  and  33  hours  for  Nicaragua.  These 
periods  are  practically  the  measure  of  the  relative  advantages  of 
the  two  canals  as  waterways  connecting  the  two  oceans,  but  not 
entirely,  because  the  risks  to  vessels  and  the  dangers  of  delay  are 
greater  in  a  canal  than  in  the  open  sea. 

Except  for  the  items  of  risks  and  delays,  the  time  required 
to  pass  through  the  canals  need  to  be  taken  into  account  only 
as  an  element  in  the  time  required  by  vessels  to  make  their 
voyages  between  terminal  ports.  Compared  on  this  basis,  the 
Nicaragua  route  is  the  more  advantageous  for  all  trans-isthmian 
commerce  except  that  originating  or  ending  on  the  west  coast  of 
South  America.  For  the  commerce  in  which  the  United  States 
is  most  interested,  that  between  our  Pacific  ports  and  Atlantic 
ports,  European  and  American,  the  Nicaragua  route  is  shorter  by 
about  one  day.  The  same  advantage  exists  between  our  Atlantic 
ports  and  the  Orient.  For  our  Gulf  ports  the  advantage  of  the 
Nicaragua  route  is  nearly  two  days.  For  commerce  between 
North  Atlantic  ports  and  the  west  coast  of  South  America  the 
Panama  route  is  shorter  by  about  two  days.  Between  Gulf  ports 
and  the  west  coast  of  South  America  the  saving  is  about  one  day. 

The  commission's  recommendation  was  that: 

After  considering  all  the  facts  developed  by  the  investigations 
made  by  the  commission  and  the  actual  situation  as  it  now  stands, 
and  having  in  view  the  terms  offered  by  the  New  Panama  Canal 
Company,  this  Commission  is  of  the  opinion  that  "the  most 
practicable  and  feasible  route' *  for  an  Isthmian  Canal,  to  be 
"  under  the  control,  management,  and  ownership  of  the  United 
States,"  is  that  known  as  the  Nicaragua  route. 


24 


THe  Panama  Canal 


When  this  information  reached  Paris  the  French 
company  were  at  our  mercy  and  capitulated  with  a 
cabled  offer  to  sell  to  the  United  States  for  $40,000,000. 
The  Isthmian  Commission  then  made  a  supplementary 
report,  dated  January  18,  1902,  as  follows: 

The  unreasonable  sum  asked  for  the  property  and  rights  of  the 
New  Panama  Canal  Company  when  the  Commission  reached  its 
former  conclusion  overbalanced  that  route,  and  now  that  the 
estimates  by  the  two  routes  have  been  nearly  equalized  the  Com- 
mission can  form  its  judgment  by  weighing  the  advantages  of 
each  and  determining  which  is  the  more  practicable  and  feasible. 
..  .  .  After  considering  the  changed  conditions  that  now  exist, 
the  Commission  is  of  opinion  that  "the  most  practicable  and 
feasible  route"  for  an  Isthmian  Canal,  to  be  "under  the  control, 
management,  and  ownership  of  the  United  States,"  is  that  known 
■as  the  Panama  route. 

The  report  and  plans  of  the  commission  of  1899-1901 
are  most  comprehensive,  covering  the  subject  from  the 
earliest  times  and  forming  a  veritable  mine  of  in- 
formation. 

The  American  desire  for  a  trans-isthmian  canal  had 
now  become  a  determination.  The  demands  of  com- 
merce were  intensified,  and  the  trip  of  the  U.  S.  S. 
Oregon  around  South  America  had  made  clear  the  im- 
mense potential  value  of  the  canal  to  the  navy.  During 
the  succeeding  moves  the  American  side  of  the  case  was 
handled  with  great  skill  and  acumen,  for  which  the  able 
report  of  the  Isthmian  Commission  had  paved  the  way. 

The  Spooner  law  became  effective  on  June  28,  1902, 
and  authorized: 

(a)  The  purchase  of  the  rights  and  property  of  the 
New  Panama  Canal  Company  at  $40,000,000,  includ- 
ing the  stock  of  the  Panama  Railroad. 


Historical 


25 


(b)  Acquiring  from  the  Republic  of  Colombia  per- 
petual control  of  a  strip  of  land,  together  with  all  water 
rights,  and  the  right  to  build  and  perpetually  maintain 
a  canal,  together  with  the  right  to  exercise  sanitary 
control  over  the  strip  of  land  and  the  cities  at  either 
end. 

(c)  The  actual  building  of  the  canal  on  the  Panama 
route. 

(d)  The  making  of  all  arrangements  for  the  complete 
building  of  a  canal  on  the  Nicaragua  route,  should  the 
negotiations  with  Colombia  or  with  the  New  Panama 
Canal  Company  prove  unsuccessful. 

(e)  The  creation  of  an  Isthmian  Canal  Commission 
of  seven  members,  four  of  whom  were  to  be  skilled 
engineers,  and  of  the  four,  one  to  be  an  officer  of  the 
Engineer  Corps  of  the  United  States  Army,  and  one  an 
officer  of  the  United  States  Navy. 

(f)  The  act  appropriated  $10,000,000,  to  be  im- 
mediately available,  and  authorized  a  further  sum  of 
$135,000,000  (besides  the  $40,000,000  for  purchase 
of  the  canal  company's  property)  in  case  of  adoption 
of  the  Panama  route,  or  of  $185,000,000  in  case  of 
adoption  of  the  Nicaragua  route. 

During  the  negotiations  with  Colombia  the  hopes  of 
the  stockholders  in  the  French  company  were  alter- 
nately raised  and  dashed  as  the  trend  of  affairs  indi- 
cated the  adoption  of  the  Panama  or  the  Nicaragua 
route.  The  Colombian  government,  which  had  the 
sovereign  rights  over  the  Isthmus,  failed  to  ratify  the 
treaty,  and  soon  thereafter  the  Department  of  Panama 
led  a  successful  revolt.   The  new  Panama  government, 


26 


TKe  Panama  Canal 


after  being  recognized  by  the  United  States,  concluded 
a  treaty  which  was  very  satisfactory  and  which  was 
proclaimed  February  26,  1904.  The  purchase  from  the 
French  Canal  Company  was  soon  consummated,  and 
on  May  4,  1904,  the  United  States  took  possession  of 
the  site  and  property.  The  occasion  was  a  momentous 
one.  The  men  who  had  accomplished  so  much  in 
clearing  the  way  for  the  building  of  the  canal  looked 
forward  with  confidence  to  its  speedy  and  successful 
construction.  There  were  many  others  who  looked 
with  fear  and  trepidation  upon  the  undertaking. 
There  was  a  general  feeling  that  after  almost  four 
centuries  of  reports,  investigations,  surveys  and  failures, 
it  was  time  for  the  dirt  to  fly  immediately.  Fortunately 
those  placed  in  charge  of  the  work  were  trained  in  the 
scientific  planning  of  large  undertakings,  and  while 
certain  excavation  work  was  done  to  appease  the  pop- 
ular demand,  and  also  to  secure  experimental  data  for 
excavating  and  planning,  the  great  problems  of  the 
moment  were  recognized  as  three  in  number:  first,  to 
decide  on  the  type,  form  and  exact  location  of  the 
canal;  second,  to  outline  the  method  of  attack  and  to 
purchase  and  assemble  the  vast  amount  of  equipment 
and  material;  third,  to  perfect  an  organization  of  the 
administrative  and  working  forces. 


THE  PANAMA  CANAL 


Part  II 

THE  ROUTE 
THE  DESIGN  AND  CONSTRUCTION 

BY 

REUBEN  E.  BAKENHUS,  S.  B. 

CIVIL  ENGINEER  U.  S.  NAVY 


THE  ROUTE 
THE  DESIGN  AND  CONSTRUCTION 


PHYSICAL  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  THE  CANAL  ROUTE 

While  the  size  and  character  of  the  canal  were  open 
questions,  the  general  location  was  determined.  The 
line  of  cut  adopted  by  the  French  had  been  selected  by 
some  of  the  early  exploiters;  the  Panama  Railroad 
had  been  located  in  the  same  valleys  and  depressions; 
and  the  French  had  actually  begun  to  build  along  this 
line.  At  this  point  it  is  well  to  consider  briefly  the 
character  and  topography  of  the  canal  route  and  adja- 
cent territory  as  it  was  before  any  work  was  done,  but 
bearing  the  future  canal  in  mind. 

The  Isthmus  of  Panama,  if  it  joined  the  two  conti- 
nents by  the  shortest  line,  would  extend  northwest 
toward  North  America  and  southeast  toward  South 
America;  but  it  does  not  follow  the  shortest  line,  and 
on  the  map  looks  as  if  South  America  had  been  pushed 
northwestward  and  the  narrow  part  of  the  Isthmus  on 
the  end  toward  South  America  had  been  bent  out  of 
shape  with  a  bulge  to  the  north  and  the  concave  side 
to  the  south,  almost  forming  a  semicircle  enclosing  the 
Gulf  of  Panama.  (See  plan  No.  1.)  Near  the  head  of 
this  gulf  is  an  indentation  known  as  the  Bay  of  Panama. 
This  bay  touches  that  part  of  the  rough  semicircle 
where  the  Isthmus  sweeps  to  the  northeast  toward  the 
top  of  the  semicircle,  and  where  a  line  at  right  angles 

29 


30 


The  Panama  Canal 


to  the  Isthmus  is  about  northwest.  This  northwest 
line  from  the  Bay  of  Panama  ends  in  the  Limon  Bay, 
on  the  Atlantic  side,  and  happens  to  pass  through  the 
region  where  the  Continental  Divide  is  much  lower 
than  anywhere  else  and  where  the  Isthmus  is  less  than 
36  miles  wide,  only  5  miles  wider  than  at  the  very 
narrowest  point.  The  line  if  slightly  distorted  may  be 
made  to  pass  for  three-fourths  of  its  length  along  the 
valley  of  the  Rio  Grande  River  on  the  Pacific  side,  and 
the  valley  of  the  lower  Chagres  on  the  Atlantic  side, 
except  that  the  Chagres  before  reaching  Limon  Bay 
turns  off  to  the  left  to  its  mouth,  seven  miles  west  of 
the  bay,  while  the  line  continues  straight  to  Limon 
Bay.   This  is  in  general  terms  the  course  of  the  canal. 

Limon  Bay  faces  almost  directly  north,  and  has  an 
opening^  three  miles  wide  into  the  Caribbean  Sea, 
and  extends  five  miles  inland  of  the  full  width. 
The  depth  of  the  water  varies  from  5  feet  to  36  feet. 
(See  plan  No.  2.)  The  Atlantic  end  of  the  French 
canal  was  cut  through  the  swamps  along  the  east  shore 
of  Limon  Bay  and  extended  into  the  bay,  so  as  to 
make  use  of  Colon  as  a  protection  from  northerly  seas. 
Limon  Bay,  on  the  westerly  and  inland  sides,  is  sur- 
rounded by  much  higher  land,  except  that  the  lowlands 
of  the  small  Mindi  River  valley  extend  inland  from 
the  above-named  swamps  almost  through  the  ridge, 
which  is  here  very  low.  The  narrow  strip  of  lowland 
continues  inland  beyond  the  Mindi  River  valley  and 
dips  into  the  Chagres  valley  near  Gatun.  One  would 
almost  have  expected  the  Chagres  River  to  seek  outlet 
straight  ahead  in  Limon  Bay,  only  three  miles  distant; 


Rovite,  Design  and  Construction  31 


but  the  little  ridge  between  the  Chagres  and  the  head- 
waters of  the  Mindi  River  prevented  this,  and  so  the 
Chagres  follows  the  lowlands  behind  the  ridges  sur- 
rounding Limon  Bay  and  discharges  into  the  Caribbean 
Sea  about  seven  miles  west  of  the  bay.  At  Gatun, 
where  the  line  of  the  canal  first  meets  the  Chagres,  the 
valley  is  about  a  mile  and  a  half  wide,  but  as  we  follow 
upstream  it  becomes  very  much  wider.  The  stream  is 
sluggish  and  winds  in  and  out  amongst  the  swamp 
lands. 

Just  above  Gatun  the  Chagres  on  its  right  bank 
receives  an  important  tributary,  the  Gatun  River.  It 
was  of  some  importance  in  the  plans  for  any  canal  of 
which  the  sea-level  portion  extended  inland  beyond 
Gatun,  for  the  canal  had  either  to  cross  the  river,  to 
take  its  flow,  or  otherwise  the  river  must  be  turned  off 
before  reaching  the  canal  by  a  new  channel  or  diver- 
sion to  the  sea  parallel  to  the  canal.  The  French  actu- 
ally built  a  very  wide  diversion  to  the  sea,  8  miles  long. 
The  Trinidad  River  enters  the  Chagres  from  the  other 
side,  about  three  miles  above  Gatun. 

Throughout  this  portion  of  the  Chagres  the  water- 
surface  is  but  little  above  sea  level,  and  it  so  con- 
tinues inland  as  far  as  Bohio,  16  miles  by  the  canal 
line  from  Colon.  At  Bohio  the  valley  contracts,  and 
this  was  the  site  selected  for  the  locks  and  dams  in  the 
French  canal,  and  in  one  of  the  early  American  plans. 
The  land  surface  from  Bohio  upstream  becomes  grad- 
ually more  undulating  and  the  slopes  of  the  valleys 
become  steeper.  At  Bas  Obispo,  13  miles  inland  from 
Bohio  by  canal  line,  or  29  miles  from  Colon,  the  low 


32 


XKe  Panama  Canal 


water  level  of  the  river  rises  to  45  feet  above  the  sea. 
Up  to  this  point  the  Chagres  valley  leads  in  a  fairly 
direct  line  toward  the  Pacific  Ocean,  and  fortunately 
approaches  the  low  point  of  the  Continental  Divide. 
Now  the  canal  line  must  leave  the  Chagres,  for  the 
river  makes  an  abrupt  turn,  and  to  follow  it  to  its 
sources  would  carry  us  into  the  mountains  to  the 
northeast,  that  is,  into  the  apex  of  the  roughly  semi- 
circular part  of  the  Isthmus.  The  canal  builder  can- 
not dismiss  the  river  from  his  mind  at  the  point  where 
the  line  of  the  canal  leaves  the  valley,  for  some  of  the 
most  important  problems  of  the  canal  are  dependent 
upon  the  character  of  the  stream  above  Obispo. 

At  Bas  Obispo  the  Chagres  River  is  joined  by  its 
tributary,  the  Obispo  River,  the  valley  of  which  offers 
the  best  opportunity  for  continuing  the  canal  for  the 
next  4  miles.  The  continental  ridge  begins  at  Bas 
Obispo,  and  with  it  the  hills  become  higher.  The 
stream  is  tortuous,  and  the  canal  line  cannot  follow  it, 
but  must  be  cut  on  more  direct  lines  to  avoid  objec- 
tionable curvature. 

The  elevation  of  the  ground  is  constantly  increasing, 
reaching  a  low  summit  at  Empire,  and  the  highest 
summit  at  Culebra,  where  the  future  canal  passes 
between  Gold  Hill  and  Contractors  Hill.  The  highest 
elevation  of  the  ground  on  the  center  line  is  312  feet 
above  sea  level,  but  the  highest  part  of  the  sloping 
sides  will  be  554  feet  above  sea  level.  Culebra  is 
about  6  miles  from  Obispo,  and  about  35  miles  from 
Colon.  The  country  falls  much  more  rapidly  on  the 
Pacific  side,  and  3  miles  beyond  Culebra,  close  to 


Photo  by  L.  E.  G. 

Fig.  5.  —  A  slide,  showing  shovel  at  work,  February,  1913. 


Photo  by  L.  E.  G. 

Fig.  6.  —  A  slide  —  near  view,  February,  1913. 


Route,  Design  and  Construction  33 


Pedro  Miguel,  the  level  is  lower  than  at  Obispo,  8 
miles  back. 

The  Continental  Divide  covers  a  distance  of  9  miles 
from  Bas  Obispo  through  Empire  and  Culebra  to  Pedro 
Miguel,  and  of  this  the  deepest  part  is  6  miles  in  length, 
from  Las  Cascades  to  a  point  near  Pedro  Miguel,  and 
forms  the  heaviest  part  of  the  so-called  Culebra  Cut. 
From  Pedro  Miguel  to  Miraflores,  a  distance  of  1J 
miles,  the  land  continues  to  fall,  and  the  canal  fortu- 
nately finds  the  low  valley  of  the  Rio  Grande  as  an 
available  path  to  the  Pacific.  This  valley  from  Mira- 
flores to  the  sea  is  very  little  above  the  sea  level,  and 
beyond  the  lowlands  is  lined  on  both  sides  with  much 
higher  ground  and  hills,  of  which  Sosa  Hill  and  Ancon 
Hill  are  the  best-known.  The  distance  from  Colon  to 
Miraflores  is  about  39  J  miles,  and  from  Miraflores  to 
the  Pacific  is  5|  miles,  or  a  total  of  about  45  miles 
from  Colon  to  the  shores  of  the  Pacific. 

The  waters  of  Panama  Bay  vary  in  depth  from  7  to 
32  feet,  and  the  bottom  slopes  off  into  the  deeper 
waters  of  the  Gulf  of  Panama  and  the  Pacific  Ocean. 
(See  plan  No.  3.)  About  2\  miles  off  shore  from  the 
mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande  is  a  group  of  islands  with 
both  lowlands  and  mounds.  The  question  as  to 
whether  the  canal  should  pass  to  the  east  or  to  the 
west  of  them  was  decided  one  way  by  the  French  and 
the  opposite  way  by  the  Americans,  the  reasons  for 
which  will  develop  later. 

Having  thus  observed  the  principal  natural  features 
of  the  canal  route,  we  may  note  to  what  extent  the  to- 
pography was  affected  by  the  French  operations,  pay- 


34 


THe  Panama  Oanal 


ing  but  little  attention  to  the  period  from  1889  to 
1904,  for  the  New  Panama  Canal  Company,  aside 
from  its  comprehensive  preparatory  technical  work, 
wisely  did  only  enough  excavation  to  hold  the  charter. 

As  already  noted,  the  French  canal  was  excavated 
from  Colon  through  the  lowlands  on  the  easterly  shore 
of  Limon  Bay,  and  as  far  as  Gatun  it  was  later  used 
by  the  Americans  for  carrying  materials  to  the  locks. 
It  was  partly  excavated  as  far  as  Bohio,  a  total  dis- 
tance of  about  17  miles. 

The  bottom  width  of  the  canal  was  not  over  72  feet, 
and  the  depth  of  water  averaged  about  20  feet  for  half 
the  length,  and  over  the  part  toward  Bohio,  where  the 
ground  was  higher,  did  not  go  below  sea  level.  The 
canal  crossed  the  Chagres  River  at  several  points,  and 
the  river  water  flowed  freely  into  the  canal.  At  Gatun, 
where  the  canal  on  its  way  to  Colon  leaves  the  river 
bed,  about  one-third  of  the  flow  continued  through  the 
canal.  The  large  bend  in  the  river  where  it  sweeps 
toward  Gatun  is  "short-circuited"  by  a  cut-off  known 
as  the  Chagres  diversion.  Deadening  this  bend  elim- 
inated two  river  crossings  and  shortened  the  distance 
to  the  mouth  of  the  river.  A  part  of  this  diversion  is 
utilized  in  the  spillway  channel  of  the  completed  canal. 
There  were  also  a  number  of  other  such  diversions. 
At  Bohio  considerable  rock  excavation  was  done  after 
the  sea-level  canal  was  given  up  in  favor  of  a  lock  canal. 
From  Bohio  to  Bas  Obispo  the  canal  excavation  cut 
the  course  of  the  Chagres  a  great  many  times.  Across 
the  Continental  Divide  the  French  cut  a  comparatively 
narrow  trench,  which  at  its  deepest  point  was  165  feet 


Roiate,  Design,  and  Construction  35 


below  the  original  surface,  and  left  about  190  feet 
more  of  cut  to  accomplish  a  sea-level  canal,  and  over 
100  feet  for  the  French  lock  canal.  On  the  Pacific 
end  a  partial  channel  was  dredged,  and  also  the  neces- 
sary diversions  on  each  side,  which  captured  the  water 
from  the  river  branches  and  discharged  it  into  the 
bay  before  it  could  reach  the  canal.  A  total  amount 
of  80,000,000  cubic  yards  of  excavation  was  done 
all  along  the  canal.  Some  of  it  was  deposited  on 
the  line  of  the  much  wider  canal  finally  adopted  by  the 
Americans,  and  required  re-excavating;  some  of  the 
channels  were  partially  filled  by  silting.  Besides  exca- 
vation, the  French  left  behind  them  some  2000  buildings 
and  a  vast  amount  of  equipment.  Much  of  it  was 
overgrown  with  a  dense  jungle  during  the  15  years  of 
inactivity,  and  was  lost  until  years  after. 

THE  CHOICE  OF  TYPE 

With  this  brief  excursion  across  the  Isthmus,  ob- 
serving the  various  natural  and  artificial  features  of 
importance,  and  which  an  examination  of  the  maps 
will  aid  in  fixing  in  the  mind,  we  are  in  a  better  posi- 
tion to  consider  the  problems  that  confronted  the 
United  States  when  it  was  necessary  to  decide  on  the 
type  of  canal.  The  choice  lay  between  a  sea-level  and 
a  lock  canal.  The  United  States  was  determined  to 
have  the  best  canal,  regardless  of  cost  or  trouble.  The 
French  ideal  was  a  sea-level  canal  which  they  epito- 
mized as  the  "Straits  of  Panama."  But  their  resources 
would  not  allow  them  to  attain  their  ideal,  so  they 
adopted  a  lock  canal  as  a  makeshift  and  temporary 


36 


THe  Panama  Canal 


expedient.  Knowing  this,  the  American  tendency  was 
to  regard  the  sea-level  canal  as  something  more  diffi- 
cult to  attain  and,  therefore,  as  something  more  valu- 
able and  more  desirable.  Furthermore,  the  average 
citizen  or  average  official  is  unfamiliar  with  locks,  and 
these  devices  convey  to  him  an  idea  of  something 
vague  and  hazardous.  These  feelings  had  first  to  be 
overcome  before  the  nation  was  ready  to  consider  the 
question  on  its  true  merits.  In  view  of  this,  and  of 
the  vital  necessity  to  the  success  of  the  enterprise  of 
deciding  the  question  of  the  type  of  canal  correctly, 
the  President  appointed  an  International  Board  of 
Consulting  Engineers  to  advise  in  the  decision  as  to 
type  and  probable  cost.  The  board  was  presided  over 
by  a  retired  major-general  of  the  United  States  Army, 
and  included  in  the  membership  seven  American  and 
five  foreign  engineers,  all  most  eminent  in  their  profes- 
sion and  experienced  in  the  problems  involved  in  the 
construction  of  the  canal. 

The  divided  report  of  the  board  was  unexpected  and 
in  a  way  disappointing.  Five  of  the  American  engineers 
favored  the  lock  type,  but  they  were  in  the  minority, 
as  the  chairman,  the  two  remaining  American  engineers 
and  all  the  five  foreign  engineers  voted  for  the  sea-level 
canal.  Five  members  of  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commis- 
sion and  the  chief  engineer  approved  and  recommended 
the  lock  canal,  while  the  other  member  favored  the 
sea-level  type.  On  a  poll  of  individuals  of  both  bodies, 
nine  were  for  the  sea-level  and  eleven  for  the  lock  canal. 
It  remained  for  the  Secretary  of  War  and  the  President 
to  consider,  with  the  various  reports  of  facts  and  state- 


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Route,  Design  and  Construction  37 

merits  of  relative  advantages  and  disadvantages  before 
them,  which  type  was  to  be  adopted. 

The  essential  facts  regarding  the  two  types  of  canal 
can  be  most  clearly  set  forth  in  a  table  such  as  the 
following,  to  which  is  added  a  third  column  showing 
the  characteristics  of  the  canal  as  actually  built: 


COMPARATIVE  DATA 

Sea-level  canal  and  lock  canal  as  proposed  by  the  Board  of  Consulting  Engineers  and  canal 
as  built. 


Item 

Sea-level  canal 

Lock-canal  85-foot 
summit 

Lock  canal  as  built 
85-foot  summit 

$247,000,000 

$140,000,000 

$375,000,000* 

Depth  

40  feet 

40  to  45  feet 

40  to  45  feet 

1000  feet,  none 

1000  feet,  19  miles 

1000  feet,  16  miles 

800  feet,  none 

800  feet,  4  miles 

800  feet,  4  miles 

500  feet,  5  miles 

500  feet,  12  miles 

500  feet,  22  miles 

300  feet,  4  miles 

300  feet,  7  miles 

300  feet,  8  miles 

200  feet,  19  miles 

200  feet,  7  miles 

200  feet,  none 

150  feet,  21  miles 

150  feet,  none 

150  feet,  none 

Total  volume  of  water  within 

limits  of  canal  in  cubic  yards. . . 

100,664,000 

303,600,000 

Number  of  pairs  of  locks  

1 

6 

6 

Dimensions  of  locks  in  feet  

1000X100 

900X95 

1000X110 

Highest  current,  miles  per  hour. . . 

2.6 

Inappreciable 

Inappreciable 

Time  to  complete  

12  to  20  years 

9  years 

9  years 

Gamboa  in  upper 

Gatun,  Pedro 

Gatun,  Pedro 

Chagres  valley 

Miguel,  Balboa 

Miguel,  Mira- 

flores 

*  Includes  sanitation,  civil  government,  land  damages  and  purchase  price  from  French,  not 
included  in  first  two  columns. 


Not  only  was  the  sea-level  canal  of  inferior  dimen- 
sions and  greater  cost,  but  its  winding  channel  would 
not  be  conducive  to  easy  or  safe  navigation,  and  the 
time  which  a  vessel  in  the  high-level  canal  would  lose 
in  the  locks  would  be  lost  in  the  sea-level  canal  in 
slowing  down  for  passing  other  vessels  on  account  of 
the  very  narrow  channels;  in  fact,  two  vessels  of  any 
size  could  not  pass  in  the  21  miles  of  150-foot  width 
unless  one  of  them  tied  up  in  specially  provided  turn- 


38 


The  Panama  Canal 


outs,  similar  to  the  custom  in  the  Suez  Canal.  The 
sea-level  canal  was  not  considered  superior  from  the 
standpoint  of  safety;  the  sinking  of  a  single  ship 
could  block  the  canal  indefinitely;  the  many  stream 
diversions  along  the  banks  of  the  canal  and  the  great 
dam  at  Gamboa  were  potential  sources  of  danger  in 
time  of  flood  to  a  canal  which  was  in  the  lowest  part 
of  the  valley,  and  would  form  the  receptacle  for  flood 
debris. 

It  is  illuminating  to  read  the  following  extract  from 
the  comment  of  Secretary  of  War  Taft,  on  the  report 
of  the  Board  of  Consulting  Engineers: 

The  majority  of  the  Board  makes  objection  that  locks  are  un- 
safe for  the  passage  of  the  great  seagoing  vessels  contemplated 
by  the  act,  due  to  the  disastrous  consequences  that  might  result 
if  the  gates  are  injured  by  vessels  entering;  that  the  lifts  pro- 
posed are  beyond  the  limit  of  prudent  design  for  safe  operation 
and  administrative  efficiency;  that  locks  delay  transit. 

Lock  navigation  is  not  an  experiment.  All  the  locks  are  du- 
plicated, thereby  minimizing  such  dangers,  and  experience  shows 
that  with  proper  appliances  and  regulations  the  dangers  are 
more  imaginary  than  real.  The  locks  proposed  have  lifts  of 
about  30  feet,  or  less  than  those  heretofore  advocated  by  en- 
gineers of  such  high  standing  that  the  objection  is  believed  to  be 
not  well  founded.  The  delays  due  to  lockages  are  more  than 
offset  by  the  greater  speed  at  which  vessels  can  safely  navigate 
the  lakes  formed  by  the  dams  than  is  possible  in  the  sea-level 
canal,  and  the  argument  on  this  point  in  the  minority  report 
seems  to  me  to  be  the  more  weighty. 

J  The  advocates  of  the  sea-level  canal  express  doubt  as  to  the 
stability  of  the  dams  at  Gatun  and  at  La  Boca,  if  founded  on  the 
natural  soil,  and  advance  the  opinion  that  "no  such  vast  and 
doubtful  experiment  should  be  indulged  in." 

It  appears,  however,  that  the  dams  proposed  are  to  be  founded 
on  impervious  materials,  thereby  conforming  to  the  views  of  the 


Route,  Design  and  Construction  39 


majority,  and  are  to  have  such  ample  dimensions  as  to  insure 
the  compression  of  the  mud  and  clay  rather  than  its  displacement. 
Furthermore,  the  estimates  include  an  allowance  for  additional 
safeguards  against  seepage  if  subsequent  detailed  investigations 
show  the  necessity  for  extra  precautions.  The  construction  of 
earth  dams  to  retain  water  85  feet  deep  is  not  experimental,  and 
as  the  dams  proposed  have  greater  mass  and  stability  than  sim- 
ilarly constructed  dams  of  greater  heights,  it  appears  that  the 
apprehensions  as  to  the  safety  of  the  dams  are  unnecessary. 

When  I  visited  the  Isthmus  a  year  and  a  half  ago  and  went 
over  the  site  and  talked  with  the  then  chief  engineer,  I  received 
a  strong  impression  that  the  work  of  construction  upon  which  the 
United  States  was  about  to  enter  was  of  such  world-wide  im- 
portance and  so  likely  to  continue  in  active  use  for  centuries  to 
come,  that  it  was  wise  for  the  government  not  to  be  impatient 
of  the  time  to  be  taken  or  of  the  treasure  to  be  spent.  It  seemed 
to  me  that  the  sea-level  canal  was  necessarily  so  much  more 
certain  to  satisfy  the  demands  of  the  world's  commerce  than  a 
lock  canal  that  both  time  and  money  might  well  be  sacrificed  to 
achieve  the  best  form,  and  this  feeling  was  emphasized  by  reading 
the  very  able  report  of  the  majority.  But  the  report  of  the  mi- 
nority, in  showing  the  actual  result  of  the  use  of  the  locks  in  ship 
canals,  in  pointing  out  the  dangers  of  so  narrow  and  contracted 
a  canal  prism  as  that  which  the  majority  proposes,  and  in  making 
clear  the  great  additional  cost  in  time  and  money  of  a  sea-level 
canal,  has  led  me  to  a  different  conclusion. 

We  may  well  concede  that  if  we  could  have  a  sea-level  canal 
with  a  prism  from  300  to  400  feet  wide,  with  the  curves  that 
must  now  exist  reduced,  it  would  be  preferable  to  the  plan  of 
the  minority,  but  the  time  and  the  cost  of  constructing  such  a 
canal  are  in  effect  prohibitory. 

I  ought  not  to  close  without  inviting  attention  to  the  satis- 
factory character  of  the  discussion  of  the  two  types  of  canal  by 
the  greatest  canal  engineers  of  the  world,  which  insures  to  you 
and  to  the  Congress  an  opportunity  to  consider  all  the  arguments, 
pro  and  con,  in  reaching  a  proper  conclusion. 

The  following  is  the  essential  part  of  the  decision  by 
President  Roosevelt,  dated  February  19,  1908,  which 


40 


XKe  Panama  Canal 


with  the  reports  of  the  board  he  transmitted  to 
Congress: 

It  will  be  noticed  that  the  American  engineers  on  the  Consult- 
ing Board  and  on  the  Commission  by  a  more  than  two  to  one 
majority  favor  the  lock  canal,  whereas  the  foreign  engineers  are 
a  unit  against  it.  I  think  this  is  partly  to  be  explained  by  the 
fact  that  the  great  traffic  canal  of  the  Old  World  is  the  Suez 
Canal,  a  sea-level  canal,  whereas  the  great  traffic  canal  of  the 
New  World  is  the  Sault  Ste.  Marie  Canal,  a  lock  canal.  Al- 
though the  latter,  the  Soo,  is  closed  to  navigation  during  the 
winter  months,  it  carries  annually  three  times  the  traffic  of  the 
Suez  Canal.  In  my  judgment  the  very  able  argument  of  the 
majority  of  the  Board  of  Consulting  Engineers  is  vitiated  by  their 
failure  to  pay  proper  heed  to  the  lessons  taught  by  the  construc- 
tion and  operation  of  the  Soo  Canal. 

It  must  be  borne  in  mind,  as  the  Commission  points  out,  that 
there  is  no  question  of  building  what  has  been  picturesquely 
termed  "the  Straits  of  Panama  that  is,  a  waterway  through 
which  the  largest  vessels  could  go  with  safety  at  uninterrupted 
high  speed.  Both  the  sea-level  canal  and  the  proposed  lock  canal 
would  be  too  narrow  and  shallow  to  be  called  with  any  truthful- 
ness a  strait,  or  to  have  any  of  the  properties  of  a  wide,  deep 
water  strip.  Both  of  them  would  be  canals,  pure  and  simple. 
Each  type  has  certain  disadvantages  and  certain  advantages. 
But,  in  my  judgment,  the  disadvantages  are  fewer  and  the  ad- 
vantages very  much  greater  in  the  case  of  a  lock  canal  substan- 
tially as  proposed  in  the  papers  forwarded  herewith.  .  .  . 

A  careful  study  of  the  reports  seems  to  establish  a  strong 
probability  that  the  following  are  the  facts:  The  sea-level  canal 
would  be  slightly  less  exposed  to  damage  in  the  event  of  war,  the 
running  expenses,  apart  from  the  heavy  cost  of  interest  on  the 
amount  employed  to  build  it,  would  be  less,  and  for  small  ships 
the  time  of  transit  would  probably  be  less.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  lock  canal  at  a  level  of  80  feet  or  thereabouts  would  not  cost 
much  more  than  half  as  much  to  build  and  could  be  built  in 
about  half  the  time,  while  there  would  be  very  much  less  risk 
connected  with  building  it,  and  for  large  ships  the  transit  would 
be  quicker;  while,  taking  into  account  the  interest  on  the  amount 


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IVovite,  Design  and  Construction  41 


saved  in  building,  the  actual  cost  of  maintenance  would  be  less. 
After  being  built,  it  would  be  easier  to  enlarge  the  lock  canal 
than  the  sea-level  canal.  Moreover,  what  has  been  actually  dem- 
onstrated in  making  and  operating  the  great  lock  canal,  the  Soo, 
a  more  important  artery  of  traffic  than  the  great  sea-level  canal, 
the  Suez,  goes  to  support  the  opinion  of  the  minority  of  the  Con- 
sulting Board  of  Engineers  and  of  the  majority  of  the  Isthmian 
Canal  Commission  as  to  the  superior  safety,  feasibility,  and  desira- 
bility of  building  a  lock  canal  at  Panama. 

The  law  now  on  our  statute  books  seems  to  contemplate  a 
lock  canal.  In  my  judgment  a  lock  canal,  as  herein  recommended, 
is  advisable. 

On  June  27,  1906,  Congress  passed  a  joint  resolution 
which  approved  the  lock  canal  proposed  by  the  minor- 
ity, and  finally  closed  the  case.  This  was  more  than 
one  year  after  the  appointment  of  the  Board  of  Con- 
sulting Engineers.  Many  details,  as  well  as  many 
problems  of  importance,  were  not  finally  determined 
by  the  board  and  required  consideration  by  the  Isth- 
mian Canal  Commission.  It  will  not  be  necessary  to 
describe  the  detailed  processes  and  the  steps  by  means 
of  which  these  matters  were  finally  determined,  except 
incidentally  when  studying  some  of  the  important  ele- 
ments of  the  canal.  A  general  account  of  the  canal  as 
it  is  actually  being  built  will  now  be  given,  to  be 
followed  by  descriptions  of  its  important  parts. 

GENERAL  DESCRIPTION  OF  THE  CANAL 

The  sea-level  approach  channel  from  the  Caribbean 
Sea  lies  within  Limon  Bay  for  4|  miles.  (See  plan 
No.  2.)  It  is  500  feet  wide  on  the  bottom,  with  side 
slopes  of  one  vertical  to  three  horizontal,  and  having  a 
depth  of  41  feet  below  mean  sea  level.   (See  plans  Nos. 


42 


THe  Panama  Canal 


4  and  5.)  The  range  of  the  tide  is  about  2  feet.  The 
alignment  is  straight  for  5|  miles  from  the  entrance  as 
far  as  the  Mindi  Hills,  at  which  point  the  American 
canal  intersects  the  comparatively  insignificant  old 
French  canal.  There  is  a  slight  bend  of  long  radius 
at  Mindi  Hills,  and  then  a  straight  run  of  1|  miles  to 
Gatun  Locks.  We  have  passed  from  the  valley  of  the 
Mindi  River  into  the  valley  of  the  Chagres,  and  are 
face  to  face  with  one  of  the  great  problems  of  the  canal 
construction,  namely,  the  handling  of  the  torrential 
Chagres  River.  After  weighing  several  other  schemes, 
that  finally  adopted  consists  of  the  formation  of  a  lake 
measuring  about  24  miles  on  the  canal  axis  from  Gatun 
to  Bas  Obispo.  The  length  of  the  lake  in  the  other 
direction  will  be  over  30  miles.  The  lake  is  formed  by 
the  construction  of  an  earth  dam  of  unusual  dimensions 
extending  across  the  valley  at  Gatun.  The  dam  does 
not  seem  artificial  to  the  eye,  but  appears  as  one  of  the 
major  features  of  the  landscape.  After  the  lake  is 
filled,  the  flow  of  the  Chagres  into  it  will  be  discharged 
by  the  carefully  designed  concrete  spillway,  which  cuts 
through  the  middle  of  the  great  earth  dam  at  a  point 
where  a  rocky  eminence  afforded  a  safe  location.  The 
normal  water  surface  of  Gatun  Lake  will  be  85  feet 
above  mean  sea  level,  but  provisions  are  made  so  that 
the  water  surface  can  be  carried  at  any  elevation 
between  80  feet  and  87  feet. 

Ships  will  be  passed  into  Gatun  Lake  by  means  of  a 
series  of  three  locks  at  Gatun,  each  of  which  in  turn 
will  raise  the  vessel  an  average  of  28J  feet.  The  locks 
are  close  together  and  the  ships  will  pass  directly  from 


Route,  Design  and  Construction  43 


one  lock  into  the  next.  The  three  locks  are  in  dupli- 
cate; that  is,  a  vessel  may  go  up  either  one  flight  or 
the  other  of  the  duplicate  locks,  or  one  flight  may  be 
used  for  ascending  vessels  and  the  other  for  descending 
vessels.  The  corresponding  locks  adjoin  and  there  is 
only  a  dividing  wall  between  them.  After  the  ship  has 
passed  into  the  lower  lock,  and  while  it  is  being  raised, 
the  following  ship,  if  close  behind,  may  be  tied  up  at 
the  approach  wall  1200  feet  long,  formed  by  an  exten- 
sion of  the  dividing  wall.  Each  lock  has  a  net  or  usable 
length  of  1000  feet,  and  a  net  or  usable  width  of  110 
feet,  but  the  dimensions  of  the  ship  must  be  somewhat 
less  than  this  to  provide  for  fenders  and  clearances. 

The  formation  of  the  lake  with  the  water  85  feet 
above  the  sea  level  obviated  all  digging  for  17  miles, 
except  the  top  of  an  occasional  mound.  (See  plan  No. 
5.)  The  alignment  of  the  channel  in  the  lake  was 
determined  by  the  position  of  hills,  changed  into 
islands  by  the  rising  water. 

At  the  locks,  the  canal  axis  makes  a  slight  bend  to 
the  left  and  the  channel  of  1000  feet  width  and  75  feet 
depth  extends  in  a  straight  line  for  3|  miles  to  the 
first  bend  in  the  lake.  This  bend  is  followed  by  a 
straight  channel  of  the  same  width  but  reduced  depth 
for  a  distance  of  miles,  almost  to  Bohio,  where  a 
further  turn  to  the  left  is  made.  The  course  does  not 
run  straight  to  Bohio  from  the  locks,  because  Tiger 
Hill  and  Lion  Hill  are  in  the  way.  After  a  two-mile 
run  from  Bohio  to  Buena  Vista,  1000  feet  wide,  there 
is  a  turn  to  the  right,  the  course  continuing  straight 
for  a  distance  of  2§  miles  to  a  point  opposite  Frijoles. 


44 


THe  Panama  Canal 


Here  there  is  a  further  turn  to  the  right,  with  a  straight 
course  of  miles,  still  1000  feet  wide,  to  a  point  near 
Tabernilla;  then  a  turn  to  the  left,  with  a  reduction  in 
width  to  800  feet,  and  a  straight  reach  of  3  miles  to  a 
point  near  San  Pablo.  The  lake  has  now  become  a 
narrow  arm,  occupying  the  region  where  the  valley  of 
the  Chagres  had  much  steeper  banks.  At  San  Pablo 
there  is  a  turn  to  the  left  with  a  short  run  800  feet 
wide  of  1  mile;  then  a  turn  to  the  right,  another  short 
run  of  1  mile,  with  a  further  turn  to  the  right;  then 
a  longer  reach  of  3  miles,  with  width  reduced  to  500 
feet,  passing  the  submerged  town  of  Gorgona;  then 
a  right  turn  and  a  1-mile  run  to  a  point  near  Gamboa. 
From  Gatun  to  Gamboa  there  are  23  crossings  of  the 
former  course  of  the  Chagres,  showing  that  the  canal 
has  practically  followed  the  course  of  the  river,  but 
with  the  aid  of  steam  shovels  has  selected  a  much 
straighter  course  than  the  one  carved  by  the  river 
along  the  lines  of  least  resistance. 

At  Bas  Obispo,  which  is  close  to  Gamboa,  we  enter 
the  great  Culebra  Cut.  The  minimum  width  of  the 
canal  up  to  this  point  has  been  500  feet,  but  through 
the  following  8.1  miles  the  bottom  width  is  reduced  to 
300  feet  to  save  excavation.  A  width  of  only  200  feet 
was  originally  contemplated  but  was  wisely  increased 
to  300  feet.  The  banks  of  the  canal  become  higher 
and  higher  as  we  pass  on,  until  at  Gold  Hill,  the  ele- 
vation of  the  highest  land  on  one  side  is  554  feet  above 
sea  level,  and  the  other  side,  410  feet,  while  the  land 
over  the  center  of  the  canal  was  formerly  312  feet 
above  sea  level,  or  227  feet  above  the  bottom  of  the 


IVomte,  Design  and  Construction  45 


canal.  The  minimum  depth  of  the  canal  on  the  entire 
upper  section  is  45  feet  at  normal  lake  level,  or  40  feet 
at  low  lake  level,  but  throughout  Gatun  Lake  the 
depth  is  in  excess  of  these.  The  Culebra  Cut  and  the 
85-foot  elevation  of  the  water  both  end  at  the  Pedro 
Miguel  Lock.  In  passing  through  the  cut,  from  Bas 
Obispo  to  Pedro  Miguel,  there  are  eight  straight 
reaches  connected  by  easy  curves,  three  to  the  right 
and  four  to  the  left.  It  is  most  remarkable  that  so 
large  a  portion  of  this  run  is  on  straight  lines,  and  that 
the  total  degree  of  curvature  has  been  kept  so  low. 

At  Pedro  Miguel  there  is  one  lock  in  duplicate  which 
lowers  the  vessel  to  the  55-foot  elevation  of  Miraflores 
Lake.  The  Pedro  Miguel  Lock  has  approach  walls 
formed  by  1200-foot  extensions  in  both  directions  of 
the  dividing-wall  between  the  locks.  Miraflores  Lake 
is  comparatively  small,  and  a  run  of  1|  miles,  in  a 
500-foot  channel  45  feet  deep,  takes  the  ship  to  Mira- 
flores. At  this  point  there  are  two  locks  in  duplicate, 
with  approach  walls  at  the  upper  and  lower  levels,  the 
same  as  at  Pedro  Miguel  and  Gatun.  The  two  locks 
at  Miraflores  lower  the  vessel  to  tidewater,  a  drop  of 
45  feet  at  high  tide,  or  65  feet  at  low  tide.  (See  plan 
No.  3.)  The  20-foot  tides  on  the  Pacific  coast  have 
made  the  problem  more  difficult  than  on  the  Atlantic 
coast,  where  the  tide  is  only  2  feet.  One-half  mile 
beyond  Miraflores  Locks,  the  canal  makes  a  turn  to 
the  right  and  extends  for  a  distance  of  2|  miles  to 
Balboa,  where  it  makes  a  turn  to  the  left  and  extends 
for  4J  miles  to  deep  water  in  the  Bay  of  Panama. 
The  Pacific  sea-level  section  is  all  of  500  feet  width, 


TKe  Panama  Canal 


and  the  depth  of  the  water  is  55  feet  at  high  tide  and 
35  feet  at  low  tide,  and  is  usually  stated  to  be  45  feet 
deep,  referring  to  mean  tide. 

The  total  length  of  the  canal,  measured  along  its 
axis,  is  50.4  miles.  The  portion  within  the  shore  lines 
is  only  41.5  miles,  and  the  remainder  consists  of 
dredged  channels  in  Limon  Bay  and  Panama  Bay. 
Of  the  total  length,  14|  miles  are  at  sea  level,  over 
23  J  miles  in  Gatun  Lake,  nearly  3  miles  in  the  locks  or 
alongside  approach  walls,  1|  miles  in  Miraflores  Lake 
and  8  miles  in  the  Culebra  Cut.  In  the  total  length 
there  are  22  bends,  with  a  total  curvature  of  600  de- 
grees and  51  minutes.  The  average  length  of  the 
straight  reach  is  a  little  over  2  miles.  At  each  bend 
the  canal  is  widened  by  cutting  away  on  the  inside  of 
the  bend,  the  shape  and  amount  of  cutting  having 
been  determined  after  observations  of  vessels  actually 
rounding  turns. 

The  time  required  for  a  vessel  to  pass  through  was 
estimated  to  be  from  10  to  12  hours,  of  which  3  hours 
are  required  for  passing  the  locks,  and  these  estimates 
have  been  verified  by  experience.  Through  the  Culebra 
Cut  the  vessel  must  reduce  speed,  but  for  most  of  the 
remaining  distance  may  approach  full  speed. 

GATUN  LAKE 

Less  attention,  it  is  believed,  has  been  paid  to  Gatun 
Lake  by  those  describing  the  canal  than  the  subject 
really  deserves.  (See  plan  No.  1.)  It  forms  the  pre- 
ponderant element  in  the  American  project.  The 
great  dam  at  Gatun,  the  spillway,  and  the  locks  are 


Route,  Design  and  Construction  47 


incidental  to  the  lake,  and  by  virtue  of  it,  the  amount 
of  excavation  and  the  attendant  difficulties  in  the 
Culebra  Cut  are  greatly  reduced. 

The  lake  provides  23  J  miles  of  canal  channel,  or 
nearly  half  the  total  length,  and  gives  a  width  of  1000 
feet  for  16  miles,  800  feet  for  4  miles,  and  500  feet  for 
the  remaining  4  miles;  the  average  width  is  nearly 
900  feet,  while  the  rest  of  the  canal  averages  less  than 
450  feet.  Not  only  in  width,  but  also  in  depth  the 
lake  channel  offers  an  advantage,  for  while  the  rest  of 
the  channel  is  limited  to  an  ample  depth  of  45  feet, 
the  lake  offers  a  maximum  depth  of  about  75  feet,  and 
is  nowhere  less  than  45  feet  along  the  navigable  channel. 
These  generous  dimensions  will  facilitate  navigation 
and  will  allow  vessels  to  approach  their  ocean  speed. 

Besides  being  such  a  valuable  asset  to  navigation, 
Gatun  Lake  solves  one  of  the  most  difficult  and  most 
vital  of  all  the  problems  involved  in  the  canal  con- 
struction. We  are  familiar  with  the  characteristics  of 
the  Chagres  River.  This  wild  and  variable  stream  is 
immediately  tamed  and  calmed  on  entering  Gatun 
Lake.  Its  waters,  which  form  and  replenish  the  lake, 
may  be  likened  to  a  beast  of  burden  quietly  carrying 
the  ships  to  and  fro,  supplying  the  lifting  force  that 
passes  them  through  the  locks,  and  the  power  to  drive 
the  generators  which  light  the  canal,  operate  the 
machinery,  and  which  may,  later,  operate  the  railroad. 

While  great  ideas  and  great  accomplishments  may 
be  briefly  abstracted  in  picturesque  terms,  the  knowl- 
edge so  given  is  superficial  if  unaccompanied  by  a 
more  intimate  consideration  of  the  principles  involved, 


48 


XKe  Panama  Canal 


and  of  the  studies  and  investigations  which  attended 
them.  Nothing  may  be  left  to  surmise  or  conjecture, 
no  assumptions  may  be  made,  unsupported  by  masses 
of  the  best  evidence  available.  Where  the  problems 
are  new  and  no  direct  evidence  can  be  obtained,  the 
best  engineering  judgment,  based  on  experience,  must 
be  brought  into  play. 

An  investigation  had  first  to  be  made  as  to  the  suf- 
ficiency of  the  water  supply.  The  lake,  once  it  is 
formed,  will  suffer  losses  from  at  least  five  different 
sources:  1st,  evaporation;  2d,  seepage,  or  groundflow; 
3d,  leakage  through  the  lock  gates  and  spillway  gates; 
4th,  water  required  to  pass  ships  through  the  locks, 
and  5th,  water  to  develop  power,  if  a  sufficient  amount 
remains  available. 

Evaporation  depends  on  the  wind  and  the  hygro- 
metric  state  of  the  air,  and  also  on  the  area  of  the  lake. 
At  the  normal  elevation  of  85  feet  above  sea  level,  the 
area  of  the  lake  is  163  square  miles.  For  certain  rea- 
sons that  will  be  discussed  later,  the  elevation  of  the 
lake  may,  when  actually  placed  in  service,  vary  from 
80  to  90  feet  above  sea  level,  and  the  area  of  the  lake 
will  vary  correspondingly  from  153  to  173  square 
miles.  Evaporation  continues  from  day  to  day,  and, 
unfortunately,  is  the  greatest  when  rainfall  is  the  least. 
The  length  of  the  dry  season  is,  therefore,  of  importance. 
To  provide  for  the  driest  future  year,  the  weather 
records  as  far  back  as  available  are  studied,  and  the 
driest  year  taken  as  a  standard,  with  an  allowance  for 
even  more  unfavorable  conditions.  Fortunately,  the 
French  under  the  New  Company,  differing  from  the 


Route,  Design  and  Construction  49 


de  Lesseps  Company,  made  continuous  and  careful 
observations  of  all  meteorological  and  hydrological 
features  of  value.  The  Americans  have  continued 
these  observations  with  great  care  and  completeness. 
Evaporation  pans  have  also  been  exposed  to  secure 
direct  evidence  which  would  bear  some  relation  to  the 
rate  of  evaporation  from  the  lake.  From  the  best  evi- 
dence available  at  the  time,  the  probable  rate  of  evap- 
oration was  found  to  be  about  one-fourth  of  an  inch 
per  24  hours.  This  has  been  computed  to  equal  a  loss 
of  930  cubic  feet  per  second,  continuing  during  the 
dry  season.  Later  observations  indicate  one-sixth  of 
an  inch  daily  during  the  dry  season,  thus  reducing  the 
computed  probable  loss. 

The  loss  by  seepage  is  dependent  on  the  character 
of  the  soil  forming  the  bottom  of  the  lake,  and  upon 
the  head  or  pressure  of  water  at  any  particular  point. 
To  clearly  understand  its  character,  we  may  note  that 
an  ordinary  river  in  reality  includes  more  than  the 
flowing  water  which  is  visible  between  its  banks,  in 
that  the  ground  along  the  river  contains  water  which 
to  the  eye  seems  quiescent,  but  which  actually  has  a 
flow,  extremely  slow,  but  always  moving  toward  the 
river  and  down  the  valley  with  the  river.  Its  rate  of 
flow  depends  on  the  character  of  the  material,  the 
frictional  resistance,  and  the  distance  to  be  traveled; 
it  is  comparatively  rapid  in  sand  or  gravel,  and  is  re- 
duced to  a  minimum  in  clays  and  rocks.  The  seepage 
from  Gatun  Lake  will  be  of  an  allied  nature,  and  it 
remains  to  estimate  the  amount.  The  engineers  made 
careful  studies  of  thfc  bottom  of  the  lake  by  borings, 


50 


XHe  Panama  Canal 


test  pits,  and  geological  surveys.  Specially  careful  ex- 
aminations were  made  at  those  points  where  the  ridges 
between  the  lake  and  the  adjoining  valleys  are  narrow 
and  low.  It  was  perfectly  possible  that  gravel  strata 
or  porous  coral  deposits  might  exist  which,  communi- 
cating with  the  sea,  might  discharge  the  waters  of  the 
lake  as  through  a  sieve.  The  engineers  satisfied  them- 
selves that  no  ;such  condition  existed,  and  their 
judgment  was  confirmed  by  a  Board  of  Consulting 
Engineers  appointed  in  1908  by  President  Roosevelt. 
The  probable  seepage  was  estimated  to  be  85  cubic  feet 
per  second,  or  less  than  one-tenth  the  rate  of  evapora- 
tion during  the  dry  season. 

The  loss  of  water  through  leaks  and  imperfect  seat- 
ings  in  the  many  valves  and  miter-gates  of  the  locks, 
and  the  14  gates  of  the  spillway,  depends  on  the  accu- 
racy with  which  the  devices  are  made  and  the  care 
used  in  the  maintenance.  The  commission  followed 
correct  principles  in  using  the  utmost  care  in  designing 
and  constructing  them,  and  yet  assuming  a  rather 
heavy  loss  of  water  from  incomplete  closure  or  accident. 
The  amount  lost  is  estimated  to  be  275  cubic  feet  per 
second,  the  equivalent  of  500  ordinary  city  fire  streams. 

The  amount  of  water  found  necessary  for  developing 
electric  current  for  lighting  the  canal,  and  operating  all 
the  machinery  is  estimated  at  275  cubic  feet  per  second, 
based  on  the  required  amount  of  current  and  the  effi- 
ciency of  the  apparatus. 

The  amount  of  water  required  for  lockages  is  de- 
pendent on  the  design  of  the  locks,  the  amount  of 
traffic,  and  the  size  of  the  vessels,  for  the  locks  are  so 


Route,  Design  and  Construction  51 


divided  that  small  vessels  may  use  short  sections,  or 
several  small  vessels  pass  through  the  whole  lock  to- 
gether. Assuming  the  traffic  equal  to  the  maximum 
capacity  of  the  locks,  and  utilizing  records  of  experi- 
ence with  the  Sault  Ste.  Marie  Canal,  the  Board  of 
Consulting  Engineers  estimated  the  traffic  at  80,000,000 
register  tons  per  year,  as  against  30,000,000  tons  for 
the  "Soo"  Canal,  and  an  actual  maximum  at  that  time 
of  15,500,000  tons  for  the  Suez.*  The  amount  of  water 
required  for  lockage  was  found  by  the  designing  engi- 
neers to  be  about  2618  cubic  feet  per  second,  which 
means  about  one  lockage  in  each  direction  per  hour, 
but  the  assumed  maximum  traffic  will  not  be  reached 
for  many  years. 

Adding  the  total  losses  from  all  causes  gives  a  total 
of  4183  cubic  feet  per  second,  applicable  during  the 
dry  months,  when  evaporation  is  the  greatest.  The 
question  now  arises:  Where  is  this  rather  enormous 
quantity  of  water  coming  from?  The  input  into 
Gatun  Lake  comes  from  rainfall  directly  on  the  lake, 
which  is  absent  in  the  dry  season,  however,  and  from 
the  flow  of  Chagres  River  and  of  minor  streams.  The 
data  desired  for  this  purpose  pertains  to  the  driest 
period  that  may  be  reasonably  expected,  and  the  best 
way  to  predict  it  is  from  records  of  the  flow  of  the 
Chagres  in  past  years.  The  records  of  the  New  French 
Panama  Canal  Company  furnish  much  reliable  infor- 
mation, while  that  obtained  from  the  old  company  is 
fragmentary  and  incomplete. 

*  The  Suez  Canal  passed  5373  vessels  in  1912,  about  12  per  day,  with  a 
total  tonnage  of  28,008,945  the  largest  year  of  record.  The  tonnage  in  1913 
was  less. 


52 


XKe  Panama  Canal 


The  driest  consecutive  four  months  in  the  available 
records  of  19  years  showed  a  flow,  on  an  average,  of  1190 
cubic  feet  per  second  into  the  lake.  Unfortunately,  a 
19-year  period  is  hardly  sufficient  to  determine  the 
future  probable  minimum,  and  the  average  of  1190 
cubic  feet  which  occurred  in  1908,  the  year  the  com- 
putations were  made,  was  followed  in  1912  by  an  aver- 
age flow  for  four  months  of  less  than  900  cubic  feet 
per  second,  or  about  25  per  cent  less.  This  will  not 
affect  the  problem  adversely,  because  of  the  liberal 
allowances  made  in  determining  losses  and  the  possi- 
bility of  using  an  oil-fired  steam  plant  in  place  of 
water  power. 

It  is  apparent  that  the  900  cubic  feet  per  second 
supplied  to  Gatun  Lake  will  not  provide  the  4183 
cubic  feet  per  second  to  be  consumed.  The  balance, 
or  3283  cubic  feet  per  second,  will  be  obtained  by 
filling  Gatun  Lake  to  a  level  of  87  feet  above  the  sea 
(the  gates  and  copings  are  92  feet)  before  the  end  of 
the  rainy  season,  and  then,  during  the  succeeding  dry 
season,  drawing  the  lake  down  gradually  to  a  level  of 
80  feet  above  sea  level,  if  need  be.  The  storage  capac- 
ity of  the  lake  between  these  two  levels,  at  an  average 
area  of  about  159  square  miles,  will  supply  this  amount 
of  water  with  a  slight  margin.  The  problem  is  iden- 
tical, in  many  respects,  with  that  involved  in  the  great 
impounding  reservoirs  of  modern  city  water  works, 
such  as  those  of  Boston  and  New  York,  where  storage 
tides  over  the  dry  season. 

It  may  be  noted  that  this  drawing  off  of  the  upper 
5  feet  of  the  lake  explains  one  reason  why  the  depth  of 


Route,  Design,  and  Construction  53 


channel  through  the  Culebra  Cut  was  made  45  feet  at 
normal  lake  level.  The  water  level  in  the  cut  is  the 
same  as  in  the  lake,  and  when  the  lake  falls  to  80  feet, 
the  channel  in  the  cut  will  have  40  feet  depth  of  water. 

At  this  point  it  becomes  clear  that  one  of  the  great- 
est responsibilities  of  the  canal  operating  force  will  be 
the  conservation  of  the  water.  The  operator  must  be 
thoroughly  versed  in  problems  of  rainfall  and  hydrol- 
ogy, and  should  begin  the  dry  season  with  a  full  lake, 
and  he  must  be  careful  not  to  be  caught  by  an  unex- 
pectedly early  or  unusually  dry  season;  he  must  each 
year  be  prepared  for  the  worst.  No  apprehension  need 
be  felt  that  the  water  supply  will  give  out,  however, 
if  reasonable  care  is  taken.  Should  increased  storage 
capacity  for  water  be  required  to  meet  new  conditions 
of  the  distant  future,  it  may  be  obtained  by  building  a 
reservoir  on  the  upper  Chagres,  with  a  dam  at  Alha- 
juela,  where  some  of  the  flood  waters  of  the  Chagres, 
which  now  waste  over  the  spillway,  may  be  stored  until 
needed  in  the  dry  season.  It  was  here  that  the  French 
proposed  building  a  reservoir  for  supplying  the  highest 
level  of  their  canal  through  a  tunnel. 

It  is  seen  that  Gatun  Lake  can  be  kept  full,  but  the 
designing  engineer  was  required  to  determine  that  it 
could  be  filled  initially.  An  examination  of  the  records 
of  flow  of  the  Chagres  for  all  available  years  left  no 
doubt  that  the  water  in  the  rainy  season  in  excess  of  all 
losses  was  more  than  sufficient  to  fill  the  lake  in  two 
successive  years.  The  driest  rainy  season  of  record, 
1911-1912,  afforded  an  average  flow  of  6556  cubic  feet 
per  second,  which  would  have  filled  Gatun  Lake  in 


54 


THe  Panama  Canal 


about  400  days,  or  two  rainy  seasons,  making  deduc- 
tions for  reduced  losses  on  account  of  there  being  no 
lockages,  no  hydraulic  power  plant  in  operation,  and 
less  leakage,  evaporation,  and  seepage,  due  to  reduced 
lake  area  and  head  of  water.  Two  rainy  seasons 
were  actually  taken  to  fill  the  lake,  although  in  fact 
the  rate  of  filling  depended  more  on  the  contingencies 
of  construction  work  than  on  the  amount  of  water 
available. 

THE  GATUN  DAM 

The  Gatun  Dam,  which  made  Gatun  Lake  possible, 
is  the  key  to  the  American  Panama  Canal  scheme. 
(See  plan  No.  2.)  The  lock-level  canal  might  have 
been  built  with  a  dam  at  a  different  location,  9  miles 
upstream  at  Bohio  adopted  by  the  French  in  their  final 
scheme  and  selected  by  the  first  Isthmian  Commission 
on  the  lock  canal  alternative;  but  the  area  of  the  lake 
would  have  been  very  much  less,  with  a  consequent 
loss  of  opportunity  to  navigate  in  wide,  unrestricted 
channels,  and  a  great  loss  in  storage  capacity.  The 
dam  at  Bohio  could  have  been  built  of  masonry  on  a 
rock  foundation,  for  which  the  French  made  consider- 
able excavation.  A  masonry  dam  on  rock  foundation 
was  not  possible  at  Gatun,  because  the  rock  is  too  far 
below  the  surface.  It  was  only  after  advice  had  been 
obtained  of  some  of  the  ablest  engineering  talent  in 
the  world,  familiar  with  similar  problems  elsewhere, 
that  an  earth  dam  at  Gatun  was  decided  on.  This 
decision  was  probably  the  most  momentous  one  in 
connection  with  the  canal  construction.  Elaborate 
investigations  were  made  of  the  character  of  the  under- 


Route,  Design  and  Construction 


55 


lying  material  through  test  pits  and  innumerable  bor- 
ings. It  was  found  that  the  top  layer  consisted  of  fine 
sand  intermixed  with  a  large  proportion  of  clay,  which 
extended  to  a  maximum  depth,  at  one  point,  of  practi- 
cally 80  feet.  Below  this,  for  a  distance  of  100  feet  or 
more,  is  a  thick  deposit  of  impervious  blue  clay,  con- 
taining a  little  sand  with  a  quantity  of  shells  inter- 
spersed. Below  the  clay,  and  directly  overlying  the 
bed  rock,  is  a  miscellaneous  layer  of  variable  thickness 
up  to  20  feet,  consisting  of  boulders  and  gravel  consoli- 
dated with  finely  divided  clays  and  silts. 

Several  important  factors  enter  into  the  design  of 
this  dam  and  the  determination  of  its  dimensions. 
The  dam  itself  must  be  impervious  to  water,  or,  on 
finer  analysis,  it  would  be  more  accurate  to  say  the 
seepage  must  be  a  minimum.  If  a  well,  extending 
below  the  ordinary  level  of  the  ground  water,  and 
without  tapping  subterranean  water  channels,  is 
pumped,  the  ground  water  in  the  surrounding  territory 
will  flow  towards  the  well  and  its  level  will  gradually 
fall  and  assume  a  curve  joining  the  surface  of  the  water 
in  the  well  with  the  normal  ground-water  level  some 
distance  away.  The  slope  of  this  curve  depends  upon 
the  character  of  the  material  and  the  amount  of  fric- 
tion which  it  exerts  against  the  flow.  Deeper  pumping 
will  lower  the  curve  and  extend  it  farther  back.  To 
maintain  a  fixed  level  of  water  in  the  well  will  require 
a  fixed  rate  of  pumping,  equal  to  the  seepage  through 
the  ground,  so  long  as  no  rain  falls  on  the  area  affected 
by  the  well.  The  conditions  at  the  Gatun  Dam  are 
similar,  with  the  ground-water  level  in  the  valley  below 


56 


THe  Panama  Canal 


the  dam  corresponding  to  the  water  in  the  well  and  the 
water  in  the  lake  corresponding  to  the  normal  ground- 
water level,  and  the  slope  curve  passing  through  the  dam. 

To  prevent  loss  of  water,  the  materials  of  which  the 
dam  is  built  must  be  selected  from  the  available  local 
deposits  and  placed  in  such  a  way  as  to  retard,  to  the 
greatest  possible  extent,  the  flow  of  water.  In  very 
fine  silts,  the  rate  of  flow  is  so  minute  that  they  are 
generally  classed  as  impervious.  Capillary  attraction  is 
a  force  which  must  be  considered.  It  is  this  which  keeps 
the  surface  of  ordinary  ground  moist.  The  evapora- 
tion from  the  surface  removes  the  moisture,  but  it  is 
promptly  replaced  by  capillary  attraction  from  the 
ground-water  reservoir  below.  With  no  rain,  the  ground 
water  is  thus  gradually  lowered  until  the  capillary 
forces  are  no  longer  sufficient  to  raise  the  water  from 
the  increased  depth  to  the  surface  which  then  becomes 
dry.  This  force  must  also  be  considered,  although  to  a 
minor  extent,  in  the  design  of  the  dam. 

Unfortunately,  the  ordinary  materials  which  are 
classed  as  impervious  have  a  faculty  for  absorbing 
water,  which  softens  them  and  reduces  their  capacity 
for  self-support.  With  the  height  of  water  furnished 
by  Gatun  Lake,  there  is  ample  opportunity  for  the 
contents  of  the  dam  to  become  saturated,  and  mate- 
rials subject  to  disintegration,  or  with  a  tendency  to 
absorb,  would  settle  and  not  maintain  the  side  slopes. 
Clay  or  fine  silt  is  particularly  treacherous  in  its  nature; 
yet  it  is  upon  these  materials  that  the  imperviousness 
of  Gatun  Dam  must  depend.  The  solution  of  this 
problem  is  to  build  the  center  of  the  dam  of  impervious 


Route,  Design  and  Construction  57 

material  and  the  outer  portion  on  both  sides  of  a  ma- 
terial capable  of  maintaining  the  predetermined  slopes 
wet  or  dry,  but  necessarily  allowing  water  to  pass.  On 
the  lake  side,  it  must  be  faced  with  a  lining  to  resist 
wave  action. 

Yet  this  is  not  all.  The  weight  of  the  dam  might 
produce  so  great  a  pressure  on  the  original  surface  of 
the  earth  that  it  would  sink  and  cause  the  earth  to  rise 
just  beyond  the  toe  of  the  dam.  This  actually  hap- 
pened only  a  short  distance  away  with  embankments 
for  the  Panama  Railroad.  The  remedy  was  to  counter- 
weight the  rising  area  of  soft  material  at  the  toe  of  the 
embankment  with  fill  material  and  thus  prevent  any 
further  rise.  With  a  structure  like  the  Gatun  Dam, 
settlement  of  this  character  would  have  dislodged  the 
parts  of  the  dam  already  built,  would  have  created 
possible  fissures  and  avenues  for  future  flow,  and 
would  have  aroused  the  greatest  doubt  in  the  minds  of 
the  public  as  to  its  strength  and  safety;  therefore, 
the  question  must  be  investigated  and  settled  in  ad- 
vance. The  rising  of  the  material  is  prevented  by  first 
removing  any  soft  material,  and  further  by  making 
the  dam  very  wide,  with  a  thin  extended  toe,  thus 
making  the  counterweight  a  part  of  the  dam  itself. 
Even  with  the  greatest  precautions,  a  slip  in  the  rock 
fill  due  to  the  giving  way  of  soft  material  near  the  old 
French  canal  occurred  and  caused  great  popular 
alarm,  and  led  the  President  to  order  a  board  of  emi- 
nent engineers  to  Panama.  Their  report  was  most  re- 
assuring and  confirmed,  in  the  main,  the  judgment  of 
the  commission. 


58 


THe  Panama  Canal 


Not  only  the  dam  itself  must  be  impervious,  but 
also  the  material  upon  which  it  is  built  must  prevent 
the  water  from  flowing  underneath  it.  To  increase 
imperviousness,  the  commission  drove  a  line  of  sheet 
piling  twenty  feet  into  the  earth;  but  on  the  advice  of 
the  special  board  of  engineers  this  was  omitted  and, 
instead,  a  trench  was  dug  along  the  middle,  which  was 
filled  by  the  core  of  the  dam. 

The  generous  dimensions  of  the  dam,  however,  prin- 
cipally contribute  the  imperviousness  and  stability. 
As  finally  built,  the  crest  is  100  feet  wide  and  20  feet 
above  normal  water  level;  the  thickness  of  the  dam  at 
the  water  surface  is  400  feet,  and  it  increases  to  a 
thickness  of  nearly  one-half  mile  at  its  deepest  part. 

The  dam,  after  clearing  the  573  acres  of  site,  was 
constructed  by  first  building  long  mounds  at  the  outer 
lines  of  the  dam  with  the  proper  exterior  slope.  The 
material  was  spoil  from  the  Culebra  Cut,  the  locks 
and  the  spillway,  and  was  dumped  from  trestles. 
When  the  mounds  were  carried  to  sufficient  height, 
the  interior  space  was  filled  with  silty  material  from 
nearby  deposits  by  the  hydraulic  dredging  process. 
Where  the  course  of  the  Chagres  crosses  the  dam,  two 
lines  of  sheet  piling  were  driven,  and  the  material 
between  them,  which  was  not  of  a  suitable  character, 
was  excavated  and  replaced. 

The  design  of  the  Gatun  Dam  was  not  decided  on 
until  elaborate  tests  had  been  made  of  the  actual  seep- 
age through  the  material  to  be  used  in  the  construc- 
tion. These  seepage  tests  were  made  by  drilling  holes 
into  the  deposits  that  were  later  to  form  the  core  of 


Fig.  10.  —  Gatun  Spillway  Dam,  under  construction,  showing  three  perma- 
nent crest  gates  in  position,  January,  1913.  The  water  is  issuing  from  tempo- 
rary culverts,  which  were  permanently  closed  at  a  later  date. 


R.o\ite,  Design  and  Construction  59 


the  dam,  and  pumping  a  measured  amount  of  water 
into  them,  and  noting  the  loss  and  rate  of  flow  under 
fixed  pressures.  The  natural  flow  of  the  ground  water 
through  the  soil  was  also  studied.  Several  model  dams 
were  built  and  experiments  made  to  determine  the 
slope  of  the  water  through  the  material  of  the  dam, 
caused  by  the  miniature  lake  on  one  side.  Test  pits 
were  dug  in  the  deposits,  and  the  flow  into  the  test 
pits  was  pumped  out  and  measured,  while  at  the  same 
time,  observations  on  the  level  of  the  ground  water 
were  taken  in  the  neighborhood. 

The  dimensions  of  the  cross-section  of  the  dam  were 
twice  changed.  The  height  of  135  feet  above  sea  level, 
as  originally  proposed,  was  at  first  reduced  to  115  feet, 
and  finally  to  the  adopted  height  of  105  feet.  The 
surface  slopes  and  width  at  the  bottom  were  also 
changed. 

GATUN  SPILLWAY 

During  the  rainy  season  the  influx  of  water  into 
Gatun  Lake  is  much  greater  than  the  amount  con- 
sumed, and  the  spillway  through  the  Gatun  Dam  pro- 
vides the  outlet.  It  might  have  been  placed  anywhere 
on  the  rim  of  the  lake  and  a  channel  to  the  sea  con- 
structed, but  a  favorable  site  on  rock  foundation  was 
found  on  the  line  of  the  dam,  which  allowed  the  use  of 
the  bed  of  the  Chagres  for  carrying  the  water  to  the 
sea.    (See  plan  No.  2.) 

The  spillway  consists  of  a  concrete  dam  with  means 
for  overflow,  and  a  concrete  channel  to  lead  the  water 
away.  It  is  a  most  important  adjunct  to  Gatun  Lake, 
for  it  not  only  will  safely  relieve  the  lake  of  dangerous 


60 


» 

The  Panama  Canal 


flood  waters,  but  also  will  control  the  level  of  the  water 
surface,  thus  accomplishing  the  storage  of  a  part  of 
the  flood  waters  for  use  in  the  dry  season.  Its  dis- 
charge capacity  must  be  made  equal  to  that  of  the 
greatest  possible  flood.  To  determine  the  amount  of 
water,  we  must  again  seek  information  in  the  records 
of  the  New  French  Company  and  the  succeeding 
records  by  the  Americans.  It  is  to  be  deplored  that 
the  old  company  obtained  no  record  of  the  Chagres 
flood  of  1879,  known  to  be  larger  than  any  covered  by 
subsequent  records.  The  engineers'  report  states  that, 
"The  maximum  momentary  discharge  of  the  Chagres 
River  at  Gatun  is  calculated  from  the  measured  Bohio 
discharge  to  be  182,000  cubic  feet  per  second."  This 
is  over  200  times  the  minimum  dry-weather  flow. 

An  overflow  type  of  spillway  to  carry  off  this  amount 
of  water  would  be  over  2,000  feet  long,  and  even  so,  its 
discharge  capacity  at  the  highest  floods  would  not  be 
sufficient,  and  the  lake  might  rise  five  feet.  For  these 
reasons,  the  commission  adopted  a  spillway  with  a 
crest  that  is  semi-circular  in  plan  and  has  fourteen 
openings  cut  through  the  upper  part,  closed  by  gates. 
The  elevation  of  the  bottom  of  the  openings  is  at  69 
feet  above  sea  level,  or  16  feet  below  the  normal  level 
of  the  lake.  Each  opening  is  about  45  feet  wide. 
They  are  so  wide,  in  fact,  that  the  top  of  the  spillway 
is  really  composed  of  a  series  of  piers,  with  the  open- 
ings containing  the  valves  between  them.  When  the 
gate  is  shut,  its  top  is  at  elevation  88  feet  above  sea 
level,  making  the  gate  19  feet  in  its  vertical  dimension. 
The  gate  may  be  raised  22J  feet,  or  clear  of  a  90-foot 


Route,  Design  and  Construction  61 


depth  of  water  in  the  lake.  This  device  for  discharg- 
ing water  from  the  lake  is  far  superior  to  the  plain 
crest  without  gates,  because  the  amount  of  water  pass- 
ing through  may  be  very  nicely  controlled;  further- 
more, any  increase  in  the  depth  of  the  water  in  the  lake 
from  sudden  floods  would  tend  to  increase  the  capacity 
of  each  opening  of  the  spillway,  because  the  amount  of 
water  discharged  through  a  weir  is  dependent  upon  the 
head  or  elevation  of  water  which  is  acting  on  the  weir. 

When  the  lake  is  at  elevation  87  a  single  gate  will 
discharge  11,000  cubic  feet  per  second,  or  154,000 
cubic  feet  per  second  for  the  lot.  The  maximum  known 
flow  of  the  Chagres  is  less  than  this  amount;  in  fact,  is 
only  137,500  cubic  feet  for  any  prolonged  period,  such 
as  33  hours.  The  momentary  discharge  may  be  much 
greater  than  this  and  has  been  determined  as  high  as 
186,000  cubic  feet  per  second,  but,  in  designing  a  spill- 
way, the  momentary  maximum  is  not  what  is  wanted. 
Should  any  flood  occur  which  will  exceed  the  capacity 
of  154,000  cubic  feet  per  second,  then,  of  course,  the 
lake  will  begin  to  rise;  but  as  it  rises,  the  capacity  of 
the  spillway  is  increased  until,  with  the  lake  at  the 
improbable  elevation  of  92  feet,  above  which  the  water 
would  flow  over  the  miter  gates  and  into  the  locks,  the 
rate  of  discharge  of  the  crest  will  be  222,000  cubic  feet 
per  second.  In  addition  to  this,  water  can  be  passed 
through  the  lock  culverts  both  at  Gatun  and  Pedro 
Miguel.  The  length  of  the  period  over  which  records 
of  flow  of  the  Chagres  are  available  is  insufficient  to 
predict  with  any  degree  of  certainty  the  probable  max- 
imum flood  at  some  future  time,  and  the  commission 


62 


THe  Panama  Canal 


has  again  shown  its  wisdom  in  designing  for  a  capacity 
which  is  quite  far  in  advance  of  that  required  by 
recorded  floods. 

The  gates  themselves  are  constructed  of  heavy  and 
massive  steel  work.  They  are  of  the  so-called  Stoney 
gate-valve  type.  The  sliding  frictional  resistance  of 
ordinary  valves  of  this  size  would  be  very  great.  The 
Stoney  pattern  of  valve  overcomes  this  by  using  roller 
trains  upon  which  the  valve  travels.  Passing  length- 
wise along  the  dam  and  underneath  the  gates  is  a  tun- 
nel in  which  all  the  machinery  for  operating  the  gate 
valves  is  placed.  A  chain  is  fastened  to  each  side  of 
the  gate  and  passes  over  a  sprocket  wheel  on  the  ad- 
joining pier,  and  then  down  through  a  vertical  well  to 
the  machinery  tunnel.  A  large  screw  is  fastened  to 
the  end  of  the  chain  and  passes  through  a  worm.  A 
heavy  counterweight  hangs  on  the  lower  end  of  this 
screw  rod,  leaving  only  frictional  resistance  to  be  over- 
come. The  motor  for  operating  the  worms  is  located 
midway  between  the  screw  rods,  thus  applying  equal 
lifting  force  to  each  end  of  the  gate. 

After  passing  over  the  crest  the  water  slides  over  the 
face  of  the  spillway,  which  is  so  designed  as  to  fit  the 
normal  curve  of  the  water.  At  the  bottom  the  con- 
crete work  is  curved  so  as  to  give  the  stream  a  hori- 
zontal direction.  About  21  baffle  piers  are  built 
within  this  area  to  retard  the  rapid  flow.  At  the  same 
time,  the  channel  becomes  contracted  from  a  width  of 
414  feet,  which  is  the  length  of  the  inside  of  the  crest, 
to  a  width  of  285  feet.  The  water  is  carried  in  a  long 
sluiceway,  lined  with  heavy  concrete  walls  and  paved 


Route,  Design  and  Construction 


63 


with  a  concrete  floor,  and  is  discharged  at  a  safe  dis- 
tance from  the  dam  into  the  old  French  Chagres  di- 
version and  then  into  the  bed  of  the  Chagres  River, 
whence  it  continues  to  the  sea.  During  the  dry  season 
of  four  months  very  little  water  will  pass  through  the 
spillway,  but  in  the  rainy  season  varying  amounts  will 
pass.  The  average  flow  will  be  about  10,000  cubic  feet 
per  second,  increased  momentarily  to  almost  15  times 
that  amount  during  periods  of  high  flood.  Over  the 
tops  of  the  piers  which  separate  the  gate  openings,  a 
bridge  and  roadway  have  been  built,  so  that  traffic  may 
be  carried  the  full  length  of  the  Gatun  Dam. 

So  important  to  the  success  of  the  canal  is  this  spill- 
way that  the  commission's  engineers  constructed  a 
model  of  the  same  for  experimental  purposes,  one 
thirty-second  of  the  size  of  the  original.  It  was  tested 
under  various  conditions  and  the  facts  thus  gained 
were  of  value  in  making  the  final  designs. 

EXCAVATION  OF  CULEBRA  CUT 

The  Culebra  Cut  is  very  generally  and  very  justly 
considered  the  most  important  part  of  the  canal  con- 
struction work.  (See  plan  No.  5.)  The  date  of  com- 
pletion of  the  cut  practically  determined  that  of  the 
whole  canal.  It  was  in  charge  of  the  Central  Divison 
of  the  canal  organization,  which  covered  also  the  small 
amount  of  dredging  and  excavation  within  the  limits  of 
Gatun  Lake.  Total  expenditures  are  a  good  measure  of 
the  magnitude  and  relative  importance  of  the  various 
items  and,  as  given  in  the  table  elsewhere,  show  that 
about  half  the  amount  applied  to  construction  work 


64  XKe  Panama  Canal 

direct,  was  for  the  Culebra  Cut.  There  might  be  added 
to  the  total  for  the  Culebra  Cut  $20,000,000  of  the 
payment  for  the  French  property,  which  applied  to  ex- 
cavation, thus  indicating  that  the  cut  comprised  over 
one-half  of  the  construction  work  of  the  canal  proper. 

A  typical  American  tool  developed  largely  on  rail- 
road work,  namely,  the  steam  shovel,  solved  one  of  the 
vital  parts  of  the  excavation  problem.  Its  function 
was  to  pick  up  the  soft  material  or  blasted  hard  mate- 
rial and  place  it  aboard  the  cars.  It  performed  its 
function  so  well  that  the  rate  of  progress  was  dependent 
on  keeping  the  shovels  supplied  with  cars  and  disposing 
of  the  material  on  the  dumps.  Again  allowing  the  cost 
of  the  various  items  into  which  excavation  may  be 
analyzed  to  indicate  their  relative  importance,  the  fol- 
lowing table,  taken  from  the  records  for  the  fiscal  year 
1912,  is  given  with  the  items  arranged  in  the  order  of 
cost: 

ANALYSIS  OF  COST  OF  EXCAVATING  CULEBRA  CUT,  TAKEN  FROM 
RECORDS  FOR  FISCAL  YEAR  1912 


Cost  per  Cubio 
Yard., 

1.  Transportation   $0.1331 

2.  Drilling  and  blasting   0. 1157 

3.  Tracks   0.0885 

4.  Loading  by  steam  shovels   0.0681 

5.  General  expense  and  supervision   0.0503 

6.  Dumps   0.0479 

7.  Plant,  arbitrary   0.0395 

8.  Drainage,  structures  and  clearing   0 . 0045 

Total  unit  cost   $0.5496 


The  clearing  of  the  site  in  preparation  for  excavation 
work  was  of  minor  importance.   After  the  loose  mate- 


Rx>\ite,  Design  and  Construction 


65 


rial  had  been  cut  away  by  the  shovels,  the  drilling  and 
blasting  followed.  Of  the  total  of  93,000,000  cubic 
yards  of  material  removed  from  the  cut  prior  to  July 
1,  1912,  about  66,500,000  cubic  yards,  or  71  §  per  cent, 
required  drilling  and  blasting.  The  power  for  drilling 
was  supplied  by  a  large  compressed-air  main,  which 
was  tapped  at  convenient  points  and  the  lines  laid  to 
the  drills.  The  work  was  most  carefully  studied  and 
planned.  Systematic  records  were  kept  of  the  amount 
drilled  by  each  crew  daily.  Familiarity  with  the  ma- 
terial and  trial  of  various  methods  indicated  exactly 
the  setting  of  the  holes  and  the  depths  to  which  they 
should  be  drilled  to  obtain  the  greatest  economy.  All 
loading  of  holes  and  firing  was  placed  in  the  charge  of 
a  special  crew  of  trained  men,  and  the  firing  was  done 
by  current  from  the  electric  station  at  Empire.  There 
was  a  serious  accident  during  the  early  stages  of  the 
work,  due  to  a  premature  discharge  of  a  vast  quantity 
of  dynamite  that  had  been  placed  in  the  holes  and  left 
there  for  firing  at  a  convenient  time.  From  some  ob- 
scure cause,  such  as  the  overheating  of  the  dynamite, 
it  exploded  and  killed  a  large  number  of  men.  There- 
after, the  dynamite  was  fired  within  a  few  hours  after 
being  placed,  with  the  result  that  in  three  years  only 
eight  men  were  killed  by  dynamite,  although  a  total 
of  19,000,000  pounds  of  explosives  was  used  in  the 
Central  Division  during  that  time.  A  knowledge  of 
the  handling  of  explosives,  as  in  the  case  of  many 
other  important  public  works,  formed  an  asset  of  great 
importance.  Various  kinds  of  explosives  were  used, 
including  saltpeter  dynamite  with  60  per  cent  nitro- 


66 


THe  Panama  Canal 


glycerin,  saltpeter  dynamite  with  40  per  cent  nitro- 
glycerin and  Trojan  powder.  The  total  amount  of 
explosives  used  on  the  entire  canal  work  to  June  30, 
1913,  reached  the  enormous  total  of  56,000,000  pounds. 
When  the  blasting  did  not  break  up  the  material  small 
enough  for  handling  by  steam  shovel,  it  was  further 
broken  up  by  so-called  "dobe"  shots,  which  consisted 
in  laying  a  small  stick  of  dynamite  on  the  top  of  the 
rock  and  detonating  it  with  a  safety  fuse. 

The  shovels  worked  on  short  pieces  of  track,  which 
were  extended  as  the  work  progressed,  while  the  cars 
for  receiving  the  material  were  handled  on  parallel 
tracks  next  to  the  shovel.  So  rapidly  did  the  shovels 
load  cars  that  the  handling  of  dirt  trains  into  and  out 
of  the  cut  was  a  problem  in  railroad  transportation  of 
the  very  first  order.  Within  the  limits  of  the  cut  there 
were  nine  parallel  tracks  to  carry  the  traffic,  having  a 
total  length  of  over  one  hundred  miles.  Where  two  or 
more  shovels  were  working  on  one  line,  the  empties 
came  in  on  one  end  of  the  track,  so  that  each  shovel 
had  a  train  of  cars.  As  soon  as  any  shovel  filled  its 
train,  all  were  immediately  shoved  ahead  so  as  to  get 
the  full  train  out  of  the  way.  By  adhering  to  this  sys- 
tem the  first  train  was  always  the  one  to  be  loaded 
first.  All  trains  were  handled  by  a  train  dispatcher 
and  his  assistants,  who  were  located  in  a  tower  in  a 
commanding  position  and  provided  with  telephones, 
flags,  and  other  forms  of  signalling  apparatus.  A  great 
deal  depended  on  the  manner  in  which  the  train  dis- 
patcher handled  his  work.  There  were  empties  to 
get  into  the  cut  over  a  complicated  system  of  tracks 


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Route,  Design  and  Construction  67 


to  the  proper  shovel;  there  were  loaded  trains  to  be 
moved  on,  and  loaded  trains  to  be  passed  out  of  the 
cut;  there  were  workmen's  trains,  accident  cases,  spe- 
cial locomotives,  and  other  traffic  to  handle.  There 
was  scarcely  a  moment  when  some  definite  action, 
affecting  the  economy  of  the  entire  operation,  was  not 
expected  of  the  train  dispatcher.  The  trains  were 
passed  on  to  the  construction  tracks  and  thence  to  the 
main  line  of  the  Panama  Railroad.  The  dirt  trains 
invariably  had  the  right-of-way.  To  observe  the  work 
of  these  train  dispatchers,  and  to  see  the  constant  pro- 
cession of  dirt  trains  and  empties  rolling  along  the 
main  line  of  the  Panama  Railroad,  was  most  impres- 
sive. The  traffic  was  probably  equal  to  that  on  the 
main  lines  of  the  important  trunk  lines  of  the  United 
States.  The  amount  of  traffic  is  indicated  by  consid- 
ering the  average  number  of  locomotives  and  cars  in 
use  during  a  typical  year,  namely  1912,  as  shown  by 
the  following  table: 

Average  Daily 


LOCOMOTIVES  AND  CARS  Number  in 

Use,  1912 

Locomotives  handling  spreaders   6 

Locomotives  handling  unloaders   10 

Locomotives  handling  track  shifters   3 

Locomotives  handling  dirt  and  miscellaneous  trains. . .  117 

Lidgerwood  flat  cars,  average  per  day   2403 

Large  steel  dump  cars   320 

Small  steel  dump  cars   973 


The  largest  number  of  cars  handled  in  one  day 
during  the  year  1912  was  4896.  In  other  years  the 
total  was  even  larger.  The  number  of  shovels  in 
use  during  this  year  was  46,  of  which  nearly  half  were 


68 


THe  Panama  Canal 


95-ton  shovels  with  a  dipper  capacity  of  5  cubic  yards. 
The  highest  daily  yardage  for  one  shovel  was  4465 
cubic  yards.  The  highest  annual  record  was  543,481 
cubic  yards.  The  average  amount  of  material  handled 
per  shovel  per  hour  increased  from  121  cubic  yards  in 
1908  to  165  cubic  yards  in  1912.  In  the  meantime 
the  average  cost  per  cubic  yard  of  excavation  dropped 
from  $0,725  in  1908  to  $0.55  in  1912. 

The  disposal  of  the  excavated  material  required 
most  careful  thought  and  involved  considerable  en- 
gineering ability.  The  rate  of  progress  on  the  Culebra 
Cut,  and,  therefore,  the  rate  of  progress  on  the  whole 
canal,  at  various  times  depended  upon  the  speed  at 
which  the  trains  could  dispose  of  their  loads  of  dirt. 
Where  the  material  could  possibly  be  of  any  use, 
trestles  were  built  and  the  material  was  deposited 
without  rehandling  directly  where  it  was  needed,  as  in 
the  Gatun  Dam,  the  back  fill  behind  the  lock  walls, 
the  embankments  of  the  new  Panama  Railroad,  and 
in  raising  the  level  of  swamp  lands,  making  land,  and 
building  a  breakwater  at  the  Pacific  entrance  of  the 
canal.  The  vast  bulk  of  the  material  was  wasted. 
The  principal  dumps  were  at  Tabernilla,  Gatun,  Mira- 
flores,  Balboa  and  the  Panama  Railroad  relocation. 
Each  of  these  dumps  took  from  5,000,000  to  18,000,000 
cubic  yards.  Trestles  were  first  built  to  dump  material 
off  the  cars;  and  as  the  level  of  this  fill  rose,  the  track 
was  removed  from  the  trestle  and  shifted  always 
toward  the  edge  of  the  bank.  It  was  the  constant 
shifting  of  track  and  extension  of  trestles  which  caused 
the  delays  in  disposal  of  material.    The  ingenious 


Route,  Design  and  Construction  69 


methods  that  had  been  developed  on  railroad  work 
and  elsewhere  were  utilized  on  the  dumps.  A  small 
amount  of  the  material  was  handled  in  steel  side- 
dump  cars  which  landed  the  material  alongside  the 
track.  Air  pressure  from  a  locomotive  was  used  in 
dumping  these  cars.  Another  and  a  more  ingenious 
method  for  unloading  them  was  by  means  of  a  large 
plow.  The  cars  were  flat  and  had  a  bulkhead  on  one 
side  only;  to  balance  this  the  other  side  overhung 
slightly  more.  When  a  train  arrived  at  the  dump  an 
enormous  plow  of  the  full  width  of  the  car  was  set  on 
one  end  of  the  train,  and  a  cable  led  to  the  other  end. 
The  winding  of  the  cable  drew  the  plow  the  full  length 
of  the  train  and  discharged  all  the  material  on  the 
ground  next  to  the  track. 

A  further  operation  was  necessary,  because  the 
track  could  not  then  be  laid  directly  on  the  brink  of 
the  dump.  The  material  which  was  piled  up  by  the 
dumping  of  the  cars  was  shoved  off  the  edge  of  the 
embankment  by  means  of  an  enormous  plow,  sus- 
pended over  the  area  alongside  the  track  from  a  special 
car,  and  pushed  along  by  powerful  locomotives.  When 
the  dump  had  been  widened  to  a  point  where  the  plow 
or  spreader  could  no  longer  slide  the  material  out  of 
the  way,  it  was  necessary  to  shift  the  track.  Here 
again  railroad  experience  was  brought  into  play,  and 
the  work  of  hundreds  of  men  was  done  by  a  small 
crew  with  a  track  shifter.  This  machine  had  two 
booms;  the  first  lifted  the  track  off  the  ground,  the 
second  was  slewed,  and  a  line  passing  over  it  was  made 
fast  to  the  track  and  drew  the  track  into  its  new 


70 


TTHe  Panama  Canal 


location.  The  length  of  the  booms  was  sufficient  so  that 
the  weight  of  the  shifter  itself,  which  ran  on  the  track, 
did  not  affect  the  work. 

Special  problems  were  encountered  in  some  of  the 
dumps,  of  which  one  of  the  most  interesting  was  the 
disposition  of  silt  and  clays  taken  from  the  Chagres 
section  of  the  Central  Division.  It  became  very  soft 
when  exposed  during  the  rainy  season,  and  the  slope 
was  found  in  some  cases  to  be  as  flat  as  1  vertical  to 
22  horizontal.  It  was  impossible  to  maintain  tracks 
on  such  material.  Accordingly,  a  track  was  laid  along 
the  banks  of  the  Chagres  on  hard  ground,  and  when  the 
material  was  dumped,  it  was  thoroughly  wetted  by 
means  of  a  4-inch  water  pipe,  whereupon  the  saturated 
material  slid  slowly  but  firmly  into  the  Chagres  River. 
The  current  was  sufficient  to  carry  it  along  and  deposit 
it  at  points  where  it  could  do  no  harm. 

In  September  1913  steam  shovel  work  in  the  Culebra 
Cut  was  completed,  the  decision  having  been  reached 
to  flood  the  cut  and  do  the  remaining  digging  by  means 
of  dredges.  Controlling  factors  in  this  decision  were: 
first,  it  was  hoped  that  the  weight  of  the  water  in  the 
cut  would  have  a  deterrent  effect  on  some  of  the  slides 
and  breaks;  second,  the  remaining  material  required  no 
drilling  and  blasting  and  could,  therefore,  be  more 
economically  handled  by  dredges;  and  third,  the  canal 
could  be  used  for  traffic  while  excavation  was  still  in 
progress  which  would  be  impossible  with  shovels  at 
work.  The  step  forms  a  connecting  link  between  canal 
construction  and  canal  maintenance,  since  dredges  will 
be  continually  at  work  to  maintain  the  various  channels. 


Rovite,  Design  and  Construction  71 


The  French  began  excavating  the  Culebra  Cut  on  Janu- 
ary 20, 1882  and  with  the  exception  of  the  six  years  from 
1889  to  1895  it  has  been  in  continuous  progress  cover- 
ing a  period  of  over  32  years. 

GEOLOGY  AND  THE  SLIDES 

The  material  through  which  the  Culebra  Cut  passes 
is  very  variable.  The  region  of  the  Isthmus  was  once 
geologically  very  active,  and  each  period  of  activity  is 
marked  by  material  typical  of  the  conditions  under 
which  it  was  formed.  Fortunately,  as  in  so  many 
other  parts  of  the  world  that  were  once  the  scene  of 
geologic  or  volcanic  activity,  the  Isthmus  is  now  in  a 
quiescent  period  and  the  great  geologic  forces  are  in  a 
condition  of  comparatively  stable  equilibrium.  When 
the  canal  project  was  being  agitated  there  was  great 
apprehension  on  the  part  of  those  not  familiar  with 
conditions  as  to  possible  volcanic  eruptions  or  earth- 
quakes. In  allaying  this  feeling,  the  photographer  of 
the  flat  arch  in  the  ruins  of  the  old  Santo  Domingo  con- 
vent in  Panama  played  a  very  important  part.  The 
fact  that  the  arch  has  stood  for  so  many  years,  while 
the  roof  and  windows  have  disappeared  and  the  ma- 
sonry has  deteriorated,  adds  to  the  impressiveness. 
Equally  important,  as  proving  the  absence  of  seismic 
disturbances,  is  an  almost  exactly  similar  arch  in  a 
nearby  church  which  still  carries  its  superimposed  floor 
load.  Being  in  a  different  plane  adds  to  the  force  of 
the  evidence. 

The  comparatively  infinitesimal  forces  controlled  by 
the  hand  of  man  in  a  few  localities  produced  minor 


72 


THe  Panama  Canal 


conditions  of  instability  that  have  resulted  in  so-called 
" slides"  or  " breaks."  Fortunately,  man  controls  the 
means  to  restore  equilibrium.  This  phase  of  the  canal 
work  will  be  more  fully  described  later  on. 

From  the  reports  of  the  commission's  geologists  it 
is  learned  that  the  oldest  rocks  are  exposed  along  the 
canal  in  the  Atlantic  end  of  the  Culebra  Cut  in  the 
region  about  Bas  Obispo.  There  is  also  a  smaller  out- 
crop of  these  rocks  near  Miraflores  at  the  Pacific  end 
of  the  Culebra  Cut  and  the  evidence  is  that  the  two 
are  joined  by  deep-lying  rocks  of  the  same  character. 
These  are  of  a  type  known  as  volcanic  breccia,  with 
local  deposits  of  meta-conglomerates,  and  originally 
composed  of  fragments  from  volcanic  craters  but  which, 
in  the  course  of  ages,  have  been  compacted  and  ce- 
mented into  a  fairly  hard  rock.  The  whole  in  past 
ages  has  been  under  heavy  stresses,  which  have  caused 
faults  and  shears;  that  is,  the  rocks  have  cracked  and 
the  parts  have  slid  by  one  another  vertically,  and  this 
has  resulted  in  very  much  broken  masses. 

From  Empire  to  Paraiso,  at  the  head  of  Miraflores 
Lake,  and  thus  including  the  greater  part  of  the  Cu- 
lebra Cut,  there  existed  in  a  former  age  a  great  basin  or 
sag.  This  basin  no  longer  forms  a  valley,  for  during 
succeeding  geologic  periods  it  was  filled  with  new  forma- 
tions. These  are  not  of  a  regular  character  and  the 
variations  in  the  rocks  and  in  their  disposition  are 
greater  than  in  many  other  parts  of  the  world.  A  com- 
plete and  detailed  description  would  interest  only  the 
geologist  or  the  engineer  in  advance  of  his  constructive 
operations.    The  basin  rocks  are  overlaid  by  the  next 


iVo\ite,  Design  and  Construction  73 


younger  formation,  composed  of  light  gray  limy  sand- 
stones and  sandy  limestones  in  beds  or  lenses,  and 
separated  from  each  other  by  thin  beds  of  friable  shale 
with  occasional  masses  of  carbonaceous  matter.  These 
formations  contain  fossils  of  marine  fauna  which  also 
occur  at  other  points  entirely  across  the  Isthmus, 
and  as  these  are  formed  only  in  the  shallow  estuaries 
of  the  sea,  it  is  proved  that  the  materials  in  which  the 
fossils  are  now  lodged  were  deposited  under  water; 
and  their  disposition  across  the  Isthmus  is  considered 
by  geologists  as  proof  that  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific 
Oceans  were  joined  at  that  time.  The  latest  marine- 
deposited  rock  is  composed  of  coral  and  shell  limestones 
and  is  of  non-continuous  occurrence.  During  succeed- 
ing ages,  these  formations  slowly  rose,  as  they  are  now 
above  the  level  of  the  sea.  There  was  then  aerially 
deposited  a  thick  bed  of  greenish  fine-grained  volcanic 
clay  rock,  which  fills  the  depressions  in  the  marine- 
deposited  rocks  —  the  remains,  probably,  of  former  es- 
tuaries and  channels.  This  deposit  is  also  not  uniform, 
but  contains  beds  of  gravel,  sandstone  and  lava  flow. 
The  whole  is  weak  and  crumbly. 

The  most  recent  geologic  formations  consist  of  masses 
of  volcanic  rock;  molten  lava  from  below  forced  its 
way  through  the  softer  rocks  along  the  lines  of  least 
resistance,  sometimes  spreading  between  the  layers  of 
softer  rock  and  sometimes  breaking  through  in  great 
rifts,  forming  dikes.  Great  volcanic  masses  have  also 
risen,  due  to  the  pressure  exerted  from  below,  and, 
forcing  their  way  upward  in  a  cold  condition  through 
several  hundred  feet  of  softer  overlying  rocks,  are  said 


74 


THe  Panama  Canal 


to  have  formed  such  elevations  as  Gold  Hill  and 
Contractors  Hill. 

The  geologically  recent  volcanic  eruptive  rocks  are 
generally  hard,  and  they  fortunately  serve  to  greatly 
strengthen  the  banks  of  the  canal.  The  various  rocks 
are  in  irregular  formation,  and  have  in  some  cases 
been  dislodged  from  their  former  relative  position  by 
faults  or  vertical  sliding  of  unstable  masses,  and  by 
the  breaking  and  cracking  into  blocks  of  masses  of 
contiguous  rocks. 

With  this  brief  description  of  the  local  geology,  the 
problem  ahead  of  the  engineer  in  planning  and  making 
the  Culebra  Cut  becomes  a  little  clearer.  It  is  to  be 
remembered  that  most  of  the  information  now  avail- 
able was  unknown  before  the  excavation  exposed  ma- 
terials hundreds  of  feet  below  the  surface.  Where  the 
canal  passes  through  a  deep  cut,  the  exact  slopes  to 
be  given  to  the  sides  are  of  the  greatest  importance. 
If  they  are  too  steep  the  material  will  slide  or  fall  into 
the  canal,  and  if  the  slope  is  flattened,  even  a  little, 
unnecessary  excavation  and  greater  cost  will  be  in- 
curred, increasing  rapidly  with  the  depth  of  the  cut. 
The  side  slopes  must  be  determined  in  advance  of 
excavation,  as  far  as  possible,  because  the  shovels  in 
the  beginning  cover  the  full  width  and  gradually  work 
to  the  lower  and  narrower  levels.  The  cutting  of  any 
additional  material  from  the  side  to  flatten  the  slope 
will  be  hazardous  and  costly.  As  the  cut  progressed, 
the  bulk  of  the  side  slopes  proved  stable.  But  as 
already  mentioned,  certain  areas  of  instability  devel- 
oped into  breaks  and  slides. 


Fig.  12.  —  Miraflores  upper  locks,  general  view,  looking  north  from  lower 
locks.  Steam-shovel  excavation  for  lower  locks  in  foreground.  November  8, 
1911.  The  two  cranes  on  extreme  left  and  on  extreme  right  are  the  "berme" 
cranes  containing  concrete  mixers.  The  two  center  cranes  are  chamber  cranes 
and  handle  materials  to  center  part  of  the  locks. 


Fig.  13.  —  Concrete  handling  cranes  at  Miraflores.  The  booms  on  the  right 
carry  the  buckets  which  pick  up  the  sand  and  stone  from  the  storage  piles  and 
dump  in  bins  over  the  mixers  in  center  of  crane.  The  booms  on  the  left  carry 
the  concrete  for  dumping  in  the  lock  walls.  The  whole  crane  travels  on  a  track. 
The  booms  on  the  left  move  through  a  small  angle  horizontally. 


Route,  Design  and  Construction  75 


The  slides  as  a  feature  of  the  canal  operations  have 
received,  perhaps,  more  than  their  share  of  attention, 
and  have  been  made  use  of  by  alarmist  press  agents. 
Whereas  the  amount  of  American  excavation  for  the 
whole  canal  is  232,353,000  cubic  yards,  the  total  addi- 
tional amount  of  material  to  be  removed,  due  to  the 
slides,  is  estimated  to  be  approximately  29,431,000 
cubic  yards,  or  about  12J  per  cent  of  the  total  excava- 
tion, or  a  little  over  22  per  cent  of  the  dry  excavation, 
or  about  30  per  cent  of  the  excavation  in  the  Culebra 
Cut.  This  is,  relatively,  the  same  condition  that  would 
be  encountered  on  a  difficult  sewer  or  water-pipe 
trench.  Recent  activity  of  the  slides  will  increase  the 
amounts. 

The  slides  are  not  to  be  minimized,  however,  as  the 
amount  of  material  involved  is  equivalent  to  the  exca- 
vation for  60  of  the  largest  dry  docks  and  they  have 
served  to  considerably  prolong  the  time  of  completing 
the  Culebra  Cut.  Careful  attention  has  been  given 
them  by  the  commission,  and  the  geologist  employed 
by  them  has  made  a  thorough  examination  and  report 
on  the  subject. 

Slides  have  developed  at  those  points  where  the  side 
slopes  of  the  canal  excavation  were  left  too  steep;  that 
is,  where  not  enough  material  was  taken  out  to 
provide  a  stable  bank,  having  in  view  the  soft  or  weak- 
ened character  of  the  material.  By  removing  addi- 
tional material,  stability  of  the  banks  results  and  the 
slides  are  thus  resolved  into  a  problem  of  the  ultimate 
amount  of  excavation.  Very  large  areas  are  involved. 
The  West  Culebra  slide,  for  instance,  covers  68  acres 


76 


THe  Panama  Canal 


and  involves  the  excavation  of  over  11,000,000  cubic 
yards.  The  Cucaracha  slide  covered  over  50  acres 
and  involved  over  5,300,000  cubic  yards.  The  East 
Culebra  slide  covers  an  area  of  55  acres  and  will  mean 
a  total  excavation  of  about  8,000,000  cubic  yards. 
The  slides  are  uncertain.  It  was  thought  that  the 
Cucaracha  slide  would  come  to  rest  because  of  some 
strengthening  dikes  of  hard  rock,  but  the  pressure  of 
the  material  above  was  sufficient  to  break  or  shear  the 
rocks,  allowing  the  material  to  move,  which  it  did 
very  rapidly,  filling  the  almost  completed  canal. 

The  slides  are  of  four  different  characters,  each  due 
to  different  conditions.  The  first  is  produced  where  a 
bed  of  clayey  materials,  with  or  without  superimposed 
formations,  rests  on  a  bed  of  harder  material  which 
pitches  toward  the  canal.  If  the  surface  is  sufficiently 
lubricated  by  the  ground  waters,  the  superincumbent 
mass  slowly  moves  into  the  canal.  The  second  class  re- 
sults where  faults  or  great  geologic  cracks  in  the  rocks 
occur,  and  where  the  fault  is  at  such  an  angle  that  the 
material  in  the  canal  prism  held  the  rocks  from  sliding 
and,  upon  excavation  of  this  material,  there  is  nothing 
to  prevent  a  sliding  into  the  canal.  The  third  and 
most  subtle  and  difficult  form  of  slide,  which  is  locally 
known  as  a  break  or  structural  break,  begins  by  a  verti- 
cal settling  of  the  banks.  Cracks  form  in  the  surface  of 
the  ground  and  the  material  between  cracks  settles  a 
little  more  on  the  side  toward  the  canal,  causing  the 
cracks  to  open  and  a  series  of  steps  to  form ;  at  the  same 
time  the  bottom  of  the  canal  rises.  The  rocks  in  which 
this  phenomenon  occurs  are  some  of  the  weakest  in 


IVo\xte,  Design  and  Construction  77 


the  canal  and  are  composed  of  loosely  cemented 
rounded  particles.  Very  little  stress  will  break  the 
cementitious  material,  and  the  rounded  particles  then 
flow  freely  on  one  another;  there  is  nothing  to  prevent 
their  sliding,  as  would  be  the  case  if  they  interlocked 
like  pieces  of  broken  stone.  The  masses  do  not  slide 
directly  into  the  canal,  but  the  high  part  of  the  bank 
drops  vertically,  slides  some,  and  forces  the  bottom  of 
the  excavation  to  rise.  It  reaches  a  state  of  equilib- 
rium by  a  different  method  than  the  normal  sliding 
mass.  The  fourth  form  of  slide  is  that  due  to  erosion 
and  weathering  induced  both  by  physical  and  by  chem- 
ical forces.  Just  as  every  cliff  has  as  its  foot  a  talus  of 
broken  bits  of  weathered  rock,  so  the  banks  of  the  canal 
will  weather,  and  limited  amounts  of  material  will  wash 
into  the  canal.  Vegetation  will  retard  this.  The 
rest  will  have  to  be  dug  or  later  dredged  from  the  canal. 

The  serious  problems  of  the  slides  will  have  been 
solved  when  the  canal  is  entirely  finished.  No  one  can 
predict  with  certainty,  however,  that  they  will  have 
been  altogether  eliminated  by  that  time.*  New  slides 
may  develop  or  old  ones  extend.  But  the  slides  are 
usually  slow  to  develop,  and  the  material  can  be  rapidly 
excavated  should  any  occur.  The  commission  will  no 
doubt  leave  for  the  maintenance  force  a  fleet  of  dredges 
and  other  excavating  apparatus,  with  which  the  prob- 
lems could  be  met  should  they  arise. 

It  may  be  added  that  it  is  most  fortunate  that  we 
did  not  adopt  the  sea-level  canal,  for  with  85  feet 
greater  depth  the  slides  in  the  cut  might  easily  have 

*  A  slide  in  October,  1914,  temporarily  closed  the  canal  to  traffic,  after 
vessels  had  been  regularly  passing  through  for  several  weeks. 


78 


THe  Panama  Canal 


been  fourfold  the  present  extent,  and  they  might,  in- 
deed, have  been  a  problem  of  the  first  magnitude. 

MIRAFLORES  LAKE 

Miraflores  Lake  is  a  very  much  smaller  body  of 
water  than  Gatun  Lake,  and  lies  between  the  locks  at 
Pedro  Miguel  and  those  at  Miraflores.  (See  plan  No. 
1.)  It  is  a  little  over  miles  long  and  about  1|  miles 
wide  at  its  widest  part.  It  was  at  first  intended  to 
have  the  lower  locks  built  close  to  Balboa  instead  of 
at  Miraflores.  If  this  had  been  done,  the  lake  would 
have  had  an  area  of  7  square  miles  instead  of,  as  built, 
only  one  square  mile,  and  would  have  afforded  a  very 
good  navigable  channel  of  5  miles,  instead  of  onlyl^ 
miles,  as  at  the  present  time.  This  was  the  scheme 
proposed  by  the  Board  of  Consulting  Engineers  in 
their  report  of  1906.  The  change  from  the  board's 
plan  to  the  one  finally  adopted  involved  an  increased 
cost  of  about  $10,000,000,  and  was  apparently  disad- 
vantageous, so  far  as  the  physical  characteristics  of 
the  canal  are  concerned.  The  reasons  for  the  change 
were  that  close  to  Balboa  the  locks  would  be  subject 
to  hostile  gun-fire  from  the  Bay  of  Panama,  and  that 
the  preliminary  work  on  the  dam  at  Balboa  connecting 
with  Sosa  Hill  showed  that  a  suitable  foundation  did 
not  exist. 

The  water  level  of  Miraflores  Lake  will  be  carried 
at  an  elevation  55  feet  above  mean  tide.  Miraflores 
Lake  occupies  a  portion  of  the  valley  of  the  Rio  Grande 
River,  and  at  its  lower  end  the  Miraflores  locks  have 
been  constructed  in  the  line  of  this  valley.  Dams 


R,o\ite,  Design  and  Construction 


79 


extend  from  the  lock  walls  to  neighboring  hills,  which 
are  close  by,  so  as  to  enclose  the  lake.  The  dam  on 
the  west  side  of  the  locks  makes  an  apparently  un- 
necessary sweep  to  the  south,  but  the  object  is  to  cap- 
ture the  flow  of  the  Cocoli  River  for  use  in  the  lake  and 
to  prevent  the  water  from  giving  trouble  in  the  valley 
below  the  locks.  The  flow  from  the  Rio  Grande  and 
Pedro  Miguel  Rivers,  and  from  one  or  two  other  smaller 
streams,  also  enters  the  lake.  The  water  from  Gatun 
Lake  which  is  used  in  the  single  lock  at  Pedro  Miguel 
will  flow  into  Miraflores  Lake.  The  water  consump- 
tion from  Miraflores  Lake  is  that  due  to  evaporation 
and  lockages  through  the  two  sets  of  locks  at  Mira- 
flores, and  the  amount  used  will  be  in  excess  of  the 
supply  from  the  rivers  during  the  dry  season.  The 
difference  will  be  made  up  from  water  allowed  to  flow 
into  Miraflores  Lake  from  Gatun  Lake.  During  the 
rainy  season  there  may  be  an  excess  of  water,  and  this 
will  be  discharged  through  a  spillway  having  gates 
exactly  like  those  for  the  Gatun  Dam  spillway.  The 
capacity  of  the  gates  was  not,  however,  designed  from 
the  estimated  flow  thus  obtained,  but  was  based  on  the 
larger  flow  which  would  enter  Miraflores  Lake  in  case 
all  the  gates  in  one  of  the  Pedro  Miguel  locks  should  be 
wrecked,  and  the  full  head  of  water  from  Gatun  Lake 
should  flow  uninterruptedly  through  one  of  the  Pedro 
Miguel  locks.  The  discharge  from  the  spillway  is  into 
the  old  channel  of  the  Rio  Grande  River,  over  which 
the  spillway  is  built.  After  following  the  old  channel 
for  about  one  mile,  the  water  will  be  carried  through 
the  Rio  Grande  diversion  for  about  If  miles,  when  it 


80 


THe  Panama  Canal 


will  again  enter  a  part  of  the  old  river  channel  and 
find  its  way  to  the  sea  close  to  the  mouth  of  the  canal. 

THE  CANAL  LOCKS 

The  passage  of  a  vessel  through  locks  wherein  it 
remains  continually  water-borne  is  simple,  as  com- 
pared with  the  usual  process  of  placing  vessels  in  dry 
dock,  involving  the  removal  of  water  from  the  dock 
and  support  of  the  ship  on  blocking.  The  percent- 
age of  accidents  in  both  cases  is  found  to  be  exceed- 
ingly small.  About  90  per  cent  of  the  accidents  in 
locking  vessels  are  due  to  failure  of  signals  from  the 
bridge  to  the  engine  room,  and  these  will  be  eliminated 
at  Panama  through  the  adoption  of  a  part  of  the  process 
in  common  use  in  docking;  namely,  the  vessel  will  not 
move  into  the  lock  under  its  own  steam,  but  will  come 
to  a  full  stop  at  the  approach  wall,  and  the  movement 
of  the  ship  will  then  be  controlled  by  the  lock  opera- 
tives. Two  lines  to  the  bow  and  two  to  the  stern  will 
be  used,  the  strains  being  obtained  from  four  electric 
locomotives  with  winches  on  board,  running  on  rack 
railroads  on  the  edge  of  the  lock  walls,  two  on  each 
side  of  the  lock.  For  large  ships  more  lines  and  more 
locomotives  may  be  found  necessary.  The  process  is 
not  dissimilar  to  towing  canal  boats,  but  with  amplifi- 
cations. With  experience  there  will  no  doubt  be  de- 
veloped the  proper  order  of  seamanship  to  handle  all 
vessels  expeditiously  under  these  novel  conditions. 
(See  plan  No.  6.) 

The  canal  has  in  all  twelve  lock  chambers,  two 
flights  of  three  each  at  Gatun,  two  flights  of  one  each 


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Route,  Design  and  Construction 


81 


at  Pedro  Miguel,  and  two  flights  of  two  each  at  Mira- 
flores.  The  twelve  locks  are  alike  in  their  principal 
features,  but  variations  occur  from  differences  in  ar- 
rangements of  gates  and  protective  devices.  The  lock 
chamber  must  have  at  least  one  gate  at  each  end,  to 
separate  it  from  the  adjoining  chamber  or  from  the 
adjoining  body  of  water.  The  minimum  number  of 
gates  that  would  fulfil  this  condition  for  the  arrange- 
ment of  locks  adopted  is  18.  The  actual  number  used 
is,  for  various  reasons  to  be  explained  later,  increased 
to  46. 

Each  lock  has  a  chamber  110  feet  wide  and  1000 
feet  long,  but  as  about  95  per  cent  of  all  ocean-going 
vessels  are  under  600  feet  long,  the  locks  are  divided 
by  a  second  set  of  gates  into  two  parts,  one  400  feet 
long  and  the  other  600  feet  long.  There  is  no  saving 
of  time  in  filling  a  small  chamber  rather  than  the  full 
1000-foot  lock,  since  all  filling  is  done  at  the  rate  of 
2  feet  per  minute;  but  advantage  in  the  use  of  divided 
locks  arises  from  the  great  saving  in  water,  which  is 
an  element  of  importance,  as  we  have  seen  in  consid- 
ering Gatun  Lake.  This  feature  adds  ten  pairs  of  lock 
gates  to  the  installation.  One  duplicate  lock,  namely, 
the  lower  one  at  Miraflores,  is  not  provided  with  the 
dividing  gates.  This  is  because  the  designing  engineers 
found  that  the  cost  of  the  gates  and  additional  length 
of  concrete  structure  in  this  particular  lock,  due  to 
tidal  conditions,  outweighed  the  saving  in  water. 

Should  a  vessel  approaching  the  first  lock  of  any 
flight  not  come  to  a  stop  through  some  misunderstand- 
ing, a  collision  with  the  lock  gate  will  be  prevented  by 


82 


THe  Panama  Canal 


a  chain  of  3-inch  iron  stretched  from  one  side  of  the 
lock  to  the  other.  The  impact  will  be  taken  up  by 
hydraulic  cylinders  in  the  lock  walls  to  which  the  ends 
of  the  chain  will  be  attached.  The  resistance  is  suffi- 
cient to  stop  a  10,000-ton  vessel  moving  at  4  knots 
per  hour  in  a  length  of  73  feet.  When  not  in  use  the 
chain  will  rest  in  a  groove  in  the  floor  and  side  walls. 
If  the  chain  should  give  way,  or  not  be  in  position,  the 
impact  would  be  received  by  a  pair  of  guard  or  safety 
gates,  which  it  is  expected  would  check  the  vessel  and 
prevent  it  from  injuring  the  next  set  of  gates.  Should 
the  inconceivable  accident  happen  of  a  vessel  passing 
both  the  guard  chain  and  safety  gate  and  wrecking  the 
next  one  while  all  the  other  gates  in  the  lock  were  open, 
due  to  a  vessel  having  just  passed  through,  then 
Gatun  Lake  would  begin  to  flow  out  to  the  full  ca- 
pacity of  the  channel  now  formed  by  the  lock,  and 
similarly  for  Lake  Miraflores.  Four  guard  gates  are 
required  to  protect  the  entrances  to  the  four  lock 
chambers  adjoining  Gatun  Lake  at  Gatun  and  Pedro 
Miguel,  and  four  more  to  protect  the  exits  from  the 
same  locks,  as  an  accident  at  the  exits  would  have  the 
same  consequences  as  at  the  entrances.  Similarly, 
two  gates  each  are  required  at  the  entrances  and  exits 
of  the  upper  Miraflores  lock  chambers,  or  a  total  of 
twelve  guard  gates. 

A  guard  gate  is  also  constructed  at  the  lower  en- 
trance of  each  flight  of  locks,  and  the  leaves  of  this 
gate  point  away  from  the  lock.  Each  of  these  gates  is 
a  guard  for  vessels  approaching  from  below  and  also 
may  be  used  in  unwatering  the  lock. 


Route,  Design  and  Construction 


83 


Even  the  well-nigh  impossible  combination  of  cir- 
cumstances described  above  would  not  wreck  the 
canal.  The  mitering  lock  gates  could,  of  course,  not  be 
closed  against  the  flowing  stream,  therefore,  to  stop  the 
flow  the  emergency  dam  would  be  brought  into  play. 
The  emergency  dam  is  in  the  form  of  a  bridge  resting 
on  a  turntable  on  the  side  wall  of  the  lock.  It  may  be 
turned  so  as  to  span  the  lock  and  then  be  firmly  bed- 
ded on  each  side.  A  series  of  steel  girders  with  the 
upper  ends  fastened  to  the  bridge  would  be  lowered 
by  cables  into  position,  having  the  lower  ends  on  a 
concrete  sill  provided  for  the  purpose.  Then  steel 
plates  would  be  forced  down  one  by  one,  supported  by 
the  girders,  and  the  opening  would  thus  be  gradually 
closed  by  a  steel  wall  and  the  flow  practically  stopped. 
A  floating  caisson  such  as  is  used  with  dry  docks 
would  then  be  placed  at  the  lake  end  of  the  lock  on  a 
seat  provided  for  the  purpose.  The  caisson  carries  a 
pumping  plant  for  unwatering  the  lock,  and  repairs 
may  thus  be  made.  In  the  meantime  traffic  would 
use  the  other  series  of  locks  in  both  directions. 

The  locks  are  some  of  the  most  massive  concrete 
work  in  the  world.  The  dividing  wall  between  the 
flights  of  three  locks  at  Gatun,  with  the  approach 
walls  which  are  in  extension  of  the  dividing  wall, 
forms  a  mass  of  concrete  60  feet  thick,  about  81  feet 
high,  and  over  If  miles  long.  The  approach  walls 
are  of  cellular  construction.  The  dividing  wall  is  built 
with  the  faces  vertical  and  is  solid  for  over  half  the 
height.  Above  the  solid  portion  the  center  of  the 
wall  is  filled  with  earth,  except  three  superimposed 


84 


THe  Panama  Canal 


tunnels.  The  lowest  tunnel  is  used  for  drainage  of  the 
upper  ones,  the  center  tunnel  for  electric  light  and 
power  cables,  and  the  upper  one  as  a  passageway  for 
employees  to  reach  the  various  chambers  containing 
machinery  for  operating  the  miter  gates  and  the  many 
valves.  The  exterior  walls  of  the  locks  are  of  equal 
height  with  the  central  wall,  and  are  from  45  feet  to 
50  feet  thick  at  the  floor-level;  they  diminish  by  steps 
on  the  back  to  a  thickness  of  8  feet  at  the  top.  The 
thickness  of  the  floor  is  variable  but  is  approximately 
13  feet. 

The  emptying  and  filling  of  the  locks  is  done  through 
circular  openings  in  the  floor,  each  3  feet  10  J  inches  in 
diameter  and  having  an  area  of  12  square  feet.  There 
are  five  of  them  in  each  line  across  the  lock,  and  the 
lines  are  spaced  32  feet  to  36  feet  apart.  In  one  1000- 
foot  lock  there  are  in  all  105  openings,  with  a  total  area 
of  1260  square  feet.  Each  row  of  five  openings  com- 
municates with  a  cross-tunnel  under  the  floor.  Eleven 
of  these  cross-tunnels  in  each  lock  lead  to  the  outside 
wall  and  there  open  into  a  culvert  18  feet  in  diameter, 
without  the  interposition  of  valves.  The  remaining 
ten  tunnels,  alternating  with  the  others,  lead  to  the 
center  wall  where  a  cylindrical  valve  allows  each  tunnel 
to  communicate  with  the  culvert  in  the  center  wall, 
which  is  also  18  feet  in  diameter.  The  center-wall 
culvert  receives  the  tunnels  from  both  locks.  It  ex- 
tends the  full  length  of  the  three  locks  at  Gatun,  and 
at  the  upper  end  it  opens  into  Gatun  Lake,  while  the 
lower  end  discharges  into  the  sea-level  canal.  There 
are  control  valves  at  each  end  and  also  in  the  line  of 


Rxmte,  Design  and  Construction  85 


the  culvert  at  intermediate  points  corresponding  to  the 
locks.  It  is  evident  that,  with  a  proper  adjustment  of 
the  culvert  valves,  the  water  in  any  two  lock  chambers 
may  be  equalized  by  opening  the  cylindrical  valves 
that  allow  the  floor  tunnels  to  communicate  with  the 
center  culvert.  This  allows  a  very  considerable  saving 
of  water  in  operation.  With  all  culvert  valves  open, 
the  center  culvert  may  be  used  to  discharge  water 
from  Gatun  Lake  into  the  sea.  The  side-wall  culverts 
also  extend  the  full  length  of  the  locks,  and  have  con- 
trol valves  at  the  ends  and  at  points  corresponding  to 
the  ends  of  the  locks,  and  at  the  subdivision  points. 
They  may  be  used  in  equalizing  the  water  in  any  two 
locks  that  adjoin  endwise,  or  in  passing  water  into  and 
out  of  the  end  locks.    (See  plan  No.  6.) 

LOCK-OPERATING  MACHINERY 

All  machinery  connected  with  the  locks  is  operated 
by  electricity  and  has  been  specially  designed  for  the 
canal  work,  based  largely  on  previous  experience  with 
locks.  There  are  114  rising  stem  gate  valves,  120  cy- 
lindrical valves,  and  92  machines  for  operating  the  in- 
dividual leaves  of  the  large  miter  gates.  The  apparatus 
is  equipped  with  remote  control  and  position  indicators, 
which  show  at  the  control  switchboard  the  positions  of 
the  gates  and  valves  during  operation.  Indicators  also 
show  the  various  water  levels.  All  regular  operating 
machinery  will  be  controlled  by  means  of  interlocking 
switches,  with  one  central  switchboard  for  each  of  the 
three  groups  of  locks  at  Gatun,  Pedro  Miguel  and 
Miraflores.   There  is  also  local  control  and  hand  oper- 


86 


TKe  Panama  Canal 


ation  where  feasible.  The  whole  installation  is  a  good 
example  of  electric  operation. 

Realizing  that  a  great  deal  of  the  machinery  was  of 
new  type  and  that  the  operating  conditions  in  a  trop- 
ical climate  would  be  unusually  severe,  the  greatest 
care  was  exercised  before  finally  deciding  on  the  type 
and  character  of  the  apparatus.  In  most  cases  a 
sample  piece  was  first  made  and  actually  tried  out 
under  the  severest  working  conditions,  and  changed  if 
necessary  before  the  order  for  the  whole  lot  was 
given. 

The  cylindrical  gate  valves  controlling  the  tunnels 
from  the  center-wall  culvert  consist  essentially  of  a 
vertical  cylinder  placed  in  a  chamber  adjoining  the 
culvert.  The  cylinder  is  seated  at  the  bottom,  and 
directly  beneath  it  is  a  well  to  the  floor  culvert.  A 
short  lift  gives  a  large  waterway  under  the  edges  of  the 
cylinder. 

The  great  advantage  of  the  cylindrical  type  is  that 
it  is  very  quick  opening,  and  that  the  water  pressures 
are  balanced  and  do  not  tend  to  prevent  either  open- 
ing or  closing.  On  the  canal  a  special  form  is  used 
which  does  not  involve  carrying  the  full  diameter  of 
the  cylinder  above  the  water  surface. 

The  larger  openings  to  the  main  culverts  are  con- 
trolled by  rising  stem  gate  valves  of  the  Stoney  pat- 
tern, similar  to  those  used  in  the  crest  of  the  Gatun 
spillway  dam.  The  gate  is  made  of  heavy  structural 
steel,  and  the  water  pressure  is  taken  by  a  train  of 
rollers  at  the  back  of  the  valve  upon  which  the  gate 
moves.    Leakage  is  prevented  by  means  of  a  metal 


Route,  Design  and  Construction 


87 


water-seal  extending  around  the  face  of  the  valve. 
This  seal  is  fastened  to  the  valve  and  slides  on  the 
wall  of  the  opening  and  forms  the  only  sliding  friction 
of  the  whole  valve. 

Each  mitering  lock  gate  consists  of  two  leaves  hinged 
to  the  walls  at  opposite  sides  of  the  lock,  and  each  leaf 
is  65  feet  long;  that  is,  longer  than  half  the  width  of 
the  lock,  so  that  when  the  two  leaves  are  closed,  they 
form  an  angle  pointing  against  the  water  pressure. 
The  92  leaves  weigh  in  the  aggregate  60,000  tons,  a 
weight  in  excess  of  that  of  two  modern  dreadnoughts. 
If  all  the  gates  were  laid  flat  in  a  pile,  it  would  be  644 
feet  high. 

The  joints  at  the  hinges  are  made  water-tight  by 
means  of  Babbitt  metal.  Embedded  on  the  sill  of  the 
lock  is  a  heavy  block  of  wood,  against  which  a  similar 
block  along  the  lower  end  of  the  gate  fits.  The  water- 
tight joint,  however,  is  made  by  means  of  a  seal  on  the 
under  side  of  the  block  on  the  gate  in  the  form  of  a 
rubber  flap  \  inch  thick,  which  is  forced  against  the 
seat  by  the  water  pressure  itself.  The  weight  of  the 
gates  is  decreased  by  water-tight  compartments  near 
the  bottom,  which  give  flotation.  A  trunk  extends 
from  the  deck  to  these  compartments.  Some  of  the 
upper  water-tight  chambers  may  be  filled  so  as  to 
control  the  buoyancy  of  the  gates  for  different  levels 
of  water.  When  in  motion  the  gates  hang  simply  on 
their  hinges,  and  there  are  no  rollers  on  the  floor  of  the 
lock,  the  weight  being  carried  principally  by  the 
buoyancy  of  the  chambers. 


88 


THe  Panama  Canal 


CONSTRUCTING  THE  LOCKS 

In  deciding  on  the  site  for  the  locks,  extensive  and 
elaborate  borings  were  made,  indicating  the  exact 
character  of  the  material.  In  every  case  a  rock  foun- 
dation was  selected. 

The  Gatun  locks  were  constructed  somewhat  ear- 
lier than  those  at  Pedro  Miguel  and  Miraflores,  and 
the  method  of  building  them  also  differed  from  that 
used  for  the  others.  The  conditions  were  not  so  favor- 
able for  economical  work.  The  three  Gatun  locks  and 
the  approach  walls  contain  over  2,000,000  cubic  yards 
of  concrete.  For  purpose  of  comparison  it  may  be 
stated  that  a  large  modern  dry  dock^  contains  less  than 
one-tenth  this  amount. 

The  broken  stone  was  obtained  from  quarries  at 
Porto  Bello,  which  were  opened  particularly  for  the 
lock  work.  The  material  was  quarried  and  crushed 
at  Porto  Bello,  and  was  transported  on  barges  in  tow 
of  commission  tugs  and  carried  through  the  old  French 
canal,  which  happened  to  pass  very  close  to  the  site 
selected  for  the  locks.  On  account  of  the  silting  in  of 
the  old  canal  and  the  long  haul,  the  cost  of  transpor- 
tation was  quite  materially  increased.  The  cost  of  the 
stone  delivered  at  Gatun,  including  cost  of  plant  and 
overhead  charges,  averaged  $2.40  per  cubic  yard.  The 
sand  was  dredged  at  Nombre  de  Dios  and  similarly 
transported  on  barges,  at  a  total  cost  of  about  $2.10 
per  cubic  yard.  Cement  was  shipped  from  the  United 
States  to  Colon,  transferred  by  train  and  placed  in 
storehouses  at  Gatun.    The  mixing  of  the  concrete 


F^ovite,  Design  and  Construction  89 


was  done  at  a  stationary  mixing  plant.  The  stone, 
sand  and  cement  were  transferred  by  gravity,  in  proper 
proportions  for  each  batch,  to  cars  which  dumped  the 
materials  into  the  mixers.  After  thorough  mixing,  the 
concrete  was  discharged  into  buckets  on  electric  cars 
which  ran  on  an  automatically  operated  electric  rail- 
road. The  cars  were  carried  to  tracks  parallel  to  the 
locks  and  were  stopped  at  the  proper  point.  To 
transfer  the  concrete  to  the  desired  location  in  the 
lock,  a  number  of  aerial  cableways  were  used,  extend- 
ing from  one  side  to  the  other  of  the  locks.  The  cable 
at  one  end  was  fastened  to  the  top  of  a  movable  tower 
which  contained  hoisting  apparatus,  and  at  the  other 
end  the  cable  was  fastened  to  a  tower  that  was  also 
movable  but  contained  no  machinery.  The  concrete 
was  lifted  from  the  cars,  and  by  a  trolley  operating  on 
the  cableway  was  carried  over  the  point  of  deposit, 
lowered  and  dumped. 

The  forms  for  the  interior  face  of  the  side  walls  con- 
sisted of  a  heavy  steel  frame  with  steel  face  plates 
which  were  moved  into  position.  The  full  height  of 
the  wall  for  the  length  of  the  form  was  then  con- 
structed, whereupon  the  form  was  moved  to  the  next 
section.  The  cost  of  concrete  on  the  Gatun  locks  was 
$6.64  per  cubic  yard  in  1911  and  $7.76  in  1912. 

For  the  Miraflores  locks  broken  stone  was  brought 
from  a  very  large  quarry  opened  high  up  on  the  side 
of  Ancon  Hill,  where  a  satisfactory  quality  of  stone 
was  found.  About  5,000  cubic  yards  of  stone  were 
turned  out  daily.  Heavy  blasts  were  set  off  above  the 
berm,  and  steam  shovels  then  loaded  the  material  into 


90 


THe  Panama  Canal 


railroad  dump  cars,  which  were  switched  farther  down 
the  hill  by  locomotives  to  the  top  of  a  crusher,  and 
then  dumped  directly  into  it.  "Dobe"  shots  were 
fired  off  in  the  cars  to  split  the  stones  which  were  too 
large.  The  crusher  could  take  stones  equal  in  size  to 
that  of  an  ordinary  chair.  The  crushed  material  was 
screened,  and  that  of  proper  size  was  carried  by  a  rub- 
ber belt  to  a  sorting-screen  and  passed  into  the  storage 
bins  underneath  for  the  various  sizes.  The  material 
from  the  large  crusher  which  was  rejected  by  the 
screen  passed  into  four  small  gyratory  crushers,  and 
from  these  on  to  the  same  belt  for  transfer  to  the 
sorting-screen.  With  this  efficient  and  well-arranged 
plant  the  cost  of  stone  delivered  at  the  site  of  the  locks 
was  about  $0.82  per  cubic  yard.  The  capacity  of  the 
Panama  Railroad  was  insufficient  to  supply  this  mate- 
rial to  the  works  at  Gatun  on  the  other  side  of  the 
Isthmus. 

Sand  for  the  Miraflores  locks  was  obtained  by  dredg- 
ing at  Chame,  transferred  by  barges  to  Balboa,  where 
it  was  unloaded  by  means  of  grab  buckets  and  placed 
in  overhead  storage  bins  for  transfer  by  rail  to  the  lock 
site.  The  total  cost  in  storage  at  the  locks  was  about 
$0.76  per  cubic  yard. 

To  handle  the  stone  and  sand  in  building  the  Mira- 
flores locks,  an  elevated  trestle  was  built  parallel  to 
the  locks  and  about  200  feet  away.  The  cars  dumped 
the  stone  on  the  side  toward  the  locks,  and  the  sand 
on  the  side  away  from  them.  On  the  bank  between 
the  locks  and  the  storage  pile  a  large  cantilever  crane 
operated  on  a  track.    The  tower  contained  bins  and 


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Rcvute,  Design  and  Construction  91 


hoppers  and  two  large  concrete-mixers.  One  canti- 
lever arm  overhung  the  storage  piles,  and  a  grab  bucket 
kept  the  bins  full.  The  other  cantilever  arm  overhung 
the  nearest  lock  wall  and  transferred  the  concrete  from 
the  mixers  to  the  lock  wall.  The  cement  was  taken 
directly  from  the  cars  to  the  tower  without  first  going 
into  storage.  In  the  lock  chamber  was  another  canti- 
lever crane,  which  transported  concrete  to  those  parts 
of  the  lock  beyond  the  reach  of  the  mixing-crane.  The 
entire  plant  was  probably  one  of  the  most  perfect  ever 
devised  for  handling  concrete.  The  cost  of  the  concrete 
in  place  was  $4.68  per  cubic  yard  in  1911  and  $4.77  in 
1912. 

LOCKS  AS  THE  LIMITING  FEATURE 

The  locks  fix  the  maximum  size  ship  that  may  use 
the  canal.  They  will  pass  the  largest  now  built  or 
building,  but  will  not,  for  instance,  pass  the  floating 
dry  dock  Dewey,  which  passed  through  the  Suez  Canal 
on  the  way  to  the  Philippine  Islands.  The  size  of  the 
locks  was  determined  from  the  provisions  of  the  Act 
of  Congress  approved  June  28,  1902,  which  state: 
"Such  canal  shall  be  of  sufficient  capacity  and  depth 
as  shall  afford  convenient  passage  for  vessels  of  the 
largest  tonnage  and  greatest  draft  now  in  use,  and 
such  as  may  be  reasonably  anticipated.  ..." 

In  considering  the  limiting  dimensions  of  the  locks, 
and  thus  of  the  canal,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that 
there  has  been  a  steady  increase  in  the  size  of  ships, 
upon  which  great  emphasis  has  been  laid.  If  curves 
are  plotted  to  show  the  growth  in  length,  width,  depth 
and  tonnage,  especially  if  the  maximum  ship  of  each 


92 


XKe  Panama  Canal 


period  is  taken,  and  if  these  curves  are  extended  to 
show  future  developments,  the  predictions  are  alarm- 
ing. However,  when  the  curves  are  produced  beyond 
a  certain  point  other  factors  not  hitherto  considered, 
and  having  no  influence  on  the  curves  as  plotted,  are 
likely  to  enter.  Shipbuilding  has  undergone  an  almost 
untrammelled  development;  building  facilities,  capital 
and  cost  have,  seemingly,  not  retarded  growth.  Har- 
bors have  been  deepened,  channels  have  been  widened, 
wharves,  docks,  locks  and  wet  basins  have  been  in- 
creased in  size,  to  make  way  for  the  leviathans.  The 
impetus  toward  larger  vessels  has  undoubtedly  been 
from  economic  reasons.  Shipowners  have  found  that 
with  the  larger  and  better  equipped  ships,  having  in 
view  passenger  traffic  and  advertising  effects  as  well 
as  freight,  their  ratio  of  income  has  increased  and  there 
has  been  nothing  to  curb  their  efforts.  Communities 
and  governments  have,  in  their  striving  for  all-im- 
portant commercial  growths,  paid  the  bills  for  harbor 
development.  As  economic  conditions  have  brought 
about  the  steep  rise  in  the  ship-growth  curve,  so  eco- 
nomic conditions,  but  in  another  field,  will  tend  to 
flatten  the  curve.  There  must  be  a  limit  beyond  which 
harbor  development  cannot  economically  go,  and  be- 
yond which  the  sum  of  the  cost  of  shipping  and  build- 
ing and  the  cost  of  construction  and  maintenance  of 
port  works  will  increase  rather  than  decrease.  It  will 
be  difficult  to  determine  when  this  point  is  reached, 
especially  because  the  same  interests  do  not  provide 
capital  for  both  enterprises.  There  are  already  occa- 
sional indications  that  this  factor  is  entering.  The 


Route,  Design  and  Construction  93 


difficulty  in  providing  for  the  largest  ships  in  New 
York  harbor,  while  from  one  standpoint  a  physical  one, 
is  in  the  last  analysis  economic. 

There  is  now  no  commercial  necessity  why  the  Pan- 
ama Canal  should  accommodate  the  largest  ships;  the 
largest  ships  may  be  regarded  as  ocean  ferries  with 
fixed  ports.  The  total  estimated  traffic  capacity  of 
80,000,000  tons  can  be  handled  in  ships  under  600  feet 
long,  which  comprise  95  per  cent  of  the  world's  ton- 
nage, but  within  the  next  generation  the  canal  may 
become  one  of  the  elements  which  exercise  a  retardant 
influence  on  the  maximum  size  of  ships,  depending  on 
developments  in  the  commerce  of  the  world. 

More  important  is  the  effect  of  the  canal  on  the  size 
of  naval  vessels.  Battleships  of  the  United  States 
have  increased  in  beam  from  76  feet  in  1900  (date  of 
authorization)  to  80  feet  in  1905,  88  feet  in  1908,  and 
about  98  feet  in  1912;  and  if  this  ratio  of  increase  is 
maintained,  the  limiting  beam  would  be  reached  in 
ships  authorized  in  about  1915. 

It  is  worthy  of  note  that  the  locks  of  the  enlarged 
Kaiser  Wilhelm  Canal  from  the  Baltic  to  the  North 
Sea  are  1082  feet  long  and  147  feet  wide,  but  the  lift  is 
very  much  less  than  at  Panama. 

Before  leaving  the  subject  of  the  locks  as  the  limit- 
ing features,  it  is  important  to  note  that  no  physical 
obstacle  will  prevent  the  engineer  of  the  coming  gen- 
eration from  building  an  additional  series  of  locks, 
should  experience  show  wider  or  longer  locks  to  be  a 
real  necessity.  The  cost  will  be  great  but  not  prohib- 
itive and  will  be  but  a  small  fraction  of  the  original 


94 


XKe  Panama  Canal 


cost  of  the  canal.  So  far  as  commercial  needs  are  con- 
cerned the  present  provisions  are  extremely  liberal. 
So  far  as  naval  needs  are  concerned  no  one  can  foretell 
what  results  the  rapid  and  radical  developments  of  the 
present  decade  may  disclose. 

THE  SEA-LEVEL  SECTIONS  AND  THE  TERMINALS 

Limon  Bay,  through  which  the  Atlantic  sea-level 
section  passes,  faces  directly  north  and  is  open  to  the 
northerly  storms  and  seas,  which  are  quite  severe  at 
certain  times.  Protection  was  necessary  in  order:  first, 
that  ships  might  enter  the  canal  in  quiet  water;  second, 
to  provide  a  quiet  anchorage;  third,  to  make  traffic  in 
small  boats  feasible  and  safe  between  the  shore  and 
ships  at  anchor;  fourth,  to  prevent  the  movement  of 
silts  and  sands  by  the  seas  and  the  attendant  dredging 
expenditure.    (See  plan  No.  2.) 

To  give  this  protection,  Toro  Point  breakwater  has 
been  constructed,  extending  from  Toro  Point  in  a 
northeasterly  direction  for  a  distance  of  about  2  miles. 
The  outer  end  does  not  quite  cover  the  entrance  to  the 
canal.  The  breakwater  protects  the  greater  part  of 
Limon  Bay  from  the  northerly  storms,  but  the  easterly 
portion  is  still  exposed,  especially  to  waves  and  trade 
winds  from  a  northeasterly  direction.  The  construc- 
tion of  a  breakwater  to  close  this  part  of  the  bay  was 
postponed  to  await  the  results  of  actual  experience 
with  the  one  at  Toro  Point.  It  seemed  probable  at 
the  time  that  this  breakwater  would  ultimately  be 
built,  as  the  protection  was  not  sufficient,  especially 
for  boating,  and  as  the  effects  of  wave  action  cause 


Route,  Design  and  Construction  95 


silting  of  the  channel.  It  was  actually  found  as  a 
result  of  the  experience  of  the  navy  that  it  would  be 
dangerous  and  at  times  impossible  for  small  boats  and 
coal  barges  to  lie  alongside  ships.  Furthermore,  an 
estimate  showed  that  2,200,000  cubic  yards  of  material, 
costing  several  hundred  thousand  dollars  to  remove, 
had  been  deposited  in  the  finished  channel  during 
twelve  months'  action  of  the  waves.  The  construction 
of  the  east  breakwater  was  accordingly  decided  upon. 

The  Toro  Point  breakwater  was  constructed  from  a 
trestle  supported  on  creosoted  piles  85  feet  long  and 
having  two  tracks.  The  piles  were  driven  by  a  railroad 
pile-driver  with  very  heavy  hammer,  which  could  reach 
all  of  the  piles  from  either  track.  Stone  from  a  Toro 
Point  quarry  was  carried  in  cars  on  the  trestle  and 
dumped  overboard,  and  forms  the  core  of  the  break- 
water. Porto  Bello  stone,  which  is  harder  and  much 
more  durable,  was  transported  a  distance  of  about  28 
miles  on  barges  and  carefully  deposited  on  the  exte- 
rior by  means  of  derricks.  The  breakwater  is  20  feet 
in  width  on  top,  and  is  built  in  water  from  35  to  50 
feet  in  depth.  The  height  of  the  top  above  the  surface 
of  the  water  is  about  16  feet.  The  total  quantity  of 
material  placed  to  December  31,  1912,  when  the 
breakwater  was  nearly  completed,  was  954,500  cubic 
yards,  at  an  average  cost  of  $2.20  per  cubic  yard. 
In  addition,  620,000  cubic  yards  of  rock  dredged  from 
the  canal  were  deposited  in  the  vicinity  of  the  break- 
water. During  the  fiscal  year  1912  the  Toro  Point 
rock  cost  $1.38  per  cubic  yard,  and  the  Porto  Bello 
rock,  $4.31. 


96 


XKe  Panama  Canal 


A  large  anchorage  basin  is  provided  between  Cris- 
tobal and  the  canal  channel.  The  wharfage  space  at 
Cristobal  is  being  increased.  New  piers  are  built  on 
steel  cylinders  which  were  excavated  inside  by  hand 
and  gradually  forced  down.  The  cylinders,  upon 
reaching  the  proper  depth,  were  filled  with  concrete, 
and  a  superstructure  of  reinforced  concrete  was  built 
upon  them. 

To  complete  the  Atlantic  sea-level  section,  from  the 
outer  end  to  its  terminus  at  the  Gatun  Locks,  required 
the  excavation  of  over  32,000,000  cubic  yards  by 
dredging,  costing  over  $7,600,000,  or  about  24  cents 
per  cubic  yard;  and  over  2,000,000  cubic  yards  by 
steam  shovel,  costing  over  $1,450,000,  or  about  67  cents 
per  cubic  yard. 

The  Pacific  sea-level  section  from  the  Miraflores 
Locks  to  Panama  Bay  cuts  the  winding  channel  of  the 
Rio  Grande  River  and  then  continues  through  the  bay. 
The  land  is  all  very  low.  This  channel  up  to  Decem- 
ber 31,  1912,  when  the  work  was  well  in  hand,  had 
required  the  excavation  of  over  34,500,000  cubic  yards 
by  dredging,  at  a  total  cost  of  over  $8,500,000,  or 
about  25  cents  per  cubic  yard;  over  2,500,000  cubic 
yards  by  steam  shovel,  at  a  cost  of  over  $2,000,000, 
or  about  80  cents  per  cubic  yard,  and  in  addition  over 
1,500,000  cubic  yards  by  hydraulic  excavation,  at  a 
total  cost  of  over  $1,100,000,  or  about  72  cents  per 
cubic  yard.  The  hydraulic  excavation  consisted  in 
dislodging  the  earth  by  means  of  powerful  streams  of 
water  and  carrying  the  material,  water-borne,  to  suc- 
tion pumps  which  discharged  it  on  the  neighboring 


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Romte,  Design  and  Construction 


97 


swamps.  A  great  deal  of  submarine  rock  was  exca- 
vated, partly  through  the  use  of  a  Lobnitz  rock- 
breaker,  which  shattered  the  rock  by  dropping  a 
heavy  cylindrical  shaft,  and  partly  through  the  usual 
process  of  submarine  drilling  and  blasting.  (See  plan 
No.  3.) 

It  was  originally  intended  to  carry  the  canal  into 
deep  water  on  the  easterly  side  of  the  group  of  islands 
Naos,  Culebra  and  Flamenco,  which  lie  about  3  miles 
off  the  Pacific  shore.  A  study  of  the  conditions  devel- 
oped the  fact  that  the  strong  littoral  currents  carried 
silt  in  a  westerly  direction,  and  as  the  shores  of  the 
bay  are  lined  with  a  very  fine  mud,  this  action  would 
cause  the  dredged  channel  to  fill  rapidly.  For  these 
reasons  it  was  decided  to  carry  the  channel  to  deep 
water  on  the  west  of  the  group  of  islands,  and  to  build 
a  breakwater  or  dike  from  the  shore  at  Balboa  to  Naos 
Island,  about  parallel  to  the  canal.  The  object  of  the 
breakwater  was  not  to  give  protection  from  seas  or 
storms,  for  these  are  unknown  on  the  Pacific  side  of 
the  Isthmus,  but  to  prevent  the  movement  of  silt  into 
the  canal,  to  shut  off  the  swift  tidal  currents  which 
would  carry  vessels  at  right  angles  to  their  course  and, 
incidentally,  to  provide  a  roadway  from  the  mainland 
to  the  fortifications  on  the  islands.  An  ample  amount 
of  material  was  available  from  the  excavations  in  the 
Culebra  Cut,  which  necessarily  required  disposal  some- 
where. The  breakwater,  or  dike,  was  built  by  means  of 
a  trestle  of  creosoted  timber  piles,  from  which  railroad 
cars  dumped  their  material  into  the  water.  The 
trestle  was  over  three  miles  in  length,  and  as  stated 


98 


TKe  Panama  Canal 


in  the  annual  reports  of  the  commission,  was  driven 
for  a  greater  part  of  its  length  in  blue  mud,  varying 
from  a  few  feet  to  102  feet  in  depth.  The  mud  par- 
ticles are  exceedingly  fine,  and  the  substance  feels 
greasy  and  slippery,  and  has  a  very  low  coefficient  of 
friction.  The  mud  was  not  able  to  carry  the  weight  of 
the  stone  dumped  from  the  trestle,  and  the  stone  and 
trestle  were  continually  sinking  and  shifting  laterally. 
At  one  locality,  the  total  vertical  displacement  aggre- 
gated 125  feet  in  a  single  year.  In  some  cases  the 
lateral  displacement  of  the  trestle  was  as  much  as  300 
feet.  The  pressure  of  the  stone  was  most  effective  when 
a  20-foot  tide  was  out,  and  the  displacements  usually 
occurred  at  low  water.  The  rock  in  settling  caused 
parallel  ridges  of  mud  to  rise  about  80  feet  from  the 
center  of  the  track.  At  one  point  a  record  was  kept  of 
the  amount  of  material  required  to  bring  the  stone  fill 
up  to  the  required  height  of  29  feet  above  the  original 
bottom,  and  it  was  actually  ten  times  as  much  as  com- 
putations taking  no  account  of  settlement  indicated 
necessary.  Such  occurrences  might  have  been  very 
serious,  but  in  this  case  unlimited  material  was  avail- 
able from  the  cut,  and  the  total  cost  of  the  work  was 
not  excessive.  In  fact,  the  total  cost  of  the  dike  up  to 
December  31,  1912,  was  $300,000  for  1,121,000  cubic 
yards,  or  at  the  rate  of  about  27  cents  per  cubic  yard, 
or  about  $13.00  per  lineal  foot.  Costs  are  exclusive  of 
the  amount  that  would  have  been  spent  to  dispose 
of  the  materials  on  the  ordinary  dumps. 

The  principal  ship  repair  plant  will  be  on  the  Pacific 
end  of  the  canal.   There  will  be  a  large  dry  dock,  equal 


Route,  Design  and  Construction 


99 


in  capacity  to  that  of  the  locks,  with  an  entrance  of  at 
least  110  feet  clear  width  and  a  clear  length  of  1,000 
feet.  A  smaller  dry  dock  may  also  be  built.  The  ship 
repair  yard  is  designed  to  afford  repair  facilities  for 
all  of  the  Panama  Canal  plant,  and  for  visiting  ships. 
It  will  comprise  foundries,  machine  shops,  equipment 
for  shipfitting,  woodworking,  paint  shops,  storehouses, 
and  all  the  other  necessary  outfit  for  the  great  variety 
of  work  that  it  will  be  called  upon  to  do.  Its  general 
character  will  be  similar  to  that  of  a  large  navy  yard. 
The  plant  will  be  a  valuable  asset  to  the  United  States 
Navy,  especially  in  time  of  war.  There  is  at  present  a 
small  dock  and  repair  plant  at  the  Atlantic  end. 

Unloading  piers  are  being  provided  at  Balboa  in 
addition  to  the  present  facilities,  as  at  Cristobal.  It  is 
probable  that  there  will  be  an  anchorage  basin  near  the 
dock  yard,  though  rock  bottom  is  a  deterrent  influence. 

Two  of  the  largest  floating  cranes  in  the  world,  Ger- 
man built,  form  a  part  of  the  equipment,  and  these  are 
of  the  revolving  type.  They  have  a  lifting  capacity  of 
250  tons  at  22  feet  reach,  or  150  tons  at  62  feet  reach, 
and  100  tons  at  82  feet,  with  a  hook  100  feet  above  the 
surface  of  the  water.  Their  stability  will  be  retained 
under  any  and  all  conditions  of  loading,  without  shift- 
ing ballast  or  counterweight,  except  that  the  revolving 
structure  will  be  counterweighted.  The  two  cranes 
acting  together  will  be  able  to  lift  any  one  of  the 
enormous  leaves  of  the  mitering  lock  gates. 

The  coaling  plant  at  the  Pacific  end  will  have  a 
total  storage  capacity  of  135,000  tons,  of  which  75,000 
tons  will  be  subaqueous.   Arrangements  are  made  for 


100 


THe  Panama  Canal 


separate  storage  of  coal  belonging  to  different  owners. 
The  capacity  of  the  plant  for  unloading  from  colliers 
will  be  500  tons  per  hour,  and  the  total  issuing  capacity 
will  be  1000  tons  per  hour.  It  is  proposed  to  furnish 
coal  by  sale  to  passing  vessels.  The  Cristobal  coaling 
plant  will  be  larger,  and  will  have  a  total  storage 
capacity  of  about  240,000  tons,  of  which  125,000  tons 
will  be  subaqueous.  The  capacity  for  unloading  from 
colliers  will  be  1000  tons  per  hour,  and  the  total  issuing 
capacity  will  be  2000  tons  per  hour.  While  private 
owners  and  steamship  companies  will  be  permitted  to 
store  their  own  coal  in  this  plant,  the  government  will 
do  all  the  handling.  The  government  will  own  and 
operate  a  large  number  of  coal  and  oil  lighters  at  each 
end  of  the  canal.  Oil  storage  and  an  oil  pipe  line 
across  the  Isthmus  will  also  be  provided. 

CONTROL  OF  WATER  DURING  CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  CANAL 

One  of  the  serious  problems  that  arose  in  connection 
with  the  actual  construction  of  various  parts  of  the 
canal  has  not  been  mentioned  in  describing  items  such 
as  the  locks,  dams,  and  Culebra  Cut,  because  it  can  be 
better  treated  as  an  individual  subject.  We  realize 
that  the  canal  is  built  in  the  valleys  of  the  Chagres  and 
Rio  Grande  Rivers,  and  that  the  route  selected  is  the 
very  lowest  one  that  could  be  found.  Knowing  the 
character  of  tropical  rainstorms  and  river  floods,  it 
needs  but  a  moment's  thought  to  make  clear  the  seri- 
ousness of  the  problem  of  keeping  the  storm  waters 
and  the  floods  away  from  the  construction  work.  Im- 
properly or  insufficiently  controlled,   these  waters 


Route,  Design  and  Construction  101 


would  have  the  power  to  destroy  a  great  deal  of  what 
had  been  laboriously  done. 

The  Culebra  Cut  forming  the  low  point  for  many 
square  miles  of  territory,  and  coinciding  for  a  consid- 
erable distance  with  the  Obispo  River  valley,  would 
naturally  collect  vast  quantities  of  water  were  steps 
not  taken  to  prevent  it.  The  course  of  the  Obispo 
River  was  artificially  changed,  beginning  at  the  point 
where  it  approached  the  cut.  The  total  length  of  the 
new  river  channel  as  originally  built  was  5i  miles, 
from  a  point  on  the  east  side  of  the  Culebra  Cut,  near 
the  foot  of  Gold  Hill,  to  a  point  clear  of  the  cut,  and 
finally  discharging  into  the  Chagres  River.  On  account 
of  slides  encountered  during  construction  work,  the^ 
Obispo  diversion  gave  way,  and  the  flow  of  the  river 
entered  the  cut  for  three  days,  causing  inconvenience 
and  damage.  A  new  diversion  channel  was  constructed 
with  great  speed.  That  the  Obispo  diversion  was  no 
small  problem  may  be  noted  from  the  fact  that  in  six 
years  a  total  of  1,200,000  cubic  yards  of  excavation 
was  necessary,  of  which  nearly  40  per  cent  was  in  rock 
and  the  total  cost  was  over  $1,000,000.  The  diver- 
sion was  able  to  carry  6000  cubic  feet  of  water  per 
second.  The  Camacho  diversion  on  the  opposite  side 
of  the  cut  was  similarly  built. 

These  two  diversions  take  waters  which  flow  toward 
the  Atlantic.  The  Rio  Grande  River  formerly  flowed 
through  part  of  the  area  excavated  on  the  Pacific  side  of 
the  Continental  Divide.  It  was  similarly  diverted,  and 
a  dike  was  constructed  across  the  south  end  of  the 
canal  to  prevent  access  of  the  river  water.  Keeping 


102 


TKe  Panama  Canal 


water  out  of  the  cut  also  kept  out  the  silt  which  would 
inevitably  have  come  down  with  the  freshets. 

The  elevation  of  the  bottom  of  the  cut  was  40  feet, 
which  was  lower  than  the  Chagres  River  where  it  joined 
the  canal,  and  a  dam  was  built  across  the  cut  with  its 
crest  at  elevation  73  to  prevent  the  river  from  flowing 
into  it. 

The  natural  streams  being  thus  prevented  from  en- 
tering the  work,  it  only  remained  to  get  rid  of  the 
water  which  originated  along  8J  miles  of  cut.  This 
was  done  by  means  of  centrifugal  pumps  at  low  points 
in  the  cut,  which  discharged  the  water  over  the  dams. 
Excavation  at  a  new  level  was  always  preceded  by  the 
cutting  of  a  pioneer  trench  down  the  middle  of  the 
canal,  in  which  all  the  water  was  collected  and  carried 
to  the  pumping  stations.  The  summit  during  con- 
struction was  at  Culebra.  Drainage  to  the  south  was 
carried  to  Pedro  Miguel  until  August,  1911,  when  the 
flow  was  taken  through  the  center-wall  culvert  of  the 
Pedro  Miguel  Lock.  The  drainage  to  the  north  was 
disposed  of  by  pumping. 

The  Chagres  had  no  opportunity  to  interfere  with 
the  Culebra  Cut,  but  had  ample  opportunity  by  virtue 
of  its  location,  to  threaten  the  work  on  the  Gatun 
Dam.  This  problem  was  handled  with  ingenuity  by 
the  engineers.  The  portions  of  the  dam  not  accessible 
to  the  river  were  constructed  first.  The  spillway  was 
built  with  its  foundations  on  rock  and  with  the  river 
kept  out  by  cofferdams  and  otherwise.  In  the  mean- 
time the  Chagres  River  flowed  through  the  west  diver- 
sion built  by  the  French.   When  the  spillway,  in  1911, 


Route,  Design  and  Construction 


103 


had  been  constructed  to  elevation  10  feet  above  sea 
level,  and  the  earth  dam  well  above  this  elevation,  the 
channels  of  the  Chagres  were  closed  by  carrying  the 
dam  across,  and  the  water  then  rose  in  Gatun  Lake 
until  it  flowed  over  the  concrete  work  of  the  spillway 
during  the  rainy  season.  This  depth  kept  the  Panama 
Railroad,  still  on  the  old  line  in  the  Chagres  valley,  free 
of  water.  During  the  following  season  the  railroad  was 
transferred  to  the  relocated  or  high  line  above  the  final 
level  of  Gatun  Lake.  The  earth  dam  was  continually 
kept  at  an  elevation  well  above  that  of  the  concrete 
work  of  the  spillway,  and  the  next  step  during  the  dry 
season  consisted  of  constructing  four  very  large  culverts 
in  a  part  of  the  spillway~temporarily  protected  from  the 
flow  of  the  water  and  controlled  by  gates.  There  were 
provisions  for  placing  stop  planks  for  closing  the 
openings  at  some  future  time.  When  these  culverts 
were  completed,  the  dry-weather  flow  of  the  river 
was  carried  through  them,  and  the  remaining  concrete 
work  of  the  spillway  progressed  as  long  as  the  dry 
season  lasted,  and  as  long  as  the  culverts  were  able  to 
carry  the  flow.  During  the  rainy  season  the  flow  was 
again  over  the  concrete  work  of  the  spillway  now 
carried  to  elevation  50.  Proceeding  thus,  the  spillway 
was  completed,  and  the  final  step,  when  the  spillway 
was  entirely  done,  consisted  in  placing  the  stop  planks 
before  the  entrance  to  the  four  culverts  and  filling  them 
with  concrete. 

The  Gatun  Locks  extend  to  a  depth  of  about  55  feet 
below  mean  sea  level,  and  the  water  was  kept  off  the 
site  by  means  of  a  temporary  dam  to  the  north  of  the 


104 


THe  Panama  Canal 


locks.  This  was  built  so  that  the  excavation  for  the 
flare-walls  might  be  done  by  dredges,  as  the  material 
was  too  soft  to  hold  steam  shovels.  Inasmuch  as  the 
dredges  could  not  dig  the  full  depth  of  70  feet,  a  small 
lake  was  formed  over  the  area  of  the  flare-walls,  and 
its  elevation  was  lowered  by  pumping  until  the  dredge 
could  reach  the  bottom.  This  lake  was  kept  from  flow- 
ing into  the  partially  completed  locks  by  means  of  a 
temporary  concrete  dam,  built  between  the  center  and 
side  walls  near  the  lower  end  of  the  Gatun  Locks. 

AIDS  TO  NAVIGATION 

The  Atlantic  entrance  is  marked  by  a  light  of  the 
fourth  magnitude  placed  on  the  end  of  the  Toro  Point 
Breakwater,  where  there  will  also  be  a  compressed-air 
fog  whistle  and  a  submarine  bell.  The  tangents  in  the 
canal  are  defined  by  range  lights.  Vessels  going  in  op- 
posite directions  use  different  ranges  giving  courses  250 
feet  apart.  There  are  also  side  lights,  spaced  about  1 
mile  apart  on  each  side  of  the  channel.  In  the  Culebra 
Cut  the  range  lights  are  omitted,  due  to  the  tangents 
being  so  short  and  the  banks  too  steep  for  placing  them. 
There  will  be,  instead,  35  concrete  beacons  at  tangent 
points  and  at  intermediate  locations.  By  a  system  of 
screening,  only  those  lights  will  be  visible  to  the  navi- 
gator which  are  necessary  to  define  the  channel  where 
the  ship  may  be. 

The  sides  of  the  canal  are  further  marked  by  acety- 
lene, flashing  gas  buoys  of  450  candlepower,  and  inter- 
mediate spar  buoys. 

The  range  lights  involved  much  clearing  of  forest 


Route,  Design  and  Construction  105 


growth,  since  the  trochas  are  in  general  of  the  full  width 
of  the  canal  at  the  start,  narrowing  down  to  480  feet 
at  the  rear  light. 

All  lights,  beacons  and  buoys  are  white,  and  are  dis- 
tinguished from  one  another  by  characteristic  flashes. 
Gas  and  electricity  are  used  for  illumination,  preferably 
electricity  where  feasible.  Inaccessible  lights  are  oper- 
ated by  means  of  compressed  acetylene  dissolved  in 
acetone. 

The  locks  are  illuminated  by  means  of  400-watt 
tungsten  lamps  on  concrete  posts,  with  concrete  re- 
flectors, having  a  lighting  effect  superior  to  that  of  an 
ordinary  arc  lamp.  The  lamp  is  30  feet  above  the 
coping  and  is  screened  by  concrete  skirts,  so  as  to  cut 
off  the  direct  light  rays  longitudinally  of  the  locks, 
thus  keeping  the  glare  out  of  the  navigator's  eyes. 


THE  PANAMA  CANAL 


Part  III 

SANITATION  —  COSTS  OF  WORK  —  ELEMENTS  OF 
SUCCESS  —  CONCLUSION 

BY 

REUBEN  E.  BAKENHUS,  S.  B. 

CIVIL  ENGINEER  U.  S.  NAVY 


SANITATION— COSTS  OF  WORK— ELEMENTS 
OF  SUCCESS— CONCLUSION 

SANITATION 

To  regard  the  sanitation  work  as  a  mere  contributory 
element  to  a  successful  culmination  of  the  canal  con- 
struction work  does  not,  perhaps,  place  it  upon  the 
high  plane  that  it  deserves.  Rather  should  we  regard 
it  as  one  manifestation  of  the  great  progressive  move- 
ment that  is  now  pervading  civilization  and  that  re- 
gards the  prevention  of  disease  as  of  more  importance 
than  its  cure,  and  in  its  execution  requires  the  co- 
operation of  the  physician,  the  bacteriologist,  the  en- 
gineer, and  the  administrator.  The  Panama  Canal  is 
undoubtedly  the  most  marked  single  example  the 
world  has  seen  of  the  intelligent  and  thorough  appli- 
cation of  the  principles  of  sanitation.  In  many  other 
parts  of  the  world,  and  for  years,  such  principles  have 
been  applied  in  preventing  contamination  of  water 
supplies,  in  the  purification  of  sewage,  in  the  control 
of  epidemics  and  in  other  important  sanitary  measures; 
but  none  have  had  the  opportunity  to  display  in  so 
marked  and  convincing  a  way  the  great  benefits  to  be 
derived,  especially  with  the  example  of  the  French 
experience  for  a  background.  In  no  case  has  more 
been  done  to  educate  the  world  in  general  in  the  need 
and  effectiveness  of  the  application  in  a  practical 
way,  under  control  of  experts,  of  the  scientific  prin- 

109 


110 


THe  Panama  Canal 


ciples  of  sanitary  science.  We  can  with  truth,  there- 
fore, say  that  the  sanitary  work  on  the  Isthmus  has 
extended  beyond  the  confines  of  the  Canal  Zone  and 
of  canal  construction,  and  that  its  good  effects  on  the 
whole  human  race  rival  those  of  the  canal  accomplish- 
ment itself. 

The  very  title  of  the  "Department  of  Sanitation" 
is  indicative  of  the  new  era;  in  the  old  days  there 
would  have  been  a  department  of  hospitals.  The  new 
era  gives  a  department  of  health  and  its  preservation, 
of  sickness  and  its  prevention  and  cure,  while  the  old 
merely  gave  a  department  for  the  care  of  the  sick. 

Of  some  of  the  numerous  activities  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  Sanitation,  such  as  the  Colon  and  Ancon 
hospitals,  the  system  of  vital  statistics,  the  control 
and  inspection  of  foods,  the  discovery  and  isolation 
of  infectious  diseases,  and  the  handling  of  accident  or 
emergency  cases,  we  may  only  note  in  passing  that  all 
are  well  administered  and  rank  with  the  best  of  their 
class  in  the  world.  The  phases  of  the  work  which 
interest  us  more  are  the  control  of  yellow  fever  and 
malaria. 

The  Americans  in  Cuba  proved  that  yellow  fever 
was  communicated  only  through  the  stegomyia  mos- 
quito. It  had  been  proved  that  malaria  was  commu- 
nicated through  another  type  of  mosquito  known  as 
the  anopheles.  Knowing  these  facts,  the  fight  against 
yellow  fever  resolved  itself  into  several  elements:  First, 
to  prevent  the  introduction  of  yellow  fever  into  the 
Isthmus  by  strict  quarantine;  second,  to  isolate  all 
yellow  fever  cases  within  doubly  screened  rooms,  to  pre- 


Sanitation,  Costs,  Etc 


111 


vent  the  stegomyia  from  gaining  access  to  yellow  fever 
germs  and  thus  gaining  the  power  to  communicate  it 
to  others;  third,  to  screen  all  living  spaces,  so  as  to 
prevent  access  of  the  dangerous  mosquitoes  to  the  well; 
fourth,  to  study  the  habits  of  the  mosquitoes  and  ex- 
terminate them  as  far  as  possible,  especially  those  which 
have  been  in  the  presence  of  yellow  fever. 

In  accordance  with  these  principles,  all  hospitals, 
hotels,  dwellings  and  offices  were  most  carefully 
screened ;  the  yellow  fever  rooms  in  the  hospitals  were 
separated  by  screens  from  the  rest  of  the  hospital. 
Most  careful  and  comprehensive  inspections  and  studies 
led  to  the  finding  of  the  breeding-places  of  the  danger- 
ous mosquitoes  and  to  the  removal  of  the  pools  of 
water.  In  the  cities  all  open  cisterns  and  accidental 
lodgments  for  pools  of  water  were  removed.  In  the 
open  country  swamps  were  drained  or  filled;  extensive 
systems  of  ditches  were  established  and  maintained; 
pools  that  could  not  be  removed  were  coated  with  a 
disinfectant  that  prevented  breeding;  underground 
drains  were  placed  to  run  off  the  water  before  it  could 
ooze  to  the  surface  and  form  pools.  Larvicide  was  lib- 
erally distributed  on  stagnant  water  that  could  not  be 
drained;  it  was  manufactured  in  concentrated  form, 
was  carried  to  the  brooks  in  the  mountains,  and  was 
arranged  to  drip  automatically  on  the  streams,  so  that 
if  pools  should  form,  the  film  of  destructive  liquid  would 
already  be  there.  Near  all  habitations,  underbrush  and 
grass  were  cut,  so  that  the  sun  might  dry  up  possible 
pools  and  the  mosquitoes  be  deprived  of  shade,  and 
perish.   Fish  were  thus  experimented  with  as  to  their 


112 


XKe  Panama  Canal 


destructive  effect  on  mosquito  larvae.  The  cities  were 
cleaned,  sewered,  paved,  and  provided  with  water.  In 
fine,  no  possible  precaution  that  intelligence  and  ex- 
treme diligence  could  devise  was  overlooked. 

The  result  was  the  banishment  of  the  hitherto  prev- 
alent yellow  fever,  a  marked  diminution  in  the  amount 
of  malaria,  and  generally  healthful  conditions  accom- 
panied by  a  low  death  rate. 

Sanitation  work  is  expensive;  the  cost,  to  June  30, 
1913,  was  $16,250,000. 

COSTS  OF  WORK 

One  of  the  most  effective  and  widely  used  means  for 
determining  the  degree  of  efficiency  in  the  performance 
of  work  is  obtained  through  the  careful  study  and 
analysis  of  the  costs  of  work.  The  commission  in 
1907  established  a  very  complete  system  of  engineer- 
ing cost  keeping  devised  for  the  purpose  of  disclosing 
the  unit  costs  of  the  various  elements  of  work.  The 
cost  of  excavating  in  the  Culebra  Cut  for  instance, 
which  was  referred  to  in  the  description  of  the  exca- 
vation was  computed  monthly.  The  quantities  exca- 
vated and  the  amount  of  supplies  used  were  measured 
and  recorded  as  well  as  the  moneys  expended.  Similar 
records  were  kept  and  unit  costs  determined  for  the 
elements  of  a  great  variety  of  operations  including 
dredging  and  delivering  of  sand,  quarrying  and  crush- 
ing of  rock,  making  of  concrete,  dredging  channels, 
laying  railroad  tracks  and  many  other  items  of  work. 
From  these  records  combined  with  their  knowledge  of 
the  conditions,  the  engineers  could  determine  whether 


Sanitation,  Costs,  Etc. 


113 


the  work  was  being  done  better  or  worse  than  in  pre- 
vious periods  and  also  where  efforts  must  be  made  to 
bring  up  the  efficiency  or  where  plant  changes  must  be 
made.  The  unit  costs  on  the  canal  work  compare  very 
favorably  with  similar  costs  elsewhere  which  is  absolute 
proof,  if  any  be  needed,  that  the  various  operations  were 
carried  on  efficiently.  A  few  of  the  interesting  unit 
costs  are  as  follows: 


Excavating  Culebra  Cut  per  cu.  yd.  to  June  30,  1909   $0.9155 

"     "    "    "fiscal  year    1910   0.6682 

"           "        "     "    "    "     "     "       1911   0.5865 

"           "        "     "    "    "     "     "       1912   0.5147 

Dredging  by  sea-going  suction  dredge  per  cu.  yd.  fiscal  year  1911 . .  0.0452 

«       «    «     u        u         u       «    u    a      tt      tt    i9i2..  0.0637 

"  dipper  dredge  per  cu.  yd.  fiscal  year  1911....   0. 1346 

"       "     "        "      "    "     "     "      <*    1912   0.2548 

Hydraulic  excavation  per  cu.  yd.   0 . 3485 

Plain  concrete  Gatun  spillway,  per  cu.  yd.  1911   6.7044 

"        "        "         "        "    "    "    1912   7.0133 

"     Gatun  locks       " "     "1911   6.5919 

"        "        "       "           "    "     "  1912   7.1317 

"        "     Pedro  Miguel  locks  per  cu.  yd.  1911   4.7040 

"        "        "     "    "    "  1912   5.7183 


It  must  be  remembered  that  the  proper  weighing  of 
unit  cost  records  requires  experience,  knowledge  of 
local  conditions  and  general  good  judgment.  The  con- 
crete costs  on  the  Atlantic  end  were  greater,  due  to 
the  necessarily  high  production  costs  of  stone  and 
sand.  A  dredge  cutting  a  shallow  layer  of  material 
would  necessarily  be  operating  at  a  higher  unit  of  cost 
than  if  working  on  a  layer  of  sufficient  thickness  to 
develop  the  full  capacity  of  the  dredge,  and  a  hard 
sandy  clay  would  cost  more  to  dredge  than  river  mud. 


114 


THe  Panama  Canal 


It  is  interesting  to  compare  the  predicted  costs  of 
the  various  branches  of  the  work  as  made  by  the 
minority  of  the  board  of  consulting  engineers  and  the 
estimates  of  the  final  project  made  by  the  commission 
with  the  actual  records  of  cost  to  June  30,  1913,  when 
the  great  bulk  of  the  work  was  nearly  completed. 
The  following  table  shows  such  a  comparison : 


COMPARATIVE  ESTIMATES 


1906, 

February, 

Actual  cost  to 

Board 

1908,  Estimates 

June  30,  1913 

$35,445,000 

$68,564,000 

$53,504,000 

Central  Division  

48,867,000 

88,458,000 

83,943,000 

28,109,000 

47,985,000 

47,355,000 

Panama  R.  R  

3,709,000 

8,164,000 

14,200,000 

Land  damages  

300,000 

500,000 

Administration,  engineering 

23,284,200 

84,095,000 

24,181,000 

Totals  

$139,705,200 

$297,766,000 

$223,183,000 

Sanitation  

20,053,000 

16,250,000 

7,382,000 

6,438,000 

French  Company  

40,000,000 

40,000,000 

Panama  Republic  

10,000,000 

10,000,000 

Totals  

$375,201,000 

$295,871,000 

Deduct  expected  reimbursement 

15,000,000 

$360,201,000 

The  differences  are  large  but  readily  explained.  The 
increases  in  the  1908  estimate  over  that  of  1906  are 
principally  due  to  changes  in  plan  resulting  in  improve- 
ments. In  the  Atlantic  Division  the  locks  were  made 
larger  and  wider  and  provided  with  additional  gates, 
the  Toro  Point  breakwater  was  changed  in  location 
and  increased  in  size,  the  cost  of  channel  excavation 
was  greater,  due  to  larger  quantities  in  earth  and  rock 


Sanitation,  Costs,  Etc. 


115 


excavation,  the  Gatun  Dam  cost  more,  due  to  use  of 
rock  in  part  and  due  to  addition  of  items.  In  the 
Central  Division  the  width  of  channel  in  the  Culebra 
Cut  was  increased  from  200  to  300  feet,  a  concrete  re- 
vetment was  added  and  there  were  other  increases  in 
excavation.  In  the  Pacific  Division  there  was  the  same 
increase  in  the  size  of  the  locks  as  in  the  Atlantic  Divi- 
sion and,  in  addition  to  this,  there  was  a  very  large  in- 
crease in  the  dredging,  due  to  moving  the  locks  and 
dams  farther  inland  for  military  reasons,  thus  increasing 
the  length  of  the  dredged  channel  and  reducing  the  size 
of  Miraflores  Lake.  The  Panama  Railroad  developed 
into  a  most  important  adjunct  of  the  canal  and  ab- 
sorbed greater  amounts  of  funds.  The  estimate  of 
1908  also  included  many  items  of  general  expense  not 
directly  chargeable  to  construction  and  not  included  in 
the  consulting  engineers'  estimates,  because  not  re- 
quired for  purpose  of  comparing  the  lock  canal  with 
the  sea-level  canal. 

The  actual  costs  have  in  general  been  less  than  the 
commission's  estimated  costs  of  1908.  While  this 
may,  in  part,  be  due  to  the  estimated  amounts  being 
very  liberal,  it  is  principally  due  to  the  remarkable 
efficiency  attained  in  execution.  Otherwise  it  would 
not  have  been  possible  to  complete  the  removal  of  the 
slides  and  do  other  additional  work  at  the  terminals 
and  elsewhere  within  the  allotted  appropriation. 

The  following  is  a  record  of  the  actual  cost  of  various 
items  to  the  close  of  the  fiscal  year  1913: 


116 


TKe  Panama  Canal 


TOTAL  EXPENDITURES  TO  JUNE  30,  1913 

(Including  plant  and  distributed  overhead  charges) 

I.  Direct  charges  to  Construction 
Atlantic  Division 

Dry  Excavation,  Canal  Prism .  .  $1,480,000 

Dredging  Canal  Prism   8,515,000 

Gatun  Dam  and  Spillway   11,573,000 

Gatun  Locks   28,343,000 

Toro  Point  Breakwater   2,643,000 

Miscellaneous   950,000 

Total  Atlantic'  Division   $53,504,000 

Central  Division  (Gatun  to  Pedro  Miguel) 

Dry  Excavation,  Culebra  Cut .  .  $83,749,000 
Dredging,  Gatun  Lake,  channel, 
etc   194,000 

Total  Central  Division  (Culebra  Cut)  $83,943,000 

Pacific  Division 

Dry  Excavation,  Canal  Prism .  .  $  3,388,000 

Dredging  Canal  Prism   11,249,000 

Pedro  Miguel  Locks  and  Dams.  11,665,000 

Miraflores  Locks  and  Dams  .  . .  18,236,000 

Naos  Island  Breakwater   405,000 

Terminal  Facilities,  Balboa   2,125,000 

Miscellaneous   287,000 

Total  Pacific  Division   $47,355,000 

General  Construction  Items 

Lighting,  buoying,  oil  and 
transmission  fines,  etc   $  514,000 

Total  direct  charges  to  Construction  $185,316,000 

II.  Expenditures  not  chargeable  directly  to  Construction 

Department  of  Sanitation   $16,250,000 

Civil  Administration  and  Law   6,438,000 

Payment  to  French  Company   40,000,000 

Payment  to  Republic  of  Panama   10,000,000 

Panama  Railroad,  Improvements,  Relocat1'  )n,  etc.  14,200,000 

Steamers  purchased  and  repaired     2,680,000 

Canal  Zone  Buildings   10,288,000 

Canal  Zone  Water  Works,  Roads  and  Improve- 
ments  9,647,000 

Miscellaneous  Items   1,052,000 

Total  of  Items  not  directly  chargeable  to  Con- 
struction  $110,555,000 

Total  Expenditures  on  Fortifications  (incomplete)  3, 1 14,000 

Grand  Total  of  all  Expenditures   $298,985,000 


Photo  by  R.  E.  B. 

Fig.  19.  —  Toro  Point  Breakwater,  two  miles  long,  showing  two-track 
construction  trestle  and  rock  fill. 


Fig.  20.  —  Mindi  Excavation,  view  looking  north  from  west  bank,  showing 
intersection  of  French  and  American  canals.  Atlantic  entrance  of  canal  in 
distance.    March,  1913. 


/ 


Sanitation,  Costs,  Etc. 


117 


THE  ELEMENTS  OF  SUCCESS 

A  consideration  of  the  elements  to  which  the  under- 
taking owes  its  accomplishment  is  most  important  and 
interesting,  in  order  to  comprehend  correctly  how  suc- 
cess was  achieved.  It  must  first  be  admitted  that 
fortune  favored  us.  We  did  not  apply  our  determina- 
tion to  build  the  canal  to  actual  construction  work 
until  after  the  world  had  fully  developed  the  mosquito 
theory,  and  Cuba  had  given  us  an  opportunity  to 
apply  it  to  practical  sanitation. 

Two  generations  of  railroad  building,  river  and 
harbor  improvement,  water  works,  and  other  large  con- 
struction, together  with  the  coincident  growth  of  the 
great  technical  schools,  had  developed  a  body  of  engi- 
neers and  constructors  with  the  technique  and  capacity 
for  conceiving  and  executing  large  works,  and  with  a 
strongly  formed  spirit  of  loyalty  and  devotion  that  al- 
lowed them  to  be  welded  into  the  nucleus  of  a  great 
organization.  Everywhere  on  the  work  are  evidences 
of  the  standard  practice  developed  by  engineers  on 
other  undertakings  and  adapted  to  local  conditions. 
Without  these  years  of  preliminary  engineering  train- 
ing, the  Panama  Canal  as  built  would  have  been 
impossible. 

The  management  of  the  enterprise  was  first  placed 
in  the  hands  of  engineers  and  others  who  had  been 
eminently  successful  in  great  works  conducted  by  pri- 
vate capital.  They  were  undoubtedly  able  men  and 
contributed  enormously  to  the  primary  work,  and  are 
deserving  of  great  credit.    They  had  not  had  experi- 


118 


THe  Panama  Canal 


ence  in  conducting  work  under  the  many  restrictions 
imposed  by  the  government,  and  in  dealing  with  su- 
periors who  were  representatives,  not  of  capital  and 
business,  but  of  the  people  of  the  United  States.  The 
large  body  of  engineers  in  the  employ  of  the  United 
States  was  at  first  passed  over  when  the  greatest  and 
most  responsible  engineering  positions  ever  at  the  dis- 
posal of  the  government  were  to  be  filled.  They  had 
devoted  their  lives  to  the  service  and  were  now  ignored. 
After  but  a  short  interval  a  change  came,  and  the 
management  was  turned  over  to  government  engineers. 
The  selections  were  made  from  the  oldest  and,  as  a 
body,  the  most  experienced  organization  of  engineers 
in  the  government  service,  the  Corps  of  Engineers  of 
the  United  States  Army,  and  to  a  lesser  extent,  from 
the  Corps  of  Civil  Engineers  of  the  United  States 
Navy.  The  results  of  the  work  are  a  sufficient  tribute 
to  the  wisdom  of  the  selection. 

The  evidence  is  clear  that  a  strong  national  senti- 
ment pervades  the  force,  which  lends  inspiration  to 
self-sacrificing  cooperation,  to  hard  work,  and  to  con- 
tentment under  discomforts  —  a  sentiment  intensified 
through  isolation  in  a  foreign  land.  It  finds  expression 
not  only  in  the  canal  employee,  but  in  every  American 
who  admires  and  looks  up  to  his  fellow  citizen  who 
has  worked  on  the  canal.  This  element  of  success  is 
fundamental,  and  rarely  has  an  enterprise  given  so 
good  an  opportunity  for  its  display.  It  might  easily 
have  been  smothered  by  ill-advised  administration, 
but  the  organization  is  blessed  with  a  leader  who  says 
that  "we"  are  building  the  canal,  and  whose  inspira- 


I 

Sanitation,  Costs,  Etc. 

tion  leads  all  to  take  the  same  view.  It  is  remarkable 
to  note  the  extent  to  which  a  feeling  of  loyalty  to  the 
work  exists,  rather  than  to  the  individual  or  to  any 
division.  Even  a  company  agent  resident  on  the 
Isthmus,  in  referring  to  the  Pacific  Division,  stated 
that  "we  put  in  4500  cubic  yards  of  concrete  on  the 
locks  yesterday/ '  This  general  feeling  of  loyalty  in 
no  way  excludes  a  healthful  rivalry  for  each  crew  or 
division  to  excel.  The  individual  who  would  ordinarily 
be  disgruntled  or  dissatisfied  soon  leaves  the  Isthmus, 
or  he  finds  those  feelings  pushed  into  the  background 
or  smothered  by  the  all-pervading  spirit  of  loyalty  to 
the  work.  The  whole  is  an  interesting  phenomenon, 
which  only  a  visit  to  the  Isthmus  can  disclose  in  all 
its  force. 

In  the  valuation  by  the  Americans  of  the  French 
canal  company's  property,  one  notable  item,  though 
an  intangible  one,  is  missing  —  the  value  to  us  of  the 
French  endeavor,  the  lessons  learned  by  them  through 
their  years  of  bitter  experience.  It  is,  of  course,  impos- 
sible now  to  state  what  costly  mistake  we  might  have 
made  or  what  untoward  conditions  we  might  have 
overlooked  if  we  had  begun  the  canal  as  pioneers; 
there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  knowledge  of  what  the 
French  had  done  aided  us  in  making  up  our  minds 
what  to  do  and  what  not  to  do.  One  of  the  greatest 
errors  of  the  French,  and  one  that  contributed  most 
largely  to  their  failure,  was  that  they  did  not  realize 
until  too  late  the  magnitude  of  the  enterprise. 

In  a  material  way  the  most  valuable  contributions 
to  the  elements  of  success  were  the  well-developed 


119 


120 


The  Panama  Canal 


state  of  the  art  of  making  concrete,  the  perfected 
steam  shovel,  compressed-air  tools  and  numerous  other 
mechanical  devices. 

IN  CONCLUSION 

There  is  so  much  of  interest  connected  with  the 
Panama  Canal  that  the  most  difficult  problem  in  writ- 
ing a  limited  work  on  the  subject  is  to  decide  what  to 
omit.  The  organization  of  the  forces,  the  system  of 
accounting  and  cost  keeping,  the  method  of  civil  gov- 
ernment, the  Panama  Railroad,  the  administration  of 
the  subsistence  and  storekeeping  divisions,  and  many 
other  subjects,  offer  a  wealth  of  material,  sufficient  for 
separate  essays,  and  are  well  worthy  of  study.  All 
branches  pertaining  to  the  execution  of  the  work  have 
been  studied  out  to  a  point  of  maximum  possible  effi- 
ciency, and  that  this  has  been  possible  is  largely  due  to 
the  absence  of  hidebound  precedents  and  to  the  fact 
that  control  was  left  to  the  man  on  the  ground. 

The  canal  will  soon  be  completed  and  begin  its 
history  as  an  actuality.  Study  and  statistics  throw 
much  light  upon  what  its  history  will  be.  No  one 
may  venture  to  predict  what  momentous  influence  it 
may  have  in  war  or  in  preventing  war.  Whatever  may 
be  the  detailed  events  in  which  the  canal  may  take 
a  part,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  it  is  one  more  step 
in  the  westward  trend  of  civilization.  The  prophecy 
of  sixty  years  ago  by  that  farseeing  statesman,  William 
H.  Seward,  made  in  a  speech  in  the  Senate,  is  still  in 
remarkable  process  of  fulfillment: 


Sanitation,  Costs,  Etc 


121 


Even  the  discovery  of  this  continent  and  its  islands,  and  the 
organization  of  society  and  government  upon  them,  grand  and 
important  as  these  events  have  been,  were  not  conditional,  pre- 
liminary and  ancillary  to  the  more  sublime  result  now  in  the  act 
of  consummation,  the  reunion  of  the  two  civilizations,  which, 
parting  on  the  plains  of  Asia  4000  years  ago,  and  travelling 
ever  after  in  opposite  directions  around  the  world,  now  meet 
again  on  the  coasts  and  islands  of  the  Pacific  Ocean.  Certainly 
no  mere  human  event  of  equal  dignity  and  importance  has  ever 
occurred  upon  the  earth.  It  will  be  followed  by  the  equalization 
of  the  condition  of  society  and  the  restoration  of  the  unity  of  the 
human  family.  Who  does  not  see  that  henceforth,  every  year, 
European  commerce,  European  politics,  European  thought  and 
activity,  although  actually  gaining  greater  force,  and  European 
connections,  although  actually  becoming  more  intimate,  will  ulti- 
mately sink  in  importance;  while  the  Pacific  Ocean,  its  shores, 
its  islands,  and  the  vast  regions  beyond,  will  become  the  chief 
theater  of  events  in  the  world's  great  hereafter? 


THE  PANAMA  CANAL 


Part  IV 

THE  NAVY  AND  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

BY 

HARRY  S.  KNAPP 

CAPTAIN  U.  S.  NAVY 


THE  NAVY  AND  THE  PANAMA  CANAL 


The  formal  opening  of  the  Panama  Canal  is  so  nearly 
at  hand  that  the  time  is  appropriate  for  a  discussion  of 
the  effect  of  the  canal  upon  the  Navy. 

Because  it  has  the  widest  appeal  the  question  of 
how  the  canal  will  affect  the  strength  of  the  Navy 
will  be  considered  first  and  at  most  length.  To  those 
outside  of  professional  circles  it  has  a  more  direct  and 
personal  application  than  any  other,  because  upon  the 
answer  will  depend  the  appropriations  that  the  tax- 
payer must  provide.  The  canal  has  been  an  expensive 
undertaking  for  the  United  States,  and  the  people  of 
the  country,  in  thinking  of  its  bearing  upon  the  Navy, 
naturally  anticipate  that  its  completion  may  consid- 
erably modify  the  appropriations  for  the  upkeep  of 
the  naval  establishment.  Everybody  is  familiar  in  a 
general  way  with  the  shortening  of  sea  routes  via  the 
Panama  Canal  from  our  Atlantic  to  our  Pacific  coast; 
for  instance,  that  the  direct  distance  from  New  York 
or  Philadelphia  to  San  Francisco  is  reduced  from 
about  13,000  miles  via  Magellan  to  about  5000  miles 
via  Panama,  or  that  the  distance  from  New  Orleans 
to  San  Francisco  is  about  9000  miles  less  via  the  canal 
than  via  Magellan.  From  such  general  and  obvious 
knowledge  it  is  an  easy  step  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
strength  of  the  Navy  with  the  canal  may  be  much  less 
than  it  would  necessarily  be  without  the  canal;  or, 

125 


126 


The  Panama  Canal 


what  amounts  to  the  same  thing,  that  the  appropria- 
tions for  the  Navy  may  be  greatly  reduced  as  soon  as 
the  canal  is  opened.  Recently,  within  a  week  of  one 
another,  the  writer  has  heard  two  members  of  Congress 
publicly  refer  to  this  very  matter,  one  of  them  saying, 
in  effect,  that  the  canal  would  increase  the  effective- 
ness of  the  Navy  two  or  threefold,  while  the  other 
thought  its  effectiveness  would  be  doubled.  The  writer, 
while  prepared  to  admit  that  these  remarks  were 
rather  an  after-dinner  facon  de  parler  than  the  expres- 
sion of  a  deliberately  formed  opinion,  yet  believes  they 
indicate  a  somewhat  general  impression  that  careful 
study  of  the  situation  will  not  justify. 

A  prerequisite  to  the  formation  of  any  intelligent 
conclusion  on  this  question  is  an  understanding  of  the 
conditions  that  govern  the  strength  of  the  Navy. 
The  ultimate,  dynamic  use  of  the  Navy  is  to  beat  the 
enemy  in  war;  the  everyday  political  use  of  the  Navy 
in  peace  is  to  avert  war  by  reason  of  its  existence 
ready  for  war.  Neither  purpose  will  be  served  unless 
the  Navy  be  adequately  strong  in  material  and  person- 
nel, and  unless  the  personnel  be  trained  and  efficient; 
the  Navy  itself  is  responsible  for  trained  efficiency,  but 
the  country  at  large,  through  Congress,  is  responsible 
that  adequate  strength  be  provided. 

Wars  do  not  merely  happen;  they  usually  result 
from  the  clash  of  some  definite  policies.  In  an  attempt 
to  fix  the  strength  of  our  Navy  the  national  policies 
of  our  government  that  affect  other  countries  are  a 
prime  factor  to  be  considered.  The  United  States  has 
the  following  definite  policies  in  its  external  relations: 


The  Navy  and  the  Panama  Canal  127 


First,  the  avoidance  of  entangling  alliances;  second,  the 
Monroe  Doctrine;  third,  the  Open  Door  in  the  Far 
East;  fourth,  Asiatic  exclusion;  fifth,  the  control  and 
protection  of  the  Panama  Canal  itself.  Where  any  of 
these  policies  affect  adversely  the  interests  of  other 
nations  there  is  the  possibility  of  friction,  and  where 
friction  arises  there  is  always  the  possibility  of  war. 

The  first  of  the  policies  mentioned  above  may  be 
dismissed  with  a  word,  for  it  is  distinctly  one  of  absten- 
tion, and  so  is  not  apt  to  be  the  cause  of  diverse  in- 
terests. Its  effect  is,  however,  that  we  must  play  a  lone 
hand,  and  that  effect  is  not  without  a  bearing  on  the 
strength  of  the  Navy.  The  second  policy  was  recog- 
nized in  a  manner  by  England  in  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty  of  1850,  and  to  a  greater  degree  in  the  Hay- 
Pauncefote  treaty  of  1901.  But  other  nations  do  not 
accept  it  as  international  law,  and  it  is  not  infrequently 
the  subject  of  unfriendly  comment.  The  Monroe  Doc- 
trine may  be  the  occasion  of  friction,  and  so  of  war, 
with  European  nations,  and  there  is  a  possibility  that 
it  may  be  with  Japan,  or  at  a  later  day  with  China. 
The  relation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  to  the  Navy  was 
pointedly  indicated  by  Mr.  Secretary  Meyer,  when  he 
said  in  effect,  for  his  words  are  not  before  the  writer, 
that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  just  as  strong  as  the  Navy 
and  no  stronger.  The  third  policy  is  one  that  may 
cause  friction  with  both  European  and  Asiatic  nations. 
The  fourth  concerns  our  relations  with  Asiatic  nations 
only.  The  fifth  policy  is  a  result  of  a  duty  we  have 
assumed  single-handed  for  manifest  reasons  of  advan- 
tage, and  we  consulted  no  nation  about  it  excepting 


128 


XKe  Panama  Canal 


Great  Britain.  It  has  a  very  direct  bearing  upon  the 
strength  of  the  Navy,  upon  which  it  throws  an  added 
responsibility. 

The  extension  of  our  foreign  trade  that  is  now  being 
so  urgently  advocated  in  connection  with  the  change 
of  our  tariff  laws  cannot  be  placed,  perhaps,  under  the 
same  head  as  the  policies  just  mentioned.  But  foreign 
trade  certainly  does  involve  relations  with  foreign 
nations;  and,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  commercial  and 
trade  rivalries  are  most  fruitful  causes  of  misunder- 
standing between  nations. 

What  has  just  been  said  does  not  by  any  means  ex- 
haust all  sources  of  possible  wars,  as  it  does  not  exhaust 
all  of  our  external  relations.  Enough  has  been  said, 
however,  to  show  reasons  why  war  is  not  an  improb- 
ability —  certainly  it  is  a  possibility  —  with  nations  in 
Europe  and  Asia.  European  nations  will  hardly  attack 
us  in  force  in  the  Pacific,  nor  will  any  nation  fronting 
on  the  Pacific  be  apt  to  attack  us  in  force  in  the  Atlan- 
tic. We  have,  therefore,  to  anticipate  the  possibility 
of  war  in  the  Atlantic  with  a  European  nation,  and  in 
the  Pacific  with  an  Asiatic  nation. 

This  leads  us  to  the  formulation  of  a  policy  for  the 
strength  of  the  Navy.  It  should  be  strong  enough  to 
safeguard  our  interests  and  meet  any  probable  attack 
in  either  ocean  and  not  leave  our  interests  unguarded 
in  the  other.  With  reference  to  the  last  clause  it  may 
be  said  that  a  full  consideration  of  the  subject  should 
not  stop  short  of  the  possibility  of  a  simultaneous 
attack  in  both  oceans,  however  improbable;  a  war 
with  allied  nations  in  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  is  not 


THe  Navy  and  tKe  Panama  Canal  129 


impossible.  It  is  especially  the  duty  of  men  in  the 
military  branches  of  the  government  to  have  their 
eyes  open  to  every  contingency. 

In  considering  possible  antagonists  in  the  Atlantic 
Great  Britain  may  be  eliminated  from  consideration. 
In  the  first  place,  it  would  take  us  many  years  to  catch 
up  with  her  in  material  strength  if  we  tried,  and  would 
entail  an  enormous  expense;  in  the  second,  war  with 
us  would  be  a  blow  to  her  commercial  interests  and 
sources  of  supply  that  she  can  ill  afford  to  suffer; 
and,  in  the  third,  we  have  a  hostage  in  Canada  worth 
many  battleships.  There  are,  moreover,  powerful  in- 
terests of  a  more  sentimental  nature  that  are  yet  very 
real.  No  such  strong  reasons  exist  for  eliminating  any 
other  European  nation  from  the  list  of  possible  antag- 
onists and  the  formula,  therefore,  becomes,  in  its  final 
and  definite  statement,  that  our  Navy  should  be  strong 
enough  to  meet  in  the  Atlantic  the  maritime  nation  of 
Europe  next  strongest  to  Great  Britain,  and  in  the 
Pacific  the  strongest  nation  in  that  ocean. 

As  affecting  the  strength  of  the  Navy  it  is  well  to 
keep  in  mind  also  the  position  of  the  United  States  in 
the  two  oceans.  In  the  Atlantic,  aside  from  the  main- 
tenance of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  we  have  a  great 
material  interest  in  Porto  Rico,  which  is  our  own  ter- 
ritory; and  toward  Cuba  and  Panama  we  have  a  duty 
in  the  protection  of  their  independence.  Then  there 
is  the  canal  itself.  All  of  these  interests  are  compara- 
tively near  to  us,  and  very  much  nearer  than  is  any 
European  adversary.  In  the  Pacific  we  are  in  a  differ- 
ent case.  There  we  have  Alaska,  the  Hawaiian  Islands, 


130 


THe  Panama  Canal 


Guam,  the  Philippines,  and  Tutuila,  the  nearest  2000 
miles  and  the  most  distant  7000  miles  from  our  coast, 
and  some  much  nearer  possible  adversaries  in  that 
ocean  than  ourselves.  The  distance  of  our  outlying 
Atlantic  interests  has  vastly  less  bearing  on  the  strength 
of  our  fleet  in  that  ocean  than  has  the  distance  of  our 
outlying  Pacific  interests  on  the  strength  of  the  fleet 
in  the  Pacific. 

If  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  were  closed  oceans  the 
formula  reached  above  for  the  strength  of  the  Navy 
would  mean  that  in  each  there  should  be  maintained 
a  force  (that  may  be  called  the  Standard  Atlantic 
Fleet  and  the  Standard  Pacific  Fleet,  for  brevity) 
sufficient  for  the  duty  in  that  ocean,  which  is  the  Two- 
ocean  Standard,  pure  and  simple. 

Neither  here  nor  elsewhere  in  this  chapter  will  a  con- 
crete estimate  be  undertaken  of  the  strength  in  numbers 
of  ships  of  the  " standard"  fleets.  Such  an  estimate 
is  not  reached  by  a  simple  matching  of  ship  by  ship, 
but  is  influenced  also  by  such  considerations  as  the 
probable  situation  of  the  theater  of  war,  the  possibility 
that  the  assumed  antagonist  may  not  be  able  to  have 
his  entire  strength  present  in  that  theater  for  political 
or  other  reasons,  and  the  morale  of  the  antagonist. 
This  may  not  impossibly  result  in  the  conclusion  that 
our  own  necessary  strength  in  ships  is  less  than  that 
of  some  possible  antagonists  and  greater  than  that  of 
others.  For  the  present  purpose  no  such  concrete  esti- 
mate is  necessary  and  it  is  enough  to  say  that  the 
strength  should  be  " sufficient  for  the  duty." 

Without  the  canal  the  requirements  are  practically 


THe  Navy  and  tKe  Panama  Canal  131 


the  same  as  if  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  were  closed 
oceans.  For,  although  the  possibility  exists  of  rein- 
forcement in  one  ocean  from  the  other,  yet  the  long 
distance  to  be  traversed  by  the  reinforcement  by  what- 
ever route,  the  difficulties  about  fueling  en  route,  and 
the  danger,  especially  to  a  force  coming  from  the 
Pacific,  of  finding  the  enemy  between  the  reinforce- 
ment and  the  body  it  is  attempting  to  join,  all  militate 
so  greatly  against  a  successful  issue  that  it  would  be 
imprudent  to  count  upon  it. 

With  the  canal  in  operation,  however,  a  different 
situation  arises.  The  route  of  the  reinforcements  will 
be  shortened  from  8000  to  10,000  miles  by  the  canal, 
and  that  route  will  lie  on  interior  lines.  Fuel  can  be 
taken  at  stations  under  our  own  flag,  separated  by 
distances  less  than  those  representing  the  sea  endur- 
ance of  the  fleet;  the  embarrassment  arising  from  the 
necessity  of  avoiding  any  semblance  of  violating  neu- 
trality in  fueling  will  thus  be  avoided.  Junction  is 
possible  from  40  to  60  days  sooner,  and  the  enemy 
need  not  be  passed  to  effect  it.  Put  in  another  way: 
Guantanamo  is  at  practically  the  same  distance  from 
the  English  channel  that  it  is  from  San  Francisco  via 
the  canal;  or,  again,  the  nearest  Asiatic  port  to  Hon- 
olulu is  only  about  1250  miles  nearer  than  Panama, 
but  is  about  8700  miles  nearer  to  Honolulu  than  our 
nearest  Caribbean  port  by  way  of  Magellan.  In  the 
face  of  such  facts  it  would  be  difficult  to  maintain  that 
the  canal  will  have  no  effect  on  the  strength  of  the 
Navy,  for  that  would  be  tantamount  to  the  claim  that 
the  canal  has  no  military  value  to  the  United  States. 


132 


THe  Panama  Canal 


On  the  other  hand,  the  claim  that  the  canal  will 
double  or  more  than  double  the  effectiveness  of  the 
Navy  is  a  great  exaggeration.  Though  such  state- 
ments probably  result  from  a  loose  use  of  language 
rather  than  a  careful  study  of  the  situation,  they  are 
dangerous,  for  they  are  apt  to  be  taken  literally  by  the 
layman,  and  the  Navy  cannot  afford  to  have  such  an 
impression  gain  ground.  To  show  their  fallacy  it  is 
only  necessary  to  consider  the  matter  of  distances.  It 
is  quite  true  that  the  canal  will  enable  the  fleet  to  be 
transferred  from  one  ocean  to  the  other  in  a  few  hours, 
but  that  is  only  the  beginning  of  the  problem.  The 
added  strength  that  the  canal  will  give  to  the  Navy 
must  be  measured  by  the  facility  the  canal  affords  in 
enabling  reinforcements  to  arrive  in  time  to  be  of  use 
tactically;  that  is,  as  a  part  of  the  entire  force  in  battle 
with  the  enemy.  The  canal  will  be  of  little  use  if  the 
reinforcements  arrive  so  late  that  the  battle  has  already 
been  won  by  the  enemy.  The  Atlantic  terminal  is 
about  700  miles  from  Guantanamo,  1200  miles  from  the 
most  distant  part  of  the  Caribbean,  and  2000  miles 
from  New  York,  no  inconsiderable  distances  in  them- 
selves. On  the  Pacific  side  the  condition  is  very  much 
less  favorable,  for  the  Pacific  terminal  is  about  3250 
miles  from  San  Francisco,  4700  from  Honolulu,  8000 
from  Guam,  and  9350  from  Manila.  Merely  to  be  able 
to  get  the  fleet  rapidly  from  one  ocean  to  another  is  a 
great  gain,  a  very  great  gain;  but  it  is  not  by  any 
means  the  whole  problem.  Allowing  the  fleet  an  aver- 
age speed  of  12  knots  from  departure  to  destination, 
which  is  high,  considering  the  time  necessary  to  coal 


THe  Navy  and  tHe  Panama  Canal  133 


and  effect  repairs  and  the  necessity  that  all  the  fighting 
components  arrive  together  and  ready  for  action,  this 
means  that,  from  the  time  of  leaving  the  canal  until  its 
arrival  where  it  would  probably  be  needed,  the  shortest 
time  interval  to  any  of  the  places  mentioned  above  is 
about  58  hours  to  Guantanamo,  and  the  longest  is 
about  33  days  to  Manila,  during  which  the  enemy  will 
not  have  been  idle.  The  canal  will  be  a  great  military 
asset  in  war,  and  an  equally  great  one  in  anticipation 
of  war;  but  it  is  quite  beside  the  mark  to  say  that  it 
will  double  the  effectiveness  of  the  Navy,  or  do  any- 
thing approaching  that. 

The  truth,  as  usual,  lies  between  these  two  extreme 
views  just  examined,  and  the  writer  believes  that  the 
former  is  much  nearer  the  truth  than  the  latter.  By 
its  very  nature  the  problem  of  determining  just  what 
will  be  the  effect  of  the  canal  upon  the  strength  of  the 
Navy  cannot  be  mathematically  demonstrated.  The 
solution  is  largely  one  of  opinion,  and  will  be  modified 
as  greater  or  less  weight  is  given  to  the  several  consid- 
erations on  which  it  is  based.  If  the  general  formula 
advanced  above  for  fixing  the  strength  of  the  navy  be 
accepted,  then  manifestly,  canal  or  no  canal,  the  min- 
imum permissible  strength  of  the  Navy  is  that  which 
will  enable  us  to  meet,  with  our  entire  force,  our 
strongest  probable  enemy,  wherever  situated.  Under 
the  same  conditions  the  maximum  strength  that  can 
be  claimed  as  necessary  is  the  sum  of  that  of  the 
Standard  Atlantic  Fleet  plus  that  of  the  Standard 
Pacific  Fleet  (Great  Britain  being  excluded  for  reasons 
above  given).   This  amounts  to  saying  that  the  max- 


134 


THe  Panama  Canal 


imum  strength  that  can  be  claimed  as  necessary  is 
that  which  will  enable  us  to  conduct  a  war  with  pros- 
pect of  success  in  both  oceans  at  once,  which  is  the 
Two-ocean  Standard  again.  If  the  possible  antago- 
nists in  the  two  oceans,  in  relation  to  whom  our  formula 
for  strength  is  founded,  were  equally  strong,  our  min- 
imum permissible  Navy  would  be  half  as  strong  as 
the  maximum  Navy  that  will  ever  be  necessary. 
They  are  not  equally  strong,  however,  and  our  Stand- 
ard Atlantic  Fleet  should  now,  and  the  condition  is 
probably  permanent,  be  stronger  than  the  Standard 
Pacific  Fleet  need  be.  The  Standard  Atlantic  Fleet, 
therefore,  is  the  measure  of  our  minimum  permissible 
strength;  and,  to  avoid  any  misunderstanding,  the 
words  " minimum  permissible  strength"  are  used  in 
the  narrow  sense  of  indicating  the  very  least  strength 
that  can  logically  be  believed  allowable  by  anybody 
who  believes  in  a  Navy  at  all  for  well-founded  reasons. 
The  Standard  Atlantic  Fleet  does  not  represent  the 
writer's  views  of  what  our  minimum  naval  strength 
should  be. 

Our  total  naval  strength  at  this  minute  is  not  equal 
to  that  of  what  is  called  above  the  Standard  Atlantic 
Fleet.  Hence,  the  completion  of  the  canal  should  have 
no  immediate  effect  upon  our  building.  It  remains  to 
find  an  answer  to  the  question:  What  effect  will  it 
have  upon  our  building  policy  for  the  future? 

The  writer's  personal  opinion  is  that,  when  the  canal 
is  finished,  our  policy  should  be  to  have  eventually, 
and  as  soon  as  possible,  a  total  strength  not  less  than 
that  of  the  Standard  Atlantic  Fleet  plus  three-quarters 


THe  Navy  and  tKe  Panama  Canal  135 


that  of  the  Standard  Pacific  Fleet.  These  so-called 
" standard"  fleets  are  not  fixed  quantities,  but  will 
vary  from  year  to  year  as  foreign  nations  increase 
their  own  naval  strength.  The  policy  itself  can,  how- 
ever, be  fixed,  and  some  policy  should  be  established. 

The  reasons  that  have  appealed  to  the  writer  in 
reaching  this  conclusion  are  as  follows: 

(a)  With  no  canal  our  total  strength  should  be  the 
sum  of  both  the  Standard  Atlantic  Fleet  and  the 
Standard  Pacific  Fleet. 

(b)  The  canal  so  greatly  shortens  distances  between 
the  two  oceans  that  some  reduction  of  strength  below 
that  of  (a)  is  justifiable  when  it  shall  be  finished,  in 
view  of  the  heavy  financial  burden  imposed  by  a  great 
navy,  and  the  rather  remote  possibility  of  simultaneous 
war  in  both  oceans. 

(c)  This  reduction  should  not  be  sufficient  to  leave 
the  nation  in  a  hopeless  case  in  either  ocean  if  war 
broke  out  in  one  while  war  was  being  waged  in  the 
other. 

(d)  As  the  strength  of  the  Standard  Atlantic  Fleet 
must  be  maintained  in  any  event,  the  Pacific  Fleet  is 
the  one  in  which  to  make  the  reduction  in  strength. 

(e)  Our  interests  are  so  great,  and  are  scattered  over 
such  immense  distances  in  the  Pacific,  that  anything 
less  than  three-quarters  of  the  Standard  Pacific  Fleet 
would  make  even  a  defensive  war  in  that  ocean  hopeless. 

(f)  With  three-quarters  of  the  Standard  Pacific 
Fleet  a  defensive  war,  a  containing  war  so  to  speak, 
would  not  be  hopeless  while  waging  a  war  on  equal 
terms  in  the  Atlantic. 


136 


TKe  Panama  Canal 


(g)  If  there  were  no  prospect  of  war  in  the  Pacific 
at  a  time  when  engaged  in  war  in  the  Atlantic,  then 
one-half  of  the  Standard  Pacific  Fleet,  and  perhaps 
less,  would  suffice  to  guard  our  interests  in  the  Pacific, 
leaving  the  rest  of  the  fleet  in  that  ocean  free  to  rein- 
force the  Atlantic  Fleet  and  give  in  the  Atlantic  a 
marked  superiority  of  force. 

(h)  If  at  war  in  the  Pacific  with  no  prospect  of  war 
in  the  Atlantic,  a  great  superiority  of  force  could  be 
maintained  in  the  Pacific  that  would  be  the  more 
valuable,  owing  to  the  distances  over  which  the  Navy 
would  have  to  operate  in  that  ocean. 

The  composition  of  the  fleet  will  be  little  affected  by 
the  existence  of  the  finished  canal.  All  classes  of 
fighting  ships  will  be  as  much  needed  after  the  canal 
as  before,  and  the  numbers  and  proportions  deemed 
requisite  for  the  duty  in  either  ocean  will  be  necessary, 
canal  or  no  canal.  It  is  not  improbable  that  the  de- 
fense of  the  canal  itself  may  demand  a  limited  number 
of  certain  classes  of  vessels  that  would  not  otherwise 
be  necessary.  But  in  its  large  aspect  the  composition 
of  the  fighting  fleet  can  hardly  be  affected  by  the  com- 
pletion of  the  canal.  Even  in  the  matter  of  auxiliaries 
the  same  thing  appears  to  be  true.  If  the  Navy  de- 
pended upon  its  own  auxiliaries  for  the  transfer  of 
supplies  and  fuel  from  one  ocean  to  the  other,  the 
canal  would  naturally  serve  to  diminish  the  number  of 
supply  and  fuel  ships;  but  such  cargoes  are  practically 
all  sent  by  contract.  Other  auxiliaries  are  based  in 
number  on  the  fighting  ships  they  have  to  serve,  and 


THe  Navy  and  tKe  Panama  Canal  137 

distance  has  little  to  do  with  the  question.  Speaking 
in  a  broad  way,  then,  the  existence  of  the  canal  will 
have  no  effect  on  the  composition  of  the  fleet. 

It  is  more  than  probable  that  the  completion  of  the 
canal  will  effect  some  changes  in  the  disposition  of  the 
fleet  in  time  of  peace.  It  has  already  been  pointed  out 
that  the  Navy  is  not  now  as  strong  as  is  theoretically 
necessary  in  the  Atlantic  alone;  so  that  for  a  consid- 
erable time  to  come,  whatever  building  program  may 
be  adopted,  it  will  be  necessary  to  concentrate  our 
entire  fighting  fleet  in  time  of  war,  trusting  to  Provi- 
dence that  the  part  sent  to  the  threatened  ocean  will 
not  be  needed  during  the  war  in  the  ocean  from  which 
it  is  withdrawn.  In  effecting  this  concentration  the 
canal  will  be  a  very  great  military  advantage  to  us. 
Even  in  time  of  peace,  however,  the  completion  of  the 
canal  will  enable  some  desirable  changes  to  be  made  in 
the  present  disposition  of  the  fleet.  The  disposition 
hitherto,  while  dictated  by  reasons  of  convenience  under 
the  conditions  then  existing,  has  yet  not  been  very 
logical  considered  in  the  light  of  all-round  preparedness 
for  war.  One  suggested  disposition  is  the  maintenance 
of  a  force  of  fixed  strength  in  each  ocean,  with  a  shift- 
ing squadron  that  will  go  first  into  one  and  then  into 
the  other.  This  can  be  so  managed  as  to  keep  in  both 
oceans  a  force  better  balanced  in  all  its  components  of 
fighting  strength  than  is  now  the  case  with  either. 
The  outcome  in  accord  with  the  best  professional  opin- 
ion, however,  would  be  the  organization  under  one 
command  of  the  entire  military  fleet,  with  the  exception 


138 


THe  Panama  Canal 


of  the  few  units,  none  of  first  importance,  that  are 
needed  in  Asiatic  waters.  By  the  aid  of  the  canal  this 
single  fleet  could  cruise  as  a  whole  in  either  ocean  at 
will,  or  detachment  could  be  sent  from  one  ocean  to 
the  other  if  occasion  demanded.  A  great  advantage 
arising  from  either  disposition  will  be  the  possibility  of 
having  parts  of  the  Navy  appear  on  the  Pacific  coast 
that  could  not  well  be  sent  there  in  the  past.  The 
people  on  the  Pacific  coast  are  as  vitally  interested  in 
the  Navy  as  are  those  in  the  East;  yet  they  have  ha- 
bitually seen  the  least  powerful  and  least  modern  of  our 
ships.  It  is  natural  and,  indeed,  commendable,  that 
they  should  wish  to  have  in  their  own  waters  at  one 
time  or  another  the  flower  of  the  Navy.  The  comple- 
tion of  the  canal  will  enable  this  to  be  done;  and  it  will 
further  be  good  policy  for  the  Navy  to  do  it,  and  so 
stimulate  the  friendly  interest  in  the  Navy  that  is 
always  in  evidence  on  the  Pacific  coast. 

Another  advantage  that  will  accrue  in  connection 
with  the  transfer  of  ships  from  one  ocean  to  another 
is  the  possibility  of  making  between  our  own  ports, 
and  without  taxing  the  hospitality  of  foreign  nations, 
the  long  voyages  in  fleet  that  we  believe  in  our  service 
to  be  so  advantageous  as  a  means  of  fleet  discipline 
and  fleet  preparedness.  The  entire  battle  fleet  could 
easily  go  from  New  York  to  Seattle,  stay  ten  days  at 
San  Francisco  and  ten  in  Puget  Sound,  and  be  back 
in  New  York  in  a  little  more  than  three  months.  As 
a  long-distance  cruise  this  would  have  many  advan- 
tages over  a  cruise  to  Europe  and  back,  not  the  least 
of  which  would  be  the  experience  gained  in  logistics 


THe  Navy  and  tHe  Panama  Canal  139 

over  a  route  that  the  fleet  may  have  to  follow  some  day 
in  one  direction  or  the  other  when  the  errand  is  not 
peaceful. 

The  completion  of  the  canal  will  be  advantageous  to 
the  Navy  in  still  another  way  connected  with  the  dis- 
position of  the  ships  of  the  fleet.  Corinto,  on  the  Pa- 
cific coast  of  Nicaragua,  is  less  than  100  miles  further 
distant  from  New  York  via  Panama  than  it  is  from 
San  Francisco.  All  the  Pacific  coast  of  Central  America 
outside  of  Mexico  is  1000  miles  or  more  nearer  Panama 
than  it  is  to  San  Francisco.  It  will,  therefore,  be  possible 
generally  to  send  ships  more  quickly  from  the  Atlantic 
to  the  Pacific  coast  of  Central  America  in  times  of  dis- 
turbance there  than  it  will  be  to  send  them  from  San 
Francisco,  and  this  is  even  more  true  if  ships  on  the 
Pacific  side  must  come  from  Puget  Sound. 

The  preponderance  of  our  naval  strength  will  prob- 
ably continue  to  be  in  the  future,  as  it  has  been  in  the 
past,  habitually  kept  in  the  Atlantic.  That  ocean  is 
the  better  one  for  the  upkeep,  drill  and  administration 
of  the  battle  fleet  for  many  reasons.  But  the  canal 
will  permit  of  many  changes  of  disposition,  some  of 
them  permanent  and  some  temporary,  that  will  be 
advantageous  and  that  have  not  been  found  practicable 
under  present  conditions. 

The  completion  of  the  canal  should  serve  to  bring 
home  to  everyone  the  importance  of  our  naval  bases 
in  the  West  Indies  and  the  Pacific.  That  their  im- 
portance has  not  been  adequately  realized  is  evidenced 
by  the  lack  of  funds  provided  to  put  them  in  an  effi- 


140 


TTie  Panama  Canal 


cient  condition.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  was  an  old 
story  before  the  war  of  1898;  but  few  people  realized 
that  it  extended  our  military  frontier  beyond  the  At- 
lantic and  Gulf  coasts,  for  it  is  a  mental  conception 
and  not  a  tangible  thing  appealing  to  the  senses. 
After  1898  and  the  acquisition  of  Porto  Rico  there  was 
a  visible  projection  of  our  frontier  into  the  Caribbean; 
and  after  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  in  1901,  which 
gave  the  United  States  undivided  responsibility  for  the 
canal,  another  visible  and  material  interest  appeared 
still  further  to  the  front.  It  has  always  been  clear  to 
the  naval  mind  that  our  military  frontier  extends  far 
beyond  our  continental  borders;  and  now,  irrespective 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  it  extends  from  the  Atlantic 
coast  around  Porto  Rico  to  the  canal.  It  has  been 
equally  clear  that,  for  the  security  of  that  frontier,  a 
naval  base  somewhere  on  the  outer  edge  of  the  Carib- 
bean is  a  necessity.  After  careful  consideration,  the 
site  for  such  a  base  was  selected  several  years  ago  at 
Guantanamo  as  being  the  suitable  harbor  situated  fur- 
thest to  the  front  on  the  edge  of  the  Caribbean.  Con- 
gress has  not  yet  recognized  its  appreciation  of  the 
necessity  for  Guantanamo  by  the  provision  of  an  ade- 
quate program  for  its  defense  and  equipment,  although 
there  are  some  signs  of  such  an  appreciation.  Nor  do 
the  people  of  some  of  the  gulf  states  realize  that  the 
frontier  has  advanced  more  than  a  thousand  miles 
from  their  coast,  and  that  the  New  Orleans  and  Pen- 
sacola  naval  stations  no  longer  serve  any  useful  mili- 
tary purpose,  if  one  may  judge  by  their  arguments 
against  the  action  of  the  Navy  Department  in  closing 


THe  Navy  and  tHe  Panama  Canal  141 


them  during  the  last  administration.  When  the  canal 
becomes  a  great  utility  in  regular  operation  instead  of 
an  interesting  engineering  work,  when  trade  has  settled 
into  the  new  routes  the  canal  will  make  possible,  and 
when  business  men  have  occasion  to  think  of  it  daily 
as  a  vital  link  in  their  transportation  problems,  a 
juster  appreciation  will  arise  of  the  necessity  of  a 
naval  base  at  Guantanamo  for  the  protection  of  the 
canal  and  of  the  trade  routes  converging  toward  it,  as 
well  as  for  the  maintenance  of  our  general  interests  in 
the  Caribbean;  and  that  appreciation  will  doubtless 
find  expression  in  a  complete  scheme  for  the  defense 
and  equipment  of  Gauntanamo. 

If,  as  it  almost  surely  will,  the  canal  serves  to  place 
in  the  Pacific  a  greater  force  and  one  of  larger  ships 
than  is  now  kept  there,  the  question  of  bases  in  that 
ocean  must  be  considered,  even  though  the  ships  be  kept 
there  only  a  part  of  the  time.  In  the  Pacific,  excepting 
our  limited  plant  in  the  Philippines,  there  are  three 
bases  —  Mare  Island,  Bremerton  and  Pearl  Harbor. 
To  these  should  be  added  a  fortified  station  at  Guam 
to  make  our  situation  secure  in  that  ocean.  To  care  for 
any  considerable  force  in  peace,  and,  what  is  more  im- 
portant, to  care  for  it  in  war,  the  established  bases  are 
all  too  few.  Pearl  Harbor  is  in  the  making,  and 
Bremerton  is  not  yet  a  first-class  base.  San  Francisco  >y 
Bay  is  the  place  above  all  others  on  our  Pacific  conti- 
nental coast  that  is  suited  for  a  naval  base  by  reason 
of  its  strategic  situation  geographically  and  the  advan- 
tages attending  the  proximity  of  a  large  city.  But  the 
Mare  Island  Navy  Yard  is  impossibly  situated  for  this 


142 


XHe  Panama  Canal 


purpose.  It  has  neither  the  depth  of  water  in  its 
approaches  needed  for  modern  capital  ships  nor  a  suf- 
ficient area  of  water  of  suitable  depth  opposite  the  yard 
for  the  safe  anchorage  and  maneuvering  of  such  ships, 
while  its  distance  from  San  Francisco  and  lack  of  a  rail- 
way connection  are  handicaps  in  the  supply  of  labor 
and  in  the  economical  handling  of  freight  and  building 
supplies.  At  the  present  time  *  the  available  depth  is 
22  feet  at  mean  lower  low  water,  and  the  channels  con- 
stantly and  rapidly  silt  up.  It  is  even  difficult  to  keep 
the  entrance  to  the  new  dry  dock  deep  enough  for  the 
safe  docking  of  ships  that  can  enter  it.  The  adopted 
departmental  policy  is  to^  have  40  feet  depth  from  the 
sea  to  our  navy  yards,  and  that  depth  of  channel  is  be- 
ing urged  at  our  important  commercial  ports  in  the  in- 
terests of  commerce.  To  all  except  those  who  will  not 
see  it  has  been  increasingly  evident  during  the  last  ten 
years  that  the  Mare  Island  Navy  Yard  is  doomed  for 
the  service  of  modern  capital  ships,  and  it  is  equally 
evident  that  a  new  location,  somewhere  in  San  Fran- 
cisco Bay,  on  deep  water  near  the  city,  must  eventually 
be  provided  for  their  docking  and  repair.  If  the  people 
of  California  desire  and  expect  to  see  any  considerable 
part  of  our  modern  fleet  habitually  visiting  in  their 
waters  after  the  canal  is  finished,  they  cannot  too  soon 
bestir  themselves  to  provide  in  the  deep  water  of  San 
Francisco  Bay  the  naval  facilities  that  are  required  for 
the  supply,  upkeep  and  repair  of  modern  capital  ships. 
Mare  Island  does  not  afford  them  for  the  simple  reason 
that  recent  capital  ships  cannot  safely  go  there,  if  for 

*  Written  in  the  spring  of  1913.    Some  dredging  has  since  been  done. 


THe  Navy  and  tKe  Panama  Canal  143 


no  other.  Men  cannot  drive  rivets  on  a  ship  20  to  30 
miles  away.  The  completion  of  the  canal  should  help 
to  force  this  conclusion  home  if  the  people  of  Cali- 
fornia are  not  prepared  to  accept  it  now. 

Of  Pearl  Harbor  and  Bremerton  there  is  less  occa- 
sion to  speak  in  this  connection.  Congress  is  treating 
Pearl  Harbor  in  a  liberal  spirit,  and  the  facilities  at 
Bremerton  are  gradually  increasing.  The  development 
of  both  should  go  on  to  provide  for  the  increased  naval 
shipping  that  may  naturally  be  expected  to  follow  the 
completion  of  the  canal;  but,  above  all,  to  provide  for 
the  greatly  increased  demand  upon  them  in  the  event 
of  war  in  the  Pacific. 

In  the  present  uncrystallized  state  of  opinion  con- 
cerning the  ultimate  status  to  be  conferred  upon  the 
Philippines,  it  is  open  to  question  whether  it  is  worth 
while  to  add  materially  to  our  naval  facilities  in  those 
waters  just  now.  But  whether  the  Philippines  remain 
a  dependency,  become  a  territory,  or  be  made  inde- 
pendent, each  of  which  things  is  a  possibility  and  has 
its  advocates,  the  United  States  will  have  a  direct 
responsibility  for  them.  The  responsibility  is  visible  as 
long  as  our  flag  flies  over  the  Philippines.  It  will  be 
moral  in  any  event,  and  probably  contractual  if  inde- 
pendence be  granted;  for  it  is  inconceivable  that  the 
United  States  will  abandon  the  new  and  weak  nation 
to  which  it  may  give  birth,  and  leave  it  a  prey  to  the 
ambitions  of  strong  nations,  able  to  subdue  it,  and 
even  now  suspected  of  casting  covetous  eyes  in  its  di- 
rection. Should  aggression  come  the  United  States 
must  resist  it  with  the  fleet;  and  if  occasion  arise  for 


144 


THe  Panama  Canal 


the  fleet  to  go  to  the  Philippines  for  belligerent  purposes 
the  way  must  be  open  for  it  to  make  safe  passage,  and, 
more  than  that,  to  arrive  ready  for  action.  Honolulu 
(Pearl  Harbor)  is  more  than  4750  miles  from  Manila 
by  the  shortest  route,  —  an  impracticable  distance  over 
which  to  conduct  operations  without  an  intermediate 
point  of  support.  Guam,  under  our  own  flag,  offers 
such  a  point;  but  Guam  unfortified  would  be  a  broken 
reed  in  time  of  war.  The  value  of  Guam  to  the  United 
States  is  as  a  place  of  rest  and  supply  on  the  long 
voyage  to  the  Far  East  for  the  fighting  fleet,  and  for 
the  ships  that  keep  up  the  continual  stream  of  per- 
sonnel and  supplies  necessary  to  maintain  its  efficiency, 
and  as  a  base  for  the  naval  ships  required  to  safeguard 
the  long  line  of  communications.  Guam  in  the  hands 
of  an  enemy  would  be  a  most  serious  obstacle  to  any 
hope  of  success  for  the  United  States  in  a  campaign  in 
the  Philippines.  Both  to  make  it  a  secure  point  of 
support  for  our  own  Navy  and  to  deny  it  to  an  enemy 
Guam  should  be  fortified,  and  fortified  and  garrisoned 
so  effectively  that  it  cannot  be  captured  by  an  enemy 
before  our  fleet  can  arrive  for  its  relief.  The  value  of 
the  canal  in  connection  with  Guam  lies  in  the  reduc- 
tion by  two  months,  made  possible  by  it,  of  the  time 
that  Guam  must  be  able  to  hold  out  under  its  own  re- 
sources before  a  relieving  fleet  from  the  Atlantic  can 
arrive  on  the  scene. 

The  consideration  that,  perhaps,  comes  most  naturally 
to  mind  in  connection  with  the  canal  is  the  immense 
shortening  of  distances  effected  by  it  in  most  cases 


THe  Navy  and  tKe  Panama  Canal  145 


between  points  in  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific.  This  con- 
sideration was,  of  course,  the  reason  for  building  it. 
What  may  be  termed  the  commercial  routes  from  New 
York  to  Hong  Kong,  those  that  take  in  ports  of  call, 
are  practically  the  same  length  via  Panama  and  Suez, 
the  difference  between  them  being  less  than  20  miles 
in  favor  of  Suez;  but  the  Panama  route  is  the  shorter 
from  New  York  to  Shanghai  and  the  ports  of  Japan. 
From  New  York  to  Manila  the  Panama  route  is 
shorter  than  that  by  Suez  unless  the  former  go  by  way 
of  Honolulu  and  Yokohama.  The  further  east  the 
point  in  the  Pacific,  the  greater  the  gain  in  distance  to 
New  York  by  the  Panama  route.  Valparaiso  is  3750 
miles  nearer  New  York  via  Panama  than  via  Magellan. 
Speaking  generally,  the  distance  is  shortened  via  the 
canal  from  New  York  to  any  point  in  the  Pacific 
north  of  a  line  drawn  from  Magellan  Strait,  through 
Australia  and  the  Philippines,  to  Hong  Kong.  As 
affecting  naval  movements  this  means  more  than 
time  and  fuel  saved,  though  both  economies  are  of 
prime  importance.  It  means  the  possibility  of  sending 
ships  from  the  Atlantic  to  almost  any  place  where 
they  will  be  needed  in  the  Pacific  by  a  route  that  has 
fuel  stations  under  our  flag  along  the  entire  distance, 
no  two  of  which  are  further  apart  than  the  fuel  en- 
durance of  our  capital  ships.  This  is  an  enormous 
advantage,  for  the  problem  of  fueling  our  naval  ships 
in  time  of  war  on  a  passage  from  the  Pacific  to  the 
Atlantic,  or  vice  versa,  would  be  a  staggering  one  by 
either  the  Suez  or  Magellan  route,  and  the  attitude  of 
neutrals  might  make  it  almost  an  unsolvable  one. 


146 


TTKe  Panama  Canal 


The  canal  will  eliminate  the  question  of  neutrality 
altogether,  and  for  that  reason  alone  it  is  of  incalculable 
benefit  to  the  Navy. 

The  question  of  economy  is,  however,  one  not  to  be 
ignored.  Between  New  York  and  San  Francisco,  in 
either  direction,  Panama  and  Guantanamo  would 
probably  be  ports  of  call  for  a  fleet.  A  study  of  the 
saving  of  time,  fuel  and  money  effected  by  sending  a 
fleet  between  Panama  and  Guantanamo  through  the 
canal  instead  of  through  Magellan  gives  some  aston- 
ishing results.  Such  a  study  has  been  made,  based  on 
the  movement  of  25  capital  ships  with  attendant 
cruisers,  destroyers  and  auxiliaries.  It  is  too  long  to 
give  more  than  the  results,  but  they  are  sufficiently 
interesting. 

The  time  saved  under  the  assumptions  is  about  60 
days.  This  could  be  considerably  shortened  by  in- 
creasing the  assumed  sea  speed,  but  this  would  involve 
a  considerable  increase  in  the  amount  of  fuel  burned 
to  cover  the  same  distance,  with  the  attendant  in- 
creased cost  and  necessity  of  fueling  oftener.  The 
route  via  Magellan  that  the  fleet  would  follow  between 
Guantanamo  and  Panama  requires  nearly  900  actual 
steaming  hours  at  12  knots,  or  37  days.  This  makes 
no  allowance  for  necessary  time  to  refuel  and  repair, 
so  that  60  days  is  not  an  unreasonable  gain  in  time  to 
allow  in  favor  of  the  canal,  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
refueling  on  the  Magellan  route  would  have  to  be 
carried  on  at  places  outside  the  territorial  limits  of 
neutrals,  and  often  under  disadvantageous  circum- 
stances.   This  might  be  time  enough  to  enable  the 


XKe  Navy  and  tKe  Panama  Canal  147 


enemy  to  finish  the  campaign  in  his  favor.  At  the 
best,  the  long  sea  voyage  via  Magellan  would  be 
wearing  upon  personnel  and  material,  and  the  prob- 
lem of  supply  would  be  very  difficult. 

The  saving  in  coal  is  about  290,000  tons,  and  in 
fuel  oil  about  54,000  tons.  At  the  present  *  market 
values  of  these  fuels  taken  for  the  conditions,  this 
means  a  money  saving  of  nearly  $3,000,000.  Not  to 
overestimate  this  saving,  and  assuming  that  an  over- 
supply  of  20  per  cent  has  been  allowed,  the  saving  in 
coal  would  still  be  240,000  tons,  in  oil  45,000  tons,  and 
in  money  $2,500,000. 

The  gain  in  time  is  the  all-important  economy,  but 
the  saving  in  money  is  itself  important.  In  view  of 
our  lack  of  a  merchant  marine,  however,  the  simplifi- 
cation in  the  supply  of  fuel  via  the  canal  is  of  vastly 
greater  moment  than  the  money  saving.  The  United 
States  can  furnish  whatever  money  the  circumstances 
of  war  may  demand,  but  it  cannot  build  over-night  a 
merchant  marine  for  the  service  of  the  fleet.  This 
subject  could  be  greatly  elaborated,  but  enough  has 
been  said  to  show  what  a  valuable  military  asset  the 
canal  is  in  its  bearing  on  fleet  logistics. 

Simply  for  the  ordinary  service  of  the  fleet  in  time 
of  peace  the  canal  will  effect  very  large  savings  to  the 
naval  appropriations.  A  fair  average  price  for  eastern 
coal  of  a  kind  fit  for  naval  use  is  $8.45  per  ton  at 
San  Francisco,  Puget  Sound  and  Honolulu.  While  no 
exact  prediction  can  be  made,  competent  authorities 
believe  that,  when  the  canal  is  in  operation,  the  price 

*  Spring  of  1913. 


148 


THe  Panama  Canal 


at  which  eastern  coals  can  be  laid  down  at  these  places 
will  be  not  more  than  $6.20  per  ton.  Taking  as  a 
basis  the  amount  of  coal  on  naval  account  sent  to  the 
Pacific  in  the  last  fiscal  year,  160,000  tons,  the  saving 
amounts  to  $360,000.  Nor  does  the  advantage  end 
there;  a  collier  can  take  a  cargo  via  the  canal  to  the 
Pacific  coast,  discharge  and  be  back  at  Norfolk  in  the 
time  she  would  take  to  make  the  voyage  out  via  Magel- 
lan. This  roughly  divides  by  two  the  tonnage  neces- 
sary for  any  given  supply  of  coal  at  those  ports.  In 
time  of  war  in  the  Pacific,  this  will  be  of  inestimable 
advantage,  considering  our  woful  lack  of  a  merchant 
marine.  With  respect  to  other  bulky  naval  supplies, 
like  provisions,  the  same  thing  does  not  hold  true,  for 
they  can  be  delivered  equally  well  and  at  little  differ- 
ence in  cost  on  either  coast  from  their  points  of  origin. 
Even  ammunition  and  guns,  which  are  practically  all 
manufactured  in  the  east,  would  very  probably  be  sent 
by  rail  to  the  Pacific  in  order  to  save  time,  although 
the  expense  would  be  greater.  But  with  oil  fuel, 
again,  the  advantage  to  the  Navy  is  apparent,  and 
this  time  the  gain  is  in  movement  toward  the  Atlantic. 
In  the  last  few  months  the  price  of  oil  has  markedly 
increased.  California  produces  more  oil  than  any 
other  state  and  its  price  is  lower  than  eastern  oils. 
This  fact,  in  addition  to  the  important  fact  that  a 
large  oil-producing  area  has  been  set  aside  for  naval 
purposes  in  California,*  points  to  the  possibility  that 
the  Navy  may  soon  be  using  California  oil  in  the 

*  A  decision  rendered  early  in  June,  1914,  by  Judge  Dooling  of  the  Federal 
District  Court,  San  Francisco,  will  invalidate  the  Government's  title  to  the 
naval  reservation  of  oil  lands  unless  it  is  reversed  by  the  higher  court. 


THe  Navy  and  tKe  Panama  Canal  149 


Atlantic,  which  would  hardly  be  possible  without  the 
canal.  The  demand  for  oil  increases  every  day  and 
many  of  the  older  wells  are  falling  off  in  production; 
the  Navy  may  not  improbably  have  great  occasion  in 
the  years  to  come  to  congratulate  itself  that  the  canal 
will  make  the  Pacific  coast  fields  available. 

Modifications  of  trade  routes  that  will  follow  the 
completion  of  the  canal  are  sure  eventually  to  cause  a 
reduction  in  freight  rates,  and  so  act  as  a  stimulus  to 
trade.  The  increased  trade  will,  in  turn,  demand  a 
greater  tonnage,  although  this  demand  will  be  partially 
met  at  first  by  the  ability  of  the  same  amount  of 
shipping  to  provide  for  a  greater  trade  because  of  the 
shortened  distances  via  the  canal.  Still  it  can  hardly 
be  doubted  that  the  opening  of  the  canal  will  create  a 
demand  in  time  for  an  amount  of  shipping  consider- 
ably greater  than  exists  now  in  order  to  provide  for 
the  increased  trade.  The  opinion  has  been  advanced 
that  the  United  States  merchant  marine  will  be  greatly 
stimulated  by  the  operation  of  these  causes.  The 
Navy  earnestly  hopes  that  this  may  be  true,  for  a 
large  merchant  marine  is  a  necessity  for  a  strong 
navy  only  in  a  less  degree  than  the  auxiliary  ships 
especially  designed  for  its  service;  and  anything  what- 
ever that  can  properly  be  done  to  increase  the  mer- 
chant marine  should  have  the  active  support  of  the 
Navy.  In  so  far  as  the  coasting  trade  is  concerned 
there  seems  to  be  good  reason  to  expect  an  increase 
of  United  States  shipping,  for  that  trade  is  certain  to 
grow  rapidly  upon  the  opening  of  the  canal,  and  for- 


150  The  Panama  Canal 


eigners  cannot  take  any  part  in  it.  Already  some 
ships  have  been  built  for  this  trade  in  anticipation  of 
the  completion  of  the  canal,  and  others  are  being 
built.  But  the  writer  has  been  unable  to  convince 
himself  that  the  opening  of  the  canal  will  alone  serve 
to  draw  American  capital  into  a  form  of  investment 
from  which  it  has  persistently  kept  aloof,  and  under 
present  conditions  and  laws*  he  anticipates  little  or  no 
resultant  increase  in  that  part  of  the  merchant  marine 
of  the  United  States  engaged  in  foreign  trade.  With- 
out any  close  examination  of  the  reason  why,  it  seems 
to  be  a  fact  that  Americans  either  cannot  or  else  do 
not  care  to  compete  with  other  maritime  nations  in 
the  sea  carriage  of  foreign  trade,  and  it  is  not  apparent 
that  the  opening  of  the  canal  will  by  itself  change 
that  condition.  That  we  should  have  a  flourishing 
merchant  marine  is  a  matter  of  such  vital  interest  to 
the  Navy  that  it  will  anticipate  with  satisfaction  the 
increase  of  shipping  engaged  in  coastwise  trade  due  to 
the  opening  of  the  canal;  and,  as  remarked  above,  the 
Navy  should  exert  its  influence  in  favor  of  every  proper 
measure  tending  to  put  American  ships  on  the  ocean  in 
the  foreign  trade. 

However  interesting  and  profitable  it  may  be  to 
dwell  upon  the  military  advantages  to  the  United 
States  attending  the  opening  of  the  canal,  that  feature 
is  not  the  most  vital  one  to  the  Navy.  The  canal  puts 
an  added  and  very  great  responsibility  upon  the  Navy, 
and  this  fact  is  one  that  the  Navy  and  its  friends  must 
always  keep  in  mind. 

*  Written  before  the  outbreak  of  war  in  Europe. 


THe  Navy  and  tHe  Panama  Canal  151 


The  canal  is  being  built,  and  it  will  be  operated  and 
controlled,  solely  by  the  United  States  government, 
and  its  protection  falls  solely  upon  the  United  States. 
In  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  of  1901,  the  neutraliza- 
tion rules  are  embodied  in  Article  3,  in  which  the  lan- 
guage is:  "The  United  States  adopts,  as  the  basis  of 
the  neutralization  of  such  ship  canal,  the  following 
rules.  .  .  We  are,  therefore,  the  sole  guarantors  of 
the  neutralization  of  the  canal.  Again  Article  1  of  the 
treaty  of  November  18,  1903,  with  Panama  reads: 
"The  United  States  guarantees  and  will  maintain  the 
independence  of  the  Republic  of  Panama."  Finally, 
the  United  States  trade  passing  through  the  canal 
will  be  very  great.  Here  are  new  and  great  responsi- 
bilities, all  flowing  from  the  canal,  and  all  dependent 
upon  the  Navy  for  their  realization.  The  Navy  is  the 
outer  line  of  defense  of  the  canal  as  it  is  of  the  country. 
The  inner  line  of  defense  of  the  canal  resides  in  the 
fortifications  and  garrison  at  the  canal  itself.  If  our 
Navy  is  driven  from  the  sea  and  made  negligible,  an 
enemy  with  a  great  army  can  undertake  with  impunity 
the  transportation  of  the  troops  necessary  to  overcome 
the  inner  line  of  defense  and  complete  the  victory 
begun  on  the  ocean.  The  task  may  not  be  easy  for 
him,  but  its  possibility  must  be  conceded  if  the  sea  is 
closed  to  us  and  open  to  the  enemy.  The  only  possible 
and  final  assurance  of  safety  for  the  canal  is  in  a  Navy 
strong  enough  to  meet  the  enemy,  beat  him,  and  pre- 
vent him  from  ever  getting  near  it.  The  following 
words,  quoted  from  Admiral  Mahan,  indicate  the  alter- 
native: "Permanent  [naval]  inferiority  means  inevit- 


152 


TTie  Panama  Canal 


ably  ultimate  defeat,  which  fortifications  can  only 
delay. "  And  a  few  lines  later  he  uses  these  words: 
"If  the  United  States  desires  peace  with  security,  it 
must  have  a  Navy  second  to  none  but  that  of  Great 
Britain;  to  rival  which  is  inexpedient,  because  for 
many  reasons  unnecessary.' 1 

The  United  States  is  not  a  military  nation.  There 
is  little  consideration  and  less  understanding  among 
the  people  at  large  of  military  matters.  The  govern- 
ment has  no  defined  military  policy,  using  "  military " 
in  its  wide  sense,  and  it  has  no  defined  naval  policy. 
By  this  is  meant  that  there  is  no  soberly  thought-out 
relation  between  our  military  strength  and  our  situa- 
tion in  the  world  —  between  our  declared  external 
political  policies  and  the  only  means  yet  found  effica- 
cious to  uphold  them  —  that  manifests  itself  as  a 
guiding  principle  in  Congress,  or  even  in  the  recom- 
mendations of  departmental  heads  to  Congress.  There 
should  be  such  a  military  policy,  and  it  should  carry 
on  from  administration  to  administration,  from  Con- 
gress to  Congress,  and  be  considered  a  part  of  our  for- 
eign affairs  policy,  as  little  open  to  attack  from  within 
our  own  household  as  the  external  policies  on  which  it 
is  founded.  Our  form  of  government,  the  immensity 
of  our  country,  and  our  isolated  position,  almost  in- 
sular as  far  as  other  first-class  nations  having  great 
military  strength  are  concerned,  all  doubtless  conspire 
to  cause  the  general  lack  of  interest  of  our  people  in 
foreign  affairs,  which  is  the  ultimate  cause  why  there 
is  so  little  appreciation  of  the  underlying  need  for  a 
strong  Navy.   The  Navy  is  popular  just  now,  and  to 


TKe  Navy  and  tHe  Panama  Canal  153 


that  degree  it  is  fortunate;  but  the  roots  of  its  exist- 
ence should  lie  in  deeper  ground  than  popularity.  It 
is  to  be  hoped  that  the  completion  of  the  canal  may 
serve  to  broaden  the  national  outlook,  and  that  we 
may  be  able  to  look  back  to  it  in  coming  years  as  the 
period  in  which  a  reasoned  national  policy,  founded  on 
national  aims,  shall  have  had  its  birth  in  the  country 
at  large. 

There  would  be  no  excuse  for  a  failure  of  the  Navy 
itself  to  have  a  " reason  for  the  faith  that  is  in  us"; 
nor  can  that  reproach  be  laid  at  the  door  of  the  Navy, 
which  has  for  years  had  a  definite,  consistent  policy 
as  expressed  by  the  responsible  naval  advisers  of  the 
Navy  Department.  Moreover,  the  effect  of  the  canal 
upon  that  policy  has  been  carefully  kept  in  mind  since 
the  day  the  canal  was  started. 


THE  PANAMA  CANAL 
Part  V 

THE  PANAMA  CANAL  IN  INTERNATIONAL  LAW 

BY 

HARRY  S.  KNAPP 

CAPTAIN  U.  S.  NAVY 


THE  PANAMA  CANAL  IN  INTERNATIONAL 

LAW 

The  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty,*  negotiated  in  1901 
between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain,  is  the 
basis  of  the  international  status  of  the  Panama  Canal. 
It  superseded  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  f  of  1850  be- 
tween the  same  nations.  In  another  place  $  the  writer 
has  made  a  study  of  the  two  treaties,  and  a  summary 
of  the  conclusions  reached  will  be  given  here,  for  it  is 
important  to  have  a  knowledge  of  the  antecedent  his- 
tory to  appreciate  the  full  bearings  of  the  present 
treaty  obligations  of  the  United  States  with  respect  to 
the  canal. 

Long  before  1850  the  desirability  and  eventual  ne- 
cessity of  a  canal  joining  the  Atlantic  and  the  Pacific 
had  been  recognized,  but  no  sentiment  had  developed 
in  the  United  States  for  exclusive  control  by  this 
nation.  On  the  contrary,  the  utterances  of  represent- 
ative men  were  quite  in  the  opposite  sense;  i.e., 
toward  a  guarantee  by  all  the  great  commercial  na- 
tions that  the  canal  should  be  free  and  open  to  all. 
Shortly  before  1850  Great  Britain,  already  having  a 
foothold  in  Central  America  at  Belize,  assumed  a  pro- 

*  Compilation  of  Treaties  in  Force,  1904,  p.  609. 
f  Ibid.,  p.  380. 

%  The  Real  Status  of  the  Panama  Canal  as  Regards  Neutralization.  U.  S. 
Naval  Institute  Proceedings,  Vol.  36,  No.  1;  Whole  No.  133,  March, 
1910. 

157 


158 


XKe  Panama  Canal 


tectorate  over  the  Mosquito  Indian  country,  claiming 
as  far  south  as  the  San  Juan  River.  This  greatly  irri- 
tated the  people  of  the  United  States;  for,  in  addition 
to  being  an  infringement  upon  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
it  would,  if  allowed,  put  Great  Britain  in  control  of 
the  eastern  end  of  what  was  then  considered  to  be  the 
most  practicable  route  for  a  canal.  The  attitude  of 
the  two  nations  was  one  of  mutual  jealousy,  each 
fearing  that  the  other  would  attempt  to  get  for  itself 
some  advantage  not  possessed  by  the  other,  with 
respect  to  a  canal,  although  neither  actually  sought  a 
monopoly  of  political  control.  In  other  words,  it  was 
not  a  question  of  what  either  nation  did  want  to  get 
for  itself  alone,  but  of  what  each  suspected  that  the 
other  nation  might  be  trying  to  get  for  itself  alone. 

The  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  of  1850  settled  that 
point,  the  first  sentence  of  Article  I  reading:  "The 
Governments  of  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain 
hereby  declare  that  neither  the  one  nor  the  other  will 
ever  obtain  or  maintain  for  itself  any  exclusive  control 
over  the  said  ship-canal."  Other  stipulations  were 
that  neither  would  erect  or  maintain  fortifications 
commanding,  or  in  the  vicinity  of  the  canal;  nor 
occupy,  fortify,  colonize,  assume  or  exercise  any  do- 
minion over  Nicaragua,  Costa  Rica,  the  Mosquito 
Coast,  or  any  part  of  Central  America,  nor  to  that 
end  make  use  of  any  intimacy  or  alliance;  the  powers 
jointly  engaged  to  protect  the  finished  canal  from  in- 
terruption, seizure  or  unjust  confiscation,  and  to  guar- 
antee that  the  canal  should  be  ever  open  and  free; 
they  engaged  to  invite  other  powers  to  join  them  in 


Panama  Canal  in  International  Law  159 


similar  stipulations;  and  they  established  a  " general 
rule"  by  agreeing  to  extend  their  protection,  not  alone 
to  a  canal  at  Nicaragua  (the  then  favored  site),  but 
to  any  other  practicable  communication,  whether  by 
canal  or  railway,  across  the  Isthmus. 

In  a  memorandum*  of  the  Secretary  of  State,  Mr. 
Olney,  written  in  1896,  it  is  pointed  out  that  the 
United  States  desired,  in  negotiating  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty,  to  overcome  two  difficulties:  one,  the 
rights  asserted  by  Great  Britain  on  the  Mosquito 
Coast;  the  other,  the  inability  to  get  in  this  country 
the  capital  necessary  to  prosecute  the  work  of  canal 
construction  by  the  American  company  in  whose 
favor  the  United  States  had  obtained  concessions 
from  Nicaragua  by  treaty  in  1849,  or  to  get  capital 
abroad  as  long  as  the  canal  enterprise  was  conducted 
under  purely  American  auspices.  After  stating  that 
the  treaty  secured  the  two  objects  desired,  he  goes  on 
to  say:  "In  short,  the  true  operation  and  effect  of  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  is  that,  as  respects  Central 
America  generally,  Great  Britain  has  expressly  bound 
herself  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  while,  as  respects  all 
water  and  land  interoceanic  communications  across 
the  Isthmus,  the  United  States  has  expressly  bound 
itself  to  so  far  waive  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  to  admit 
Great  Britain  to  a  joint  protectorate."  The  waiver  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  even  greater  than  Mr.  Olney 
states,  for  Article  VI  opens  with  the  words:  "The 
contracting  parties  in  this  convention  engage  to  invite 
every  state,  with  which  both  or  either  have  friendly 

*  Moore's  International  Law  Digest,  Vol.  Ill,  Sec.  364. 


160 


XKe  Panama  Canal 


intercourse,  to  enter  into  stipulations  with  them  sim- 
ilar to  those  which  they  have  entered  into  with  each 
other."  If  it  was  a  waiver  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
in  any  degree  to  enter  into  a  joint  protectorate  of  the 
canal  with  Great  Britain,  it  was  certainly  a  waiver  to 
a  greater  degree  to  engage  to  invite  every  other  state 
to  do  likewise. 

For  a  decade  after  1850  there  was  friction  between 
the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  over  the  inter- 
pretation of  some  features  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty,  which  were  not  directly  connected,  however, 
with  canal  matters.  In  1860  these  sources  of  friction 
were  satisfactorily  adjusted,  and  then  the  Civil  War 
engaged  this  country's  attention  to  the  exclusion  of 
everything  not  of  immediate  importance.  After  the 
Civil  War  there  were  signs  of  a  change  of  sentiment 
in  the  United  States  regarding  the  control  of  the 
canal.  It  began  to  be  appreciated  that  our  interests 
demanded  our  exclusive  control  of  the  canal,  instead 
of  sharing  that  control  with  foreign  nations,  or  with 
one  such  nation,  as  Great  Britain.  Such  a  complete 
reversal  of  sentiment  took  time  to  develop.  In  1877, 
in  President  Grant's  administration,  a  draft  treaty 
looking  to  neutralization  was  prepared  "to  which  it 
was  proposed  to  obtain  the  accession  of  the  principal 
maritime  powers."  *  In  his  message  of  March  8,  1880, 
President  Hayes  enunciated  the  new  and  contrary 
policy  in  these  plain  words:  "The  policy  of  this  coun- 
try is  a  canal  under  American  control.  The  United 
States  cannot  consent  to  the  surrender  of  this  control 

*  Moore's  International  Law  Digest,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  187. 


Panama  Canal  in  International  Law  161 


to  any  European  power,  or  to  any  combination  of 
European  powers";  *  and  further  on  he  used  the  words 
so  often  quoted  since:  "It  (the  canal)  will  be  .  .  . 
virtually  a  part  of  the  coast  line  of  the  United  States." 
This  policy  directly  contravened  our  engagements  with 
Great  Britain  in  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  and  it  be- 
came our  object  to  get  rid  of  those  engagements  in 
order  to  have  the  free  hand  we  desired.  For  twenty 
years  the  matter  was  agitated  until,  in  the  Hay- 
Pauncefote  treaty,  our  wishes  were  met  by  Great 
Britain,  and  very  fully  met  as  will  be  seen  by  a  perusal 
of  the  treaty  which  is  quoted  at  the  end  of  this  chapter. 

I  This  treaty,  as  stated  at  the  outset,  is  the  basis  of 
the  international  status  of  the  canal.  With  a  knowl- 
edge of  the  conditions  before  the  treaty  was  negotiated 
it  is  difficult  to  see  in  what  manner  the  United  States 
has  been  worsted  in  its  provisions,  as  has  recently  been 
claimed.  Almost  invariably  treaties  are  compromises, 
and  almost  invariably  for  favors  granted  there  is,  ex- 
pressed or  implied,  a  quid  pro  quo  which  carries  obliga- 
tions complementary  to  the  favors.  In  the  Hay  mem- 
orandum,! sent  to  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign 
Relations  while  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  was  under 
consideration,  it  is  said:  " These  rules  (those  of  Article 
III)  are  adopted  in  the  treaty  with  Great  Britain  as  a 
consideration  for  getting  rid  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty."  In  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  Great  Britain 
definitely  renounced  her  legal  right,  existent  under  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  of  sharing  with  the  United 

*  Moore's  International  Law  Digest,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  188. 
f  Senate  Document  No.  746,  61st  Congress,  3d  Session. 


162 


THe  Panama  Canal 


States  in  the  control  and  protection  of  the  canal.  In 
consenting  to  the  supersession  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty  she  gave  up  the  only  treaty  right  with  the 
United  States  known  to  the  writer  by  which  a  non- 
American  nation  had  a  voice  in,  and  consequent  possi- 
bility of  interference  with,  matters  in  this  hemisphere 
external  to  those  covered  by  direct  treaties  between 
the  several  non-American  and  American  nations.  And 
more  than  this,  —  Great  Britain  gave  up  the  right, 
the  duty  even,  of  inviting  other  nations  to  join  with 
her  and  the  United  States  in  stipulations  similar  to 
those  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty.  It  is  plain  that 
the  United  States  not  only  gained  the  free  hand  she 
wanted  in  canal  matters  when  the  Hay-Pauncefote 
treaty  was  concluded,  but  also  that  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine was  immensely  strengthened,  not  to  say  rehabil- 
itated. The  impairment  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  by 
the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  whether  due  to  force  of 
circumstances  at  the  time  or  done  without  a  realiza- 
tion of  its  import,  has  now  been  remedied,  and  the 
United  States  can  maintain  it  with  no  embarrassing 
exception  to  explain. 

With  the  obstacle  presented  by  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty  cleared  away,  everything  bade  fair  for  the  at- 
tainment of  the  wish  of  this  country  to  build  and 
control  the  canal.  After  much  discussion  the  Panama 
route  was  decided  upon,  which  was  doubtless  good 
engineering,  although  with  that  we  are  not  concerned 
here;  it  was  certainly  good  statesmanship  to  dispose 
of  any  possible  rival,  both  in  a  business  sense  and  with 
a  view  to  obviating  any  possible  future  diplomatic  dis- 


Panama  Canal  in  International  Law  163 

agreements.  No  great  difficulty  was  anticipated  in 
reaching  an  agreement  with  Colombia,  which  was 
bound  to  be  greatly  benefited  by  the  canal  and  was 
too  weak  financially  to  dream  of  undertaking  it  alone. 
But  negotiations  dragged,  for  Colombia  insisted  on 
terms  that  were  considered  unreasonable  in  this  coun- 
try. Then  one  morning  Panama  was  born,  and  the 
United  States  hastened  to  make  with  the  infant  re- 
public a  canal  treaty  that  was  concluded  November 
18,  1903,  two  years  to  a  day  after  the  Hay-Pauncefote 
treaty  was  concluded.  This  treaty  with  Panama, 
quoted  at  the  end  of  this  chapter,  is  the  second  one 
upon  which  the  international  status  of  the  canal  rests. 
It  is  the  only  treaty  with  an  American  nation,  as  the 
Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  is  the  only  one  with  a  non- 
American  nation,  that  directly  enters  into  stipulations 
concerning  the  Panama  Canal.  It  is  true  that  the 
35th  Article  of  the  treaty  of  1846  with  New  Grenada, 
now  Colombia,  bore  upon  the  transit  across  the  Isth- 
mus of  Panama;  but  the  successful  revolution  of 
Panama  carried  with  it  the  assumption  by  Panama 
of  all  the  rights  and  obligations  of  that  article  to  the 
exclusion  of  Colombia,  on  the  principle  that  treaties 
run  with  the  land.  The  treaty  of  1903,  moreover, 
covers  these  points  more  fully  than  did  the  treaty  of 
1846. 

There  is  one  other  treaty  and  two  protocols  that  are 
concerned  with  transit  over  the  Isthmus.  The  Gads- 
den treaty  of  1853  with  Mexico  contains  in  Article 
VIII  stipulations  concerning  transit  over  "a  plank  and 
rail  road  across  the  Isthmus  of  Tehuantepec."  This 


164 


THe  Panama  Canal 


has  no  bearing  on  the  Panama  Canal.  The  two  proto- 
cols were  identical,  concluded  December  1,  1900,  with 
Costa  Rica  and  Nicaragua,  and  looked  to  more  definite 
later  engagements  concerning  a  canal  by  the  Nicaragua 
route.  They  were  anticipatory  only  and  have  no  bear- 
ing on  the  Panama  Canal,  as  the  canal  to  which  they 
referred  has  not  been  built. 

, It  thus  appears  that  with  two  nations  only  have  we 
direct  treaty  engagements  concerning  the  Panama 
Canal  —  Great  Britain  and  Panama.  We  are  not 
legally  answerable  by  reason  of  contractual  obligations 
to  any  other  nation  for  our  control  and  operation  of 
the  canal.  The  only  possible  exception  to  this  state- 
ment that  occurs  to  the  writer  is  that  "most  favored 
nation"  treatment  might  possibly  be  held  to  apply  to 
canal  matters,  although  it  is  difficult  to  see  how.  The 
wording  of  Article  III  (1)  of  the  Hay-Pauncefote 
treaty,  confirmed  by  that  of  Article  XVIII  of  the 
treaty  with  Panama,  does,  however,  undoubtedly  place 
upon  us  a  moral  obligation  toward  all  the  nations  of 
the  earth  until  those  treaties  are  denounced  or  super- 
seded. What  has  been  said  heretofore  has  been  inspired 
by  no  desire  to  lessen  that  obligation,  but  simply  to 
point  out  its  different  character,  which  is  moral  toward 
the  world  at  large  in  so  far  as  matters  are  concerned 
about  which  we  have  made  declarations  affecting  all 
nations  in  our  treaties  with  Great  Britain  and  Panama; 
legally  we  are  under  obligations  to  those  two  countries 
only. 

Of  the  two  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  is  the  one  the 
more  likely  to  give  rise  to  international  and  diplomatic 


Panama  Canal  in  International  Law  165 


questions,  for  the  treaty  with  Panama  followed  after 
and  was  based  upon  it.  Of  the  four  essential  articles 
of  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty,  Article  I  concerns  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States  only.  Article  IV  enun- 
ciates the  mutual  agreement  providing  that  no  change 
of  sovereignty  or  of  the  international  relations  of  the 
country  traversed  by  the  canal  shall  affect  the  general 
principle  of  neutralization  or  the  obligation  of  the  high 
contracting  parties.  It  is  not  inconceivable  that  this 
article  may  at  some  time  give  rise  to  international 
questions  of  gravity;  but  it  is  so  improbable  that  it 
needs  no  further  mention  than  to  point  out  that  the 
opening  words  of  the  article,  "It  is  agreed,"  point  to 
a  joint  responsibility  of  the  two  nations  that  they 
shall  work  to  the  same  end  in  the  settlement  of  such 
a  question,  should  it  arise.  The  canal  is  being  built 
by  the  United  States,  "directly  at  its  own  cost,"  pur- 
suant to  Article  II,  which  also  provides  that  "subject 
to  the  provisions  of  the  present  treaty"  the  United 
States  "shall  have  and  enjoy  all  the  rights  incident  to 
such  construction,  as  well  as  the  exclusive  right  of 
providing  for  the  regulation  and  management  of  the 
canal."  The  vital  provisions  that  limit  the  powers  of 
the  United  States  are  found  in  Article  III,  and  it  is 
this  article  that  is  most  apt  to  give  rise  to  diplomatic 
questions,  as  it  has  already  given  rise  to  the  question 
of  tolls.  With  this  mere  mention  of  tolls  the  subject 
will  be  dismissed,  for  it  would  be  manifestly  improper 
for  the  writer  to  discuss  it  at  the  present  time  and  in 
these  pages.* 

*  Written  in  the  last  days  of  the  Taft  administration. 


166 


XKe  Panama  Canal 


Article  III  enunciates  certain  rules  to  govern  the 
conduct  of  the  canal,  and  it  is  worth  while  to  observe 
very  carefully  the  reading  of  the  opening  sentence 
preceding  the  rules  themselves.  In  the  first  place,  the 
rules  are  adopted  "as  the  basis  of  the  neutralization 
of  such  ship  canal/ '  and  for  no  other  stated  pur- 
pose whatever;  i.e.,  the  rules  are  in  pursuance  of  the 
"  'general  principle'  of  neutralization"  cited  in  the 
preamble  of  the  treaty.  In  the  second  place,  the  open- 
ing words  of  the  article  are  "The  United  States  adopts," 
not  "the  High  Contracting  Parties  adopt,"  or  "it  is 
agreed,"  or  any  such  words  implying  dual  responsi- 
bility. By  virtue  of  this  language  in  the  treaty  the 
United  States  adopts  alone,  with  the  assent  of  Great 
Britain,  the  rules  governing  that  status  of  the  canal 
termed  neutralization,  and  in  consequence  the  United 
States  is  alone  responsible  for  maintaining  that  status 
itself.  In  the  third  place,  the  wording  regarding  the 
rules  is  "the  following  Rules,  substantially  as  embodied 
in  the  Convention  of  Constantinople."  The  rules  of 
the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  are  not  said  to  be  substan- 
tially those  embodied  in  the  Convention  of  Constan- 
tinople, but  substantially  as.  In  other  words,  the 
rules  of  the  Constantinople  Convention  are  not  all 
(that  might  apply)  adopted,  but  those  that  are  adopted 
are  substantially  as  they  appear  in  that  instrument. 
This  is  a  very  real  distinction  that  has  not  always 
been  kept  clearly  in  mind  by  writers  on  canal  matters. 
Thus  the  right  of  the  United  States  to  fortify  the  canal 
has  been  challenged  at  home  and  abroad,  although  never 
by  any  government,  and  the  prohibition  of  fortifica- 


Panama  Canal  in  International  Law  167 


tions  in  the  Constantinople  Convention  has  been 
urged  as  a  reason  why  fortifications  at  Panama  would 
violate  the  spirit  of  the  rules  of  the  Hay-Pauncefote 
treaty.  That  question  has  been  settled  and  the  work 
on  the  Panama  Canal  fortifications  is  now  in  progress. 
Again  there  are  those  who  hold  that  the  United  States 
in  war  would  have  to  permit  the  ships  of  her  enemy  to 
pass  freely  through  the  canal  because  of  the  wording 
of  Rule  I  of  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty,  taken  in  con- 
nection with  the  reference  to  the  rules  of  the  Con- 
stantinople Convention  in  the  opening  sentence  of 
Article  III.  In  Article  IV  of  the  Constantinople  Con- 
vention occur  the  words  "The  Maritime  Canal  re- 
maining open  in  time  of  war  as  a  free  passage,  even  to 
the  ships  of  war  of  belligerents  .  .  .  the  high  contract- 
ing parties  agree  that  no  right  of  war,  no  act  of  hos- 
tility, nor  any  act  having  for  its  object  to  obstruct  the 
free  navigation  of  the  canal,  shall  be  committed  in  the 
canal  and  its  ports  of  access,  as  well  as  within  a  radius 
of  three  marine  miles  from  those  ports,  even  though  the 
Ottoman  Empire  should  be  one  of  the  belligerent  powers.71  * 
No  such  words  as  those  italicized  appear  in  the  Hay- 
Pauncefote  treaty  rules;  and,  if  the  remarks  recently 
made  at  a  public  banquet  by  a  gentleman  high  in  the 
councils  of  state  are  any  indication  of  governmental 
policy,  no  such  suicidal  thing  is  apt  to  occur  as  per- 
mitting a  free  passage  through  the  canal  of  our  own 
enemy's  ships  of  war,  on  an  errand  inimical  to  us. 

Considered  as  a  question  of  language  the  writer 
does  not  believe  that  the  word  "neutralization"  is 

*  Italics  the  writer's. 


168 


XKe  Panama  Canal 


applicable  to  the  present  status  of  the  Panama  Canal. 
" Neutralized"  and  "neutralization"  imply  a  status 
maintained  by  mutual  agreement  of  so  many  powerful 
nations  that  there  can  be  no  hope  of  a  successful  vio- 
lation of  that  status  by  any  one,  or  by  any  combina- 
tion. At  Panama  the  United  States  stands  alone. 
But  whatever  the  word  used  the  thing  aimed  at  is 
perfectly  plain,  and  the  word  "neutralization"  may 
be  accepted  for  want  of  a  better.  The  United  States 
is  sole  sponsor  for  the  neutralization  of  the  canal. 

Considering  now  the  rules  themselves  it  will  be 
noted  that  all  but  the  first  have  reference  to  a  state  of 
war.  This  is  to  be  expected  because  the  idea  of  neu- 
tralization is  correlative  to  that  of  a  state  of  war; 
neutralization  is  imposed  to  meet  the  conditions  arising 
in  actual  war  or  in  anticipation  of  those  that  may 
arise  in  a  future  war.  A  first  reading  of  Rule  1  leads 
to  the  impression  that  it  is  out  of  place  in  rules  pro- 
viding for  neutralization;  but  closer  consideration 
shows  that  it  belongs  properly  enough  where  it  is. 
By  the  very  omission  of  reference  to  time  of  war  the 
intention  is  evident  that  the  rule  is  intended  to  cover 
all  times,  including  time  of  war.  A  very  important 
exception  to  this  last  statement  must  be  made,  how- 
ever: the  rule  does  apply  to  times  of  war  in  which  the 
United  States  herself  is  not  a  belligerent,  but  does  not 
apply  to  her  enemy' 's  war  vessels  when  she  is  a  belligerent. 
This  limitation  is  not  expressly  stated  but  it  is  borne 
out  by  the  history  of  the  rule,  which  had  its  prototype 
in  Article  I  of  the  Constantinople  Convention.*  That 

*  Printed  at  the  end  of  this  chapter. 


Panama  Canal  in  International  Law  169 


article  reads  in  part:  "The  Suez  Maritime  Canal  shall 
always  be  free  and  open,  in  time  of  war  as  in  time  of 
peace,  to  every  vessel  of  commerce  or  of  war,  without 
distinction  of  flag.  Consequently  the  High  Contract- 
ing Parties  agree  not  in  any  way  to  interfere  with  the 
free  use  of  the  Canal  in  time  of  war  as  in  time  of  peace. 
The  words  "always"  and  "in  time  of  war  as  in  time  of 
peace"  of  this  article  are  absent  from  Rule  1  of  the 
Hay-Pauncefote  treaty.  It  will  be  remembered  that 
the  original  draft  of  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  was 
made  in  1900  and  contained  rules  for  the  neutraliza- 
tion of  the  canal.  Rule  1  of  the  original  draft,  in 
general  tenor  similar  to  Rule  1  of  the  accepted  treaty, 
did  contain  the  words  "in  time  of  war  as  in  time  of 
peace."  That  draft  was  materially  amended  in  the 
Senate,  and,  as  amended,  it  was  unacceptable  to  Great 
Britain.  One  of  the  Senate  amendments  provided 
"that  none  of  the  immediate  foregoing  conditions  and 
stipulations  .  .  .  shall  apply  to  measures  which  the 
United  States  may  find  it  necessary  to  take  for  securing 
by  its  own  forces  the  defense  of  the  United  States  and 
the  maintenance  of  public  order."  The  original  draft 
also  provided,  in  Rule  7,  that  "no  fortifications  shall 
be  erected  commanding  the  Canal  or  the  waters  adja- 
cent." Great  Britain  held  that  the  amendment  re- 
ferred to  above,  called  the  Davis  amendment,  and 
Rule  7  were  incompatible.  In  the  Hay  memorandum, 
previously  cited,  which  went  to  the  Senate  Committee 
in  explanation  of  the  later  and  accepted  draft  of  the 
treaty,  Mr.  Hay  said: 


170 


THe  Panama  Canal 


His  Majesty's  Government  .  .  .  thought  that  ...  it  would 
be  impossible  to  determine  what  might  be  the  effect  if  one  clause 
permitting  defensive  measures  and  another  clause  (which  has 
now  been  omitted)  prohibiting  fortification  of  the  canal  were 
allowed  to  stand  side  by  side  in  the  same  convention. 

This  amendment  was  strenuously  objected  to  by  Great  Britain 
as  involving  a  distinct  departure  from  the  principle  of  neutral- 
ity ..  . 

No  longer  insisting  upon  the  language  of  the  Davis  amend- 
ment —  which  had  in  terms  reserved  to  the  United  States  express 
permission  to  disregard  the  rules  of  neutrality  prescribed,  when 
necessary  to  secure  its  own  defense,  which  the  Senate  had  appar- 
ently deemed  necessary  because  of  the  provision  in  Rule  1,  that 
the  canal  should  be  free  and  open  "in  time  of  war  as  in  time  of 
peace"  to  the  vessels  of  all  nations  —  it  was  considered  that  the 
omission  of  the  words  "in  time  of  war  as  in  time  of  peace"  would 
dispense  with  the  necessity  of  the  amendment  referred  to,  and 
that  war  between  the  contracting  parties,  or  between  the  United  States 
and  any  other  power,  would  have  the  ordinary  effect  of  war  upon 
treaties  when  not  specially  otherwise  provided,  and  would  remit  both 
parties  to  their  original  and  natural  right  of  self-defense  and  give  to 
the  United  States  the  clear  right  to  close  the  canal  against  the  other 
belligerent,  and  to  protect  it  and  defend  itself  by  whatever  means 
might  be  necessary* 

The  statement  just  quoted  was  made  by  one  nego- 
tiator of  the  treaty  and  was  presented  to  the  Senate 
Committee  having  the  treaty  in  charge,  and  there  can 
be  no  reasonable  doubt  that  the  Senate  ratified  the 
treaty  with  a  clear  understanding  of  this  matter.  It 
is  thus  seen  that  the  exception  noted  above  to  the 
general  interpretation  of  Rule  1  is  fully  justified.  If 
it  be  objected  that  this  represents  the  views  of  only 
one  party  to  the  treaty,  the  words  of  Lord  Lansdowne 
in  his  memorandum  of  August  3,  1901,  may  carry  the 

*  Italics  the  writer's. 


Panama  Canal  in  International  Law  171 


conviction  that  this  interpretation  was  understood  by 
Great  Britain  also.    In  that  memorandum*  he  says: 

I  understand  that  by  the  omission  of  all  reference  to  the  matter 
of  defense  the  United  States  Government  desires  to  reserve  the 
power  of  taking  measures  to  protect  the  Canal,  at  any  time  when 
the  United  States  may  be  at  war,  from  destruction  or  damage  at 
the  hands  of  an  enemy  or  enemies.  On  the  other  hand,  I  conclude 
that,  with  the  above  exception,  there  is  no  intention  to  derogate 
from  the  principles  of  neutrality  laid  down  by  the  rules.  As  to 
the  first  of  these  propositions  I  am  not  prepared  to  deny  that 
contingencies  may  arise  when,  not  only  from  a  national  point  of 
view,  but  on  behalf  of  the  commercial  interests  of  the  whole 
world,  it  might  be  of  supreme  importance  to  the  United  States 
that  they  should  be  free  to  adopt  measures  for  the  defense  of 
the  Canal  at  a  moment  when  they  were  themselves  engaged  in 
hostilities. 

It  may  be  added  that  Lord  Pauncefote,  the  British 
plenipotentiary  in  the  negotiation  of  the  treaty,  was 
one  of  the  British  representatives  in  the  negotiation  of 
the  Constantinople  Convention,  and  must  be  assumed 
therefore  to  have  been  especially  qualified  to  note  the 
effect  of  the  deviation  in  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty 
rules  from  those  of  the  rules  governing  the  Suez  Canal. 

Taken  collectively  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  rules 
define  the  attitude  of  the  United  States  in  the  man- 
agement of  the  canal  to  be  built.  Rule  1  opens  the 
canal  on  terms  of  equality  to  the  vessels  of  commerce 
and  of  war  of  all  nations  "  observing  these  rules."  If 
any  nation,  or  its  citizens  or  subjects,  declines  or  fails 
to  observe  the  rules  it  may  not  use  the  canal.  The 
rule  is  silent  as  to  specific  times  when  it  is  applicable, 

*  Supplement,  American  Journal  of  International  Law,  Vol.  V,  No.  3, 
July,  1911. 


172 


THe  Panama  Canal 


times  of  war  or  times  of  peace;  the  manifest  inference 
is  that  free  passage  in  time  of  war  is  permissible,  to 
which  the  exception  already  noted  must  be  added. 
The  rule  may  be  stated  to  mean,  in  effect,  that  the 
canal  shall  be  free  and  open  to  the  vessels  of  com- 
merce and  of  war  of  all  nations  observing  these  rules, 
on  terms  of  entire  equality,  provided  the  voyage  of  the 
vessel  be  innocent  in  character  as  toward  the  United 
States,  so  that,  etc. 

By  inference  the  interpretation  above  leaves  in  the 
category  of  vessels  entitled  to  free  passage  through 
the  canal  those  private  vessels  of  enemies  of  the  United 
States  in  war  that  are  engaged  in  voyages  of  an  inno- 
cent character.  For  instance,  supposing  a  war  be- 
tween France  and  the  United  States,  a  French  vessel 
loaded  with  guano,  on  a  voyage  from  Peru  to  Canada, 
would  be  freely  entitled  to  passage  through  the  canal. 
The  writer  believes  this  interpretation  to  be  correct. 
In  the  present  development  of  international  law  the 
question  is  rather  academic,  for  the  French  master 
would  scarcely  run  the  risk  of  capture  by  United  States 
ships  outside  the  three  mile  limit  at  the  canal  ends. 
But  if  the  principle  of  the  inviolability  of  private 
property  at  sea  becomes  established  in  international 
law  the  question  will  at  once  be  a  practical  one.  It  is 
not  entirely  academic  now,  as  will  be  seen  from  a 
perusal  of  Article  XII  of  the  treaty  of  1871  between 
the  United  States  and  Italy  which  reads : 

The  High  Contracting  Parties  agree  that  in  the  unfortunate 
event  of  a  war  between  them  the  private  property  of  their  re- 
spective citizens  and  subjects,  with  the  exception  of  contraband 


Panama  Canal  in  International  Law  173 


of  war,  shall  be  exempt  from  capture  or  seizure  on  the  high  seas 
or  elsewhere  by  the  armed  vessels  or  by  the  military  forces  of 
either  party,  it  being  understood  that  this  exemption  shall  not 
extend  to  vessels  and  their  cargoes  which  may  attempt  to  enter 
a  port  blockaded  by  the  naval  forces  of  either  party.  (Treaties 
in  Force,  1904,  p.  453.) 

The  remaining  five  rules  are  essentially  prohibitions 
of  a  nature  similar  to  those  the  United  States  would 
enforce  in  her  own  territorial  waters  for  the  preserva- 
tion of  national  neutrality  in  a  war  between  other 
nations.  The  effect  of  them  all  is  that  the  United 
States  will  not  permit  the  canal  to  be  used  as  a  base 
by  either  belligerent  in  a  war  between  foreign  powers. 

When  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  was  negotiated 
the  canal  routes  lay  through  foreign  territory  in  which 
the  exercise  of  sovereignty  could  only  legally  apper- 
tain to  the  nation,  or  nations,  through  whose  territory 
the  canal  would  pass.  This  condition  was  entirely 
changed  by  the  treaty  with  Panama,  made  two  years 
later.  The  changed  condition  cannot,  in  equity,  be 
regarded  as  making  any  change  in  the  attitude  of  the 
United  States  toward  Great  Britain  in  the  interpreta- 
tion of  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty;  for  the  treaty  with 
Panama  came  after  it,  was  made  possible  by  it,  and  in 
Article  XVIII  expressly  states  that  the  canal  shall  be 
opened  in  conformity  with  all  the  stipulations  of  it. 
But  toward  every  other  nation  the  treaty  with  Panama 
very  materially  changed  the  rights  of  the  United  States 
in  her  control  and  management  of  the  canal,  as  will  be 
seen  by  an  examination  of  its  provisions. 

In  Article  II*  Panama  "  grants  to  the  United  States 

*  See  text  following  this  chapter. 


174 


THe  Panama  Canal 


in  perpetuity  the  use,  occupation  and  control"  of  cer- 
tain lands,  land  under  water  and  waters  for  canal  pur- 
poses. In  Article  IV  Panama  grants  in  perpetuity  a 
monopoly  for  any  system  of  interoceanic  communica- 
tion by  canal  or  railroad  across  its  territory.  In 
Article  III 

The  Republic  of  Panama  grants  to  the  United  States  all  the 
rights,  power  and  authority  within  the  zone  mentioned  and  de- 
scribed in  Article  II  of  this  agreement  and  within  the  limits  of 
all  auxiliary  lands  and  waters  mentioned  and  described  in  said 
Article  II  which  the  United  States  would  possess  and  exercise  if 
it  were  the  sovereign  of  the  territory  within  which  said  lands  and 
waters  are  located  to  the  entire  exclusion  of  the  exercise  by  the 
Republic  of  Panama  of  any  such  sovereign  rights,  power  or 
authority. 

The  title  to  the  lands  and  waters,  the  use  of  which 
is  ceded,  still  vests  in  Panama,  and  the  compensation, 
including  an  annual  rental,  is  provided  for  in  Article 
XIV;  but  the  abstract  right  of  title  does  not  affect 
the  concrete  right  of  the  United  States  to  exercise 
sovereignty  in  the  Canal  Zone  to  the  exclusion  of 
Panama.  The  Canal  Zone  is  thus  virtually  and  legally 
as  much  a  part  of  the  United  States  as  is  the  Missis- 
sippi Valley,  and  the  United  States  has  the  same  inter- 
est and  right,  and  indeed  the  same  obligation,  to  take 
measures  against  the  violation  of  the  neutrality  of  the 
Canal  Zone,  and  against  hostile  acts  toward  her  prop- 
erty there,  by  belligerents,  that  she  has  for  ensuring 
the  same  objects  in  the  Mississippi  Valley  or  any  other 
part  of  her  territorial  possessions.  Great  Britain  can 
legally  hold  us  to  the  duty  of  maintaining  neutrality 
In  the  Canal  Zone  by  virtue  of  the  terms  of  the  Hay- 


Panama  Canal  in  International  Law  175 


Pauncefote  treaty;  on  the  other  hand,  as  far  as  the 
rest  of  the  world  is  concerned,  we  have  that  right  and 
duty  naturally  in  consequence  of  the  treaty  with 
Panama,  whether  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  be  in 
existence  or  not. 

The  cities  of  Colon  and  Panama  with  their  adjacent 
harbors  are  not  included  in,  but  are  expressly  excluded 
from,  the  grant  of  the  Canal  Zone.  Even  in  them, 
however,  Panama  has  yielded  some  attributes  of  sov- 
ereignty to  the  United  States,  as  will  be  seen  from  a 
reading  of  Articles  VII  and  X. 

The  treaty  with  Panama  is  largely  occupied  with 
matters  that  are  of  interest  only  to  the  two  countries 
concerned  in  making  it.  There  are,  however,  several 
things  of  international  interest  that  have  not  yet  been 
touched  upon.  The  most  important  of  these  is  the 
subject  of  Article  I,  which  reads:  "The  United  States 
guarantees  and  will  maintain  the  independence  of  the 
Republic  of  Panama."  This  imposes  a  serious  duty  upon 
the  United  States  that  was  not  without  some  bearing 
on  the  question  of  fortifications  and  a  permanent  gar- 
rison in  the  Canal  Zone,  now  happily  settled.  The 
guarantee  is  of  great  importance  to  Panama;  and  it  is 
also  of  great  importance  to  the  United  States,  for  it 
ensures  for  the  future  that  no  embarrassing  questions 
will  arise  from  the  possibility  of  an  attack  upon  Panama 
by  a  more  powerful  neighbor;  the  announcement  of 
the  guarantee  will  probably  suffice  to  attain  the  object, 
but  the  means  will  be  at  hand  to  enforce  the  guarantee 
if  necessary.  It  would  be  intolerable  to  have  a  war  of 
aggression  going  on  in  the  vicinity  of  the  canal,  and 


176 


XKe  Panama  Canal 


the  guarantee  is  worth  the  assumption  of  the  respon- 
sibility involved. 

The  language  of  Article  I  is  unqualified,  and  the 
announcement  that  the  United  States  "will  maintain" 
the  independence  of  Panama,  read  by  itself,  is  capable 
of  the  interpretation  that  the  United  States  will  main- 
tain that  independence  even  against  the  wishes  of 
Panama  to  the  contrary;  and  very  good  reasons  are 
apparent  why  such  an  interpretation  would  be  to  the 
interest  of  the  United  States.  But  the  language  of 
the  second  paragraph  of  Article  XXIV  shows  that  the 
guarantee  of  independence  is  not  intended  to  prohibit 
Panama  from  merging  her  independence  in  another 
state  if  she  so  wishes;  for  it  expressly  provides  that,  in 
such  a  contingency,  the  rights  of  the  United  States 
under  this  treaty  shall  remain  unimpaired.  As  the 
treaty  must  be  interpreted  as  a  whole,  the  plain  mean- 
ing of  Article  I  is  that  the  independence  of  Panama  is 
guaranteed  and  will  be  maintained  against  the  assaults 
of  any  enemy  of  that  state. 

The  first  paragraph  of  Article  XXIV  provides  that 
no  change  in  the  treaties  of  Panama  shall,  "  without 
the  consent  of  the  United  States,  affect  any  right  of 
the  United  States  under  the  present  convention,  or 
under  any  treaty  stipulation  between  the  two  coun- 
tries that  now  exists  or  may  hereafter  exist  touching 
the  subject  matter  of  this  convention."  This  is  an 
evident  matter  of  international  interest,  looking  to  the 
future.  In  a  similar  way,  looking  to  the  past,  Article 
XX  provides  for  annulment  or  modification  of  any 
treaty  in  relation  to  the  territory  of  the  Isthmus  of 


Panama  Canal  in  International  Law  177 


Panama,  the  obligations  of  which  have  descended  to 
or  been  assumed  by  the  Republic  of  Panama,  whereby 
any  privilege  or  concession  is  granted  relative  to  means 
of  interoceanic  communication  that  is  incompatible 
with  the  terms  of  the  treaty  under  discussion.  The 
writer  does  not  know  of  any  formal  announcement  that 
the  provisions  of  Article  XX  have  been  complied  with. 
If  they  have  not  there  is  a  possibility  of  interesting 
diplomatic  questions  arising  out  of  that  article. 

Article  IX  provides  on  the  part  of  the  United  States 
that  the  ports  at  the  canal  entrances,  and  on  the  part 
of  Panama  that  the  towns  of  Colon  and  Panama,  shall 
be  free  ports  for  vessels  using  or  passing  through  the 
canal,  with  exceptions  covering  canal  tolls,  articles 
destined  for  other  parts  of  the  Republic  of  Panama, 
and  vessels  touching  at  Colon  and  Panama  without 
passing  through  the  canal. 

Articles  XXIII  and  XXV  may  be  considered  to- 
gether, as  both  bear  upon  the  protection  of  the  canal. 
Article  XXIII  explicitly  permits  the  United  States  to 
use  her  police  and  her  land  and  naval  forces,  and  to 
establish  fortifications  to  ensure  the  safety  and  protec- 
tion of  the  canal  and  its  auxiliaries.  This  bears  upon 
the  right  of  the  United  States  to  fortify  the  canal,  if 
that  right  needs  further  argument;  for  it  is  plain  that 
the  negotiators  of  this  treaty  with  Panama  would  never 
have  put  in  the  authorization  to  establish  fortifica- 
tions if  they  had  believed  fortifications  were  forbidden, 
by  implication  or  otherwise,  by  the  Hay-Pauncefote 
treaty.  In  Article  XXV  Panama  agrees  to  sell  or  lease 
lands  for  naval  and  coaling  stations  "to  the  end  of 


178 


t 

The  Panama  Canal 


the  efficient  protection  of  the  Canal  and  the  preser- 
vation of  its  neutrality."  The  use  of  the  word  "sell" 
in  this  article  is  noteworthy;  it  carries  with  it  the  pos- 
sibility of  the  actual  transfer  of  title,  and  with  the 
title  sovereignty  in  a  transaction  of  this  kind  between 
one  government  and  another.  The  title  to  the  Canal 
Zone  did  not  pass  under  the  provisions  of  Article  III. 
Both  Article  XXIII  and  Article  XXV  point  to  a  belief 
of  the  two  governments  that  something  more  than  a 
mere  dictum  of  the  United  States  is  necessary  to  en- 
able her  to  ensure  the  safety  and  protection  of  the 
canal,  and  to  maintain  its  neutrality. 

Summing  up,  the  international  status  of  the  canal 
appears  to  the  writer  to  be  as  follows: 

(a)  The  canal  is  free  (for  passage  but  not  in  respect 
of  tolls)  and  open  to  all  private  vessels  of  nations  ob- 
serving the  rules  of  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty. 

(b)  The  canal  is  similarly  free  and  open  to  men-of- 
war,  even  to  those  of  belligerents  when  the  United 
States  is  not  a  party  to  the  war. 

(c)  To  these  permissive  conditions  the  exception 
may  be  anticipated  that  the  United  States,  when  her- 
self engaged  in  war,  will  not  allow  the  war  vessels  of 
her  enemies  to  use  the  canal,  nor  her  enemies'  private 
vessels,  unless  the  character  of  the  voyage  be  innocent 
as  regards  the  United  States. 

(d)  The  other  conditions  are  prohibitive,  and  of  the 
nature  that  the  United  States  would  enforce  in  her  own 
ports  for  the  preservation  of  neutrality  and  the  protec- 
tion of  her  own  property.  They  are  so  explicitly  stated 
that  nothing  more  than  a  reference  to  them,  Rules  2  to 
6  inclusive,  Article  III,  is  necessary  here. 


Panama  Canal  in  International  Law  179 


(e)  The  United  States  stands  alone  as  the  guarantor 
that  the  canal  shall  be  kept  free  and  open  in  accordance 
with  the  Hay-Pauncefote  rules. 

(f)  The  canal  will  be  protected  by  permanent  forti- 
fications and  a  military  garrison. 

The  Suez  Canal  afforded  the  only  precedent  for  es- 
tablishing the  status  of  the  Panama  Canal.  The  two 
are  alike  in  the  fact  that  each  is  an  artificial  waterway 
connecting  two  great  oceans,  whereby  trade  routes 
may  be  shortened  thousands  of  miles.  The  two  are 
very  unlike  in  several  other  particulars.  The  Panama 
Canal  is  being  constructed  by  the  United  States  as  a 
government  enterprise;  the  Suez  Canal  was  built  and 
is  now  owned  by  a  private  company  of  which  the 
British  Government  later  became  a  large  stockholder, 
but  is  not  now  sole  proprietor.  .  The  Suez  Canal  is 
comparatively  near  to  several  strong  European  States 
having  diverse  interests,  while  the  Panama  Canal  is 
separated  by  the  width  of  a  great  ocean  from  any  first- 
class  power.  The  Suez  Canal  is  on  the  common  short- 
est route  of  several  European  powers  to  their  important 
colonies;  this  is  not  the  case  with  the  Panama  Canal 
as  regards  European  countries,  but  the  United  States 
has  a  vital  interest  in  it  because  it  makes  a  short  route 
between  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  coasts.  The  Suez 
Canal  is  in  Egypt,  which  is  a  suzerainty  of  Turkey, 
whose  territorial  rights  are  expressly  reserved  in  Article 
XXII  of  the  Constantinople  Convention;  the  Panama 
Canal  passes  through  territory  in  which  the  United 
States  exercises  sovereignty  to  the  exclusion  of  such 
exercise  by  Panama.    Enough  has  been  said  to  show 


180 


THe  Panama  Canal 


the  wide  differences  in  important  particulars  of  the 
two  great  artificial  waterways.  Such  differences  in 
physical  status  are  quite  sufficient  to  account  for 
differences  in  international  status. 

The  text  of  the  Constantinople  Convention  govern- 
ing "the  free  navigation  of  the  Suez  Maritime  Canal" 
is  printed  at  the  end  of  this  chapter,  and  the  reader  can 
compare  for  himself  its  provisions  with  those  of  the 
Hay-Pauncefote  treaty.  A  few  of  the  more  noticeable 
divergencies  may  be  pointed  out,  however.  In  the 
first  place  the  Suez  Canal  is  really  neutralized  by  a 
concert  of  nine  European  powers,  although  the  words 
"neutralization"  and  "neutrality"  are  carefully  omit- 
ted, and  the  language  is  "free  and  open,"  "open  .  .  . 
as  a  free  passage,"  or  "free  use";  Turkey,  the  sov- 
ereign power,  is  one  of  the  nine  signatories.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  Panama  Canal  is  not  neutralized  by 
a  concert  of  powers,  although  the  word  "neutraliza- 
tion" is  used  in  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty;  the  United 
States  is  the  sole  guarantor  of  the  condition  so  charac- 
terized. Again,  Turkey  expressly  gives  up,  in  Article 
IV,  the  right  to  exercise  any  war  right  or  commit  any 
act  of  hostility  in  the  .canal  situated  in  her  own  sov- 
ereign territory;  the  United  States  is  not  so  restricted  by 
the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty.  Permanent  fortifications 
are  forbidden  by  the  Constantinople  Convention,  Article 
VIII  and  Article  XI ;  they  are  not  forbidden  by  the  Hay- 
Pauncefote  treaty.  Comment  has  already  been  made 
upon  the  omission  in  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  of  the 
words  "in  time  of  war  as  in  time  of  peace"  found  in 
Article  I  of  the  Constantinople  Convention. 


Panama  Canal  in  International  Law  181 


The  natural  cause  of  these  divergencies  may  be 
found  in  the  entirely  different  relation  borne  to  the 
Panama  Canal  by  the  United  States  from  that  borne 
to  the  Suez  Canal  by  any  one  European  state.  The 
Panama  Canal  is  of  paramount  importance  to  us  for 
commercial  and  military  reasons,  and  the  latter  were 
very  freely  advanced  before  construction  began,  al- 
though they  are  now  somewhat  forgotten  in  the  discus- 
sion of  commercial  matters.  The  Suez  Canal  was  begun 
purely  as  a  commercial  enterprise  in  which  the  inter- 
ests of  many  nations  ran  parallel,  and  military  ad- 
vantage was  incidental.  Put  in  another  way,  the 
Panama  Canal  was  a  necessity  for  us;  the  Suez  Canal 
was  a  great  convenience  to  Europe.  For  these  reasons, 
and  also  because  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  it  was  worth 
while  to  undertake  single-handed  the  guarantee  at 
Panama  that  the  European  nations  collectively  under- 
took at  Suez.  It  very  naturally  follows  that  guns  and 
soldiers  are  necessary  to  enable  a  single  nation  to 
maintain  what  the  pronouncement  of  a  concert  of 
nations  will  effect  by  moral  suasion.  And  it  equally 
follows  by  every  rule  of  common  sense  and  self-preser- 
vation that  the  United  States  in  undertaking  such  a 
responsibility  will  not  be  quixotic  enough  to  maintain 
a  canal  for  the  use  of  her  own  enemies  in  war. 

Notwithstanding  divergencies  the  great  fact  stands 
out  that  the  management  of  both  canals  is  on  a  basis 
of  equal  treatment  to  all  with  special  advantage  to  none. 
Unless  the  United  States  be  herself  at  war  the  inter- 
national status  of  the  two  canals  is  practically  the  same. 

The  President's  Neutrality  Proclamation  concerning  the  Panama  Canal  is 
given  in  the  Appendix. 


CONVENTION  BETWEEN  GREAT  BRITAIN,  GERMANY, 
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY,  SPAIN,  FRANCE,  ITALY,  THE 
NETHERLANDS,  RUSSIA,  AND  TURKEY,  RESPECT- 
ING THE  FREE  NAVIGATION  OF  THE  SUEZ  MARI- 
TIME CANAL* 

Signed  at  Constantinople,  October  29,  1888. 

{Ratifications  deposited  at  Constantinople,  December  22,  1888.) 

HER  Majesty  the  Queen  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great 
Britain  and  Ireland,  Empress  of  India;  His  Majesty  the  Emperor 
of  Germany,  King  of  Prussia;  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Aus- 
tria, King  of  Bohemia,  &c.,  and  Apostolic  King  of  Hungary; 
His  Majesty  the  King  of  Spain,  and  in  his  name  the  Queen  Regent 
of  the  Kingdom;  the  President  of  the  French  Republic;  His  Maj- 
esty the  King  of  Italy;  His  Majesty  the  King  of  the  Nether- 
lands, Grand  Duke  of  Luxembourg,  &c. ;  His  Majesty  the  Emperor 
of  All  the  Russias;  and  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  the  Otto- 
mans; wishing  to  establish,  by  a  Conventional  Act,  a  definite 
system  destined  to  guarantee  at  all  times,  and  for  all  the  Powers, 
the  free  use  of  the  Suez  Maritime  Canal,  and  thus  to  complete 
the  system  under  which  the  navigation  of  this  Canal  has  been 
placed  by  the  Firman  of  His  Imperial  Majesty  the  Sultan,  dated 
the  22nd  February,  1866  (2  Zilkade,  1282),  and  sanctioning  the 
Concessions  of  His  Highness  the  Khedive,  have  named  as  their 
Plenipotentiaries,  that  is  to  say: 

( Here  follow  the  names  of  the  several  Plenipotentiaries.) 

Who,  having  communicated  to  each  other  their  respective  full 
powers,  found  in  good  and  due  form,  have  agreed  upon  the  fol- 
lowing Articles: 

*  Parliamentary  State  Papers,  Commercial,  No.  2  (Suez  Canal),  1889. 
[C.-5623.] 

182 


Panama  Canal  in  International  Law  183 


Article  I 

The  Suez  Maritime  Canal  shall  always  be  free  and  open,  in 
time  of  war  as  in  time  of  peace,  to  every  vessel  of  commerce  or  of 
war,  without  distinction  of  flag. 

Consequently,  the  High  Contracting  Parties  agree  not  in  any 
way  to  interfere  with  the  free  use  of  the  Canal,  in  time  of  war  as 
in  time  of  peace. 

The  Canal  shall  never  be  subjected  to  the  exercise  of  the  right 
of  blockade. 

Article  II 

The  High  Contracting  Parties,  recognizing  that  the  Fresh- 
Water  Canal  is  indispensable  to  the  Maritime  Canal,  take  note 
of  the  engagements  of  His  Highness  the  Khedive  towards  the 
Universal  Suez  Canal  Company  as  regards  the  Fresh-Water 
Canal;  which  engagements  are  stipulated  in  a  Convention  bear- 
ing date  the  18th  March,  1863,  containing  an  expose  and  four 
Articles. 

They  undertake  not  to  interfere  in  any  way  with  the  security 
of  that  Canal  and  its  branches,  the  working  of  which  shall  not  be 
exposed  to  any  attempt  at  obstruction. 

Article  III 

The  High  Contracting  Parties  likewise  undertake  to  respect 
the  plant,  establishments,  buildings,  and  works  of  the  Maritime 
Canal  and  of  the  Fresh- Water  Canal. 

Article  IV 

The  Maritime  Canal  remaining  open  in  time  of  war  as  a  free 
passage,  even  to  the  ships  of  war  of  belligerents,  according  to  the 
terms  of  Article  I  of  the  present  Treaty,  the  High  Contracting 
Parties  agree  that  no  right  of  war,  no  act  of  hostility,  nor  any  act 
having  for  its  object  to  obstruct  the  free  navigation  of  the  Canal, 
shall  be  committed  in  the  Canal  and  its  ports  of  access,  as  well  as 
within  a  radius  of  3  marine  miles  from  those  ports,  even  though 
the  Ottoman  Empire  should  be  one  of  the  belligerent  Powers. 

Vessels  of  war  of  belligerents  shall  not  revictual  or  take  in 


184 


TKe  Panama  Canal 


stores  in  the  Canal  and  its  ports  of  access,  except  in  so  far  as  may- 
be strictly  necessary.  The  transit  of  the  aforesaid  vessels  through 
the  Canal  shall  be  effected  with  the  least  possible  delay,  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  Regulations  in  force,  and  without  any  other  in- 
termission than  that  resulting  from  the  necessities  of  the  service. 

Their  stay  at  Port  Said  and  in  the  roadstead  of  Suez  shall  not 
exceed  twenty-four  hours,  except  in  case  of  distress.  In  such  case 
they  shall  be  bound  to  leave  as  soon  as  possible.  An  interval  of 
twenty-four  hours  shall  always  elapse  between  the  sailing  of  a 
belligerent  ship  from  one  of  the  ports  of  access  and  the  departure 
of  a  ship  belonging  to  the  hostile  Power. 

Article  V 

In  time  of  war  belligerent  Powers  shall  not  disembark  nor 
embark  within  the  Canal  and  its  ports  of  access  either  troops, 
munitions,  or  materials  of  war.  But  in  case  of  an  accidental 
hindrance  in  the  Canal,  men  may  be  embarked  or  disembarked 
at  the  ports  of  access  by  detachments  not  exceeding  1000  men, 
with  a  corresponding  amount  of  war  material. 

Article  VI 

Prizes  shall  be  subjected,  in  all  respects,  to  the  same  rules  as 
the  vessels  of  war  of  belligerents. 

Article  VII 

The  Powers  shall  not  keep  any  vessel  of  war  in  the  waters  of 
the  Canal  (including  Lake  Timsah  and  the  Bitter  Lakes). 

Nevertheless,  they  may  station  vessels  of  war  in  the  ports  of 
access  of  Port  Said  and  Suez,  the  number  of  which  shall  not 
exceed  two  for  each  Power. 

This  right  shall  not  be  exercised  by  belligerents. 

Article  VIII 

The  Agents  in  Egypt  of  the  Signatory  Powers  of  the  present 
Treaty  shall  be  charged  to  watch  over  its  execution.  In  case  of 
any  event  threatening  the  security  or  the  free  passage  of  the 
Canal,  they  shall  meet  on  the  summons  of  three  of  their  number 


Panama  Canal  in  International  Law  185 


under  the  presidency  of  their  Doyen,  in  order  to  proceed  to  the 
necessary  verifications.  They  shall  inform  the  Khedivial  Govern- 
ment of  the  danger  which  they  may  have  perceived,  in  order  that 
that  Government  may  take  proper  steps  to  insure  the  protection 
and  the  free  use  of  the  Canal.  Under  any  circumstances,  they 
shall  meet  once  a  year  to  take  note  of  the  due  execution  of  the 
Treaty. 

The  last-mentioned  meetings  shall  take  place  under  the  presi- 
dency of  a  Special  Commissioner  nominated  for  that  purpose 
by  the  Imperial  Ottoman  Government.  A  Commissioner  of  the 
Khedive  may  also  take  part  in  the  meeting,  and  may  preside 
over  it  in  case  of  the  absence  of  the  Ottoman  Commissioner. 

They  shall  especially  demand  the  suppression  of  any  work  or 
the  dispersion  of  any  assemblage  on  either  bank  of  the  Canal,  the 
object  or  effect  of  which  might  be  to  interfere  with  the  liberty 
and  the  entire  security  of  the  navigation. 

Article  IX 

The  Egyptian  Government  shall,  within  the  limits  of  its  powers 
resulting  from  the  Firmans,  and  under  the  conditions  provided 
for  in  the  present  Treaty,  take  the  necessary  measures  for  insuring 
the  execution  of  the  said  Treaty. 

In  case  the  Egyptian  Government  should  not  have  sufficient 
means  at  its  disposal,  it  shall  call  upon  the  Imperial  Ottoman 
Government,  which  shall  take  the  necessary  measures  to  respond 
to  such  appeal;  shall  give  notice  thereof  to  the  Signatory  Powers 
of  the  Declaration  of  London  of  the  17th  March,  1885;  and  shall, 
if  necessary,  concert  with  them  on  the  subject. 

The  provisions  of  Articles  IV,  V,  VII,  and  VIII  shall  not  inter- 
fere with  the  measures  which  shall  be  taken  in  virtue  of  the  present 
Article. 

Article  X 

Similarly,  the  provisions  of  Articles  IV,  V,  VII,  and  VIII  shall 
not  interfere  with  the  measures  which  His  Majesty  the  Sultan 
and  His  Highness  the  Khedive,  in  the  name  of  His  Imperial 
Majesty,  and  within  the  limits  of  the  Firmans  granted,  might 
find  it  necessary  to  take  for  securing  by  their  own  forces  the 
defence  of  Egypt  and  the  maintenance  of  public  order. 


186 


THe  Panama  Canal 


In  case  His  Imperial  Majesty  the  Sultan,  or  His  Highness  the 
Khedive,  should  find  it  necessary  to  avail  themselves  of  the  excep- 
tions for  which  this  Article  provides,  the  Signatory  Powers  of  the 
Declaration  of  London  shall  be  notified  thereof  by  the  Imperial 
Ottoman  Government. 

It  is  likewise  understood  that  the  provisions  of  the  four  Articles 
aforesaid  shall  in  no  case  occasion  any  obstacle  to  the  measures 
which  the  Imperial  Ottoman  Government  may  think  it  necessary 
to  take  in  order  to  insure  by  its  own  forces  the  defence  of  its 
other  possessions  situated  on  the  eastern  coast  of  the  Red  Sea. 

Article  XI 

The  measures  which  shall  be  taken  in  the  cases  provided  for 
by  Articles  IX  and  X  of  the  present  Treaty  shall  not  interfere 
with  the  free  use  of  the  Canal.  In  the  same  cases,  the  erection  of 
permanent  fortifications  contrary  to  the  provisions  of  Article  VIII 
is  prohibited. 

Article  XII 

The  High  Contracting  Parties,  by  application  of  the  principle 
of  equality  as  regards  the  free  use  of  the  Canal,  a  principle  which 
forms  one  of  the  bases  of  the  present  Treaty,  agree  that  none  of 
them  shall  endeavor  to  obtain  with  respect  to  the  Canal  territo- 
rial or  commercial  advantages  or  privileges  in  any  international 
arrangements  which  may  be  concluded.  Moreover,  the  rights  of 
Turkey  as  the  territorial  Power  are  reserved. 

Article  XIII 

With  the  exception  of  the  obligations  expressly  provided  by 
the  clauses  of  the  present  Treaty,  the  sovereign  rights  of  His 
Imperial  Majesty  the  Sultan,  and  the  rights  and  immunities  of 
His  Highness  the  Khedive,  resulting  from  the  Firmans,  are  in  no 
way  affected. 

Article  XIV 

The  High  Contracting  Parties  agree  that  the  engagements  re- 
sulting from  the  present  Treaty  shall  not  be  limited  by  the  dura- 
tion of  the  Acts  of  Concession  of  the  Universal  Suez  Canal 
Company. 


Panama  Canal  in  International  Law  187 


Article  XV 

The  stipulations  of  the  present  Treaty  shall  not  interfere  with 
the  sanitary  measures  in  force  in  Egypt. 


The  High  Contracting  Parties  undertake  to  bring  the  present 
Treaty  to  the  knowledge  of  the  States  which  have  not  signed  it, 
inviting  them  to  accede  to  it. 


The  present  Treaty  shall  be  ratified,  and  the  ratifications  shall 
be  exchanged  at  Constantinople  within  the  space  of  one  month, 
or  sooner  if  possible. 

In  faith  of  which  the  respective  Plenipotentiaries  have  signed 
the  present  Treaty,  and  have  affixed  to  it  the  seal  of  their  arms. 

Done  at  Constantinople,  the  29th  day  of  the  month  of  October, 
in  the  year  1888. 


TREATY  TO  FACILITATE  THE  CONSTRUCTION  OF  A 

SHIP  CANAL 

Concluded  November  18,  1901;  ratification  advised  by  Senate  De- 
cember 16 }  1901;  ratified  by  President  December  26,  1901; 
ratifications  exchanged  February  21,  1902;  proclaimed  February 
22,1902. 


Article  XVI 


Article  XVII 


[L.  S. 
[L.  S. 
[L.  S. 
[L.  S. 
[L.  S. 
[L.  S. 
[L.  S. 
[L.  S. 
[L.  S. 


W.  A.  White. 

Radowitz. 

Calice. 

Miguel  Florez  Y  Garcia. 

G.  DE  MONTEBELLO. 

A.  Blanc. 
Gus.  Keun. 
Nelidow. 
M.  Said. 


188 


THe  Panama  Canal 


Articles 

I.  Convention  of  April  19,  1850.   IV.  Change  of  sovereignty. 
II.  Construction  of  canal.  V.  Ratification. 

III.  Rules  of  neutralization. 

The  United  States  of  America  and  His  Majesty  Edward  the 
Seventh,  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland, 
and  of  the  British  Dominions  beyond  the  Seas,  King,  and  Emperor 
of  India,  being  desirous  to  facilitate  the  construction  of  a  ship 
canal  to  connect  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  Oceans,  by  whatever 
route  may  be  considered  expedient,  and  to  that  end  to  remove 
any  objection  which  may  arise  out  of  the  Convention  of  the  19th 
April,  1850,  commonly  called  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  to  the 
construction  of  such  canal  under  the  auspices  of  the  Government 
of  the  United  States,  without  impairing  the  "general  principle" 
of  neutralization  established  in  Article  VIII  of  that  Convention, 
have  for  that  purpose  appointed  as  their  Plenipotentiaries: 

The  President  of  the  United  States,  John  Hay,  Secretary  of 
State  of  the  United  States  of  America: 

And  His  Majesty  Edward  the  Seventh,  of  the  United  Kingdom 
of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  and  of  the  British  Dominions  beyond 
the  Seas,  King,  and  Emperor  of  India,  the  Right  Honourable 
Lord  Pauncefote,  G.  C.  B.,  G.  C.  M.  G.,  His  Majesty's  Ambas- 
sador Extraordinary  and  Plenipotentiary  to  the  United  States; 

Who,  having  communicated  to  each  other  their  full  powers, 
which  were  found  to  be  in  due  and  proper  form,  have  agreed  upon 
the  following  Articles: 

Article  I 

The  High  Contracting  Parties  agree  that  the  present  Treaty 
shall  supersede  the  afore-mentioned  Convention  of  the  19th 
April,  1850. 

Article  II 

It  is  agreed  that  the  canal  may  be  constructed  under  the  aus- 
pices of  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  either  directly  at 
its  own  cost,  or  by  gift  or  loan  of  money  to  individuals  or  Corpora- 


Panama  Canal  in  International  Law  189 


tions,  or  through  subscription  to  or  purchase  of  stock  or  shares, 
and  that,  subject  to  the  provisions  of  the  present  Treaty,  the  said 
Government  shall  have  and  enjoy  all  the  rights  incident  to  such 
construction,  as  well  as  the  exclusive  right  of  providing  for  the 
regulation  and  management  of  the  canal. 

Article  III 

The  United  States  adopts,  as  the  basis  of  the  neutralization  of 
such  ship  canal,  the  following  Rules,  substantially  as  embodied  in 
the  Convention  of  Constantinople,  signed  the  28th  October,  1888, 
for  the  free  navigation  of  the  Suez  Canal,  that  is  to  say: 

1.  The  canal  shall  be  free  and  open  to  the  vessels  of  commerce 
and  of  war  of  all  nations  observing  these  Rules,  on  terms  of  entire 
equality,  so  that  there  shall  be  no  discrimination  against  any  such 
nation,  or  its  citizens  or  subjects,  in  respect  of  the  conditions  or 
charges  of  traffic,  or  otherwise.  Such  conditions  and  charges  of 
traffic  shall  be  just  and  equitable. 

2.  The  canal  shall  never  be  blockaded,  nor  shall  any  right  of 
war  be  exercised  nor  any  act  of  hostility  be  committed  within  it. 
The  United  States,  however,  shall  be  at  liberty  to  maintain  such 
military  police  along  the  canal  as  may  be  necessary  to  protect  it 
against  lawlessness  and  disorder. 

3.  Vessels  of  war  of  a  belligerent  shall  not  revictual  nor  take 
any  stores  in  the  canal  except  so  far  as  may  be  strictly  necessary; 
and  the  transit  of  such  vessels  through  the  canal  shall  be  effected 
with  the  least  possible  delay  in  accordance  with  the  Regulations  in 
force,  and  with  only  such  intermission  as  may  result  from  the 
necessities  of  the  service. 

Prizes  shall  be  in  all  respects  subject  to  the  same  Rules  as 
vessels  of  war  of  the  belligerents. 

4.  No  belligerent  shall  embark  or  disembark  troops,  munitions 
of  war,  or  warlike  materials  in  the  canal,  except  in  case  of  acci- 
dental hindrance  of  the  transit,  and  in  such  case  the  transit  shall 
be  resumed  with  all  possible  dispatch. 

5.  The  provisions  of  this  Article  shall  apply  to  waters  adjacent 
to  the  canal,  within  3  marine  miles  of  either  end.  Vessels  of  war 
of  a  belligerent  shall  not  remain  in  such  waters  longer  than  twenty- 
four  hours  at  any  one  time,  except  in  case  of  distress,  and  in  such 
case,  shall  depart  as  soon  as  possible;  but  a  vessel  of  war  of  one 


190 


THe  Panama  Canal 


belligerent  shall  not  depart  within  twenty-four  hours  from  the 
departure  of  a  vessel  of  war  of  the  other  belligerent. 

6.  The  plant,  establishments,  buildings,  and  all  work  neces- 
sary to  the  construction,  maintenance,  and  operation  of  the  canal 
shall  be  deemed  to  be  part  thereof,  for  the  purposes  of  this  Treaty, 
and  in  time  of  war,  as  in  time  of  peace,  shall  enjoy  complete  im- 
munity from  attack  or  injury  by  belligerents,  and  from  acts 
calculated  to  impair  their  usefulness  as  part  of  the  canal. 

Article  IV 

It  is  agreed  that  no  change  of  territorial  sovereignty  or  of  the 
international  relations  of  the  country  or  countries  traversed  by 
the  before-mentioned  canal  shall  affect  the  general  principle  of 
neutralization  or  the  obligation  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties 
under  the  present  Treaty. 

Article  V 

The  present  Treaty  shall  be  ratified  by  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate 
thereof,  and  by  His  Britannic  Majesty;  and  the  ratifications  shall 
be  exchanged  at  Washington  or  at  London  at  the  earliest  possible 
time  within  six  months  from  the  date  hereof. 

In  faith  whereof  the  respective  Plenipotentiaries  have  signed 
this  Treaty  and  thereunto  affixed  their  seals. 

Done  in  duplicate  at  Washington,  the  18th  day  of  November, 
in  the  year  of  Our  Lord  one  thousand  nine  hundred  and  one. 

John  Hay.  [seal] 
Pauncefote.  [seal] 


CONVENTION  FOR  THE  CONSTRUCTION  OF  A  SHIP 

CANAL 

Concluded  November  18,  1903;  ratification  advised  by  the  Senate 
February  23,  1904;  ratified  by  President  February  25,  1904; 
ratifications  exchanged  February  26,  1904;  proclaimed  February 
26,1904. 


Panama  Canal  in  International  Law  191 


Articles 

I.  Independence  of  Panama.      XVI.  Extradition. 

II.  Canal  zone.  XVII.  Ports  of  Panama. 

III.  Authority  in  canal  zone.     XVIII.  Neutrality  rules. 

IV.  Subsidiary  rights.  XIX.  Free  transport. 

V.  Monopoly  for  construction,     XX.  Cancellation   of  exist- 

etc.  ing  treaties. 

VI.  Private  property.  XXI.  Anterior  [debts,  conces- 

VII.  Panama;  Colon;  harbors.  sions,  etc. 

VIII.  Panama  Canal  Company     XXII.  Renunciation  of  rights 
and  railroad.  under  concessionary 

IX.  Ports  at  entrance  of  canal.  contracts. 

X.  Taxes,  etc.  XXIII.  Protection  of  canal. 

XI.  Official  dispatches.  XXIV.  Change  in  government, 

XII.  Access  of  employees.  laws,  etc. 

XIII.  Importation  into  zone.         XXV.  Coaling  stations. 

XIV.  Compensation.  XXVI.  Ratification. 
XV.  Joint  commission. 

The  United  States  of  America  and  the  Republic  of  Panama 
being  desirous  to  insure  the  construction  of  a  ship  canal  across  the 
Isthmus  of  Panama  to  connect  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  oceans, 
and  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  of  America  having  passed 
an  act  approved  June  28,  1902,  in  furtherance  of  that  object,  by 
which  the  President  of  the  United  States  is  authorized  to  acquire 
within  a  reasonable  time  the  control  of  the  necessary  territory 
of  the  Republic  of  Colombia,  and  the  sovereignty  of  such  terri- 
tory being  actually  vested  in  the  Republic  of  Panama,  the  high 
contracting  parties  have  resolved  for  that  purpose  to  conclude  a 
convention  and  have  accordingly  appointed  as  their  plenipoten- 
tiaries, — 

The  President  of  the  United  States  of  America,  John  Hay, 
Secretary  of  State,  and 

The  Government  of  the  Republic  of  Panama,  Philippe  Bunau- 
Varilla,  Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Minister  Plenipotentiary  of  the 
Republic  of  Panama,  thereunto  specially  empowered  by  said  gov- 
ernment, who  after  communicating  with  each  other  their  respec- 
tive full  powers,  found  to  be  in  good  and  due  form,  have  agreed 
upon  and  concluded  the  following  articles : 


192 


XKe  Panama  Canal 


Article  I 

The  United  States  guarantees  and  will  maintain  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  Republic  of  Panama. 

Article  II 

The  Republic  of  Panama  grants  to  the  United  States  in  per- 
petuity the  use,  occupation  and  control  of  a  zone  of  land  and 
land  under  water  for  the  construction,  maintenance,  operation, 
sanitation  and  protection  of  said  Canal  of  the  width  of  ten  miles 
extending  to  the  distance  of  five  miles  on  each  side  of  the  center 
line  of  the  route  of  the  Canal  to  be  constructed;  the  said  zone 
beginning  in  the  Caribbean  Sea  three  marine  miles  from  mean 
low  water  mark  and  extending  to  and  across  the  Isthmus  of 
Panama  into  the  Pacific  ocean  to  a  distance  of  three  marine 
miles  from  mean  low  water  mark  with  the  proviso  that  the  cities 
of  Panama  and  Colon  and  the  harbors  adjacent  to  said  cities, 
which  are  included  within  the  boundaries  of  the  zone  above  de- 
scribed, shall  not  be  included  within  this  grant.  The  Republic 
of  Panama  further  grants  to  the  United  States  in  perpetuity  the 
use,  occupation  and  control  of  any  other  lands  and  waters  out- 
side of  the  zone  above  described  which  may  be  necessary  and 
convenient  for  the  construction,  maintenance,  operation,  sanita- 
tion and  protection  of  the  said  Canal  or  of  any  auxiliary  canals 
or  other  works  necessary  and  convenient  for  the  construction, 
maintenance,  operation,  sanitation  and  protection  of  the  said 
enterprise. 

The  Republic  of  Panama  further  grants  in  like  manner  to  the 
United  States  in  perpetuity  all  islands  within  the  limits  of  the 
zone  above  described  and  in  addition  thereto  the  group  of  small 
islands  in  the  Bay  of  Panama,  named  Perico,  Naos,  Culebra  and 
Flamenco. 

Article  III 

The  Republic  of  Panama  grants  to  the  United  States  all  the 
rights,  power  and  authority  within  the  zone  mentioned  and  de- 
scribed in  Article  II  of  this  agreement  and  within  the  limits  of 
all  auxiliary  lands  and  waters  mentioned  and  described  in  said 


Panama  Canal  in  International  Law  193 


Article  II  which  the  United  States  would  possess  and  exercise  if 
it  were  the  sovereign  of  the  territory  within  which  said  lands  and 
waters  are  located  to  the  entire  exclusion  of  the  exercise  by  the 
Republic  of  Panama  of  any  such  sovereign  rights,  power  or 
authority. 

Article  IV 

As  rights  subsidiary  to  the  above  grants  the  Republic  of  Panama 
grants  in  perpetuity  to  the  United  States  the  right  to  use  the 
rivers,  streams,  lakes  and  other  bodies  of  water  within  its  limits 
for  navigation,  the  supply  of  water  or  water-power  or  other  pur- 
poses, so  far  as  the  use  of  said  rivers,  streams,  lakes  and  bodies 
of  water  and  the  waters  thereof  may  be  necessary  and  convenient 
for  the  construction,  maintenance,  operation,  sanitation  and 
protection  of  the  said  Canal. 

Article  V 

The  Republic  of  Panama  grants  to  the  United  States  in  per- 
petuity a  monopoly  for  the  construction,  maintenance  and  opera- 
tion of  any  system  of  communication  by  means  of  canal  Or  railroad 
across  its  territory  between  the  Caribbean  Sea  and  the  Pacific 
ocean. 

Article  VI 

The  grants  herein  contained  shall  in  no  manner  invalidate  the 
titles  or  rights  of  private  land  holders  or  owners  of  private  prop- 
erty in  the  said  zone  or  in  or  to  any  of  the  lands  or  waters  granted 
to  the  United  States  by  the  provisions  of  any  Article  of  this  treaty, 
nor  shall  they  interfere  with  the  rights  of  way  over  the  public 
roads  passing  through  the  said  zone  or  over  any  of  the  said  lands 
or  waters  unless  said  rights  of  way  or  private  rights  shall  conflict 
with  rights  herein  granted  to  the  United  States  in  which  case  the 
rights  of  the  United  States  shall  be  superior.  All  damages  caused 
to  the  owners  of  private  lands  or  private  property  of  any  kind  by 
reason  of  the  grants  contained  in  this  treaty  or  by  reason  of  the 
operations  of  the  United  States,  its  agents  or  employees,  or  by 
reason  of  the  construction,  maintenance,  operation,  sanitation 
and  protection  of  the  said  Canal  or  of  the  works  of  sanitation  and 


194 


THe  Panama  Canal 


protection  herein  provided  for,  shall  be  appraised  and  settled  by 
a  joint  Commission  appointed  by  the  Governments  of  the  United 
States  and  the  Republic  of  Panama,  whose  decisions  as  to  such 
damages  shall  be  final  and  whose  awards  as  to  such  damages 
shall  be  paid  solely  by  the  United  States.  No  part  of  the  work  on 
said  Canal  or  the  Panama  railroad  or  on  any  auxiliary  works 
relating  thereto  and  authorized  by  the  terms  of  this  treaty  shall 
be  prevented,  delayed  or  impeded  by  or  pending  such  proceed- 
ings to  ascertain  such  damages.  The  appraisal  of  said  private 
lands  and  private  property  and  the  assessment  of  damages  to 
them  shall  be  based  upon  their  value  before  the  date  of  this 
convention. 

Article  VII 

The  Republic  of  Panama  grants  to  the  United  States  within 
the  limits  of  the  cities  of  Panama  and  Colon  and  their  adjacent 
harbors  and  within  the  territory  adjacent  thereto  the  right  to 
acquire  by  purchase  or  by  the  exercise  of  the  right  of  eminent 
domain,  any  lands,  buildings,  water  rights  or  other  properties 
necessary  and  convenient  for  the  construction,  maintenance, 
operation  and  protection  of  the  Canal  and  of  any  works  of  sani- 
tation, such  as  the  collection  and  disposition  of  sewage  and  the 
distribution  of  water  in  the  said  cities  of  Panama  and  Colon, 
which,  in  the  discretion  of  the  United  States  may  be  necessary 
and  convenient  for  the  construction,  maintenance,  operation, 
sanitation  and  protection  of  the  said  Canal  and  railroad.  All 
such  works  of  sanitation,  collection  and  disposition  of  sewage 
and  distribution  of  water  in  the  cities  of  Panama  and  Colon 
shall  be  made  at  the  expense  of  the  United  States,  and  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States,  its  agents  or  nominees  shall  be 
authorized  to  impose  and  collect  water  rates  and  sewerage  rates 
which  shall  be  sufficient  to  provide  for  the  payment  of  interest 
and  the  amortization  of  the  principal  of  the  cost  of  said  works 
within  a  period  of  fifty  years  and  upon  the  expiration  of  said 
term  of  fifty  years  the  system  of  sewers  and  water  works  shall 
revert  to  and  become  the  properties  of  the  cities  of  Panama  and 
Colon  respectively,  and  the  use  of  the  water  shall  be  free  to  the 
inhabitants  of  Panama  and  Colon,  except  to  the  extent  that 


Panama  Canal  in  International  Law  195 


water  rates  may  be  necessary  for  the  operation  and  maintenance 
of  said  system  of  sewers  and  water. 

The  Republic  of  Panama  agrees  that  the  cities  of  Panama  and 
Colon  shall  comply  in  perpetuity  with  the  sanitary  ordinances 
whether  of  a  preventive  or  curative  character  prescribed  by  the 
United  States  and  in  case  the  Government  of  Panama  is  unable 
or  fails  in  its  duty  to  enforce  this  compliance  by  the  cities  of 
Panama  and  Colon  with  the  sanitary  ordinances  of  the  United 
States  the  Republic  of  Panama  grants  to  the  United  States  the 
right  and  authority  to  enforce  the  same. 

The  same  right  and  authority  are  granted  to  the  United  States 
for  the  maintenance  of  public  order  in  the  cities  of  Panama  and 
Colon  and  the  territories  and  harbors  adjacent  thereto  in  case 
the  Republic  of  Panama  should  not  be,  in  the  judgment  of  the 
United  States,  able  to  maintain  such  order. 

Aeticle  VIII 

The  Republic  of  Panama  grants  to  the  United  States  all  rights 
which  it  now  has  or  hereafter  may  acquire  to  the  property  of  the 
New  Panama  Canal  Company  and  the  Panama  Railroad  Company 
as  a  result  of  the  transfer  of  sovereignty  from  the  Republic  of 
Colombia  to  the  Republic  of  Panama  over  the  Isthmus  of  Panama 
and  authorizes  the  New  Panama  Canal  Company  to  sell  and 
transfer  to  the  United  States  its  rights,  privileges,  properties  and 
concessions  as  well  as  the  Panama  Railroad  and  all  the  shares  or 
part  of  the  shares  of  that  company;  but  the  public  lands  situated 
outside  of  the  zone  described  in  Article  II  of  this  treaty  now 
included  in  the  concessions  to  both  said  enterprises  and  not 
required  in  the  construction  or  operation  of  the  Canal  shall 
revert  to  the  Republic  of  Panama  except  any  property  now  owned 
by  or  in  the  possession  of  said  companies  within  Panama  or  Colon 
or  the  ports  or  terminals  thereof. 

Article  IX 

The  United  States  agrees  that  the  ports  at  either  entrance  of 
the  Canal  and  the  waters  thereof,  and  the  Republic  of  Panama 
agrees  that  the  towns  of  Panama  and  Colon  shall  be  free  for  all 
time  so  that  there  shall  not  be  imposed  or  collected  custom  house 


196 


THe  Panama  Canal 


tolls,  tonnage,  anchorage,  lighthouse,  wharf,  pilot,  or  quarantine 
dues  or  any  other  charges  or  taxes  of  any  kind  upon  any  vessel 
using  or  passing  through  the  Canal  or  belonging  to  or  employed 
by  the  United  States,  directly  or  indirectly,  in  connection  with 
the  construction,  maintenance,  operation,  sanitation  and  protec- 
tion of  the  main  Canal,  or  auxiliary  works,  or  upon  the  cargo, 
officers,  crew,  or  passengers  of  any  such  vessels,  except  such  tolls 
and  charges  as  may  be  imposed  by  the  United  States  for  the  use 
of  the  Canal  and  other  works,  and  except  tolls  and  charges  im- 
posed by  the  Republic  of  Panama  upon  merchandise  destined  to 
be  introduced  for  the  consumption  of  the  rest  of  the  Republic  of 
Panama,  and  upon  vessels  touching  at  the  ports  of  Colon  and 
Panama  and  which  do  not  cross  the  Canal. 

The  Government  of  the  Republic  of  Panama  shall  have  the 
right  to  establish  in  such  ports  and  in  the  towns  of  Panama  and 
Colon  such  houses  and  guards  as  it  may  deem  necessary  to  col- 
lect duties  on  importations  destined  to  other  portions  of  Panama 
and  to  prevent  contraband  trade.  The  United  States  shall  have 
the  right  to  make  use  of  the  towns  and  harbors  of  Panama  and 
Colon  as  places  of  anchorage,  and  for  making  repairs,  for  loading 
unloading,  depositing,  or  transshipping  cargoes  either  in  transit 
or  destined  for  the  service  of  the  Canal  and  for  other  works 
pertaining  to  the  Canal. 

Article  X 

The  Republic  of  Panama  agrees  that  there  shall  not  be  im- 
posed any  taxes,  national,  municipal,  departmental,  or  of  any 
other  class,  upon  the  Canal,  the  railways  and  auxiliary  works, 
tugs  and  other  vessels  employed  in  the  service  of  the  Canal, 
store  houses,  work  shops,  offices,  quarters  for  laborers,  factories 
of  all  kinds,  warehouses,  wharves,  machinery  and  other  works, 
property,  and  effects  appertaining  to  the  Canal  or  railroad  and 
auxiliary  works,  or  their  officers  or  employees,  situated  within 
the  cities  of  Panama  and  Colon,  and  that  there  shall  not  be 
imposed  contributions  or  charges  of  a  personal  character  of  any 
kind  upon  officers,  employees,  laborers,  and  other  individuals  in 
the  service  of  the  Canal  and  railroad  and  auxiliary  works. 


Panama  Canal  in  International  Law  197 


Article  XI 

The  United  States  agrees  that  the  official  dispatches  of  the 
Government  of  the  Republic  of  Panama  shall  be  transmitted 
over  any  telegraph  and  telephone  lines  established  for  canal  pur- 
poses and  used  for  public  and  private  business  at  rates  not  higher 
than  those  required  from  officials  in  the  service  of  the  United 
States. 

Article  XII 

The  Government  of  the  Republic  of  Panama  shall  permit  the 
immigration  and  free  access  to  the  lands  and  workshops  of  the 
Canal  and  its  auxiliary  works  of  all  employees  and  workmen  of 
whatever  nationality  under  contract  to  work  upon  or  seeking 
employment  upon  or  in  any  wise  connected  with  the  said  Canal 
and  its  auxiliary  works,  with  their  respective  families,  and  all 
such  persons  shall  be  free  and  exempt  from  the  military  service 
of  the  Republic  of  Panama. 

Article  XIII 

The  United  States  may  import  at  any  time  into  the  said  zone 
and  auxiliary  lands,  free  of  custom  duties,  imposts,  taxes,  or 
other  charges,  and  without  any  restrictions,  any  and  all  vessels, 
dredges,  engines,  cars,  machinery,  tools,  explosives,  materials, 
supplies,  and  other  articles  necessary  and  convenient  in  the  con- 
struction, maintenance,  operation,  sanitation  and  protection  of 
the  Canal  and  auxiliary  works,  and  all  provisions,  medicines, 
clothing,  supplies  and  other  things  necessary  and  convenient  for 
the  officers,  employees,  workmen  and  laborers  in  the  service  and 
employ  of  the  United  States  and  for  their  families.  If  any  such 
articles  are  disposed  of  for  use  outside  of  the  zone  and  auxiliary 
lands  granted  to  the  United  States  and  within  the  territory  of 
the  Republic,  they  shall  be  subject  to  the  same  import  or  other 
duties  as  like  articles  imported  under  the  laws  of  the  Republic 
of  Panama. 

Article  XIV 

As  the  price  or  compensation  for  the  rights,  powers  and  privi- 
leges granted  in  this  convention  by  the  Republic  of  Panama  to 
the  United  States,  the  Government  of  the  United  States  agrees 


198 


TKe  Panama  Canal 


to  pay  to  the  Republic  of  Panama  the  sum  of  ten  million  dollars, 
($10,000,000)  in  gold  coin  of  the  United  States  on  the  exchange 
of  the  ratification  of  this  convention  and  also  an  annual  payment 
during  the  life  of  this  convention  of  two  hundred  and  fifty  thou- 
sand dollars  ($250,000)  in  like  gold  coin,  beginning  nine  years 
after  the  date  aforesaid. 

The  provisions  of  this  Article  shall  be  in  addition  to  all  other 
benefits  assured  to  the  Republic  of  Panama  under  this  convention. 

But  no  delay  or  difference  of  opinion  under  this  Article  or  any 
other  provisions  of  this  treaty  shall  affect  or  interrupt  the  full 
operation  and  effect  of  this  convention  in  all  other  respects. 

Article  XV 

The  joint  commission  referred  to  in  Article  VI  shall  be  estab- 
lished as  follows: 

The  President  of  the  United  States  shall  nominate  two  persons 
and  the  President  of  the  Republic  of  Panama  shall  nominate  two 
persons  and  they  shall  proceed  to  a  decision;  but  in  case  of  dis- 
agreement of  the  Commission  (by  reason  of  their  being  equally 
divided  in  conclusion)  an  umpire  shall  be  appointed  by  the  two 
Governments  who  shall  render  the  decision.  In  the  event  of  the 
death,  absence,  or  incapacity  of  a  Commissioner  or  Umpire,  or 
of  his  omitting,  declining  or  ceasing  to  act,  his  place  shall  be 
filled  by  the  appointment  of  another  person  in  the  manner  above 
indicated.  All  decisions  by  a  majority  of  the  Commission  or  by 
the  umpire  shall  be  final. 

Article  XVI 

The  two  Governments  shall  make  adequate  provision  by  future 
agreement  for  the  pursuit,  capture,  imprisonment,  detention  and 
delivery  within  said  zone  and  auxiliary  lands  to  the  authorities  of 
the  Republic  of  Panama  of  persons  charged  with  the  commitment 
of  crimes,  felonies  or  misdemeanors  without  said  zone  and  for  the 
pursuit,  capture,  imprisonment,  detention  and  delivery  without 
said  zone  to  the  authorities  of  the  United  States  of  persons  charged 
with  the  commitment  of  crimes,  felonies  and  misdemeanors  within 
said  zone  and  auxiliary  lands. 


Panama  Canal  in  International  Law  199 


Article  XVII 

The  Republic  of  Panama  grants  to  the  United  States  the  use 
of  all  the  ports  of  the  Republic  open  to  commerce  as  places  of 
refuge  for  any  vessels  employed  in  the  Canal  enterprise,  and  for 
all  vessels  passing  or  bound  to  pass  through  the  Canal  which  may 
be  in  distress  and  be  driven  to  seek  refuge  in  said  ports.  Such 
vessels  shall  be  exempt  from  anchorage  and  tonnage  dues  on  the 
part  of  the  Republic  of  Panama. 

Article  XVIII 

The  Canal,  when  constructed,  and  the  entrances  thereto  shall 
be  neutral  in  perpetuity,  and  shall  be  opened  upon  the  terms  pro- 
vided for  by  Section  1  of  Article  three  of,  and  in  conformity  with 
all  the  stipulations  of,  the  treaty  entered  into  by  the  Governments 
of  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  on  November  18,  1901. 

Article  XIX 

The  Government  of  the  Republic  of  Panama  shall  have  the 
right  to  transport  over  the  Canal  its  vessels  and  its  troops  and 
munitions  of  war  in  such  vessels  at  all  times  without  paying 
charges  of  any  kind.  The  exemption  is  to  be  extended  to  the 
auxiliary  railway  for  the  transportation  of  persons  in  the  service 
of  the  Republic  of  Panama,  or  of  the  police  force  charged  with  the 
preservation  of  public  order  outside  of  said  zone,  as  well  as  to 
their  baggage,  munitions  of  war  and  supplies. 

Article  XX 

If  by  virtue  of  any  existing  treaty  in  relation  to  the  territory 
of  the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  whereof  the  obligations  shall  descend 
or  be  assumed  by  the  Republic  of  Panama,  there  may  be  any 
privilege  or  concession  in  favor  of  the  Government  or  the  citizens 
and  subjects  of  a  third  power  relative  to  an  interoceanic  means 
of  communication  which  in  any  of  its  terms  may  be  incompatible 
with  the  terms  of  the  present  convention,  the  Republic  of  Panama 
agrees  to  cancel  or  modify  such  treaty  in  due  form,  for  which 
purpose  it  shall  give  to  the  said  third  power  the  requisite  notifi- 
cation within  the  term  of  four  months  from  the  date  of  the  present 


200 


THe  Panama  Canal 


convention,  and  in  case  the  existing  treaty  contains  no  clause 
permitting  its  modifications  or  annulment,  the  Republic  of  Panama 
agrees  to  procure  its  modification  or  annulment  in  such  form 
that  there  shall  not  exist  any  conflict  with  the  stipulations  of  the 
present  convention. 

Article  XXI 

The  rights  and  privileges  granted  by  the  Republic  of  Panama 
to  the  United  States  in  the  preceding  Articles  are  understood  to 
be  free  of  all  anterior  debts,  liens,  trusts,  or  liabilities,  or  concessions 
or  privileges  to  other  Governments,  corporations,  syndicates  or 
individuals,  and  consequently,  if  there  should  arise  any  claims 
on  account  of  the  present  concessions  and  privileges  or  other- 
wise, the  claimants  shall  resort  to  the  Government  of  the  Repub- 
lic of  Panama  and  not  to  the  United  States  for  any  indemnity  or 
compromise  which  may  be  required. 

Article  XXII 

The  Republic  of  Panama  renounces  and  grants  to  the  United 
States  the  participation  to  which  it  might  be  entitled  in  the 
future  earnings  of  the  Canal  under  Article  XV  of  the  conces- 
sionary contract  with  Lucien  N.  B.  Wyse  now  owned  by  the 
New  Panama  Canal  Company  and  any  and  all  other  rights  or 
claims  of  a  pecuniary  nature  arising  under  or  relating  to  said 
concession,  or  arising  under  or  relating  to  the  concessions  to  the 
Panama  Railroad  Company  or  any  extension  or  modification 
thereof;  and  it  likewise  renounces,  confirms  and  grants  to  the 
United  States,  now  and  hereafter,  all  the  rights  and  property 
reserved  in  the  said  concessions  which  otherwise  would  belong  to 
Panama  at  or  before  the  expiration  of  the  terms  of  ninety-nine 
years  of  the  concessions  granted  to  or  held  by  the  above  men- 
tioned party  and  companies,  and  all  right,  title  and  interest  which 
it  now  has  or  may  hereafter  have,  in  and  to  the  lands,  canal, 
works,  property  and  rights  held  by  the  said  companies  under 
said  concessions  or  otherwise,  and  acquired  or  to  be  acquired 
by  the  United  States  from  or  through  the  New  Panama  Canal 
Company,  including  any  property  and  rights  which  might  or 
may  in  the  future  either  by  lapse  of  time,  forfeiture  or  otherwise, 


Panama  Canal  in  International  Law  201 


revert  to  the  Republic  of  Panama  under  any  contracts  or  con- 
cessions, with  said  Wyse,  the  Universal  Panama  Canal  Company, 
the  Panama  Railroad  Company  and  the  New  Panama  Canal 
Company. 

The  aforesaid  rights  and  property  shall  be  and  are  free  and 
released  from  any  present  or  reversionary  interest  in  or  claims  of 
Panama  and  the  title  of  the  United  States  thereto  upon  con- 
summation of  the  contemplated  purchase  by  the  United  States 
from  the  New  Panama  Canal  Company,  shall  be  absolute,  so  far 
as  concerns  the  Republic  of  Panama,  excepting  always  the  rights 
of  the  Republic  specifically  secured  under  this  treaty. 

Article  XXIII 

If  it  should  become  necessary  at  any  time  to  employ  armed 
forces  for  the  safety  or  protection  of  the  Canal,  or  of  the  ships 
that  make  use  of  the  same,  or  the  railways  and  auxiliary  works, 
the  United  States  shall  have  the  right,  at  all  times  and  in  its 
discretion,  to  use  its  police  and  its  land  and  naval  forces  or  to 
establish  fortifications  for  these  purposes. 

Article  XXIV 

No  change  either  in  the  Government  or  in  the  laws  and  trea- 
ties of  the  Republic  of  Panama  shall,  without  the  consent  of  the 
United  States,  affect  any  right  of  the  United  States  under  the  pres- 
ent convention,  or  under  any  treaty  stipulation  between  the  two 
countries  that  now  exists  or  may  hereafter  exist  touching  the 
subject  matter  of  this  convention. 

If  the  Republic  of  Panama  shall  hereafter  enter  as  a  constitu- 
ent into  any  other  Government  or  into  any  union  or  confedera- 
tion of  states,  so  as  to  merge  her  sovereignty  or  independence  in 
such  Government,  union  or  confederation,  the  rights  of  the 
United  States  under  this  convention  shall  not  be  in  any  respect 
lessened  or  impaired. 

Article  XXV 

For  the  better  performance  of  the  engagements  of  this  conven- 
tion and  to  the  end  of  the  efficient  protection  of  the  Canal  and 
the  preservation  of  its  neutrality,  the  Government  of  the  Repub- 


202 


XKe  Panama  Canal 


lie  of  Panama  will  sell  or  lease  to  the  United  States  lands  ade- 
quate and  necessary  for  naval  or  coaling  stations  on  the  Pacific 
coast  and  on  the  western  Caribbean  coast  of  the  Republic  at 
certain  points  to  be  agreed  upon  with  the  President  of  the  United 
States. 

Article  XXVI 

This  convention  when  signed  by  the  Plenipotentiaries  of  the 
Contracting  Parties  shall  be  ratified  by  the  respective  Govern- 
ments and  the  ratifications  shall  be  exchanged  at  Washington  at 
the  earliest  date  possible. 

In  faith  whereof  the  respective  Plenipotentiaries  have  signed 
the  present  convention  in  duplicate  and  have  hereunto  affixed 
their  respective  seals. 

Done  at  the  City  of  Washington  the  18th  day  of  November  in 
the  year  of  our  Lord  nineteen  hundred  and  three. 

John  Hay.  [seal] 
P.  Bunau  Varilla.  [seal] 


THE  PANAMA  CANAL 


Part  VI 

COMMERCIAL  IMPORTANCE  OF  THE  PANAMA 

CANAL 

BY 

EMORY  R.  JOHNSON,  Ph.D., Sc. D. 


COMMERCIAL  IMPORTANCE  OF  THE 
PANAMA  CANAL 

Each  individual's  interest  in  the  Panama  Canal, 
and  his  estimate  of  the  importance  of  the  canal,  is 
necessarily  determined  by  the  point  of  view.  The 
diplomat  and  statesman  concerned  with  the  promo- 
tion of  the  peaceful  development  of  Latin  American 
countries,  politically  and  economically,  and  desirous 
of  seeing  the  United  States  become  increasingly  help- 
ful to  the  countries  south  of  the  Rio  Grande,  will  study 
the  canal  with  regard  to  the  effect  it  may  have  upon 
the  international  relations  of  American  countries;  the 
military  expert  will  seek  to  understand  how  the  water- 
way across  the  Isthmus  will  or  may  augment  the 
offensive  and  defensive  strength  of  the  American 
Navy,  what  forts  need  to  be  constructed,  what  naval 
bases  and  coaling  stations  need  to  be  established, 
what  increases  need  to  be  made  in  the  Army  and  the 
Navy  to  enable  the  Panama  Canal  to  enhance  the 
military  power  and  naval  prestige  of  the  United 
States;  while  the  producers  and  traders,  although  not 
without  interest  in  the  political  and  military  changes 
that  the  canal  may  effect,  are  especially  desirous  of 
knowing  how  the  shortened  ocean  route  between  the 
north  Atlantic  and  the  Pacific  will  assist  the  world's 
trade,  will  enable  American  industries  to  produce  for 
wider  domestic  and  foreign  markets,  and  will  reduce 

205 


206 


TKe  Panama  Canal 


freight  rates  by  rail  within  the  country  and  by  water 
beyond  and  between  the  seaboards. 

The  commercial  importance  of  the  canal,  or  the 
assistance  it  will  render  the  industry  and  trade  of  the 
people  of  the  United  States  and  other  countries,  can 
be  indicated:  (1)  by  showing  what  effects  the  new 
route  will  have  upon  the  length  and  time  of  ocean 
voyages;  (2)  by  stating  conservatively  the  volume  of 
shipping,  foreign  and  American,  international  and 
coastwise,  that  may  be  expected  to  use  the  canal; 
(3)  by  estimating  the  influence  which  the  Panama 
Canal  will  have  upon  the  freight  rates  by  rail  between 
the  two  seaboards  of  the  United  States  and  by  ocean 
carriers  engaged  in  American  intercoastal  and  foreign 
commerce;  (4)  by  showing  how  much  the  ocean  car- 
riers will  save  in  fuel  costs  by  using  the  Panama  route 
and  by  pointing  out  how  the  cheaper  fuel  costs  by  way 
of  the  Isthmus  will  assist  the  Panama  Canal  in  com- 
peting with  alternative  routes  via  the  Straits  of  Ma- 
gellan, the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  and  the  Suez  Canal; 
(5)  by  studying  the  relation  of  tolls  to  the  traffic  and 
revenues  of  the  canal;  and  (6)  by  considering  what 
policy  the  Government  should  adhere  to  in  the  manage- 
ment of  the  canal  in  order  that  the  canal  may  best 
serve  the  welfare  of  the  entire  country. 

I.  -  Distances  and  Time  Saved  by  Panama  Canal 

The  Panama  Canal  is  being  constructed  to  shorten 
the  length  and  time  of  ocean  voyages  between  the 
countries  of  the  north  Atlantic  and  those  of  the  north 
and  south  Pacific.    To  recite  textually  and  in  detail 


Commercial  Importance  of  Canal  207 


the  distances  from  the  several  Atlantic  ports,  American 
and  foreign,  to  the  leading  ports  of  each  of  the  principal 
countries  bordering  the  Pacific  would  be  wearisome  to 
writer  and  reader;  but  by  resorting  to  a  few  short 
tables,  which  the  reader  may  skip  or  may  study  in 
accordance  with  the  degree  of  his  interest,  it  will  be 
possible  to  present  with  satisfactory  completeness  the 
changes  which  the  canal  will  make  in  distances  and  in 
sailing  time.* 

The  maximum  effect  of  the  Panama  Canal  upon 
ocean  distances  will  be  the  reduction  in  the  length  and 
time  of  voyages  between  the  Atlantic-Gulf  seaboard  of 
the  United  States  and  the  Pacific  coast  of  the  United 
States  and  South  America.  Table  I  gives  the  saving 
for  trips  from  New  York  and  New  Orleans  to  San 
Francisco  and  to  four  selected  ports  having  central 
and  southern  locations  upon  the  west  coast  of  South 
America. 

The  saving  in  time  is  given  both  for  freight  steamers, 
most  of  which  are  run  at  an  average  speed  of  9  to  12 
knots,  and  for  steamers  that  carry  both  freight  and 
passengers,  which  usually  average  14  to  16  knots. 
Except  upon  the  north  Atlantic,  passenger  steamers 
seldom  average  above  16  knots.  In  calculating  the 
saving  in  time  of  voyages,  as  stated  in  the  table,  a  half 
day  is  deducted  to  allow  for  the  detention  due  to 
passing  through  the  canal. 

*  The  tables  are  taken  from  Chapter  XI  of  the  Report  upon  Panama 
Canal  Traffic  and  Tolls.  Chapters  I  and  XI  discuss  fully  the  effect  of  the 
Panama  Canal  upon  ocean  distances. 


208 


THe  Panama  Canal 


TABLE  I.  — DISTANCES  AND  TIME  SAVED  VIA  THE  PANAMA  CANAL  AS  COM- 
PARED WITH  THE  STRAITS  OF  MAGELLAN  BETWEEN  THE  ATLANTIC- 
GULF  PORTS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  WEST  COAST 
OF  NORTH  AND  SOUTH  AMERICA 


From  New  York. 


To- 


San  Francisco 

Callao  

Iquique  

Valparaiso. . . , 
Coronel  


Distance 
saved. 


Miles. 

7,873 
6,250 
5,139 
3,747 
3,296 


9 

knots. 


35.9 
28.4 
23.3 
16.8 
14.7 


Days  saved  for  vessels  of  • 


10 
knots. 


32.3 
25.2 
20.9 
15.1 
13.2 


12 
knots. 


26.8 
21.2 
17.3 
12.5 
10.9 


14 
knots. 


22.9 
18.1 
14.8 
10.6 
9.3 


16 

knots. 


20.0 
15.7 
12.9 
9.2 
8.1 


To  — 


San  Francisco 

Callao  

Iquique  

Valparaiso. . .  , 
Coronel  


Distance 
saved. 


Miles. 

8,868 
7,245 
6,134 
4,742 
4,291 


From  New  Orleans. 


Days  saved  for  vessels  of  ■ 


9 

10 

12 

14 

16 

knots. 

knots. 

knots. 

knots. 

knots. 

40.5 

36.4 

30.2 

25.8 

22.5 

33.0 

29.7 

24.7 

21.1 

18.4 

27.9 

25.0 

20.8 

17.7 

15.4 

21.4 

19.2 

16.0 

13.6 

11.8 

19.4 

17.4 

14.4 

12.3 

10.7 

On  a  trip  between  San  Francisco  and  New  York  a 
10-knot  freight  steamer  will  be  able  to  save  32  days  by- 
using  the  Panama  Canal  instead  of  going  around  by 
the  Straits  of  Magellan.  A  16-knot  passenger  steamer 
will  be  able  to  make  the  voyage  in  20  days  less.  The 
saving  in  time  and  distance  will  be  greater  for  New 
Orleans  than  for  New  York;  because  Gulf  ports  are 
nearer  to  the  canal  than  are  the  Atlantic  ports.  From 
New  York  to  the  great  nitrate  port  of  Iquique  9-  and 
10-knot  freight  steamers  will  save  from  23  to  21  days 
by  using  the  Panama  Canal  instead  of  going  by  way  of 
the  Straits  of  Magellan;  and  even  for  Valparaiso,  the 


Commercial  Importance  of  Canal  209 


principal  port  of  the  agricultural  section  of  Chile,  the 
10-knot  steamer  from  New  York  will  save  15  days  by 
using  the  Panama  Canal.  The  reduction  in  time  and 
distance  between  the  Atlantic-Gulf  seaboard  of  the 
United  States  and  the  west  coast  of  North  and  South 
America  will  be  so  great  that  the  traffic  between  these 
two  sections  will,  without  question,  use  the  Panama 
Canal. 

TABLE  II.  — DISTANCES  AND  TIME  SAVED  VIA  THE  PANAMA  CANAL  AS  COM- 
PARED WITH  THE  STRAITS  OF  MAGELLAN  BETWEEN  EUROPEAN 
PORTS  AND  THE  WEST  COAST  OF  SOUTH  AMERICA 


To- 

From  Liverpool. 

Distance 
saved. 

Days  saved  for  vessels  of  — 

9 

knots. 

10 
knots. 

12 
knots. 

14 

knots. 

16 

knots. 

Callao  

Miles. 

4,043 
2,932 
1,540 ' 
1,089 

18.2 
13.1 
6.6 
4.5 

16.3 
11.7 
5.9 
4.0 

13.5 
9.7 
4.8 
3.3 

11.5 
8.2 
4.1 
2.7 

10.0 
7.1 
3.5 
2.3 

To  — 

From  Antwerp. 

Distance 
saved. 

Days  saved  for  vessels  of — 

9 

knots. 

10 
knots. 

12 
knots. 

14 

knots. 

16 
knots. 

Miles. 

Callao  

3,905 

17.6 

15.8 

13.1 

11.5 

9.7 

2,794 

12.4 

11.1 

9.2 

7.8 

6.8 

1,402 

6.0 

5.3 

4.3 

3.5 

3.1 

951 

3.9 

3.4 

2.8 

2.3 

1.9 

To- 

From  Gibraltar. 

Distance 
saved. 

Days  saved  for  vessels  of — 

9 

knots. 

10 
knots. 

12 
knots. 

14 
knots. 

16 

knots. 

Miles. 

Callao  

3,327 

14.9 

13.3 

11.0 

9.4 

8.1 

Iquique  

2,216 

9.7 

8.7 

7.2 

6.1 

5.2 

Valparaiso  

824 

3.3 

2.9 

2.3 

1.9 

1.6 

Coronel  

373 

1.2 

1.0 

0.8 

0.6 

0.5 

210 


THe  Panama  Canal 


Table  II  illustrates  the  effect  which  the  canal  will 
have  upon  the  length  and  time  of  voyages  between 
European  ports  and  those  of  the  west  coast  of  South 
America.  From  Liverpool  and  from  Antwerp,  repre- 
sentative ports  of  north  Europe,  a  10-knot  freight 
steamer  can  save  between  11  and  12  days  by  using  the 
Panama  Canal  to  the  nitrate  ports.  For  trips  to  Val- 
paraiso, the  saving  in  time  will  be  only  about  half  as 
great  as  the  saving  in  time  for  trips  to  the  nitrate 
ports;  and,  if  saving  in  distance  and  time  were  the 
only  factor  affecting  the  choice  of  routes,  it  is  probable 
that  the  tolls  that  have  been  established  for  the  use  of 
the  Panama  Canal  would  divert  the  traffic  between 
Europe  and  Chile  to  the  Magellan  route;  but  the 
cheaper  cost  of  fuel  by  the  Panama  route,  and  the 
greater  possibility  of  trading  at  intermediate  ports  by 
taking  the  Panama  route  instead  of  going  through  the 
Straits  of  Magellan,  make  it  practically  certain  that 
but  a  small  part  of  the  traffic  between  Europe  and  the 
west  coast  of  South  America  will  continue  to  use  the 
Magellan  route  after  the  opening  of  the  Panama  Canal. 

Tables  III  and  IV  show  how  the  Panama  Canal  will 
affect  the  length  of  routes  and  the  time  of  voyages  to 
Australia  and  New  Zealand  from  New  York  and  New 
Orleans  and  from  a  representative  European  port, 
Liverpool. 


Commercial  Importance  of  Canal 


211 


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3,488 

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2,770 

3,932 

2,493 

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Commercial  Importance  of  Canal  213 


The  traffic  between  the  Atlantic-Gulf  coast  of  the 
United  States  and  Australia  is  now  carried  by  way  of 
the  Cape  of  Good  Hope.  The  short  route  from  New 
York  to  Wellington  is  by  way  of  the  Straits  of  Magel- 
lan. It  is  certain  that  practically  all,  if  not  all,  ship- 
ping engaged  in  the  trade  of  the  eastern  seaboard  of 
the  United  States  with  Australia  will  use  the  Panama 
route.  If  vessels  went  out  from  New  York  to  Adelaide 
and  from  there  directly  back  to  New  York  without 
going  on  to  Melbourne  or  Sydney,  it  is  probable  that 
the  present  route  by  way  of  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope 
might  continue  to  be  used;  but,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
the  great  port  of  Australia  is  Sydney  and  most  vessels 
outbound  to  Australia  make  the  port  of  Sydney, 
which  not  only  has  the  largest  tonnage  of  traffic  but 
which,  also,  being  situated  near  Newcastle,  has  cheap 
coal.  Moreover,  as  will  be  pointed  out  later,  the  fuel 
expenses  of  steamers  will  be  less  via  Panama  than  via 
the  Cape  of  Good  Hope.  The  trade  between  the  At- 
lantic coast  of  the  United  States  and  New  Zealand 
will  use  the  Panama  route,  both  because  of  the  shorter 
distance  and  the  lower  fuel  costs. 

Australia,  as  is  shown  by  Table  IV,  is  nearer  Europe 
by  way  of  Suez  than  via  Panama;  but  it  will  be  ob- 
served that  Sydney,  the  principal  port  of  Australia,  is 
less  than  a  day's  run  for  an  ordinary  steamer  farther 
from  Liverpool  via  Panama  than  via  Suez,  with  calls 
at  the  intermediate  ports  at  which  vessels  usually  find 
it  advantageous  to  stop  for  coal  or  traffic.  New  Zea- 
land is  6  days  nearer  to  Liverpool  for  a  10-knot  freight 
steamer  via  Panama  than  by  way  of  Suez;  but  the 


214 


The  Panama  Canal 


distance  from  Wellington  to  Liverpool  by  way  of  the 
Straits  of  Magellan  is  only  550  miles  greater  than  by 
way  of  Panama.  Thus,  the  Panama  route  will  have 
to  compete  for  the  European-New  Zealand  traffic  not 
only  with  the  Suez  Canal  but  with  the  Straits  of  Ma- 
gellan route.  The  high  cost  of  coal  by  way  of  the 
Straits  of  Magellan  will  probably  prevent  that  route 
from  being  used  to  much  extent  for  this  traffic.  The 
division  of  the  traffic  between  the  Suez  and  Panama 
routes  will  depend  largely  upon  the  extent  to  which 
the  New  Zealand  commerce  is  handled  by  vessels  en- 
gaged only  in  that  trade  or  by  vessels  which  are  en- 
gaged in  both  Australian  and  New  Zealand  commerce. 

Under  present  conditions  the  eastern  part  of  the 
United  States,  where  most  of  the  exported  goods  are 
manufactured,  competes  with  Europe  for  the  trade  of 
Japan  and  China  at  a  great  disadvantage.  The  Suez 
route  is  used  for  the  Oriental  trade  both  by  Europe 
and  by  the  producers  and  traders  located  in  the  eastern 
part  of  the  United  States.  The  opening  of  the  Panama 
Canal,  as  is  shown  by  Table  V,  will  remove  the  present 
handicap  which  America  has  in  trading  with  the 
Orient. 

A  10-knot  freight  steamer  can  make  the  voyage  to 
Yokohama  from  New  York  in  15  days  less  than  it  now 
takes  to  make  the  run  by  way  of  Suez.  For  New 
Orleans  the  Panama  Canal  will  save  23  days.  The 
distance  from  New  York  to  Shanghai  is  much  less  by 
way  of  Panama  than  by  Suez.  Hongkong  and  Manila, 
however,  are  equally  distant  from  New  York  via 
Panama  and  Suez.    The  choice  of  routes  taken  by 


Commercial  Importance  of  Canal 


215 


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THe  Panama  Canal 


vessels  outbound  from  New  York  to  Hongkong  or 
Manila  will  depend  partly  upon  whether  vessels  wish 
to  trade  at  intermediate  ports  and  partly  upon  the 
relative  costs  of  coal  via  Panama  and  Suez. 
!  The  Panama  Canal  will  evidently  not  be  used  to 
much  extent  by  the  commerce  of  Europe  with  the 
Orient.  Table  VI  shows  that  the  entire  Orient,  in- 
cluding Japan,  is  nearer  Europe  by  way  of  Suez  than 
via  Panama. 

If  relative  distances  alone  determined  the  choice  of 
routes,  none  of  Europe's  trade  with  the  Orient,  not 
even  any  of  that  with  Japan,  would  use  the  Panama 
Canal;  but  it  is  a  well-known  fact  that  distance  is  only 
one  of  the  forces  that  determine  the  routes  taken  by 
vessels  engaged  in  trade  between  widely .  separated 
parts  of  the  world.  Even  under  pre-canal  conditions, 
an  appreciable  tonnage  of  shipping  moved  from  the 
Far  East  by  way  of  America  to  Europe.  After  the 
opening  of  the  Panama  Canal,  the  shipping  making 
the  trip  from  the  Orient  to  Europe  by  way  of  America 
will  increase;  and,  as  will  be  shown  in  a  later  connec- 
tion, the  lower  fuel  costs  by  way  of  Panama,  as  well  as 
the  possibilities  of  engaging  en  route  in  the  commerce 
between  the  United  States  and  Europe,  may  be  ex- 
pected to  cause  a  considerable  tonnage  of  shipping  to 
move  both  eastward  and  westward  via  the  Panama 
Canal  between  the  Orient  and  Europe. 

II.    Panama  Traffic,  American  and  Foreign 

The  most  concrete  measure  of  the  commercial  im- 
portance of  the  Panama  Canal  will  be  the  volume  of 


Commercial  Importance  of  Canal 


217 


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218 


THe  Panama  Canal 


traffic  or  tonnage  of  shipping  making  use  of  the  water- 
way. In  the  latter  part  of  1911  and  in  the  early  months 
of  1912,  a  detailed  investigation  was  made  of  entrance 
and  clearance  statistics  kept  by  the  United  States  and 
other  countries  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  how 
much  shipping  would  have  passed  through  a  Panama 
Canal  had  one  been  in  existence  during  the  year  1909- 
1910,  the  latest  year  for  which  complete  information 
was  obtainable.  The  following  table  summarizes  the 
results  of  an  elaborate  statistical  investigation: 

TABLE  VII.— NET  REGISTER  TONNAGE  OF  VESSELS  THAT 
MIGHT  HAVE  ADVANTAGEOUSLY  USED  A  PANAMA 

CANAL  IN  1909-1910 


Europe  with  — 

Western  South  America  

Western  Central  America  and  Pacific 

Mexico  

Pacific  United  States,  British  Columbia 

and  Hawaii  

Pacific  United  States  via  Suez  Canal .... 
Oriental  countries  east  of  Singapore,  and 

Oceania  

Eastern  United  States  Coast  with  — 
Western  South  America,  Pacific  Mexico 

and  Hawaii  ,  

Pacific  Coast  of  United  States  (via  Cape 

Horn)2  

Pacific  Coast  of  United  States  and  Hawaii 
(via  American-Hawaiian  S.  S.  Co.). .  . . 
Oriental  countries  east  of  Singapore,  and 

Oceania  

Panama  traffic  

Eastern  Canada  with  Alaska,  Chile  and 

Australia  

Total  


1  Figures  furnished  by  the  Suez  Canal  Co.  It  is  not  possible  to  divide  the 
total  into  entrances  and  clearances. 

2  Not  including  Hawaii. 


Total 
entrances. 

Total 
clearances. 

Total 
entrances 

and 
clearances. 

1,553,887 

1,594,513 

3,148,400 

80,788 

118,714 

199,502 

419,865 

269,853 

689,718 
158,000! 

1,174,585 

618,704 

555,881 

300,909 

166,686 

467,595 

117,311 

55,344 

172,655 

181,713 

181,713 

363,426 

600,000 
158,558 

900,000 
259,932 

1,500,000 
418,490 

13,410 

22,248 

35,658 

4,045,145 

4,124,884 

8,328,029 

Commercial  Importance  of  Canal  219 


The  figures  presented  in  Table  VII  show  that  about 
10|  per  cent  of  the  total  tonnage  of  shipping  that 
would  have  used  a  Panama  Canal  in  1909-1910  would 
have  consisted  of  vessels  serving  the  trade  between  the 
two  seaboards  of  the  United  States,  i.e.,  vessels  which 
carried  traffic  via  Cape  Horn,  via  the  Straits  of  Ma- 
gellan, or  to  and  from  the  Isthmuses  of  Panama  and 
Tehuantepec.  The  vessels  employed  in  the  trade  of 
the  United  States  with  foreign  countries  contributed 
about  33  per  cent  of  the  total  Panama  tonnage  for  the 
year  1910.  Over  56  per  cent  of  the  shipping  that  would 
have  used  the  canal  during  the  year  in  question  was 
employed  in  handling  commerce  that  did  not  touch 
the  shores  of  the  United  States.  The  importance  of 
the  west  coast  South  American  trade  and  the  large 
place  occupied  by  Europe  in  that  trade  are  indicated 
by  the  fact  that  38  per  cent  of  the  total  shipping  that 
would  have  used  a  Panama  Canal  in  1909-1910  con- 
sisted of  vessels  serving  the  trade  of  Europe  with  the 
west  coast  of  South  America.* 

To  estimate  the  probable  traffic  of  the  Panama 
Canal  during  the  early  years  of  its  operation  and  at 
the  end  of  5-  and  10-year  periods,  it  is  necessary  to 
apply  to  the  tonnage  that  would  have  used  the  canal 
in  1910  such  a  rate  of  increase  as  is  justified  by  the 
growth  of  the  world's  commerce. 

*  Since  this  was  written  the  great  European  war  has  temporarily  stopped 
most  of  the  maritime  foreign  trade  of  Continental  Europe  and  has  interfered 
with  the  commerce  of  Great  Britain.  The  trade  of  Europe  with  the  Pacific 
coast  of  North  and  South  America  forms  such  a  large  share  of  the  commerce 
that  will  use  the  Panama  Canal  that  the  war  in  Europe  must  necessarily 
reduce  the  tonnage  of  Panama  Canal  traffic  for  one  or  two  years  at  least. 


220 


TKe  Panama  Canal 


An  investigation  made  by  the  Isthmian  Canal  Com- 
mission from  1899  to  1901  showed  that  the  available 
Panama  Canal  traffic  in  1899  was  about  5,000,000 
tons.  Records  kept  for  a  period  of  years  by  the  Suez 
Canal  Company  showed  practically  the  same  available 
tonnage.  Thus,  the  increase  in  available  Panama 
Canal  traffic  during  the  eleven  years  ending  in  1910 
amounted  to  66|  per  cent  and  was  at  the  rate  of  59  per 
cent  per  decade.  The  trade  of  the  United  States  with 
non-European  countries  increased  67  J  per  cent  in  value 
during  the  decade  1900-1910.  The  commerce  of  the 
Atlantic-Gulf  ports  of  the  United  States  with  Pacific 
countries  rose  in  value  63.1  per  cent,  while  the  ton- 
nage of  the  Suez  Canal  advanced  70.26  per  cent  during 
the  decade  ending  with  1910  and  78.4  during  the  10 
years  closing  with  1912.  These  and  other  facts  that 
might  be  adduced  indicate  that  an  increase  of  60  per 
cent  per  decade  in  the  traffic  of  the  Panama  Canal 
may  conservatively  be  assumed.  If  that  rate  of 
growth  shall  prevail  down  to  1915,  the  tonnage  of 
shipping  available  for  the  use  of  the  canal  will  then  be 
10,500,000  net  tons  per  annum. 

It  is  important  to  know  what  part  of  this  total  ton- 
nage will  probably  be  made  up  of  shipping  engaged  in 
the  intercoastal  trade  of  the  United  States,  and  how 
much  of  the  remaining  tonnage  will  consist  of  Amer- 
ican and  foreign  shipping.  Table  VIII  contains  an 
estimate  of  the  probable  tonnage  of  the  Panama  Canal 
in  1915,  1920  and  1925,  so  classified  as  to  show  what 
part  of  the  total  will  consist  of  shipping  in  the  Amer- 
ican coastwise  trade  and  what  portions  of  the  total 


Commercial  Importance  of  Canal  221 


will  consist  of  American  ships  and  foreign  ships  engaged 
in  American  and  foreign  trade. 


TABLE  VIII .—CLASSIFICATION  OF  ESTIMATED  NET  TONNAGE 
OF  SHIPPING  USING  THE  PANAMA  CANAL  IN  1915, 

1920  AND  1925 


Average  per 
annum  during 
1915  and  1916. 

1920. 

1925. 

Coast-to-coast  American  shipping. . 

American  shipping  carrying  for- 
eign commerce  of  the  United 
States  

1,000,000 

720,000 
8,780,000 

1,414,000 
910,000 
11,020,000 

2,000,000 
1,150,000 
13,850,000 

Foreign  shipping  carrying  com- 
merce of  the  United  States  and 
foreign  countries  

Total  

10,500,000 

13,344,000 

17,000,000 

The  figures  given  in  the  above  table  for  American 
coast-to-coast  shipping  are  obtained  by  assuming  that 
the  shipping  employed  in  carrying  the  water-borne 
commerce  that  moved  between  the  two  seaboards  of 
the  United  States  in  1910  will  have  somewhat  more 
than  doubled  by  1915.  Should  the  rate  of  increase 
that  has  prevailed  during  1911  and  1912  continue  to 
1915,  the  intercoastal  traffic  will  have  more  than  dou- 
bled during  the  5-year  period.  In  constructing  Table 
VIII,  it  was  also  thought  conservative  to  assume  that 
the  traffic  between  the  two  seaboards  by  way  of  the 
Panama  Canal  would  double  during  the  first  decade 
and,  thus,  reach  2,000,000  tons  in  1925.  This  again  is 
believed  to  be  an  estimate  well  on  the  safe  side  of  what 
will  happen.  In  estimating  the  growth  in  the  total 
Panama  Canal  traffic  during  the  first  10  years  of  the 
canal's  operation  an  increase  of  only  60  per  cent  has 
been  assumed.    Should  only  this  rate  of  growth  be 


222 


TTHe  Panama  Canal 


realized,  which  is  much  less  than  the  actual  rate  of 
increase  of  the  traffic  of  the  Suez  Canal  after  that 
waterway  has  been  in  operation  for  more  than  four 
decades  and  its  tonnage  has  become  large,  the  traffic 
of  the  Panama  Canal,  in  1925,  will  amount  to  17,000,000 
net  tons  of  shipping,  of  which  not  less  than  2,000,000 
tons  will  consist  of  vessels  operated  in  the  coast-to- 
coast  trade.  There  will  be  about  1,150,000  tons  of 
American  ships  employed  in  the  foreign  commerce 
of  the  United  States,  and  probably  13,850,000  tons  of 
vessels  under  foreign  flags  engaged  in  carrying  the 
commerce  of  other  countries  and  the  foreign  trade  of 
the  United  States. 

III.    Effect  of  Panama  Canal  upon  Transconti- 
nental Rates  by  Railroads  and  Carriers  by 

Water 

The  Panama  Canal  will  be  of  benefit  to  American 
producers  and  traders  by  providing  new  and  cheaper 
transportation  facilities.  It  is  also  expected  that,  at 
least,  some  of  the  transcontinental  shipments  by  rail 
will  move  at  cheaper  rates  than  would  be  charged  if 
there  were  no  Panama  Canal.  The  commercial  value 
of  the  canal  may,  thus,  be  measured  by  its  effect  upon 
services  and  rates  by  water  and  by  rail. 

Whatever  may  be  the  effect  of  the  canal  upon  the 
rates  actually  charged  by  the  coastwise  carriers,  it  is 
certain  that  the  costs  of  transportation  by  water 
between  the  two  seaboards  will  be  largely  reduced. 
The  rates  between  New  York  and  San  Francisco  by  way 
of  the  Isthmus  of  Tehuantepec  are  said  to  average 


Commercial  Importance  of  Canal 


223 


about  $11.50  per  ton  of  2,000  pounds.  The  agreement 
between  the  American-Hawaiian  Steamship  Company 
and  the  Mexican  National  Railroad  provides  that 
one-third  of  the  through  rate  shall  be  paid  to  the  rail- 
road across  the  Isthmus  of  Tehauntepec  for  transfer- 
ring the  cargo  from  the  steamer  in  one  ocean  to  the 
steamer  in  the  other  ocean.  Thus,  the  cost  of  transfer  at 
the  Isthmus,  while  varying  for  different  kinds  of  cargo, 
probably  averages  about  $3.50  per  ton  of  2000  pounds. 

Through  traffic  by  way  of  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  is 
handled  on  through  rates,  the  Panama  Railroad  Com- 
pany taking  a  proportional  of  the  through  tariff.  The 
average  cost  of  transferring  cargo  from  one  steamer  to 
another  at  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  probably  is  about 
$3.00  per  ton.  Thus,  the  absence  of  a  canal  across  the 
Isthmus  increases  the  transportation  cost  between  the 
two  seaboards  of  the  United  States  from  $3.00  to  $3.50 
per  cargo  ton.  As  vessels  carry  on  an  average  nearly 
two  tons  of  cargo  for  each  net  vessel  ton,  the  transfer 
costs  across  the  Isthmus  are  equivalent  to  six  or  seven 
dollars  per  net  vessel  ton.  The  double  handling  of 
traffic  at  the  Isthmus  often  damages  goods;  articles 
may  be  lost;  and,  in  time  of  congested  traffic,  delays 
may  occur  that  are  annoying  and  expensive  to  ship- 
pers and  consignees.  The  tolls  fixed  for  the  use  of  the 
Panama  Canal  are  $1.20  per  net  vessel  ton,  which  is 
probably  less  than  one-fourth  of  the  saving  which  the 
canal  will  effect  in  the  cost  of  transportation  between 
the  two  seaboards  of  the  United  States. 

The  reduction  in  freight  rates  coastwise  between  the 
two  seaboards  will  not  necessarily  be  equal  to  the  de- 


224 


XKe  Panama  Canal 


crease  which  the  canal  will  effect  in  the  cost  of  the 
service.  If  the  competition  between  the  steamship 
lines  were  keen  and  unrestrained,  the  rates  would  be 
based  upon  the  cost  of  the  service;  but  the  competi- 
tion of  the  steamship  lines  will  be  carefully  regulated 
in  their  "  conferences."  The  rates  between  the  two 
seaboards  will  be  the  same  by  the  several  lines.  For  a 
part  of  their  traffic,  the  regular  steamship  lines  will 
have  to  meet  the  competition  of  individual  vessels 
owned  or  chartered  by  producers  and  shippers  whose 
business  is  large  enough  to  enable  them  to  ship  goods 
in  full  cargo  lots.  This  competition,  however,  will  be 
limited,  and  only  a  minor  part  of  the  rates  of  the  reg- 
ular lines  will  be  regulated  by  the  cost  of  transporting 
goods  in  vessels  owned  or  chartered  by  the  large 
shippers. 

There  will  be  competition  between  the  transconti- 
nental railroads  and  the  coastwise  steamship  lines,  but 
it  remains  to  be  seen  how  active  that  competition  will 
be.  Will  it  be  the  policy  of  the  railroads  to  reduce 
their  rates  generally  from  coast  to  coast  in  order  to 
hold  traffic  against  the  active  competition  of  the  steam- 
ship lines,  or  will  the  railroads  maintain  their  through 
rates  practically  at  the  present  level,  knowing  that 
they  will  thereby  lose  such  traffic  between  the  two  sea- 
board sections  as  can  secure  satisfactory  service  and 
lower  rates  from  the  carriers  by  water?  If  the  rail- 
roads elect  to  maintain  their  present  rate  schedules, 
will  the  steamship  lines,  acting  through  their  confer- 
ences, maintain  their  common  rates  at  such  differen- 
tials under  the  stable  schedules  of  railroad  tariffs  as 


Commercial  Importance  of  Canal  225 


will  cause  the  rates  by  water  to  attract  to  the  coast- 
wise lines  the  volume  of  traffic  needed  to  fill  the  ships 
in  service?  In  other  words,  will  the  coastwise  lines 
operated  via  the  canal  so  compete  with  each  other  and 
with  the  railroads  as  to  bring  rates  as  low  as  the  cost 
of  service  will  allow,  or  will  the  coastwise  lines  restrict 
their  competition  with  each  other  and  fix  and  maintain 
their  rates,  not  with  reference  to  the  cost  of  the  service, 
but  with  regard  to  what  the  traffic  will  bear  —  with 
regard  to  what  shippers  can  pay,  and  what  they  will 
pay,  for  transportation  by  water  rather  than  by  rail? 

These  questions  are  not  easy  to  answer  in  advance 
of  experience;  but  the  history  of  rate  making  by  rail- 
roads and  by  steamship  lines  does  not  presage  keen 
competition  either  between  the  through  transconti- 
nental rail  lines,  or  between  the  coastwise  steamship 
companies,  or  between  the  railroads  and  the  steam- 
ship lines.  It  is  probable  that  the  railroads  will  main- 
tain most  of  their  through  rates  between  the  two 
seaboard  sections. 

Only  a  comparatively  small  percentage  of  the  traffic 
of  the  transcontinental  railroads  originates  in  the  sea- 
board sections  of  the  country.  Of  the  westbound 
traffic  carried  through  to  the  Pacific,  only  20  to  22 
per  cent  originates  east  of  the  Buffalo-Pittsburgh  ter- 
ritory, and  only  35  per  cent  originates  in  the  eastern 
section  and  in  the  Buffalo-Pittsburgh  territory.  More 
than  two-thirds  of  the  through  westbound  traffic  of  the 
transcontinental  lines  is  shipped  from  the  central  West. 
Similarly,  only  a  small  portion  of  the  traffic  originating 
on  the  Pacific  coast  is  carried  through  to  the  section 


226 


XKe  Panama  Canal 


east  of  Pittsburgh  and  Buffalo.  Most  of  the  shipments 
from  the  far  West  are  to  the  middle  West. 

Another  reason  for  anticipating  that  the  railroads 
will  not  seriously  disturb  their  present  rates  for  the 
purpose  of  meeting  the  competition  of  coastwise  lines 
through  the  canal  is  that  for  most  commodities  the 
same  rates  are  charged  to  the  Pacific  coast  and  Moun- 
tain States  from  the  entire  section  of  the  United  States 
east  of  the  Missouri  River.  In  order  to  put  the  indus- 
tries and  railroads  of  the  middle  West  on  an  equal  foot- 
ing with  the  industries  and  railroads  of  the  Eastern 
States,  railroad  rates  to  the  far  West  have  been  blan- 
keted over  the  eastern  half  of  the  United  States. 
Thus,  if  the  rail  rates  from  the  Atlantic  section  to  the 
West  are  cut  to  meet  canal  competition,  like  reductions 
will  have  to  be  made  from  the  middle  West,  or  the  rail- 
roads will  have  to  do  what  they  probably  will  not  do 
—  abolish  the  present  blanketing  of  rates. 

A  third  reason  for  thinking  that  the  railroads  will 
probably  not  make  large  reductions  in  their  rates  to 
meet  the  competition  of  the  coastwise  lines  is  that  the 
eastern  trunk  line  railroads  will  not  be  in  favor  of  join- 
ing with  their  western  connections  in  low,  through, 
transcontinental  rates.  It  will  be  to  the  advantage  of 
the  eastern  railroads  to  haul  traffic  from  points  within 
500  miles  of  the  Atlantic  to  the  seaboard  for  shipment 
thence  by  water,  rather  than  to  divide  with  their 
western  connections  low,  through,  all-rail  rates  from  the 
Atlantic  to  the  Pacific.  Otherwise  stated,  it  will  be  to 
the  interest  of  the  eastern  railroads  to  join  with  the 
coastwise  lines  in  through  services  at  profitable  rates, 


Commercial  Importance  of  Canal  227 


instead  of  fighting  the  steamship  lines  by  uniting  with 
the  western  railroads  in  through  rail  services  at  low 
rates. 

It  was  suggested  above  that  the  steamship  lines  will 
probably  not  base  their  charges  upon  the  cost  of  serv- 
ice, but  that  they  will  make  the  rates  what  the  traffic 
will  bear.  If  the  railroads  maintain  their  rates  and  do 
not  seriously  attempt  to  prevent  traffic  from  moving 
by  water,  it  can  hardly  be  doubted  that  much,  if  not 
most,  of  the  general  commodity  traffic  handled  by  the 
coastwise  lines  will  be  at  rates  that  are  less  than  the 
railroad  charges  only  by  such  a  differential  as  experience 
shows  to  be  necessary.  The  rates  via  the  Tehuan- 
tepec  route  have  been,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  adjusted 
with  reference  to  the  railroad  tariffs,  and  there  is  little 
reason  to  suppose  that  this  policy  of  the  coastwise 
carriers  will  be  abandoned  after  the  canal  is  opened. 

It  is  not,  however,  to  be  inferred  from  this  analysis 
that  the  rates  between  the  two  seaboards  will  not  be 
lower  after  the  canal  is  opened  than  they  are  at  the 
present  time.  The  lower  cost  of  the  service,  the  in- 
creased volume  of  traffic,  and  the  larger  number  of 
steamship  lines,  will  affect  the  policy  of  the  steamship 
companies  in  making  rates.  Although  the  companies 
will,  unless  prevented  by  the  effective  enforcement  of 
anti-trust  legislation,  regulate  their  competition  in 
rates  and  services  by  means  of  conferences,  the  com- 
petition to  be  regulated  after  the  canal  is  opened  will 
be  stronger  than  it  is  at  the  present  time;  and  the 
force  of  public  sentiment  will  undoubtedly  have  its 
effect  —  at  least,  some  effect  —  upon  the  policy  of  the 


228 


THe  Panama  Canal 


coastwise  carriers.  The  most  that  can  be  expected, 
however,  is  that  competition  will  somewhat  limit 
monopoly  in  the  coastwise  rates.  If  the  public  is  to 
secure  as  low  freight  rates  as  the  coastwise  carriers 
can  profitably  afford  to  give  —  rates  as  low  as  the 
public  is  entitled  to  receive  —  it  will  be  necessary  to 
regulate  the  services  and  charges  of  the  coastwise 
steamship  companies  much  the  same  as  the  railroad 
services  and  charges  are  now  regulated.  It  may 
safely  be  predicted  that  within  a  few  years  there  will 
be  a  strong  public  demand  for  the  effective  regulation 
of  the  coastwise  carriers. 

IV.   Effect  of  Fuel  Costs  upon  Usefulness  of 

the  Panama  Canal 

The  usefulness  of  the  Panama  Canal  will  depend 
upon  the  economies  that  shipping  can  effect  by  taking 
the  Panama  Canal  instead  of  some  alternative  route. 
Economies  can  result  from  shortening  the  distance  and 
time  of  ocean  voyages,  from  enabling  vessels  to  trade 
en  route  at  intermediate  ports  more  advantageously, 
and,  fortunately,  in  the  case  of  the  Panama  Canal, 
from  a  reduction  in  fuel  costs  —  the  largest  expense 
incurred  in  the  operation  of  steamships.  Fuel  costs  by 
the  way  of  the  Straits  of  Magellan  are  especially  high, 
there  being  practically  no  native  coal  on  the  east  coast 
of  South  America;  and  only  inferior  coal  can  be  ob- 
tained on  the  west  coast.  The  cost  of  coal  at  the  Suez 
Canal  will  certainly  be  higher  than  at  the  Isthmus  of 
Panama.  The  coal  sold  at  Suez  and  at  Mediterranean 
stations  is  Welsh  and  English  coal,  which  costs  more 


Commercial  Importance  of  Canal  229 


than  does  American  coal  at  home  ports,  and  which  has 
to  pay  higher  freight  rates  to  the  Mediterranean  and 
the  Isthmus  of  Suez  than  will  have  to  be  paid  upon 
American  coal  from  the  Atlantic-Gulf  seaboard  to  the 
Isthmus  of  Panama.  The  best  way  to  measure  the 
advantages  of  the  Panama  route  in  the  matter  of  fuel 
costs  is  to  compare  the  outlay  which  a  freight  steamer 
would  have  to  make  for  coal  via  the  Panama  and  the 
alternative  or  competitive  route. 

As  there  will  be  no  question  as  to  the  use  of  the 
Panama  Canal  for  all  traffic  between  the  two  seaboards 
of  North  America  and  for  practically  all  traffic  between 
the  Atlantic-Gulf  seaboard  of  the  United  States  and 
the  west  coast  of  South  America,  it  is  not  necessary  to 
compare  fuel  expenses  via  Panama  and  the  alternative 
Straits  of  Magellan  route.  For  the  trade  between 
Europe  and  the  west  coast  of  South  America,  however, 
particularly  for  the  Chilean  commerce,  the  use  of  the 
canal  is  certain  to  depend,  in  part,  upon  relative  fuel 
costs  via  that  route  and  the  Straits  of  Magellan.  In 
the  first  part  of  this  chapter,  it  was  pointed  out  that 
freight  vessels  will  save  only  five  or  six  days  by  taking 
the  Panama  route  instead  of  going  through  the  Straits 
of  Magellan  on  voyages  between  Liverpool  and  Valpa- 
raiso. The  saving  due  to  reduction  of  time  would  not 
be  sufficient  to  justify  the  payment  of  $1.20  per  net 
ton  for  the  use  of  the  Panama  Canal;  but  the  fuel 
expenses  by  Panama  would  be  so  much  less  than  via 
Magellan  as  to  make  certain  the  use  of  the  Panama 
route  by  practically  all  ships  en  route  between  Europe 
and  Chile. 


230 


THe  Panama  Canal 


A  10-knot  freight  steamer;  whose  daily  coal  con- 
sumption averages  30  tons,  would,  in  1912,  have  saved 
$9,300  in  fuel  expenses  by  using  a  Panama  Canal  for  a 
round  trip  between  Liverpool  and  Valparaiso.  The 
saving  in  fuel  expenses  would  nearly  equal  the  amount 
of  tolls  which  this  vessel  would  have  to  pay  for  passing 
through  the  canal  on  its  outbound  and  return  voyages. 

Although  Natal  coal  can  be  obtained  cheaply  by 
vessels  making  the  run  from  New  York  to  Australia 
by  way  of  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  fuel  expenses  will 
be  less  between  New  York  and  Australia  via  Panama 
than  by  way  of  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope.  With  the 
coal  prices  that  prevailed  in  1912,  a  10|-knot  freight 
steamer  having  an  average  daily  coal  consumption  of 
38  tons  while  at  sea,  could  save  about  $3,500  in  coal 
expenses  by  taking  a  Panama  route  instead  of  one 
around  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  for  a  round-trip  voyage 
between  New  York  and  Adelaide.  This  would  have 
nearly  paid  this  ship's  tolls  one  way.  Adelaide  is 
taken  for  this  illustration,  because  it  is  that  one  of  the 
three  large  Australian  ports  that  will  derive  least  ad- 
vantage from  the  Panama  Canal.  Melbourne,  and 
especially  Sydney,  which  is  the  largest  of  the  Aus- 
tralian ports,  are  brought  so  much  nearer  to  the 
Atlantic-Gulf  coast  of  the  United  States  by  the  Panama 
Canal  than  they  are  by  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  route 
that  the  use  of  the  canal  by  their  commerce  is  certain. 

The  location  of  the  Islands  of  New  Zealand  is  such 
that  the  trade  of  the  Atlantic-Gulf  seaboard  of  the 
United  States  with  those  islands  is  certain  to  be  car- 
ried on  by  way  of  Panama;  but  the  usefulness  of  the 


Commercial  Importance  of  Canal 


231 


Panama  Canal  to  the  trade  of  New  Zealand  with 
Europe  will  depend  largely  upon  the  relative  fuel 
expenses  via  Panama  and  alternative  routes.  As  was 
pointed  out  above,  the  distance  from  Liverpool  to 
Wellington  is  only  550  miles  more  by  way  of  the 
Straits  of  Magellan  than  via  Panama;  but  the  fuel 
expenses  are  so  much  higher  via  the  Straits  of  Magellan 
that  a  10-knot  steamer  using  30  tons  of  coal  a  day 
while  at  sea  would,  on  a  basis  of  1912  prices,  save 
$8,470  in  fuel  expenses  by  making  the  round  trip  be- 
tween Liverpool  and  Wellington  via  the  Panama  Canal. 
The  saving  in  coal  bills  would  nearly  equal  the  tolls 
which  this  ship  would  have  to  pay  for  two  passages 
through  the  Panama  Canal. 

Manila  and  Hongkong  being  equally  distant  from 
New  York  via  Panama  and  via  Suez,  it  is  certain  that 
the  choice  of  routes  will  be  largely  influenced  by  the 
relative  fuel  costs.  Fortunately  for  the  Panama  Canal, 
the  cost  of  coal  via  the  Panama  route  will  be  much 
less.  On  a  basis  of  1912  prices,  the  lOJ-knot  freight 
steamer  mentioned  above  would  save  $4,041  in  fuel 
expenses  for  a  round  trip  between  New  York  and 
Manila  by  using  the  Panama  instead  of  the  Suez  route. 
This  would  be  half  the  tolls  payable  for  the  round  trip. 

It  is  shown  by  Table  VI  that  the  Panama  Canal  will 
not  reduce  the  distance  between  Europe  and  Japan 
and  China.  The  Suez  route  will  be  shorter  than  the 
one  via  Panama.  Fuel  expenses  by  the  two  routes, 
moreover,  will  average  about  the  same.  For  voyages 
between  Europe  and  China,  fuel  expenses  via  Suez 
will  be  somewhat  lower,  while  for  voyages  from  British 


232 


TKe  Panama  Canal 


and  other  North-European  ports  to  Japan  the  coal 
costs  will  be  somewhat  less  via  Panama.  This  fact 
will  influence  freight  vessels  leaving  Yokohama  with 
full  cargoes  for  Europe  to  select  the  Panama  route, 
provided,  as  is  probable,  the  tolls  at  Panama  are  no 
higher  than  those  charged  at  Suez. 

V.   Panama  Tolls  and  Revenue 

The  proclamation  issued  by  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  November  13,  1912,  established  the 
following  schedule  of  tolls: 

"1.  On  merchant  vessels  carrying  passengers  or 
cargo  one  dollar  and  twenty  cents  ($1.20)  per  net 
vessel  ton  —  each  one  hundred  (100)  cubic  feet  —  of 
actual  earning  capacity. 

"2.  On  vessels  in  ballast  without  passengers  or  cargo 
forty  (40)  per  cent  less  than  the  rate  of  tolls  for  vessels 
with  passengers  or  cargo. 

"3.  Upon  naval  vessels,  other  than  transports,  col- 
liers, hospital  ships  and  supply  ships,  fifty  (50)  cents 
per  displacement  ton. 

"4.  Upon  Army  and  Navy  transports,  colliers,  hos- 
pital ships  and  supply  ships  one  dollar  and  twenty 
($1.20)  per  net  ton,  the  vessels  to  be  measured  by  the 
same  rules  as  are  employed  in  determining  the  net 
tonnage  of  merchant  vessels." 

In  fixing  the  charges  payable  by  merchant  vessels 
for  the  use  of  the  Panama  Canal,  the  tolls  were  ad- 
justed with  reference  to  the  fulfillment  of  three  condi- 
tions: That  the  tolls  should  be  low  enough  to  enable 
the  canal  to  compete  successfully  with  alternative 


Commercial  Importance  of  Canal  233 


routes;  that  the  charges  should  not  be  high  enough  to 
burden  commerce  unduly  or  seriously  to  restrict  the 
usefulness  of  the  canal;  and  that  the  rates  should  be 
high  enough  to  yield  revenues  that  will,  within  a  rea- 
sonable period  of  time,  make  the  canal  commercially 
self-supporting. 

The  facts  presented  above  regarding  the  effect 
which  the  canal  will  have  upon  the  length  and  time  of 
ocean  voyages,  and  the  facts  concerning  the  relative 
costs  of  coal  via  the  Panama  Canal  and  the  alterna- 
tive routes  that  may  be  taken  by  traffic  most  sensitive 
to  tolls,  are,  possibly,  sufficient  to  show  that  the  rates 
of  toll,  as  fixed  by  the  President,  will  not  prevent  the 
canal  from  competing  with  alternative  routes,  and  will 
not  unduly  burden  traffic  or  restrict  the  use  of  the 
canal.  Whether  the  revenues  derivable  from  the  esti- 
mated volume  of  shipping  served  by  the  canal  will 
enable  the  waterway  to  carry  itself  financially  can  be 
indicated  by  comparing  the  probable  yearly  revenues 
with  the  annual  capital  and  current  expenses. 

The  estimated  revenues  that  might  be  secured  from 
the  Panama  Canal,  if  all  ships  paid  tolls,  during  1915, 
1920  and  1925  are  classified  in  the  following  table  with 
reference  to  the  nationality  of  shipping  employed  in 
American  and  foreign  commerce: 


234 


TKe  Panama  Canal 


TABLE  IX. — CLASSIFICATION  OF  ESTIMATED  REVENUE  OF  THE 
PANAMA  CANAL  AT  A  TOLL  OF  $1.20  PER  NET  TON 


Average  per 
annum  during 
1915  and  1916. 

1920. 

1925. 

Coast-to-coast  American  shipping. . 

American  shipping  carrying  for- 
eign commerce  of  the  United 
States  

$  1,200,000 

864,000 
10,536,000 

$  1,696,800 
1,092,000 
13,224,000 

$  2,400,000 
1,380,000 
16,620,000 

Foreign  shipping  carrying  com- 
merce of  the  United  States  and 
foreign  countries  

Total  

$12,600,000 

$16,012,800 

$20,400,000 

It  is  estimated  that  $20,750,000  will  be  required  an- 
nually to  make  the  canal  commercially  self-sustaining. 
This  total  is  made  up  of  $4,000,000  for  operating  and 
maintenance  expenses,  $1,500,000  for  sanitation  and 
Zone  government,  $250,000  for  the  annuity  payable 
to  Panama  under  the  treaty  of  1903,  $11,250,000  to 
pay  3  per  cent  on  the  $375,000,000  invested  in  the 
canal,  and  $3,750,000  for  an  amortization  fund  of  1  per 
cent  per  annum  upon  the  cost  of  the  canal. 

During  the  first  year  or  two  of  the  canal's  operation 
the  annual  net  tonnage  of  the  shipping  passing  through 
the  canal  will  presumably  amount  to  about  10,500,000 
tons.*  Of  this  amount  about  1,000,000  net  tons  will 
consist  of  shipping  engaged  in  the  coastwise  trade  of 
the  United  States.  By  the  end  of  the  first  decade, 
that  is,  in  1925,  the  total  net  tonnage  of  shipping 
passing  through  the  canal  annually  will  be  about 
17,000,000  tons,  of  which  at  least  2,000,000  tons  will 
be  contributed  by  the  coastwise  shipping. 

*  As  stated  in  the  footnote  on  page  219,  the  European  war  will  inevitably 
make  the  initial  tonnage  of  canal  traffic  less  than  it  otherwise  would  have  been. 


Commercial  Importance  of  Canal  235 


It  is  thus  possible  that  about  $12,600,000  per  annum 
will  be  secured  from  tolls  during  the  first  two  or  three 
years  of  the  canal's  operation,  if  all  vessels,  American 
and  foreign,  are  required  to  pay  the  tolls  fixed  by  the 
President  in  his  Proclamation  of  November  13,  1912. 
If  the  Panama  Canal  Act  of  August  24,  1912,  had  not 
been  amended  by  the  act  of  June  15,  1914,  and  the 
coastwise  shipping  had  been  exempted  from  tolls,  the 
initial  receipts  from  the  canal  would  have  amounted 
to  less  than  $10,500,000  per  annum. 

In  all  probability  the  rate  of  tolls  will,  by  1925, 
have  been  reduced  to  $1.00  per  net  ton  upon  merchant 
vessels.  It  will  not  be  wise  to  charge  higher  tolls  at 
Panama  than  are  levied  at  Suez.  The  tolls  at  Suez 
are  now  $1.20  (6.25  francs)  per  net  ton  and  they  have 
been  reduced  four  times  since  1902.  It  is  probable 
that  the  prophecy  of  de  Lesseps  will  be  realized  and 
that  the  Suez  tolls  will,  eventually,  be  brought  down 
to  5  francs,  about  $1.00  per  net  ton.  There  will  thus 
be  a  probable  revenue  of  $17,000,000  per  annum  in  1925, 
obtainable  from  canal  tolls,  if  all  ships  are  required  to 
pay  the  dues.  The  exemption  of  the  coastwise  ship- 
ping would  have  reduced  the  revenue  in  1925  to  about 
$15,000,000  a  year,  or  to  less  than  the  estimated  annual 
outlay  for  operation,  Zone  sanitation  and  government, 
the  Panama  annuity  and  the  interest  on  the  amount  in- 
vested in  the  canal.  The  revenues  would  have  yielded 
no  surplus  for  betterment  and  nothing  for  the  amorti- 
zation of  the  $375,000,000  or  more  which  the  people  of 
the  United  States  will  have  paid  for  the  canal. 

These  calculations  indicate  clearly  that  the  United 


236 


THe  Panama  Canal 


States  will  need  to  collect  tolls  from  the  owners  of  the 
ships  engaged  in  the  American  coastwise  trade  in  order 
to  secure  revenues,  within  a  reasonable  time  after  the 
opening  of  the  canal,  large  enough  to  meet  the  canal's 
current  expenses  and  its  capital  charges. 

VI.   The  Exemption  of  the  Owners  of  Coast- 
wise Ships  from  Tolls  Would  Have  Been  an 
Unnecessary  and  Unwise  Subsidy 

The  provision  which  exempted  the  owners  of  ships 
engaged  in  the  American  coastwise  trade  from  the 
payment  of  Panama  tolls  was  included  in  the  Canal 
Administration  Act  of  August  24,  1912,  presumably, 
because  it  was  thought  that  such  a  provision  was  needed 
in  order  to  enable  the  canal  to  be  of  satisfactory  service 
to  the  industries  and  trade  of  the  United  States,  and 
because  it  was  the  desire  of  Congress  to  aid  the  Amer- 
ican merchant  marine.  Would  the  rates  paid  by  pro- 
ducers and  shippers  of  most  articles  of  commerce  have 
been  less  because  of  exempting  the  coastwise  steam- 
ship companies  from  Panama  tolls;  and  did  or  do 
those  companies  need  the  subsidy  that  it  was  proposed 
to  give  them? 

The  exceptionally  large  producers  and  traders  who 
ship  goods  in  vessels  which  they  own  or  charter  would 
probably  enjoy  lower  transportation  charges  beween 
the  two  seaboards  of  the  United  States,  if  the  Govern- 
ment relieved  them  from  the  payment  of  Panama 
tolls;  and  in  so  far  as  the  railroads  compete  with  char- 
tered vessels  for  lumber,  coal,  ore  and  similar  traffic 
the  canal  tolls  would  be  of  advantage  to  the  railroads. 


Commercial  Importance  of  Canal  237 


This  advantage,  however,  would  be  more  theoretical 
than  real,  for  it  is  not  probable  that  the  railroads  can 
compete  with  the  carriers  by  water  for  bulk  cargoes 
of  lumber,  coal,  ore  and  similar  products.  The  rail- 
roads will  be  obliged  to  allow  that  traffic  to  go  by 
water  and  the  charter  rates  on  such  shipments  will  not 
be  affected  by  rail  competition. 

The  effect  which  canal  tolls  upon  coastwise  shipping 
will  have  upon  rail  and  water  rates,  and  the  adjustment 
of  the  charges  of  coastwise  carriers  and  the  railroads 
engaged  in  handling  traffic  between  the  two  seaboards 
of  the  United  States  may  be  summarized  as  follows: 

The  rates  on  traffic  handled  by  regular  steamship 
lines  between  the  two  seaboards  will  be  but  slightly 
affected  by  canal  tolls.  Only  such  producers  and 
traders  as  use  vessels  which  they  own  or  charter  for 
the  shipment  of  full  cargoes  would  profit  by  the  ex- 
emption of  the  coastwise  shipping  from  tolls.  Prob- 
ably 99  out  of  every  100  shippers  would  pay  the  same 
rates  whether  there  are  tolls  or  not.  Most  of  the  inter- 
coastal  traffic  will  consist  of  general  commodities  and 
package  freight  handled  by  the  established  steamship 
lines.  Bulk  cargoes  of  lumber,  coal,  ore  and  heavy 
steel  products  will  comprise  a  relatively  small  share  of 
the  total  traffic.  The  rates  charged  by  the  several 
steamship  lines  will  be  the  same.  The  charges  will  be 
regulated  by  agreements  among  the  competing  com- 
panies and  will  be  fixed  primarily  with  reference  to 
the  cost  of  the  service  to  the  carriers.  The  several 
steamship  lines  will  maintain  relatively  stable  sched- 
ules of  charges  which  will  ordinarily  be  adjusted  with 


238 


XKe  Panama  Canal 


reference  to  the  even  more  stable  schedule  of  com- 
modity and  class  rates  maintained  by  the  transconti- 
nental railroads  and  their  eastern  rail  connections.  If 
the  regular  steamship  lines  are  required  to  pay  Panama 
tolls,  their  payments  to  the  Government  will  be  a  part 
of  their  operating  expenses,  which  will  thus  be  increased 
by  the  amount  of  the  tolls.  If  the  steamship  compa- 
nies were  exempted  from  the  payment  of  tolls  they 
would  thereby  receive  a  subsidy  equal  to  the  amount 
of  the  tolls  not  collected  by  the  Government. 

The  policy  of  toll  exemption  for  the  owners  of  the 
coastwise  ships  was  urged  upon  Congress  by  appeals 
to  patriotism.  It  was  held  to  be  a  duty  to  aid  the 
merchant  marine  under  the  American  flag;  and  a  sub- 
sidy in  the  form  of  toll  exemption  was  granted  to  the 
owners  of  coastwise  ships.  No  assistance  was  to  be 
given  vessels  serving  the  foreign  trade  of  the  United 
States.  The  carriers  that  were  to  have  been  given  this 
subsidy  have  a  monopoly  of  the  coastwise  traffic,  no 
foreign-owned  ships  being  allowed  to  enter  the  domestic 
trade.    Was  the  subsidy  necessary  or  was  it  justifiable? 

Senator  Root,  in  the  eloquent  and  forceful  speech 
which  he  delivered  in  the  Senate  January  21,  1913, 
characterized  the  coastwise  shipping  business  as  "the 
most  highly  and  absolutely  protected  special  industry 
in  the  United  States/ '  This  industry,  moreover,  is 
prosperous,  not  languishing.  There  are  over  3,500,000 
tons  of  ships  enrolled  for  the  domestic  trade,  on  the 
Atlantic  and  Pacific  seaboards,  and  the  opening  of  the 
Panama  Canal  will  cause  a  large  addition  to  be  made 
to  the  coastwise  fleet.    It  would  seem  that  our  navi- 


Commercial  Importance  of  Canal  239 


gation  laws  now  give  the  shipping  owned  by  the  coast- 
wise carriers  sufficient  aid  and  protection.  At  least, 
the  burden  of  proof  is  upon  the  coastwise  steamship 
companies  to  show  need  of  further  assistance. 

It  is  important  that  business  principles  should  be 
adhered  to  in  the  management  of  the  Panama  Canal. 
Indeed,  it  ought  to  be  accepted  as  axiomatic  that  the 
United  States  Government  should  operate  the  canal  in 
a  business-like  way;  that  the  tolls  charged  by  the 
Government  should,  if  possible,  be  such  as  will  stimu- 
late traffic  and  at  the  same  time  safeguard  the  owners 
of  the  waterway  against  an  annual  deficit.  If  it  were 
a  private  enterprise,  it  would  be  well  to  insist  upon  its 
being  managed,  if  possible,  so  as  to  yield  its  owners  a 
profit;  but  the  canal  being  a  government  undertaking, 
it  will  be  best  for  the  United  States  to  collect  such 
revenues  as  are  needed  to  meet  operating  and  main- 
tenance expenses  and  interest  charges,  and  to  provide 
a  sinking  fund  that  will  eventually  return  to  the 
treasury  the  sum  invested  in  the  canal. 

In  advocating  the  policy  of  adhering  to  business 
principles  in  the  management  of  the  Panama  Canal, 
it  is  not  recommended  that  the  rate  of  tolls  should  be 
high.  Indeed,  the  schedule  of  charges  fixed  by  the 
President  establishes  relatively  low  rates  —  rates  that 
will  not  unduly  restrict  the  use  of  the  canal.  The 
owners  of  the  vessels  that  serve  the  coastwise  trade  will 
derive  greater  benefit  from  the  canal  than  will  the 
owners  of  any  other  vessels.  Rates  double  those  es- 
tablished by  the  President  might  be  imposed  without 
preventing  the  canal  from  being  used  by  the  coastwise 


240 


THe  Panama  Canal 


carriers.  In  view  of  these  facts,  it  seems  just  that 
those  who  derive  immediate  benefit  from  the  use  of 
the  canal  should  pay  reasonable  tolls.  Congress  acted 
wisely  when,  by  the  act  of  June  15,  1914,  it  repealed 
the  provision  of  the  law  of  August  24,  1912,  which  had 
exempted  the  shipping  engaged  in  the  coastwise  trade 
of  the  United  States  from  the  payment  of  Panama 
Canal  tolls. 


APPENDIX 


NEUTRALITY  OF  PANAMA  CANAL  ZONE] 

Since  this  book  went  to  press  the  President  of  the 
United  States  has  issued  a  proclamation  prescribing 
"|Rules  and  Regulations  Governing  the  Use  of  the 
Panama  [Canal  by  Vessels  of  Belligerents  and  the 
Maintenance  of  Neutrality  by  the  United  States  in 
the  Canal  Zone."  It  is  noteworthy  that  a  proclamation 
of  this  kind  has  been  necessary  so  soon  after  the  actual 
opening  of  the  Canal  to  traffic.  The  proclamation  is  of 
general  interest  in  connection  with  the  subject  matter 
of  this  book,  and  it  is  of  especial  interest  just  at  the 
present  time.    The  text  of  the  proclamation  follows: 

BY  THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF 

AMERICA 

A  PROCLAMATION 

WHEREAS,  the  United  States  is  neutral  in  the  present  war  and 
Whereas  the  United  States  exercises  sovereignty  in  the  land  and 
waters  of  the  Canal  Zone  and  is  authorized  by  its  treaty  with 
Panama  of  February  twenty-six,  nineteen  hundred  and  four,  to 
maintain  neutrality  in  the  cities  of  Panama  and  Colon,  and  the 
harbors  adjacent  to  the  said  cities: 

Now,  Therefore,  I,  Woodrow  Wilson,  President  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  do  hereby  declare  and  proclaim  the 
following  Rules  and  Regulations  Governing  the  Use  of  the  Panama 
Canal  by  Vessels  of  Belligerents  and  the  Maintenance  of  Neutrality 
by  the  United  States  in  the  Canal  Zone,  which  are  in  addition  to 
the  general  "Rules  and  Regulations  for  the  Operation  and  Navi- 
gation of  the  Panama  Canal  and  Approaches  Thereto,  including 

241 


242 


THe  Panama  Canal 


all  Waters  under  its  jurisdiction"  put  into  force  by  Executive 
Order  of  July  9,  1914,  and  I  do  bring  to  the  attention  of  all  con- 
cerned the  Protocol  of  an  Agreement  between  the  United  States 
and  the  Republic  of  Panama,  signed  at  Washington,  October  10, 
1914,  which  protocol  is  hereunto  annexed. 

Rule  1.  A  vessel  of  war,  for  the  purposes  of  these  rules,  is  de- 
fined as  follows :  a  public  armed  vessel,  under  the  command  of  an 
officer  duly  commissioned  by  the  government,  whose  name  appears 
on  the  list  of  officers  of  the  military  fleet,  and  the  crew  of  which  are 
under  regular  naval  discipline,  which  vessel  is  qualified  by  its 
armament  and  the  character  of  its  personnel  to  take  offensive 
action  against  the  public  or  private  ships  of  the  enemy. 

Rule  2.  In  order  to  maintain  both  the  neutrality  of  the  Canal 
and  that  of  the  United  States  owning  and  operating  it  as  a  govern- 
ment enterprise,  the  same  treatment,  except  as  hereinafter  noted, 
as  that  given  to  vessels  of  war  of  the  belligerents  shall  be  given  to 
every  vessel,  belligerent  or  neutral,  whether  armed  or  not,  that 
does  not  fall  under  the  definition  of  Rule  1,  which  vessel  is  em- 
ployed by  a  belligerent  Power  as  a  transport  or  fleet  auxiliary  or 
in  any  other  way  for  the  direct  purpose  of  prosecuting  or  aiding 
hostilities,  whether  by  land  or  sea;  but  such  treatment  shall  not 
be  given  to  a  vessel  fitted  up  and  used  exclusively  as  a  hospital 
ship. 

Rule  3.  A  vessel  of  war  of  a  belligerent,  or  a  vessel  falling  under 
Rule  2  which  is  commanded  by  an  officer  of  the  military  fleet, 
shall  only  be  permitted  to  pass  through  the  Canal  after  her  com- 
manding officer  has  given  written  assurance  to  the  Authorities  of 
the  Panama  Canal  that  the  Rules  and  Regulations  will  be  faith- 
fully observed. 

The  authorities  of  the  Panama  Canal  shall  take  such  steps  as 
may  be  requisite  to  insure  the  observance  of  the  Rules  and  Regu- 
lations by  vessels  falling  under  Rule  2  which  are  not  commanded 
by  an  officer  of  the  military  fleet. 

Rule  4-  Vessels  of  war  of  a  belligerent  and  vessels  falling  under 
Rule  2  shall  not  revictual  nor  take  any  stores  in  the  Canal  except 
so  far  as  may  be  strictly  necessary;  and  the  transit  of  such  vessels 
through  the  Canal  shall  be  effected  with  the  least  possible  delay  in 
accordance  with  the  Canal  Regulations  in  force,  and  with  only 
such  intermission  as  may  result  from  the  necessities  of  the  service. 


Appendix 


243 


Prizes  shall  be  in  all  respects  subject  to  the  same  Rules  as  vessels 
of  war  of  the  belligerents. 

Rule  5.  No  vessel  of  war  of  a  belligerent  or  vessel  falling  under 
Rule  2  shall  receive  fuel  or  lubricants  while  within  the  territorial 
waters  of  the  Canal  Zone,  except  on  the  written  authorization  of 
the  Canal  Authorities,  specifying  the  amount  of  fuel  and  lubricants 
which  may  be  received. 

Rule  6.  Before  issuing  any  authorization  for  the  receipt  of  fuel 
and  lubricants  by  any  vessel  of  war  of  a  belligerent  or  vessel  falling 
under  Rule  2,  the  Canal  Authorities  shall  obtain  a  written  declara- 
tion, duly  signed  by  the  officer  commanding  such  vessel,  stating 
the  amount  of  fuel  and  lubricants  already  on  board. 

Rule  7.  Supplies  will  not  be  furnished  by  the  Government  of 
the  United  States,  either  directly,  or  indirectly  through  the  in- 
tervention of  a  corporation,  or  otherwise,  to  vessels  of  war  of  a 
belligerent  or  vessels  falling  under  Rule  2.  If  furnished  by  private 
contractors,  or  if  taken  from  vessels  under  the  control  of  a  belli- 
gerent, fuel  and  lubricants  may  be  taken  on  board  vessels  of  war 
of  a  belligerent  or  vessels  falling  under  Rule  2  only  upon  permission 
of  the  Canal  Authorities,  and  then  only  in  such  amounts  as  will 
enable  them,  with  the  fuel  and  lubricants  already  on  board,  to 
reach  the  nearest  accessible  port,  not  an  enemy  port,  at  which  they 
can  obtain  supplies  necessary  for  the  continuation  of  the  voyage. 
The  amounts  of  fuel  and  lubricants  so  received  will  be  deducted 
from  the  amounts  otherwise  allowed  in  the  ports  under  the  juris- 
diction of  the  United  States  during  any  time  within  a  period  of 
three  months  thereafter.  Provisions  furnished  by  contractors 
may  be  supplied  only  upon  permission  of  the  Canal  Authorities, 
and  then  only  in  amount  sufficient  to  bring  up  their  supplies  to  the 
peace  standard. 

Rule  8.  No  belligerent  shall  embark  or  disembark  troops, 
munitions  of  war,  or  warlike  materials  in  the  Canal,  except  in  case 
of  necessity  due  to  accidental  hindrance  of  the  transit.  In  such 
cases  the  Canal  Authorities  shall  be  the  judge  of  the  necessity,  and 
the  transit  shall  be  resumed  with  all  possible  dispatch. 

Rule  9.  Vessels  of  war  of  a  belligerent  and  vessels  falling  under 
Rule  2  shall  not  remain  in  the  territorial  waters  of  the  Canal  Zone 
under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States  longer  than  twenty- 
four  hours  at  any  one  time,  except  in  case  of  distress;  and  in  such 


244 


Trie  Panama  Canal 


case,  shall  depart  as  soon  as  possible;  but  a  vessel  of  war  of  one 
belligerent  shall  not  depart  within  twenty-four  hours  from  the 
departure  of  a  vessel  of  an  opposing  belligerent. 

The  twenty-four  hours  of  this  rule  shall  be  construed  to  be 
twenty-four  hours  in  addition  to  the  time  necessarily  occupied  in 
passing  through  the  Canal. 

Rule  10.  In  the  exercise  of  the  exclusive  right  of  the  United 
States  to  provide  for  the  regulation  and  management  of  the  Canal, 
and  in  order  to  ensure  that  the  Canal  shall  be  kept  free  and  open 
•on  terms  of  entire  equality  to  vessels  of  commerce  and  of  war, 
there  shall  not  be,  except  by  special  arrangement,  at  any  one  time 
«t  greater  number  of  vessels  of  war  of  any  one  nation,  including 
those  of  the  allies  of  a  belligerent  nation,  than  three  in  either  termi- 
nal port  and  its  adjacent  terminal  waters,  or  than  three  in  transit 
through  the  Canal;  nor  shall  the  total  number  of  such  vessels,  at 
nny  one  time,  exceed  six  in  all  the  territorial  waters  of  the  Canal 
Zone  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States. 

Rule  11.  When  vessels  of  war  or  vessels  falling  under  Rule  2, 
belonging  to  or  employed  by  opposing  belligerents,  are  present 
simultaneously  in  the  waters  of  the  Canal  Zone,  a  period  of  not 
less  than  twenty-four  hours  must  elapse  between  the  departure 
of  the  vessel  belonging  to  or  employed  by  one  belligerent  and  the 
departure  of  the  vessel  belonging  to  or  employed  by  his  adversary. 

The  order  of  departure  is  determined  by  order  of  arrival,  unless 
the  vessel  which  arrived  first  is  so  circumstanced  that  an  extension 
of  her  stay  is  permissible. 

A  vessel  of  war  of  a  belligerent  or  vessel  falling  under  Rule  2  may 
not  leave  the  waters  of  the  Canal  Zone  until  twenty-four  hours 
after  the  departure  of  a  private  vessel  flying  the  flag  of  the  adver- 
sary. 

Rule  12.  A  vessel  of  war  of  a  belligerent  or  vessel  falling  under 
Rule  2  which  has  left  the  waters  of  the  Canal  Zone,  whether  she 
has  passed  through  the  Canal  or  not,  shall,  if  she  returns  within  a 
period  of  one  week  after  her  departure,  lose  all  privileges  of  pre- 
cedence in  departure  from  the  Canal  Zone,  or  in  passage  through  the 
Canal,  over  vessels  flying  the  flag  of  her  adversaries  which  may 
enter  those  waters  after  her  return  and  before  the  expiration  of  one 
week  subsequent  to  her  previous  departure.  In  any  such  case  the 
time  of  departure  of  a  vessel  which  has  so  returned  shall  be  fixed 


Appendix 


245 


by  the  Canal  Authorities,  who  may  in  so  doing  consider  the  wishes 
of  the  commander  of  a  public  vessel  or  of  the  master  of  a  private 
vessel  of  the  adversary  of  the  returned  vessel,  which  adversary's 
vessel  is  then  present  within  the  waters  of  the  Canal  Zone. 

Rule  13.  The  repair  facilities  and  docks  belonging  to  the  United 
States  and  administered  by  the  Canal  Authorities  shall  not  be 
used  by  a  vessel  of  war  of  a  belligerent,  or  vessels  falling  under 
Rule  2,  except  when  necessary  in  case  of  actual  distress,  and  then 
only  upon  the  order  of  the  Canal  Authorities,  and  only  to  the 
degree  necessary  to  render  the  vessel  sea-worthy.  Any  work 
authorized  shall  be  done  with  the  least  possible  delay. 

Rule  H.  The  radio  installation  of  any  vessel  of  a  belligerent 
Power,  public  or  private,  or  of  any  vessel  falling  under  Rule  2, 
shall  be  used  only  in  connection  with  Canal  business  to  the  exclu- 
sion of  all  other  business  while  within  the  waters  of  the  Canal  Zone, 
including  the  waters  of  Colon  and  Panama  Harbors. 

Rule  15.  Air  craft  of  a  belligerent  Power,  public  or  private,  are 
forbidden  to  descend  or  arise  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United 
States  at  the  Canal  Zone,  or  to  pass  through  the  air  spaces  above 
the  lands  and  waters  within  said  jurisdiction. 

Rule  16.  For  the  purpose  of  these  rules  the  Canal  Zone  includes 
the  cities  of  Panama  and  Colon  and  the  harbors  adjacent  to  the 
said  cities. 

In  Witness  Whereof,  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand  and  caused 
the  seal  of  the  United  States  to  be  affixed. 

Done  at  the  city  of  Washington  this  thirteenth  day  of 
November  in  the  year  of  our  Lord  one  thousand 
[Seal.]    nine  hundred  and  fourteen  and  of  the  independence 
of  the  United  States  the  one  hundred  and  thirty- 
ninth. 

WOODROW  WILSON 

By  the  President: 
W.  J.  Bryan 
Secretary  of  State 

Protocol  of  an  agreement  concluded  between  Honorable  Robert 
Lansing,  Acting  Secretary  of  State  of  the  United  States,  and  Don 
Eusebio  A.  Morales,  Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Minister  Pleni- 
potentiary of  the  Republic  of  Panama,  signed  the  tenth  day  of 
October,  1914. 


246 


THe  Panama  Canal 


The  undersigned,  the  Acting  Secretary  of  State  of  the  United 
States  of  America  and  the  Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Minister 
Plenipotentiary  of  the  Republic  of  Panama,  in  view  of  the  close 
association  of  the  interests  of  their  respective  Governments  on  the 
Isthmus  of  Panama,  and  to  the  end  that  these  interests  may  be 
conserved  and  that,  when  a  state  of  war  exists,  the  neutral  obliga- 
tions of  both  Governments  as  neutrals  may  be  maintained,  after 
having  conferred  on  the  subject  and  being  duly  empowered  by 
their  respective  Governments,  have  agreed: 

That  hospitality  extended  in  the  waters  of  the  Republic  of 
Panama  to  a  belligerent  vessel  of  war  or  a  vessel  belligerent  or 
neutral,  whether  armed  or  not,  which  is  employed  by  a  belligerent 
power  as  a  transport  or  fleet  auxiliary  or  in  any  other  way  for  the 
direct  purpose  of  prosecuting  or  aiding  hostilities,  whether  by  land 
or  sea,  shall  serve  to  deprive  such  vessel  of  like  hospitality  in  the 
Panama  Canal  Zone  for  a  period  of  three  months,  and  vice  versa. 

In  testimony  whereof,  the  undersigned  have  signed  and  sealed 
the  present  Protocol  in  the  city  of  Washington,  this  tenth  day  of 
October,  1914. 

Robert  Lansing    [l.  s.] 
Eusebio  A.  Morales    [l.  s.] 


INDEX 


Accidents  in  locks,  80. 

Adelaide,  distances  and  time  saved 

via  Panama  or  Suez  Canals  to, 

211,  212. 
Aids  to  navigation,  104. 
American,  Atlantic,  and  Pacific  Ship 

Canal  Co.,  13. 
Anterior    debts,    concessions,  etc., 

waived  by  Panama  treaty,  200. 
Antwerp,  distances  and  time  saved 

via  Panama  Canal  from,  209. 
Approach  walls  for  locks,  83. 
Appropriations  for  Navy,  affected 

by  canal,  126. 
Appropriations,  original,  for  canal,  25. 
Asiatic  exclusion,  127. 
Atlantic  sea-level  section,  96. 
Australia,  time  and  distances  saved 

by  various  routes,  211,  212. 
Authority  of  U.  S.  in  Canal  Zone,  192. 
Avila,  Gil  Gonzales  de,  7. 

Balboa,  6,  7. 

Battleships,  increase  in  beam,  93. 
Belligerents  and  the  Panama  Canal, 
189. 

Blockade  of  Panama  Canal  forbidden, 

by  treaty,  189. 
Bohio  site  for  locks  and  dams,  31. 
Breaks  in  canal  banks,  character  of, 

76. 

Breakwater,  Toro  Point,  94,  95. 

East,  95. 

Naos  Island,  97. 
Bremerton,  naval  base,  141,  143. 
Bryce,  Ambassador,  3. 
Bunau-Varilla,  P.,  signatory  of  Pan- 
ama treaty,  191,  202. 
Buoys  in  Panama  Canal  channel,  104. 


Caisson  for  locks,  floating,  83. 
California,  influence  on  canal  idea, 
12. 

as  source  of  oil  fuel,  148. 
Callao,  distances  and  time  saved  via 

canal  to,  208,  209. 
Camacho  River  diversion,  101. 
Canal,  effect  of,  on  size  of  Navy,  132, 

133. 

Canal  forms  the  military  coast  line  of 

the  U.  S.,  161. 
Canal  idea,  history  of,  4. 
Canal  location,  30,  42. 
Canal  projects,  modern,  11. 
Canal  route,  29. 
Canal  tolls,  and  revenues,  232. 

determination  of,  influenced  by 
competitive  routes,  233. 
Canal  Zone  sovereignty,  174,  192. 

established  by  treaty,  192. 
Cancellation  of  previous  treaties  by 

Panama,  199. 
Cathay,  route  to,  4,  5. 
Cement  as  used  at  Gatun,  88. 

as  used  at  Miraflores,  91. 
Central  Division  in  charge  of  Culebra 

Cut  excavation,  63. 
Chagres,  town  of,  8. 
Chagres  River,  a  great  problem  in 

canal  construction,  42. 

dammed  af  Culebra  Cut,  102. 

description  of,  31. 

diversions,  31,  34. 

dry  weather  flow,  52. 

early  traffic  on,  60. 

outlet,  30. 

threatens  Gatun  Dam  during  con- 
struction, 42. 
Chain  fender  in  locks,  82. 


247 


248 


Index 


Change  in  government,  laws,  etc.,  does 

not  affect  U.  S  treaty  rights,  201. 
Charles  V  of  Spain  urges  discovery 

of  strait,  7. 
China,  distances  and  time  saved  via 

Panama  or  Suez  canals  to,  215, 

217. 

Choice  of  type  of  canal,  35. 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,    127,  157, 
158,  162. 

Coal,  price  of,  affected  by  Canal, 
147. 

Coal,  see  also  Fuel. 

Coaling  plants,  Cristobal,  100. 

land  for,  177,  201. 

Pacific  end,  99. 
Coastwise  shipping,  exemption  of, 

from  canal  tolls,  236. 
Colombia  fails  to  ratify  treaty  with 
U.  S.,  25,  163. 

grants  canal  concession,  17. 

grants  extension  of  time,  20. 
Colon,  a  free  port,  177,  195. 
Columbus,  5. 

Comite  technique  of  engineers,  20. 

Commerce  across  isthmus,  early,  8. 
of  U.  S.  with  non-European  coun- 
tries, increase  in,  220. 

Commercial  importance  of  Panama 
Canal,  205,  206. 

Commercial  routes  via  Panama 
Canal,  145. 

Compensation  for  Canal  Zone,  etc., 
paid  by  U.  S.  to  Panama,  197. 

Competition  between  transcon- 
tinental railroads  and  Panama 
Canal  steamship  lines,  224,  226. 

Composition  of  fleet  as  affected  by 
canal,  136. 

Concentration  of  fleet,  canal  a  mili- 
tary advantage  in,  137. 

Concession  from  Colombia  for  canal, 
17. 

Concessionary  rights  under  old  canal 
contracts  renounced  by  Panama, 
177,  200. 


Conclusion,  120. 

Concrete  costs,  Gatun  locks,  89,  113. 

Gatun  spillway,  113. 

Miraflores  locks,  91. 
Congress  and  naval  policy,  152. 
Congress  of  Geographical  Science, 
1875,  15. 

Congress,  requirement  by,  as  to  size  of 
canal,  91. 

Constantinople  Convention,  as  to 
Suez  Canal,  166. 
copy  of,  182. 

neutralizes  Suez  Canal,  168. 
provisions  of,  as  to  Suez  Canal,  167. 
Consulting  Engineers,  International 
Board  of,  comment  by  President 
Roosevelt  on  report  of,  40. 
comment  by  Secretary  of  War 

Taft  on  report  of,  38. 
comparative  data  by,  on  sea-level 

versus  lock  canals,  37. 
report  of,  on  type  of  canal,  36. 
Continental  Divide,  32,  33. 
Contract  for  canal  construction  by 

French  company,  18. 
Control  of  canal  by  U.  S.,  157. 
Control  of  water  during  construction, 
100. 

Coronel,  distances  and  time  saved  via 

canal  to,  208,  209. 
Cost  keeping  records,  112. 
Cost  of  canal,  comparative  estimates 

of,  114 

Costs  of  operating  Panama  Canal, 

estimated,  234. 
Costs,  actual,  of  breakwater  stone, 

95. 

broken  stone,  88,  90. 

concrete,  91,  113. 

dredging,  96,  113. 

excavating  Culebra  Cut,  64,  113. 

hydraulic  excavation,  96,  113. 

Naos  Island  breakwater,  98. 

sand,  90. 

sanitation,  112. 

work,  112. 


Index 


249 


Costs  of  work,  actual,  by  divisions, 

classified,  116. 
Couvreux  &  Hersent  contract  for 

French  Canal,  18. 
Cuba,  129. 

Culebra  the  canal  summit,  32. 
Culebra  Cut,  analysis  of  excavation 

costs,  64. 
disposal  of  excavated  material,  68, 

97. 

excavation  of,  63. 

general  description,  44. 

proportion  of  blasted  material,  65. 
Culebra  Cut  and  geology  of  the  Isth- 
mus, 74. 
Cylindrical  valves  for  locks,  86. 

Dam  between   Culebra  Cut  and 

Chagres  River,  102. 
Dam,  Gatun,  see  Gatun  Dam. 
Defense  of  canal  by  Navy,  151. 
de  Lesseps,   Ferdinand,  announces 
speedy  completion  of  canal,  19. 
capitulates  to  lock  idea,  19. 
committee  formed  by,  in  1876, 
17. 

dominates  committees,  16. 

enters  on  scene,  15. 

predicts  tolls  of  $1.00  per  ton  for 

Suez,  235. 
tried  and  convicted  by  courts,  19. 
visits  Isthmus,  17,  19. 
Depth  of  canal  channel  in  Culebra 

Cut,  52. 
Dingier,  M.,  engineer,  18. 
Discovery  of  America,  5. 
Disposition  of  fleet  as  affected  by 

canal,  137. 
Distance,  not  only  factor  in  choice  of 

route,  216. 
Distance  tables,  208,  209,  211,  212, 
215,  217. 

Distances  and  time  saved,  by  Pana- 
ma Canal,  125,  206. 


Distances  and  time  saved  via  Pana- 
ma and  Suez  Canals  compared, 
211,  212,  215,  217. 

Distances  between  ports,  as  affecting 
the  Navy,  131,  132,  139. 
shortened,  125,  145. 

Distances,  maximum  effect  of  Pana- 
ma Canal  on,  207. 

Distances  via  Magellan  Straits  and 
Panama  Canal,  125,  145,  208. 

Diversion  of  rivers  see  Chagres  River, 
Rio  Grande  River,  Obispo  River. 

Drake,  Sir  Francis,  9. 

Dredging,  Atlantic  sea-level  section, 
96. 

Pacific  sea-level  section,  96. 
Dredging  in  Culebra  Cut,  70. 
Dry  docks  at  Pacific  end  of  canal,  98. 
Dumps    for    excavated  material, 

methods  of  handling  dirt  at,  69, 

70. 

Dynamite,  premature  discharge,  65. 
firing,  65. 

amount  used,  65,  66. 

history  of  canal,  4. 
Earthquakes,  absence  of,  71. 
Economic  conditions,  influence  of,  on 

ships  and  harbors,  92. 
Economies  in  fuel  via  Panama  Canal 

route,  228. 
Economy  in  fuel  for  Navy  due  to 

canal,  146. 
Effect  of  canal  on  naval  building 
policy,  134. 
on  Navy,  132,  133. 
Effect  of  fuel  cost  upon  usefulness 

of  Panama  Canal,  228. 
Egyptian    government    and  Suez 

Canal,  184,  185. 
Elements  of  success,  117. 
Elevation  of  ground  at  Culebra,  32. 
Emergency  dam,  83. 
Empire,  low  summit  of  canal  at,  32. 
Enemy's  ships  passing  through  canal, 
167. 


Early 


250 


Index 


England,  treaties  of  1850  and  1901 
with,  127. 

Entrance  and  clearance  statistics, 
possible  traffic  through  canal 
based  on,  218. 

Estimated  probable  tonnage  of  Pana- 
ma Canal,  219,  220,  221,  234. 

Estimated  revenues  of  Panama  Canal, 
234. 

Estimates  of  cost  of  Nicaragua  Canal, 
22. 

Estimates  of  cost  of  Panama  Canal 
by  Consulting  Engineers'  Board, 
114. 

by  de  Lesseps,  18. 
by  International  Survey  Commis- 
sion, 18. 

by  Isthmian  Canal  Commission, 

22,  114. 
comparative,  114. 
Estimates  by  French  Company  of 
value  of  French  work,  22. 
by  Isthmian  Canal  Commission  of 
value  of  French  work,  22. 
European-New  Zealand  traffic  not 

much  affected  by  canal,  214. 
Excavation  by  the  French,  35. 
Exemption   of    coastwise  shipping 
from  Panama  Canal  tolls,  an  un- 
wise subsidy,  236. 
reduction  in  canal  revenue,  due  to, 
235. 

Expenditures  to  June  30,  1913,  116. 
Extradition,  provisions  of  Panama 
treaty,  198. 


Fleet,  composition  of,  as  affected  by 

canal,  136. 
Floating  caisson  for  locks,  83. 
Floating  cranes  —  250  tons,  99. 
Floating  dry  dock  Dewey,  91. 
Foreign  trade  and  foreign  relations, 

128. 

Formula  for  strength  of  Navy,  129. 


Fortifications  forbidden  by  Clayton- 

Bulwer  treaty,  158. 
Fortifying   canal,    effect   of  Hay- 
Pauncefote  treaty  on,  166. 
Hay  memorandum,  169. 
Lord    Lansdowne  memorandum, 
170. 

permitted  by  Panama  treaty,  177, 
201. 

to  maintain  independence  of  Pana- 
ma, 175. 

Fortifying  Suez  Canal  forbidden,  180. 
Freight  rates  via  Panama  Canal,  how 

probably  fixed,  224. 
French  Canal  Company,  17. 
French  Canal,  evaluation  of,  22. 
location  of  Atlantic  end,  30. 
proposed  lock-level  plan,  21. 
used  to  construct  locks,  88. 
French  concession,  canal  and  roads, 

1838,  12. 
French  contribution  to  canal,  15. 
errors,  119. 
operations,  33,  34. 
Frontier,  military,  140. 
Fuel  costs,  effect  of,  on  usefulness  of 
Panama  Canal,  228. 
high  via  Straits  of  Magellan,  214. 
influence  traffic,  216. 
less  via  Panama  than  via  Cape  of 
Good  Hope  or  Straits  of  Magel- 
lan, 213,  230. 
via  Panama  Canal  and  Straits  of 

Magellan,  affecting  traffic,  229. 
via  Panama  less  than  via  Suez, 
228,  231. 
Fuel  problem  for  Navy,  145. 
Fuel  stations  for  Navy,  131,  145. 
Fueling  naval  vessels,  145. 

Gadsden  treaty  with  Mexico,  163. 
Garella,  Napoleon,  recommends  canal, 
12. 

Gates  for  locks,  81,  82,  87. 


Index 


251 


Gatun  Dam,  characteristics  of,  58. 

comment  by  Secretary  of  War 
Taft,  38. 

description,  54. 

forms  Gatun  Lake,  42. 

tests  of  models  and  soils,  58,  59. 

threatened  by  river  during  con- 
struction, 102. 
Gatun  Lake  as  a  storage  reservoir, 
52. 

description  of,  46. 
evaporation,  48. 

formation  of,  and  level  of  water, 
42. 

loss  of  water  by  leaks,  50. 
seepage  loss,  49. 

sufficiency  of  water  supply,  48,  53. 

water  required  by  lockages,  50. 
Gatun  Locks,  construction  of,  88,  103. 

general  description,  42. 
Gatun  Spillway,  channel  in  Chagres 
diversion,  34. 

construction  of,  103. 

description  of,  59. 

discharge  capacity,  61. 
General  description  of  Panama  Canal, 
41. 

Geology,  description  of  formations,  71. 
Gibraltar,  distances  and  time  saved 

via  canal,  209. 
Government  of  Panama,  free  passage 

through  canal  and  over  railroad, 

199. 

Grant,  President,  official  recognition 
of  canal  by,  in  1869,  14. 

Great  Britain  and  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, 159. 

Guam,  130,  141,  144. 

Guantanamo,  132,  140,  146. 

Guard  gates  for  locks,  82. 

Harbors  at  canal  terminals,  94. 
Hay  memorandum  as  to  defense  of 
canal,  170. 


Hay-Pauncefote   treaty,    based  on 
canal  being  in  foreign  territory, 
173. 
copy  of,  188. 

supersedes  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty, 
161. 

see  also  127,  151,  157,  164. 
Hayes,  President,  policy  as  to  canal, 

160. 
Historical,  3. 

Hong  Kong,  distances  and  time  saved 
via  Panama  Canal  to,  215. 
distances  and  time  saved  via  Suez 
Canal  to,  217. 

Hydraulic  excavation,  96. 

Illumination  of  canal  and  locks,  104, 
105. 

Immigration  into  Canal  Zone,  197. 
Importations  into  Canal  Zone  by 

U.  S.  free  by  treaty,  197. 
Income  from  Panama  Canal  tolls, 

probable,  235. 
Increase  in  size  of  ships,  91. 
Independence  of  Panama  guaranteed 

by  U.  S.,  175,  176,  192. 
International  law  and  the  canal,  157, 

178. 

International  status  of  Panama  and 
Suez  Canals  compared,  179,  180, 
181. 

International    status    of  Panama 

Canal,  157,  178. 
Interoceanic  Canal  Commission  rec- 
ommends Nicaragua  route,  14. 
Interoceanic  passage,  desire  for,  6. 
Iquique,  distances  and  time  saved  via 

canal  to,  208,  209. 
Isthmian  Canal  Commission,  author- 
ized by  Spooner  law,  25. 
first  appointed,  1899,  15. 
investigations,  1899-1901,  21. 
vote  on  type  of  canal,  36. 
Isthmus  of  Panama,  increase  in  im- 
portance of,  12. 
description  of,  29. 


252 


Index 


J apan,  distances  and  time  saved  via 
Panama  Canal  to,  215,  217. 

Joint  commission  for  valuation  of 
private  lands  in  Canal  Zone, 
198. 

Kaiser  Wilhelm  Canal  locks,  93. 
Kiel  Canal  locks,  93. 

Iiand  damages  in  Canal  Zone,  194. 
Lands  for  naval  and  coaling  stations, 
Panama  agrees  to  sell,  177,  201. 
Lansdowne,  Lord,  on  right  to  fortify 

canal,  170. 
Larvicide  used,  111. 
Length  of  canal,  33,  46. 
Lighting  canal,  104. 
Limiting  dimensions  of  locks,  91. 
Limon  Bay,  description  of,  30,  94. 
Liverpool,  distances  and  time  saved, 
via  Panama  Canal  to,  209,  212. 

via  Suez  Canal  to,  217. 
Lobnitz  rock-breakers  used,  97. 
Lock  operating  machinery,  85. 
Lock  type  of  canal,  adopted  by  de 
Lesseps,  19. 

comparative  data  with  sea-level 
type,  37. 

obligatory  at  Nicaragua,  22. 

recommended  by  commission  for 
Panama,  22. 

versus  sea-level  type,  37. 
Locking  vessels,  accidents  in,  80. 

method  used  in  Panama  Canal,  80. 
Locks,  additional  in  the  future,  93. 

as  the  limiting  feature,  91. 

construction  of,  88. 

emptying  and  filling,  84. 

general  description  of,  80. 

illumination  of,  105. 

unwatering,  82,  83. 
Locomotives  for  towing  vessels,  80. 
Long  voyages  by  navy  in  fleet,  138. 


lllachinery  for  operating  locks,  85. 
Magellan,  6. 

Magellan  Straits,  naval  route  via, 
145,  146. 

Mahan,  Admiral,  151. 

Malaria  and  yellow  fever,  110. 

Management  of  canal  enterprise,  117. 

Manila,  distances  and  time  saved  via 
Panama  Canal  to,  215. 
via  Suez  Canal  to,  217. 

Mare  Island  —  naval  base,  141,  142. 

Maritime  Canal  Company  of  Nicara- 
gua, 14. 

Melbourne,  distances  and  time  saved 

via  Canal  to,  211,  212. 
Merchant  marine  and  the  canal,  149. 

and  the  navy,  150. 
Merchantmen,  status  of,  in  war,  172. 
Meyer,  Secretary,  127. 
Military  frontier  of  U.  S.,  140. 
Military  policy  of  U.  S.,  152. 
Miraflores  Lake,  area  and  elevation 

of,  78. 

detailed  description  of,  78. 
general  description  of,  45. 
Miraflores  Locks,  construction  of,  88, 
89,  90. 
general  description  of,  45. 
Modern  canal  projects,  11,  13. 
Monopoly  of  U.  S.  for  construction  of 
canals  or  railroads  in  Panama, 
193. 

Monroe  Doctrine  infringed  by  Great 
Britain,  158. 
upheld  by  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty, 

162. 
waiver  of,  159. 
see  also  127,  129,  140,  181. 
Moral  obligations  of  U.  S.  as  to  canal, 
164. 

Morgan,  Henry,  10. 

Mosquito,  the  yellow  fever,  110. 

Naos  Island,  97. 

Naos  Island  breakwater,  97,  98. 


/ 


Index 


253 


Naval  auxiliaries,  effect  of  canal  on, 
136. 

Naval  bases  in  West  Indies  and 

Pacific,  139,  141. 
Naval  policy  of  U.  S.,  152. 
Naval  strength  of  U.  S.,  desirable, 

134. 

Navigation,  aids  to,  in  canal,  104. 

of  sea-level  canal,  37. 
Navy  and  the  Panama  Canal,  the, 

125,  150. 
Navy,  duty  to  protect  canal,  150. 

on  Pacific  Coast,  138. 
New  French  Company,  formed  by 
receiver,  20. 
gathers  data,  21. 
sells  canal  to  U.  S.,  26. 
New  Granada,  treaty  with,  163. 
New  Orleans,   distances  and  time 
saved  via  canal  to,  208,  211,  215. 
naval  station,  140. 
New  York,  distances  and  time  saved 

from,  via  canal,  208,  211,  215. 
New  Zealand,  time  and  distances 
saved  to,  by  various  routes,  211, 
212. 

Neutrality,  as  affecting  fueling  navy, 
146. 

of  Canal  Zone,  duty  of  maintaining, 
174. 

of  Canal  Zone,  Panama  treaty,  199. 
of  Canal  Zone,  proclamation  by 
President,  202,  241. 
Neutralization  of  canal,  U.  S.  sole 

sponsor,  168. 
Neutralization  policy  by  President 

Hayes,  160. 
Neutralization  rules  for  canal,  151, 
168. 

Neutralization  rules  in  Hay-Paunce- 

fote  treaty,  166. 
Nicaragua  Canal  Board  appointed 

1895,  14. 

Nicaragua   Canal   Commission  ap- 
pointed 1897,  15. 


Nicaragua  canal  route,  examined  in 
1779,  11. 
locks  obligatory,  22. 
Nicaragua  canal  route,  recommended 
in  1876,  14. 
recommended  in  1901,  23. 
surveys  in  1885,  14. 
Nicaragua    Canal    versus  Panama 

Canal,  23. 
Nicaragua  Lake  discovered,  7. 
Nombre  de  Dios  founded,  8. 

Obispo  River,  32,  101. 
Obispo  River  diversion,  101. 
Oil  fuel  for  navy  via  canal,  148. 
Olney,  Secretary  of  State,  159. 
Open  door  in  Far  East  policy,  127. 
Operating  costs  of  Panama  Canal,  234. 

Pacific  Coast  and  the  Navy,  138. 
Pacific  sea-level  section,  96. 
Panama,  copy  of  treaty  with,  190. 

grants  of  Canal  Zone  lands,  178. 

independence  of,  guaranteed  by 
U.  S.,  175,  192. 

revolts  from  Colombia,  25,  163. 

treaty  with  U.  S.,  26,  163,  173. 

U.  S.  protection,  129. 
Panama  Bay,  description  of,  33. 
Panama  Canal  in  international  law, 
157. 

in  war,  168. 

route  recommended  by  commission 

in  1902,  24. 
status  compared  with  Suez  Canal, 

179,  180,  181. 
versus  Nicaragua  Canal,  23. 
Panama  city,  a  free  port,  177,  195. 
Panama,  old  city  of,  early  metropo- 
lis, 9. 

founded,  8. 
ransacked,  10. 
Panama  Railroad,  29,  90,  115. 
amount  of  traffic  on,  67. 
established,  13. 

rights  over,  ceded  by  Panama,  195. 


254 


Index 


Panama  tolls  and  revenue,  232. 
Panama  traffic,  American  and  For- 
eign, 216. 
Pauncefote,  Lord,  171. 
Pearl  Harbor  naval  base,  141,  143. 
Pedro  Miguel,  33. 

Pedro  Miguel  lock,  construction  of,  89. 
general  description  of,  45. 

Pensacola  naval  station,  140. 

Philip  II,  canal  idea  abandoned  by,  9. 

Philippine  Islands,  130,  141,  143. 

Philippine  Islands,  distances  and  time 
saved  via  Panama  and  Suez  Ca- 
nals to,  215,  217. 

Physical  characteristics  of  canal 
route,  29. 

Piratical  attacks  on  Isthmus,  9. 

Pizarro,  conquest  of  Peru,  8. 

Policies  of  the  United  States,  127. 

Porto  Bello,  quarry,  88.  . 
stone,  95. 

town  of,  5,  8,  9,  10. 
Porto  Rico,  129. 

Ports  at  canal  entrances  declared  free 

by  treaty,  195. 
Preponderance  of  naval  strength  in 

Atlantic,  139. 
Private  land  holders  in  Canal  Zone, 

193. 

Private  property,  at  sea,  172. 
inviolability  of,  at  sea  if  at  war 
with  Italy,  172. 
Prize  vessels,  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty, 
189. 

Probable  tonnage  of  Panama  Canal, 
219,  220,  221. 

Probable  traffic  through  Panama 
Canal,  219. 

Proclamation  by  President  Wilson  on 
Canal  Zone  neutrality,  202. 
copy  of,  241. 

Protection  of  canal  by  U.  S.,  per- 
mitted, 177.  See  also  Fortifying 
canal. 

Protectorate  by  Great  Britain  in 
Central  America,  157. 


Purchase  by  U.  S.  of  Canal  Zone  from 
Panama,  197. 

Purchase  of  canal  from  French  Com- 
pany, 26. 

Quarantine  to  control  yellow  fever, 
110. 

Quarry  at  Ancon,  89. 
at  Porto  Bello,  88. 
at  Toro  Point,  95. 

Railroad  rates  via  transcontinental 
lines,  effect  of  Panama  Canal  on, 
222,  226. 

Range  lights,  104. 

Rates  for  freight  via  Panama  Canal, 
how  probably  fixed  by  steamship 
lines,  224. 

Rates  via  Isthmus  of  Tehuantepec, 
222. 

via  Panama  Railroad,  223. 
Regulation  and  management  of  canal 

vests  in  U.  S.,  165. 
Regulation  of  Panama  Canal  freight 

rates  probable,  228. 
Revenue  and  tolls,  Panama  Canal 

232. 

Revolution  by  Panama,  25,  163. 
Rio  Grande  River,  diversion,  79,  101. 

path  of  canal  to  Pacific,  33,  96. 

takes  Miraflores  spillway  flow,  79. 
Road  across  Isthmus,  8,  10. 
Roosevelt,  President,  discussion  of 

type  of  canal  by,  39. 
Route,  design  and  construction  of 

canal,  29. 

San  Francisco,  distances  and  time 

saved  via  canal  to,  208. 
San  Francisco  Bay,  suitable  for  naval 

base,  141. 
Sand,  Chame",  90. 

cost  of,  90. 
Sanitation,  109. 
cost  of,  112. 


Index 


255 


Sanitation  of  Panama  and  Colon 
placed  under  U.  S.  by  treaty,  194. 

Santo  Domingo  convent,  arch  in, 
shows  absence  of  earthquakes,  71. 

Sault  Ste.  Marie  Canal,  40. 

Saving  in  fuel  by  Navy  using  canal, 
147. 

Saving  in  time  and  distance  by 

Panama  Canal,  206. 
Saving  in  time,  one-half  day  deducted 

for  canal  passage,  207. 
Screening  dwellings,  etc.,  111. 
Sea-level  canal,  advocated  by  de  Les- 

seps,  16. 
attacks  on  feasibility  of,  19. 
comparative  data  with  lock  type, 

37. 

French  ideal,  35. 

versus  lock  canal,  37. 
Sea-level  sections,  Atlantic  end,  gen- 
eral description  of,  41,  96. 

Pacific  end,  general  description  of, 
45,96. 

Sentiment    in    canal  organization, 

national,  118. 
Seward,  Wm.  H.,  speech  of,  in  senate, 

120. 

Sewerage  and  water  supply  for  Pan- 
ama and  Colon  provided  by 
U.  S.,  194. 
Shanghai,  distances  and  time  saved 
via  Panama  Canal  to,  215. 
distances  and  time  saved  via  Suez 
Canal  to,  217. 
Ship  repair  plant,  98,  99. 
Shortening  of  sea  routes,  125. 
Singapore,  distances  and  time  saved 

via  Suez  Canal  to,  215,  217. 
Slides,  amount  of  material  in,  75. 
at  Cucaracha,  76. 
at  West  Culebra,  75. 
causes  and  description,  74. 
of  varying  character,  76. 
Sovereignty,  change  of,  in  Panama, 
no  effect  on  canal,  190. 
over  Canal  Zone,  174. 


Speed  of  passenger  and  freight  steam- 
ers, 207. 

Spooner  law,  provisions  of,  24,  25. 
Standard  Atlantic  fleet,  130. 
Standard  Pacific  fleet,  130. 
Status  of  Suez  and  Panama  canals 

compared,  179,  180,  181. 
Steam  shovels,  in  Culebra  Cut,  66. 

work  in  cut  completed,  70. 
Stone,  broken,  cost  of,  88. 

from  Ancon,  89. 

from  Porto  Bello,  88. 
Stone  crushing  plant  at  Ancon,  89. 
Stoney  gate  valves,  62,  86. 
Straits  of  Magellan,  145,  146. 

distances  via,  208. 
Straits  of  Panama,  35,  40. 
Strength  of  the  Navy,  affected  by 
canal,  125,  131,  133. 

affected  by  various  conditions,  130. 
Submarine  rock  excavation,  97. 
Success,  elements  of,  117. 
Suez  Canal,  16,  38,  91,  145. 

distances  and  time  saved  via,  211, 
212,  215,  217. 

international  status  fixed  by  Con- 
stantinople Convention,  182. 

naval  route  via,  145. 

neutralization  rules,  167. 

neutralized  by  concert  of  nine 
European  powers,  180. 

open  in  war  and  peace,  183. 

status   compared   with  Panama 
Canal,  179. 

tolls,  235. 
Superior  Advisory  Commission,  18. 
Sydney,  distances  and  time  saved 
via  canal  to,  211,  212. 

Taft,  Secretary  of  War,  discussion 
by,  of  type  of  canal,  38. 

Taxes  by  Panama  on  Canal  Zone 
property  forbidden  by  treaty, 
196. 


256 


Index 


Terminals,  94. 

Tide,  range  of,  in  Atlantic,  42. 

range  of,  in  Pacific,  45. 
Time  and  distances,  saved  by  Panama 

Canal,  206. 
Time  of  vessel  passing  through  canal, 
as   compared  with  Nicaragua 
Canal,  23. 
estimated,  46. 
Tolls  and  revenue,  Panama  Canal,  232. 
Tolls  for  Panama  Canal  fixed  at  $1.20 

per  ton,  223,  232. 
Tonnage,  estimated  amount  of,  pass- 
ing through  Panama  Canal,  234. 
of  vessels  1909-1910  that  might  have 
advantageously    used  Panama 
Canal,  218. 
Topography  of  canal  route,  29. 
Toro  Point  breakwater,  94. 
Trade  of  Panama,  8,  10. 
with  Orient,  early  European,  4. 
see  also  Traffic. 
Traffic,  American  and  foreign  via 
Panama,  216. 
amount  of,  Sault  Ste.  Marie  Canal, 
51. 

amount  of,  Suez  Canal,  51. 

between  Atlantic  and  Gulf  coasts 
and  Australia,  213. 

between  Europe  and  Australia,  213. 

between  Europe  and  China,  fuel 
costs  via  Suez  less  than  via  Pan- 
ama, 231. 

between  Europe  and  New  Zealand 
via  Panama  Canal,  influence  of 
fuel  costs  on,  231. 

between  Europe  and  Orient,  216. 

between  Europe  and  west  coast  of 
South  America  likely  to  use  canal, 
210;  influence  of  fuel  costs  on, 
229. 

estimate  for  Panama  Canal,  51, 
93. 

of  transcontinental  railroads,  small 
amount  of,  originates  on  sea- 
board, 225. 


Traffic  through  Panama  Canal,  effect 
of  European  war  (footnote),  219. 
through  Panama  Canal,  probable, 

219,  220,  221. 
through  Panama  Canal,  probable 
amount  of  in  1909-1910  if  canal 
had  been  open,  218. 

Train  dispatchers  in  Culebra  Cut,  66. 

Transcontinental  railroad  rates,  effect 
of  Panama  Canal  on,  222. 

Transcontinental  railroad  traffic, 
small  amount  originates  on  sea- 
board, 225. 

Treaty  engagements  as  to  canal,  with 
Great  Britain  and  Panama  only, 
164. 

Treaty  to  facilitate  construction  of  a 
ship  canal  (Hay-Pauncefote), 
187. 

Treaty  with  Panama,  151,  173. 
copy  of,  190. 

excepts  Colon  and  Panama  from 

Canal  Zone,  175. 
grants  Canal  Zone  to  U.  S.,  174. 
Tutuila,  130. 

Two-ocean  standard  fleet,  130,  134. 
Type  of  canal,  choice  of,  35. 

United  States  in  isolated  position, 
152. 

United  States  trade  with  Orient,  dis- 
advantage removed  by  canal, 
214. 

Universal  Interoceanic  Canal  Co.,  17. 
Unwatering  locks,  82,  83. 

Valp  araiso,  distances  and  time  saved 

via  canal  to,  208,  209. 
Valves  for  locks,  85,  86. 

for  spillway,  62. 
Vessels,  private,  status  of,  in  war,  17. 

Wars,  possible,  126,  128,  129. 
Water,  control  of,  during  construction, 
100. 


Index 


257 


Water,  amount  of,  required  by  lock- 
ages, 50. 

Water   systems   and  sewerage  for 

Panama  and  Colon  provided  by 

U.  S.,  194. 
Wellington,  distances  and  time  saved 

via  canal  to,  211,  212. 
West  Indian  naval  bases,  139. 
Wilson,  President,  proclamation  by,  on 

Canal  Zone  neutrality,  202,  241. 


Work  done  by  French,  22,  34. 
Wyse,  Lieut.  L.  N.  B.,  secures  con- 
cession, 17. 
secures  extension,  20. 

Yellow  fever,  110. 
Yokohama,  time  and  distances,  via 
Panama  Canal  to,  215. 
via  Suez  Canal  to,  217. 


A 


K 


Naranjitos 


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Fort  Lorani 


PtDiigo 


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Area  of  Gatun  Lake  at 
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ISTHMIAN  CANAL  COMMISSION 
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ISTHMUS  WITH  COMPLETED  CANAL. 


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Miles 


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I    Beam  ; 


Water  Surface  Meat?  Sea  Level' 


Mindi  River  to  Gatun  Locks  Mile4.S  to7.i5 
Miraf lores  to  Pavama  Bay  Mile  41 4-7 to  45.5 


Color?  Harbor         Mile  o  to  4.5 


Ar»gle  Nortb  of  San  Pablo  to  Ar79le  Nortb  of  Juar>  Grande-  Mile 23.66 to 27.5 


Gatur>  Locks  to  Angle  Mortb  of  San  Pablo  Mll©7.74  to  2366 


Cro»»  Section  of  Culebra  Cut  Sowing  Largest  Effect  of  Slide  (1912) 


Angle  Nortb  of  Joan  Grande  to  Angle  at  Bas  Obispo  Mile  27.5  to  31.5 


PANAMA  CANAL 

CROSS  SECTIONS 


 300'  • — <\ 

Typical  Cross  Section  of  Culebra  CVit 
Bas  obispo,Mile3l.s  to  Pedro  Migoel. Mile 39.6 


PLa.te  Y 


PANAMA  CANAL-PROFILE 

VERTICAL  SCALE  IOO  TIMES  HORIZONTAL  SCALE 


Mai  E!ev  rfl7' 


Plate  Vf 

Mean  Sea  Lev.  LtevtQ 


Side  Wall  Elevation 


GATUN  LOCKS 

GENERAL  PLAN,  PROFILES  &  SECTIONS 


REC'O 


HE 


hi 


University  of  California  Library 
Los  Angeles 

This  book  is  DUE  on  the  last  date  stamped  below. 


Hon 


wals 


10/82&-9188 


4  WK  APR  13  200C 
REC'D  YRL  MAR  17  DO 


,  is 


JUN  1  2  RECTI  :00AM 


0*  ?nof 


Form  L9 


TC    774,  R17P 


